# Merritt v. Knowles

> District Court, M.D. Florida · July 16, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11101450

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 16, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11101450

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming the dismissal of substantive due process claims as time- barred
- noting the four-year limitations period for IIED claims

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION

TISHAWN MERRITT,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:24-cv-1365-JSS-DCI

ZOE KNOWLES, ADVENTIST
HEALTH SYSTEM/SUNBELT, INC.,
PATRICIO G. BRUNO, SOFIA
QADIR, ASPIRE HEALTH
PARTNERS, JORGE DORTA-
DUQUE, and LA AMISTAD
RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT
CENTER, LLC,

Defendants.
___________________________________/
ORDER
All non-defaulting Defendants1 move to dismiss Plaintiff’s pro se complaint
(Dkt. 1). (Dkts. 20, 28, 122, 128, 130.) Plaintiff opposes the motions. (Dkts. 40, 47,
131, 132, 133.) For the reasons outlined below, the court grants the motions.

1 The Clerk has entered default against Deputy Zoe Knowles and Dr. Patricio G. Bruno. (Dkts. 95,
115.) Thus, the court does not discuss these parties further, except to caution Plaintiff that she must
include well-pleaded allegations against them in an amended complaint if she wishes to maintain
claims against them. See Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)
(“The defendant, by [her or] his default, admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of
fact . . . . [However, t]he defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded . . . .”). Because
the complaint is due to be dismissed as a shotgun pleading, the allegations therein are not well-pleaded.
See Alvarez v. Gregory HVAC LLC, No. 8:19-cv-1826-CEH-JSS, 2021 WL 3857560, at *4–5, 2021 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 163505, at *8–12 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2021) (denying a motion for default judgment and
dismissing a complaint as a shotgun pleading). When the court refers to Defendants in this order, it
refers to the non-defaulting Defendants in particular.
BACKGROUND2
Plaintiff alleges that on August 16, 2019, employees with Orange County

emergency services took her to AdventHealth Orlando hospital for elevated blood
pressure and chest pains. (Dkt. 1 at 11.) Plaintiff states that while at AdventHealth,
she was “involuntarily detained” under the Baker Act “for a mental health
examination” related to a domestic violence incident report. (Id.) See Fla. Stat.
§ 394.463; Watkins v. Bigwood, 797 F. App’x 438, 442 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Under

Florida’s Baker Act, a person may be subjected involuntarily to a mental health
examination if there is a substantial likelihood that without care or treatment the
person will cause serious bodily harm to himself or herself or others in the near future.”
(cleaned up)). According to Plaintiff, AdventHealth negligently gave her the anti-
psychotic medicine Haldol, a brand of haloperidol. (Dkt. 1 at 11.) Allegedly, Plaintiff

was detained at AdventHealth from August 16 to 20, 2019, and was then involuntarily
transferred to Central Florida Behavior Center psychiatric hospital. (Id. at 12.) At
Central Florida Behavior Center, Plaintiff states, Dr. Sofia Qadir misdiagnosed
Plaintiff and negligently administered anti-psychotic medication to her as a
requirement for her release. (Id. at 22.) Plaintiff reports that on September 22, 2019,

she was transported to Aspire Health psychiatric hospital. (Id. at 12, 25, 27.) There,
Plaintiff claims, Dr. Jorge Dorta-Duque wrongfully sedated her with haloperidol and
involuntarily restrained her in a room for several hours. (Id. at 27.) Plaintiff further

2 The court derives the facts from the complaint (Dkt. 1). See Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317,
1321–22 (11th Cir. 2012).
states that she was battered at Aspire Health and that consequently, implants in her
body ruptured on September 22, 2019. (Id. at 12, 25.) Plaintiff asserts that in addition
to these ruptured implants, she suffered “declined brain function[ and] visual

impairment” as a result of Defendants’ misconduct. (Id. at 12.)
Plaintiff initiated this case in July 2024 alleging deprivations of her due process
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as related torts under Florida law. (See Dkt. 1.)
She sues Dr. Qadir, Dr. Dorta-Duque, and the business entities that operate the three

hospitals: Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc. for AdventHealth, La Amistad
Residential Treatment Center, LLC for Central Florida Behavioral Center, and Aspire
Health Partners for Aspire Health. (Id. at 10; see Dkts. 65, 69.) For state tort claims,
Plaintiff alleges “[m]edical negligence, wrongful imprisonment, negligent dispensing
[or administering] of [anti-]psychotic medication[,] and infliction of emotional

distress” against Dr. Qadir, Adventist, and La Amistad, (Dkt. 1 at 13, 17–18, 21; see
Dkts. 65, 69), and “negligent battery, wrongful imprisonment, [and] intentional
infliction of emotional distress” against Dr. Dorta-Duque and Aspire Health Partners,
(Dkt. 1 at 23, 26). Defendants move to dismiss the complaint, raising arguments
related to shotgun pleading and statutes of limitations. (Dkt. 20 at 5–8, 21–24; Dkt.

