# Dantzler v. Jorden

> District Court, M.D. Louisiana · June 17, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11101303

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** June 17, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11101303

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing the established rule that this court “must construe [a pro se plaintiff’s] allegations and briefs more permissively”
- recognizing the established rule that this court “must construe [a pro se plaintiff’s] allegations and briefs more permissively”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

OSCAR DANTZLER CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 24-590-BAJ-SDJ
WILLIAM WILL JORDEN, et al.
NOTICE
Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge’s Report has been filed with the Clerk
of the U. S. District Court.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have 14 days after being served with the
attached report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendations set forth therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings,
conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and
legal conclusions accepted by the District Court.
ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE
WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on June 17, 2025.

Se dinjber.—
SCOTT D. JOHNSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

OSCAR DANTZLER CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
NO. 24-590-BAJ-SDJ
WILLIAM WILL JORDEN, et al.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter comes before the Court on two Motions to Dismiss, one filed by filed by
Defendant Doug Welborn (R. Doc. 17) and the other filed by Defendants the Nineteenth Judicial
District Court and Judge William Jorden (R. Doc. 26).1 Plaintiff Oscar Dantzler, who is
proceeding pro se in this matter, has not responded to either Motion to Dismiss, and the deadline
for filing an opposition has long passed. See Local Civil Rule 7(f) (responses to motions are due
within 21 days). As such, the Court considers Defendants’ Motions unopposed. The Court has
carefully considered the law and the arguments and submissions of the Parties. For the following
reasons, the Court recommends the Motions to Dismiss be granted and Plaintiff’s claims against
all Defendants be dismissed.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s Complaint and subsequent Amended
Complaints2 are difficult to understand and extremely repetitive. As such, it is difficult for the
Court to fully discern the factual bases for Plaintiff’s arguments.

1 Defendants incorrectly titled their Motion “Motion for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleadings.” R. Doc.
26. However, the contents of the Motion as well as the Memorandum in Support, which is properly titled, make clear
that this is a Motion to Dismiss. As such, the Court will refer to Defendants’ Motion as the “Motion to Dismiss”
herein.
2 See R. Docs. 1, 3, 5, and 20.
On July 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit against the 19th JDC; Judge Jorden, individually and
in his official capacity as a 19th Judicial District Judge; and Doug Welborn, individually and in
his official capacity as the Clerk of Court for the 19th JDC, seeking a writ of mandamus and
injunctive relief.3 Per Plaintiff, he filed suit:4
for the sole purpose of Receiving relief from the alleged abuse by defendant(s) and
by the defendant’s counsels that cause mental anguish to the plaintiff by the
conspiracy, the fraudulent, and the perjury petition and the fraudulent statements
filed into the court to have plaintiff to be illegally disqualified from the 2023
Governor’s Election Race involving defendant’s conspiracy; and the illegal
dismissing the defendant’s from trial and the courtroom in which plaintiff believes
that if he had not been illegally disqualified from the Governor’s race plaintiff
strongly believes that he would have won the Governor’s Election race.
Plaintiff challenges his disqualification from the race for Governor of Louisiana and the removal
of his name from the ballot.5 He alleges that Anthony Jackson, Jr., filed an objection to Plaintiff’s
gubernatorial candidacy and petitioned to have him disqualified on August 17, 2023, in state
court.6 A hearing on Jackson’s objection was held on August 22, 2023, in the 19th JDC, with
Judge William Jorden presiding.7 Judge Jorden ruled against Plaintiff and subsequently denied
Plaintiff’s requests to appeal his decision to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal.8 Plaintiff
subsequently requested and paid for a copy of the transcript of those proceedings; however, to
date, Plaintiff has never received a copy of said transcript.9
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this Court on July 22, 2024.10 He subsequently amended
his Complaint three times—on July 23, 2024; on August 1, 2024; and on September 16, 2024.11

3 R. Doc. 1.
4 R. Doc. 1 at 2.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 3.
7 Id. at 5-6.
8 Id. at 11.
9 Id. at 15.
10 R. Doc. 1.
11 R. Docs. 3, 5, 20.
On September 16, 2024, Defendant Doug Welborn filed his Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).12 Shortly thereafter, on September 27, 2024, Judge
Jorden and the 19th JDC filed their Motion to Dismiss, also arguing for dismissal pursuant to Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).13 As stated above, Plaintiff did not file an opposition or other response to
either Motion to Dismiss, and the deadline for doing so has passed. Defendants’ Motions,

therefore, are unopposed.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Applicable Law
1. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction [and] possess only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). “Without subject-
matter jurisdiction, a federal court simply has no authority to decide the case.” Pidgeon v. Parker,
46 F. Supp. 3d 692, 697 (S.D. Tex. 2014). “[F]ederal courts are duty-bound to examine the basis

of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even on appeal.” Union Planters Bank Nat’l Ass’n v.
Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S.
83, 94-95 (1998); Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 615 & n. 6 (5th Cir. 2000)).
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion seeks dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction when a court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to hear the case. Home
Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). The
burden of proof on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction. See
Strain v. Harrelson Rubber Co., 742 F.2d 888, 889 (5th Cir. 1984). A motion to dismiss under

12 R. Doc. 17.
13 R. Doc. 26.
Rule 12(b)(1) is analyzed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992). “When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed
in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the 12(b)(1) jurisdictional
attack before addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161
(5th Cir. 2001) (citing Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)).

2. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant can seek dismissal of a complaint, or any part
thereof, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
“To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Shiell v. Jones, No. 19-848,
2020 WL 2331637, at *10 (E.D. La. May 11, 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)) (internal quotations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Shiell, 2020 WL 2331637,
at *10 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
A court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting In re
Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). “Dismissal is appropriate when
the complaint on its face shows a bar to relief.” Shiell, 2020 WL 2331637, at *10 (quoting Cutrer
v. McMillan, 308 F. App’x 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009)). “Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A court does not assume
the truth of conclusory statements, but rather looks for facts which support the elements of the
pleader’s claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
3. Standard for Pro Se Litigants
Plaintiff is proceeding in this litigation pro se. Pro se pleadings are to be held “to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972); see also S.E.C. v. AMX, Int’l, Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 75 (5th Cir. 1993) (recognizing the
established rule that this court “must construe [a pro se plaintiff’s] allegations and briefs more
permissively”). A court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, taking all well-pleaded
allegations as true. Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Nevertheless,
“a pro se litigant is not exempt . . . from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and
substantive law.” NCO Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Harper–Horsley, No. 07–4247, 2008 WL 2277843, at *3
(E.D. La. May 29, 2008) (quoting Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981)) (internal
quotations omitted). As such, a pro se plaintiff’s complaint “must set forth facts giving rise to a

claim on which relief may be granted.” Johnson, 999 F.2d at 100 (citation omitted).
Additionally, “[a] liberal reading of plaintiff’s pleadings is the only special treatment
afforded pro se plaintiffs by the courts.” Kiper v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., No. 14-313, 2015
WL 2451998, at *1 (M.D. La. May 21, 2015) (citing Callahan v. C.I.R., No. 99-0295, 2000 WL
1141607, at *1 (M.D. La. Apr. 10, 2000)). A “court is not required to search for or try to create
causes of actions or find material issues of fact for pro se plaintiffs.” Id. And “[a] pro se litigant
is not entitled to greater rights than would be a litigant represented by a lawyer.” NCO Fin. Sys.,
2008 WL 2277843, at *3 (citing Birl, 660 F.2d at 593). Finally, “[w]hile much liberality is
allowed in construing pro se complaints, a pro se litigant cannot simply dump a stack of exhibits
on the court and expect the court to sift through them to determine if some nugget is buried
somewhere in that mountain of papers, waiting to be unearthed and refined into a cognizable
claim.” Richardson v. United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC, No. 24-276, 2024 WL 5264095, at *5
n. 24 (M.D. La. Dec. 31, 2024) (quoting Samtani v. City of Laredo, 274 F. Supp. 3d 695, 698
(S.D. Tex. 2017)).