28 at 3–5, 11–12; Dkt. 122 at 4–6, 9–10; Dkt. 128 at 4–6, 9–10; Dkt. 130 at 5–10, 12–
13, 17–18.)3

3 Defendants further maintain that the complaint fails to state a claim (including by failing to satisfy
elements for section 1983), that Plaintiff’s failure to comply with statutory requirements for her
medical negligence claims necessitates dismissal of the claims, and that Plaintiff cannot pursue joint
APPLICABLE STANDARDS
The court “give[s] liberal construction” to documents filed by pro se plaintiffs,

Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007), but the leniency afforded to
such plaintiffs “does not give [the] court license to serve as de facto counsel for [them]
or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading . . . to sustain an action,” GJR Invs., Inc.
v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis and citations
omitted), overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Further,

pro se plaintiffs are still “required . . . to conform to procedural rules.” Loren v. Sasser,
309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002); see Cummings v. Dep’t of Corr., 757 F.3d 1228,
1234 n.10 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The right of self-representation does not exempt a party
from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” (quoting Birl
v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981))). The two procedural rules applicable in

the shotgun pleading context are Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b).
See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off. 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015).
Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to “contain . . . a short and plain statement of
[a] claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule
10(b) requires plaintiffs to “state [their] claims . . . in numbered paragraphs, each

limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
To “promote clarity,” Rule 10(b) also requires plaintiffs to state “each claim founded

and several liability on Florida negligence claims. (Dkt. 20 at 9–21; Dkt. 28 at 5–14; Dkt. 122 at 6–9;
Dkt. 128 at 6–9; Dkt. 130 at 7–8, 10–17.) Given the resolution of the issues involving shotgun pleading
and statutes of limitations, the court does not address these other arguments.
on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . in a separate count.” Id. “Complaints that
violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often disparagingly referred to as
‘shotgun pleadings.’” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1320. Shotgun pleadings “fail . . . to give

the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which
each claim rests.” Id. at 1323. A court may dismiss a complaint as a shotgun pleading
“where ‘it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to
support which claim(s) for relief.’” Id. at 1325 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Anderson

v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996)).
In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court “accept[s]
the allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.” Henley v. Payne, 945 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2019). To survive a
motion to dismiss, the “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). The
complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544). A claim is facially plausible if a plaintiff pleads facts that
allow a court to draw a reasonable inference that a defendant is liable for the alleged

misconduct. Id. While “detailed factual allegations” are not generally required, “[a]
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of actions will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Generally,
when analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court only considers
the four corners of the complaint and the exhibits attached to the complaint. See Turner
v. Williams, 65 F.4th 564, 583 n.27 (11th Cir. 2023). “A statute of limitations defense
is an affirmative defense,” Paetz v. United States, 795 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986),

but dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate when “it is apparent from
the face of the complaint that the claim is time-barred,” Karantsalis v. City of Miami
Springs, 17 F.4th 1316, 1319–20 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States ex rel. Hunt v.
Cochise Consultancy, Inc., 887 F.3d 1081, 1085 (11th Cir. 2018)). This court applies

federal procedural law for all claims, federal substantive law for the section 1983
claims, and Florida substantive law for the supplemental state claims. See Palm Beach
Golf Ctr.-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d 1245, 1259 (11th Cir. 2015)
(discussing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
ANALYSIS