B. Discussion
In their Motions to Dismiss, Defendants argue for dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant
to both Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). As explained below, none of Plaintiff’s claims against any
Defendant are viable, as the Court either lacks subject matter jurisdiction over them, or they fail
to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the Court recommends that all of
Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed.14
1. Whether the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Applies
In their Motion to Dismiss, the 19th JDC and Judge Jorden first argue that this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over this case, or certain aspects thereof, based on the Rooker-Feldman
Doctrine.15 “[F]ederal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, lack appellate jurisdiction

to review, modify, or nullify final orders of state courts.” Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 615
(5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994)).
Specifically, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from “modify[ing] or
revers[ing] state court judgments.” Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir.

14 After filing his initial Complaint, Plaintiff filed a First, Second, and Third Amended Complaint (R. Docs. 1, 3, 5,
20). Generally, an amended complaint supersedes the previous complaint. Wooten v. Roach, 431 F. Supp. 3d 875,
887 (E.D. Tex. 2019). Here, however, it is unclear whether Plaintiff intended for his subsequent Complaints to replace
the preceding Complaint(s) or instead incorporate and amend them. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, out of an
abundance of caution, and for the purposes of these Motions only, the Court has considered all allegations and
arguments in all of Plaintiff’s Complaints in reaching its decision herein.
15 In his Motion to Dismiss, Welborn also argues that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to issue a
writ of mandamus under the statutes cited by Plaintiff. However, as the Court is recommending that all of Plaintiff’s
claims against all Defendants be dismissed on other grounds, it does not further address this argument herein.
2013). This is called the Rooker-Feldman doctrine after the cases that first recognized it: Rooker
v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is narrow and “confined to . . . cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments . . . and inviting district court review

and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,
284 (2005). In determining whether Rooker-Feldman applies, a court must carefully evaluate what
it is asked to review and reject. Truong, 717 F.3d at 382 (citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284).
The court lacks jurisdiction only when the plaintiff “seeks relief that directly attacks the validity
of an existing state court judgment,” Weaver v. Tex. Capital Bank N.A., 660 F.3d 900, 904 (5th
Cir. 2011), or the plaintiff’s federal claims “are so inextricably intertwined with a state judgment
that the federal court is in essence being called upon to review the state court decision.” Ill. Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Guy, 682 F.3d 381, 390-91 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16))
(internal quotations omitted).

Here, it is clear that Plaintiff takes umbrage with the ruling of the 19th JDC disqualifying
him as a gubernatorial candidate. For example, Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that he was “illegally
disqualified from the governor’s race.”16 What is unclear to the Court, however, is whether
Plaintiff is seeking to review, modify, or nullify that ruling. In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks
certain unspecified injunctive relief, but he never explains what injunctive relief he is seeking. As
such, the Court cannot tell whether he seeks to have any of the state court rulings changed in any
way via this lawsuit. Moreover, the Court cannot envision what injunctive relief would be
available to Plaintiff, as the gubernatorial election at issue here concluded well over a year ago.

16 See, e.g., R. Doc. 1 at 2; R. Doc. 5 at 4.
In their Motion to Dismiss, the 19th JDC and Judge Jorden argue that “Plaintiff contests
the validity of [the state court] proceeding and challenges the judgment disqualifying him from
running in the 2023 gubernatorial election.”17 The Court agrees that Plaintiff contests the validity
of the proceedings. However, should Plaintiff’s Complaint seek to modify those judgments or
preclude their enforcement in any way, such claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

and should be dismissed. Any such relief would be “inextricably intertwined” with the various
underlying state court judgments because it would call on this Court to review the final state court
decisions and conclude that they are void or otherwise inapplicable. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
precludes an exercise of subject matter jurisdiction to the extent Plaintiff seeks any prospective
relief regarding the application of final judgments in state court lawsuits. See Lance v. Dennis,
546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (“Accordingly, under what has come to be known as the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over
final state-court judgments.”).
2. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Judge Jorden

The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s claims against each Defendant, beginning with Judge
Jorden, who Plaintiff sued in both his individual and official capacities. As explained below, the
Court finds that Judge Jorden is entitled to both absolute judicial immunity as well as immunity
pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Additionally, Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against
Judge Jorden are without merit.
a. Judge Jorden is Entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment bars a state from being sued in federal court by its own citizens,
citizens of other states, or foreign nations. U.S. Const. Amend. XI; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla.,

17 R. Doc. 26-1 at 4.
517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Cox v. City of Dallas, Tex., 256 F.3d 281, 307 (5th Cir. 2001). “When a
state agency is the named defendant, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for both money damages
and injunctive relief unless the state has waived its immunity.” Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish
Council—President Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2002). “This rule extends to ‘arms of
the state,’ and to a state’s ‘officials acting in their official capacities.’” Parker v. La. Dep’t of Pub.

Safety & Corr., No. 18-1030, 2020 WL 4353564, at *8 (M.D. La. July 29, 2020) (quoting Med.
RX/Sys., P.L.L.C. v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., 633 F. App’x. 607, 610 (5th Cir. 2016)).
See also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)) (“Obviously, state officials
literally are persons. But a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit
against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from
a suit against the State itself.”) (citations omitted). The State of Louisiana has not waived its
immunity from suit in federal court. Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office, 188 F.3d
312, 314 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing La. R.S. § 13:5106(A)).
Under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, however, “a litigant may sue a state official in his

official capacity if the suit seeks prospective relief to redress an ongoing violation of federal law.”
Williams on Behalf of J.E. v. Reeves, 954 F.3d 729, 735-36 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Ex Parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 167-68 (1908); Air Evac EMS v. Tex., Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp., 851
F.3d 507, 519 (5th Cir. 2017)). This exception “rests on a legal fiction, the premise that a state
official is not the State for sovereign-immunity purposes when a federal court commands [him or
her] to do nothing more than refrain from violating federal law.” Id. at 736 (internal quotations
and citations omitted). For a suit to proceed under this doctrine, it must be a suit seeking
declaratory or injunctive relief and: “(1) be brought against state officers who are acting in their
official capacities; (2) seek prospective relief to redress ongoing conduct; and (3) allege a violation
of federal, not state, law.” Id. (citing NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 394 (5th Cir.
2015)). This is true, even where an injunction may have “an ancillary effect on the state treasury.”
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979).
Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Jorden in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. “The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the bringing

of a lawsuit in federal court against a state, its agencies, or persons acting as official representatives
thereof.” McGrew v. Roundtree, No. 09-859, 2010 WL 3396899, at *2 (M.D. La. Jun. 3, 2010),
report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3396901 (M.D. La. Aug. 24, 2010). The United
States Supreme Court has made clear that a suit against a state official in his official capacity for
monetary damages is treated as a suit against the state and, therefore, is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). See also McGrew, 2010 WL 3396899, at
*2. Because Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against Judge Jorden are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, it is recommended that those claims be dismissed. Moreover, Plaintiff
cannot rely on the Ex Parte Young doctrine for his claims for injunctive relief against Judge Jorden