The court first explains why Plaintiff’s complaint constitutes an impermissible
shotgun pleading. The court then addresses Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff’s
claims against them are time-barred under statutes of limitations.
A. Shotgun Pleading
Plaintiff’s complaint is a shotgun pleading because it does “not separat[e] into

a different count each cause of action or claim for relief.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322–
23. For example, the sole count against Dr. Qadir alleges “[m]edical negligence,
wrongful imprisonment, negligent administering of [anti-]psychotic medication[,] and
infliction of emotional distress,” (Dkt. 1 at 21), and the sole count against Dr. Dorta-
Duque alleges “negligent battery, wrongful imprisonment, [and] intentional infliction
of emotional distress” (IIED), (id. at 26). Given the pleading deficiency of combining
different claims, such as negligence and false imprisonment,4 within a single count, it

is “virtually impossible [for Defendants] to know [from the complaint] which
allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.” See Weiland, 792
F.3d at 1325 (emphasis omitted); see also Burke v. Custom Marine Grp., 847 F. App’x
578, 581 (11th Cir. 2021) (“The district court correctly identified [the] complaint as

implicating the . . . failure to separate into a different count each cause of action or
claim for relief. In Count V, [the plaintiff] alleged ‘Negligent Manufacturing, Design,
Failure to Warn, Etc.’ . . . . These are distinct theories of liability that involve different
facts and should be asserted independently.” (footnote and quotation omitted));
Trophia v. Camping World, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1310 (M.D. Fla. 2022)

(“[B]ecause a claim for loss of consortium is a separate claim, combining that claim
with another claim under the same count raises shotgun[ ]pleading concerns.”).
To correct this deficiency in an amended complaint, Plaintiff must list each of
her claims in a separate count with supporting factual allegations. See Weiland, 792
F.3d at 1322–23. If Plaintiff wishes to bring negligence, false imprisonment, and IIED

4 Though Adventist criticizes Plaintiff’s reference to a tort of “wrongful imprisonment,” (Dkt. 20 at 9
(“Florida law does not recognize a claim for ‘wrongful imprisonment.’”)), the court construes the
“wrongful imprisonment” claims liberally as claims for false imprisonment, see Albra, 490 F.3d at 829.
Florida law requires Plaintiff to establish four elements for false imprisonment: “[(1)] the unlawful
detention and deprivation of liberty of a person [(2)] against that person’s will [(3)] without legal
authority or ‘color of authority’ and [(4)] which is unreasonable and unwarranted under the
circumstances.” City of Boca Raton v. Basso, 242 So. 3d 1141, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting
Montejo v. Martin Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 935 So. 2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
claims against a defendant, for example, she must set out one count against the
defendant for negligence, another count against the defendant for false imprisonment,
and another count against the defendant for IIED. Additionally, Plaintiff must include

in each count the elements for that count’s claim and the facts supporting those
elements. Each count must include only the elements and facts applicable to it. See
Ely v. Mobile Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 15-566-KD-M, 2016 WL 3188926, at *8, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 73665, at *21 (S.D. Ala. May 11, 2016) (“[The p]laintiff should clearly
state under each count the law under which [s]he is proceeding[,] clearly list what facts

apply to that count[,] clearly explain under each count how the legal right implicated
by that count was violated (including how each element of the cause of action is
alleged)[,] and clearly articulate the relief requested—all with statements of relevant
facts rendering the claims plausible but without excessive tangential or irrelevant

material.”), report and recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 3189244, at *1, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 73663, at *1 (S.D. Ala. June 7, 2016).
The court notes three additional pleading deficiencies that Plaintiff shall correct
if she amends her complaint. First, it is not clear from the complaint whether Plaintiff
asserts claims of procedural due process, substantive due process, or both under section

1983, nor is it clear which parties are being sued for due process violations. (See Dkt.
1.) To plead a procedural due process claim, Plaintiff must allege “(1) a deprivation
of a constitutionally[ ]protected liberty or property interest[,] (2) state action[,] and (3)
constitutionally[ ]inadequate process.” Arrington v. Helms, 438 F.3d 1336, 1347 (11th
Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). To plead a substantive due process claim, Plaintiff
must allege (1) that she was “depriv[ed] of a constitutionally protected interest[] and
(2) that the deprivation was the result of an abuse of governmental power sufficient to
raise an ordinary tort to the stature of a constitutional violation.” Hoefling v. City of

Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). If Plaintiff brings a
due process claim in her amended complaint, she shall specify whether the claim is a
procedural due process or substantive due process claim and shall also identify the
defendant for the claim. The court advises Plaintiff that she cannot proceed under a
theory of respondeat superior with respect to any section 1983 claims, including her

due process claims. See Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1129 (11th Cir. 1992) (“A
defendant cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior or
vicarious liability basis.”). If Plaintiff asserts multiple due process claims, each claim
shall appear in its own count in the amended complaint, and each count shall include

only the elements and facts applicable to the claim therein. Plaintiff shall not include
time-barred counts in her amended complaint.
Second, Plaintiff incorrectly alleges “negligent battery” against some
Defendants. (Dkt. 1 at 23, 26.) See Essex Ins. Co. v. Big Top of Tampa, Inc., 53 So. 3d
1220, 1223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“There is no such thing as the negligent

commission of an intentional tort, such as battery.” (cleaned up)). The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure allow inconsistent claims such as battery and negligence to be
pleaded in the alternative. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2) (“A party may set out two or
more statements of a claim . . . alternatively . . . . If a party makes alternative
statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one of them is sufficient.”). The elements
of a civil battery claim under Florida law are “(1) the intent to cause a harmful or
offensive contact with another person[] and (2) an offensive contact that directly or
indirectly results.” Brown v. J.C. Penney Corp., 521 F. App’x 922, 923 (11th Cir. 2013)

(citing Chorak v. Naughton, 409 So. 2d 35, 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)). To allege
negligence under Florida law, Plaintiff must plead (1) a duty of care owed by defendant
to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant’s breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages
suffered by the plaintiff. See Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir.

2012). If Plaintiff wishes to assert both negligence and battery against a defendant in
her amended complaint, she may do so in the alternative, but Plaintiff shall refrain
from alleging negligent battery in her amended complaint.
Third, although Plaintiff sues Dr. Dorta-Duque and Aspire Health Partners for
IIED specifically, (Dkt. 1 at 23, 26), she sues other Defendants for the infliction of

emotional distress generally without clarifying whether the claims are for IIED,
negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), or both, (see id. at 13, 17, 21). Florida
law requires Plaintiff to satisfy four elements for an IIED claim:
(1) The wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or reckless[;] that is, he
intended his behavior when he knew or should have known that
emotional distress would likely result; (2) the conduct was [so]
outrageous . . . as to go beyond all bounds of decency[] and . . . be
regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3)
the conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was
severe.

Deauville Hotel Mgmt., LLC v. Ward, 219 So. 3d 949, 954–55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)
(quotation omitted). Whether conduct is sufficiently outrageous to support an IIED
claim is an issue of law for the court to decide, not an issue of fact. Id. at 955.
“Although there is no definitive example of what constitutes ‘outrageous conduct’ for
the purposes of maintaining a cause of action for [IIED], Florida case[]law on the
subject has evinced a comparatively high standard.” Golden v. Complete Holdings, Inc.,

818 F. Supp. 1495, 1499 (M.D. Fla. 1993). As for NIED, “[i]n Florida, ‘persons who
suffer a physical injury as a result of emotional distress arising from their witnessing
the death or injury of a loved one’” may assert an NIED claim. Godelia v. Doe, 881
F.3d 1309, 1322 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Zell v. Meek, 665 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (Fla.

1995)). Such a claim also has four elements:
(1) the plaintiff must suffer a discernable physical injury[,] (2) the physical
injury must be caused by the psychological trauma[,] (3) the plaintiff must
be involved in the event causing the negligent injury to another[,] and (4)
the plaintiff must have a close personal relationship to the directly injured
person.

Legrande v. Emmanuel, 889 So. 2d 991, 995 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). If Plaintiff
wishes to assert emotional distress claims in her amended complaint, she shall specify
which type of emotional distress claims she is bringing.
B. Time-Barred Claims
Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s state tort claims against them and section 1983
claims against Dr. Qadir are time-barred.5 (Dkt. 20 at 21–24; Dkt. 28 at 11–12; Dkt.
122 at 4–6; Dkt. 128 at 4–6; Dkt. 130 at 8–10, 12–13, 17–18.) The court agrees.
Florida’s medical negligence statute of limitations provides:

5 The court distinguishes between the state tort claims and due process claims in the complaint because
“[m]ere incidents of [medical] negligence or malpractice do not rise to the level of constitutional
violations.” See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991).
An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced
within [two] years from the time the incident giving rise to
the action occurred or within [two] years from the time the
incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with
the exercise of due diligence; however, in no event shall the
action be commenced later than [four] years from the date
of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of
action accrued, except that this [four]-year period shall not
bar an action brought on behalf of a minor on or before the
child’s eighth birthday. An ‘action for medical malpractice’
is defined as a claim in tort or in contract for damages
because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person
arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis,
treatment, or care by any provider of health[]care.