in his official capacity because Plaintiff has failed to identify or allege ongoing conduct by Judge
Jorden in violation of a federal law.
b. Judge Jorden is Entitled to Absolute Judicial Immunity
“With regard to suits against judges in their individual capacity, ‘judges enjoy absolute
judicial immunity from lawsuits that cannot be overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice.’”
Jospeh v. Jones, No. 24-208, 2024 WL 3977207, at *2 (M.D. La. Jul. 10, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3970697 (M.D. La. Aug. 28, 2024) (quoting Severin v. Par.
of Jefferson, 357 F. App’x 601, 604 (5th Cir. 2009)). Stated another way, “[j]udges enjoy absolute
immunity for judicial acts performed in judicial proceedings.” Phan v. Hanen, No. 23-20598,
2024 WL 3593902, at *1 (5th Cir. Jul. 31, 2024) (citing Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107, 110 (5th
Cir. 1996)). “A judge is judicially immune as long as [he] was not performing a ‘non-judicial
action’ or acting outside of [his] ‘jurisdiction.’” Jospeh, 2024 WL 3977207, at *2 (quoting Mireles
v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)).
“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was

done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when
he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Phan, 2024 WL 3593902, at *1 (quoting
Mays, 97 F.3d at 111). “Judicial immunity also applies to acts alleged to have been done
corruptly.” Id. (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11). “Judicial immunity is also applicable in cases
asserting civil rights violations.” Id. (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967)).
Because the allegations against Judge Jorden are based on rulings he made during the legal
proceedings concerning Plaintiff’s potential gubernatorial candidacy, they concern only judicial
acts performed in judicial proceedings, and Plaintiff has not argued otherwise. His rulings were

acts normally performed by a judge, and no party has suggested that Judge Jorden was acting
outside his jurisdiction. As such, Judge Jorden is immune from liability. See Joseph, 2024 WL
3977207, at *2 (dismissing plaintiff’s claims against judge, who signed a child support order, based
on absolute judicial immunity); McCoy v. McCormick, No. 22-443, 2023 WL 3010215, at *15
(M.D. La. Feb. 15, 2023) (dismissing claims against state court judge based on absolute judicial
immunity because judge was not acting outside the scope of his judicial duties or without
jurisdiction).
c. Plaintiff’s Claims for Injunctive Relief Against Judge Jorden
Also Fail
Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief from Judge Jorden pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.18
Historically, judicial officers did not enjoy absolute immunity from claims for injunctive relief;
relief was available under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against state court judges in their judicial capacity.
Williams v. Van Davis, No. 18-1003, 2018 WL 1477146, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 8, 2018) (citing
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984)). “However, the Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1996 . . . amended Section 1983 to provide that ‘in any action brought against a judicial officer
for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.’” Id. (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 1983). “The FCIA therefore statutorily overrule Pulliam’s holding regarding the

availability of injunctive relief against a judge in his official capacity.” Id. (citations omitted).
Here, a declaratory decree was not violated, nor is declaratory relief unavailable. As such,
injunctive relief pursuant to Section 1983 also is not available against Judge Jorden.
Finally, even if injunctive relief were not precluded, this court has no power to direct state
officials in the performance of their duties. Darville v. Verdigets, No. 22-208, 2023 WL 2418364,
at *3 (M.D. La. Jan. 17, 2023). The Court, therefore, cannot direct Judge Jorden to do, or not do,
anything related to Plaintiff’s state court case regarding his gubernatorial candidacy. As such,
there is no avenue available to Plaintiff pursuant to which he can recover against Judge Jorden. It,
therefore, is recommended that all of Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Jorden be dismissed.

3. Plaintiff’s Claims Against the 19th JDC
The Court next turns to Plaintiff’s claims against the 19th JDC. Because the 19th JDC is
not an entity capable of being sued, Plaintiff’s claims against it should be dismissed.

18 See, e.g., R. Doc. 1 at 1; R. Doc. 5 at 4-5.
According to Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Louisiana law determines
whether a party maintains capacity to be sued. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3) (“Capacity to sue or be
sued is determined . . . by the law of the state where the court is located[.]”). “And, under Louisiana
law, judicial districts lack capacity to be sued.” McLin v. Twenty-First Judicial Dist., 614
F.Supp.3d 278, 286 (M.D. La. 2022) (finding that the 21st JDC lacks capacity to be sued and