Fla. Stat. § 95.11(5)(c); see Silva v. Sw. Fla. Blood Bank, 601 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1992)
(interpreting “medical diagnosis, treatment, or care” and “provider of health[]care” in
the statute by applying the plain meaning of the words). As Plaintiff has not brought
this case on behalf of a minor, by the statute’s plain language, she had four years
maximum from the complained-of events to assert the state tort claims in her
complaint, and she did not meet this deadline. The complained-of events occurred in
August and September 2019, and Plaintiff did not file the complaint in this case until
July 2024. (See Dkt. 1.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s state tort claims against Defendants are
time-barred under the medical negligence statute of limitations.
La Amistad also contends that Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim against it is
time-barred under Florida’s false imprisonment statute of limitations. (Dkt. 28 at 12.)
The limitations period for false imprisonment is four years in Florida. Fla. Stat.
§ 95.11(3)(n); Garcia v. Psychiatric Institutes of Am., Inc., 638 So. 2d 567, 567 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) (“[T]he tort[] of false imprisonment . . . is subject to the four[-]year
statute of limitations.”). Because Plaintiff filed this complaint in July 2024, more than
four years after her alleged imprisonment, her false imprisonment claim against La
Amistad is time-barred on this basis, as well.

Additionally, Dr. Qadir argues that the due process and emotional distress
claims against her are time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations for such
claims. (Dkt. 130 at 12–13, 17–18.) Section 1983 claims, such as Plaintiff’s due
process claims, “are governed by the forum state’s residual personal injury statute of
limitations, which in Florida” sets of a limitations period of “four years.” City of

Hialeah v. Rojas, 311 F.3d 1096, 1103 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002); see Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o).
IIED claims also have a four-year limitations period in Florida. See Fla. Stat.
§ 95.11(3)(n); W.D. v. Archdiocese of Mia., Inc., 197 So. 3d 584, 587 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2016) (noting the four-year limitations period for IIED claims). As “[a]n action

founded on negligence,” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(5)(a), an NIED claim under Florida law is
subject to a two-year limitations period, id.; see Trocano v. Vivaldi, 720 F. Supp. 3d 1231,
1241 (M.D. Fla. 2024) (observing in the NIED context that “an action founded on
negligence must be filed within two years”). Dr. Qadir’s alleged misconduct occurred
in August 2019. (See Dkt. 1 at 22.) Because Plaintiff filed this complaint in July 2024,

her due process and emotional distress claims against Dr. Qadir are time-barred under
Florida’s statutes of limitations for such claims.
Plaintiff’s arguments on the statute of limitations issues are not persuasive. To
begin with, Plaintiff does not sufficiently develop these arguments with citations to
legal authorities. (See Dkts. 40, 47, 131, 132, 133.) See United States v. Harding, 104
F.4th 1291, 1300 (11th Cir. 2024) (“A party abandons an issue when [it] makes only
passing references to [the issue] or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting
arguments and authority.” (quotation omitted)). Nonetheless, the court discusses

Plaintiff’s four main arguments.
First, Plaintiff asserts that as a result of the complained-of events, she was
“physically and mentally unable” to sue La Amistad until June 2023. (Dkt. 47 at 6.)
The court construes this assertion as contending that the statutes of limitations were
tolled because of Plaintiff’s incapacity. Tolling refers to suspending the running of

“the statute of limitations time clock until the identified condition is settled.” Major
League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1076 (Fla. 2001) (quotation omitted). The
time under the statutes of limitations is tolled by the “adjudicated incapacity, before
the cause of action accrued, of the person entitled to sue.” Fla. Stat. § 95.051(1)(d).

Because the tolling requires Plaintiff to have been deemed legally incompetent before
the complained-of events, not after them, her alleged incapacity fails to toll the statute
of limitations. See Morsani, 790 So. 2d at 1075.
Second, Plaintiff maintains that the continuing violation doctrine applies to her
claims because she received drug treatment in thirty-day increments from August 2019

to December 2022. (Dkt. 132 at 2–3; Dkt. 133 at 3.) “The continuing violation
doctrine permits a plaintiff to sue on an otherwise time-barred claim when additional
violations of the law occur within the statutory period.” Robinson v. United States, 327
F. App’x 816, 818 (11th Cir. 2007). “When the violation alleged involves continuing
injury, the cause of action accrues, and the limitation period begins to run, at the time
the unlawful conduct ceases.” Id. Here, the alleged unlawful conduct ceased in
September 2019 at the latest. (See Dkt. 1.) Consequently, the continuing violation
doctrine does not overcome the statutes of limitations. See Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181,