dismissing all claims against it). See also Laugand v. Bank of New York Mellon, No. 17-83, 2017
WL 4276474, at *2 (M.D. La. Sep. 26, 2017) (“under Louisiana law, state judicial district courts
are not persons capable of being sued”). Similarly, “a state court cannot be sued in a § 1983 action
because it is not a ‘person’ subject to suit.” Ford v. 19th Judicial Dist. Court East Baton Rouge
Parish of La., No. 21-524, 2023 WL 2609824, at *2 (M.D. La. Feb. 27, 2023) (citing Wilkerson v.
17th Judicial Dist. Court, Parish of LaFourche, No. 08-1196, 2009 WL 249737, at *3-4 (E.D. La.
Jan. 30, 2009)). It, therefore, is recommended that all of Plaintiff’s claims against the 19th JDC
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.19
4. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Doug Welborn

Like Judge Jorden, Doug Welborn, Clerk of Court for East Baton Rouge Parish, also is
being sued both individually and in his official capacity. Plaintiff’s allegations against Welborn,
generally, are as follows:20
Plaintiff alleges that clerk of court, the clerk of court office and their employees has
committed fraud by silence, criminal conduct, accessories to the fact, conspiracy
and they have violated criminal laws by not turning plaintiff’s transcript request
after plaintiff have filled out the proper transcript form and after the plaintiff had
paid the judicial administrator, court for transcript to be turned over to the plaintiff.

19 In its Motion to Dismiss, the 19th JDC additionally argues that it, too, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
However, in light of its finding that the 19th JDC is not an entity capable of being sued, the Court declines to determine
this issue. See McLin, 614 F.Supp.3d at 287 (“Having determined that the 21st JDC lacks capacity to be sued, the
Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims on this basis alone, and does not address the 21st JDC’s alternative argument that
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff’s claim under La. R.S. § 23:961.”).
20 R. Doc. 5 at 12.
While Plaintiff repeats these allegations multiple times in both his original and Amended
Complaints, they remain the same, i.e., that Plaintiff properly requested and paid for a copy of the
transcript from the proceeding held on August 22, 2023, in state court, which transcript was never
received, and that Welborn refused to provide a copy to him or direct him to the proper place to
obtain one because of his conspiracy with the other Defendants.21

a. Welborn Has Not Established that He is Entitled to Immunity
In his Motion to Dismiss, Welborn also argues that he, too, has immunity for Plaintiff’s
claims. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “[c]ourt clerks ‘have absolute immunity from actions
for damages arising from acts they are specifically required to do under court order or at a judge’s
discretion.’” Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d
1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981)). However, a clerk “enjoys only qualified immunity for those routine
duties not explicitly commanded by a court decree or by the judge’s instructions.” Id. (citing
Williams v. Wood, 612 F.2d 982, 985 (5th Cir. 1980)).
As argued by Welborn, Plaintiff, in his Complaint “has alleged that Welborn and his

deputies conspired with Judge Jorden and others so as not to provide him a transcript of the hearing
held in state district court on August 22, 2023.”22 Welborn continues that Plaintiff, therefore,
“contends that Welborn and his deputies acted under some sort of instruction by Judge Jorden in
this regard.”23 Per Welborn, based on these allegations, Welborn is entitled to absolute immunity
because he is alleged to have been acting pursuant to a judge’s instruction.24 Welborn further

21 See R. Doc. 1 at 8, 15, 33-35; R. Doc. 5 at 12-15.
22 R. Doc. 17-1 at 6.
23 Id.
24 Id.
argues that it is “reasonable to infer that Plaintiff is complaining about actions which are an
‘integral part of the judicial process’ in which Welborn would be likewise immune.”25
The Court cannot accept Welborn’s reasoning here. As Plaintiff has made only conclusory
allegations that Judge Jorden conspired with others against Plaintiff in his judicial rulings, the
Court cannot use that baseless allegation as the basis for finding Welborn entitled to absolute

immunity here. In addition, nothing in Plaintiff’s allegations or otherwise indicates that Judge
Jorden provided any instruction to Welborn about Plaintiff’s transcript. As such, the Court, based
on the information provided, cannot find that Welborn is entitled to absolute immunity from
Plaintiff’s claims. However, as explained below, because the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed
to state a claim for which relief may be granted against Welborn, the Court still recommends that
all of Plaintiff’s claims against Welborn be dismissed.
b. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against Welborn
Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a plausible claim against Welborn. First, Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure article 372 provides that “[w]hen a party to a proceeding requests a transcript

and has paid for the transcript, the court reporter shall provide that party with an electronic copy
of the transcript along with a paper copy of the transcript at no additional charge or cost to the
requesting party.” La. C.C.P. art. 372(F). Thus, state procedure tasks the court reporter, not the
Clerk of Court, with the task of providing a requesting party with a copy of a court transcript.
Second, La. R.S. 13:961 provides that court reporters are to be appointed by state court judges,
with their pay coming from “the general fund of the parish or parishes comprising the judicial
district for which the appointment is made.” La. R.S. 13:961(E).

25 Id.
In contravention of these provisions, Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that Welborn had
control over the particular transcript Plaintiff had requested and that Welborn is responsible for
issuing court transcripts. Plaintiff, however, provides no support for these conclusory assertions.
In fact, the transcript request form provided by Plaintiff as an attachment to his Complaint nowhere
references Welborn, the Clerk of Court, or the Clerk of Court’s Office for the 19th JDC.26 As

such, Plaintiff’s repeated allegations directed against Welborn that, despite paying the required
fee, Plaintiff did not receive a copy of a requested transcript, fail to state a claim against Welborn,
as Plaintiff has in no way shown that Welborn is responsible for providing transcripts of court
proceedings. And state law plainly contradicts Plaintiff’s assertions.
Here, Plaintiff provides only conclusory allegations, which the Court can neither accept as
true or construe in favor of Plaintiff. See Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th
Cir. 2002) (“[R]egardless of whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or is represented by counsel,
conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice
to prevent a motion to dismiss.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also BillJCo, LLC v. Apple Inc.,

583 F.Supp.3d 769, 776 (W.D. Tex. 2022) (“While this Court construes a complaint in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, accepting well-pleaded facts as true, it does not ‘accept as true
conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.’”) (quoting Plotkin
v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)). As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted against Welborn and recommends that
Plaintiff’s claims against Welborn be dismissed.

26 R. Doc. 1-7.
C. Leave to Amend
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs amendments to pleadings.
According to Rule 15(a)(2), “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written
consent or the court’s leave.” “The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “It is well settled that before dismissing a complaint, a pro se plaintiff should

be given an opportunity to amend his complaint to remedy any deficiencies.” Hernandez v. W.
Tex. Treasures Estate Sales, L.L.C., 79 F.4th 464, 468 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Bazrowx v. Scott,
136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998)). “In other words, leave to amend should be liberally granted,
when the plaintiff might be able to state a claim based on the underlying facts and circumstances.”
Id. (citing Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009)). “Nevertheless, a district
court is not obligated to grant a futile motion to amend, for instance, when ‘the plaintiff has already
pleaded his best case.’” Id. (quoting Brewster, 587 F.3d at 768).
Here, any amendment would be futile. Plaintiff has already amended his Complaint three
times. Moreover, as explained in detail above, Plaintiff is unable to bring a viable claim against

any of the three Defendants based on the facts of this case. As such, the Court does not recommend
that Plaintiff be allowed to further amend his Complaint.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Doug Welborn
(R. Doc. 17) be GRANTED and that all claims of Plaintiff against Doug Welborn be dismissed
with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss, improperly titled
“Motion for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleadings,” filed by Defendants the Nineteenth
Judicial District Court and Judge William Jorden (R. Doc. 26) be GRANTED and that all claims
of Plaintiff against these two Defendants be dismissed with prejudice.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on June 17, 2025.

Se hinhdr—
SCOTT D. JOHNSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11101303. Public record. Not legal advice.