1183 (11th Cir. 2003) (“The critical distinction in the continuing violation analysis is
whether the plaintiff complains of the present consequence of a one[-]time violation,
which does not extend the limitations period, or the continuation of that violation into
the present, which does. Here, the defendants’ act . . . was a one[-]time act with

continued consequences, and the limitations period is not extended.” (alterations
adopted and quotation omitted)).
Third, Plaintiff invokes the relation back doctrine to argue that because she
initially brought her claims against Defendants in August 2023 in a previous lawsuit,
her complaint in this case relates back to her complaint in that lawsuit, which fell

within the four-year limitations period. (Dkt. 131 at 4; Dkt. 133 at 4.) However, the
“relation back doctrine has application only in instances where an original pleading is
amended. . . . The amendment does not . . . relate back to any prior
proceedings . . . not part of the action in question.” Rayo v. New York, 882 F. Supp. 37,
40 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15); accord Benge v. United States, 17 F.3d

1286, 1288 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[A] separately filed claim, as opposed to an amendment
or a supplementary pleading, does not relate back to a previously filed claim.”).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s current complaint does not relate back to the complaint in her
previous lawsuit.
Fourth, Plaintiff asserts that the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution preempts Florida’s statutes of limitations. (Dkt. 131 at 4; Dkt. 132 at 6;
Dkt. 133 at 5.) The Supremacy Clause preempts “state laws that ‘interfere with, or are

contrary to[,]’ federal law.” Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261,
1266 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824)). Plaintiff does
not identify a federal law for the preemption analysis. (See Dkt. 131 at 4; Dkt. 132 at
6; Dkt. 133 at 5.) However, the court construes her Supremacy Clause argument as

contending that Florida’s statutes of limitations interfere with or are contrary to section
1983 or the federal due process rights Plaintiff seeks to vindicate through that section.
Because the Eleventh Circuit has affirmed when courts have applied Florida’s statutes
of limitations to dismiss state tort claims brought alongside due process claims—and
indeed has affirmed dismissals of due process claims on statute of limitations

grounds—this argument fails. See Hollis v. W. Acad. Charter, Inc., 782 F. App’x 951
(11th Cir. 2019) (affirming the dismissal of a defamation claim as time-barred under
Florida’s statute of limitations for such claims when the pro se plaintiff also brought
due process claims under section 1983); see also McGroarty v. Swearingen, 977 F.3d 1302
(11th Cir. 2020) (affirming the dismissal of substantive due process claims as time-

barred); Black v. Broward Emp’t & Training Admin., 846 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1988)
(affirming the dismissal of procedural due process claims as time-barred); cf. Jones v.
United States, No. 22-13381, 2024 WL 837054, at *5, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 4659, at
*12 (11th Cir. Feb. 28, 2024) (“[T]he Florida statute of repose for medical-malpractice
claims is not preempted by the [Federal Tort Claims Act.]” (citation omitted)).
Plaintiff’s state tort claims against Defendants and section 1983 claims against
Dr. Qadir are thus time-barred.
CONCLUSION

Accordingly:
1. Defendants’ motions (Dkts. 20, 28, 122, 128, 130) are GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff’s state tort claims against Adventist, La Amistad, Dr. Qadir, Aspire
Health Partners, and Dr. Dorta-Duque are DISMISSED with prejudice as

time-barred.
3. Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims against Dr. Qadir are DISMISSED with
prejudice as time-barred.
4. The remainder of Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED without prejudice on
shotgun pleading grounds. If Plaintiff can do so in good faith while fully

complying with this order and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, she may
file an amended complaint. If she does so, she shall comply with all the
directions in this order and shall correct all the pleading deficiencies discussed
herein. Plaintiff shall not include any time-barred claims in her amended
complaint.

5. If Plaintiff wishes to file an amended complaint, she shall do so on or before
August 6, 2025. See Auto. Alignment & Body Serv., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 953 F.3d 707, 720 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A]n order dismissing a complaint
with leave to amend within a specified time becomes a final judgment if the time
allowed for amendment expires without the plaintiff seeking an extension. And
when the order becomes a final judgment, the district court loses all its
prejudgment powers to grant any more extensions of time to amend the
complaint.” (citation and quotation omitted)). If the amended complaint fails
to comply with any of the directions in this order, the court may dismiss it
without notice to Plaintiff.
ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on July 16, 2025.

( Yes A _ xheak
JUFIE S. SNEED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11101450. Public record. Not legal advice.