# Riegel v. The School Board of Lee County, Florida

> District Court, M.D. Florida · July 17, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11101221

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 17, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11101221

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- rejecting the “post hoc ergo propter hoc16 fallacy which assumes causation from temporal sequence”
- explaining that a “diary entry” read into a “deposition” transcript may be “part of the summary judgment record”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

KEVIN RIEGEL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:23-cv-1133-JES-KCD

THE SCHOOL BOARD OF LEE
COUNTY, FLORIDA, a
political subdivision of
the State of Florida,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter now comes before the Court on the Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. #37) filed on May 2, 2025, by Defendant The
School Board of Lee County, Florida (the “Board” or “Defendant”).
Plaintiff Kevin Riegel (“Riegel” or “Plaintiff”) filed a Response
in Opposition (Doc. #39) on May 23, 2025. The Board filed a Reply
in Support (Doc. #42) on June 6, 2025.
For the reasons set forth below, the Board’s Motion for Summ-
ary Judgment (Doc. #37) is GRANTED.
I.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact” and “the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Baby Buddies,
Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 611 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Hickson
Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court views all
evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-

movant. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Tana v. Dan-
tanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir. 2010).
The First Amendment not only protects the right to speak, but
also “the right to be free from retaliation by a public official
for the exercise of that right.” Turner v. Williams, 65 F.4th
564, 579–80 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). See also Nieves
v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019); DeMartini v. Town of
Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277, 1288 (11th Cir. 2019).
To avoid summary judgment on a speech-based retaliation claim
under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the Florida Public Whistleblower
Act (“PWA”), a plaintiff must provide evidence of (1) his protected
speech, (2) the defendant’s adverse action, and (3) a causal conn-

ection between his speech and the defendant’s conduct. See Warren
v. DeSantis, 90 F.4th 1115, 1127 (11th Cir. 2024); Zen Group, Inc.
v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 80 F.4th 1319, 1329 (11th Cir.
2023); Elver v. Hendry Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 791 F. App’x 56, 58
(11th Cir. 2019) (applying Title VII’s retaliation analysis and
burden-shifting framework to PWA claims).
Although the Eleventh Circuit has recognized the “convincing
mosaic” as an alternative to McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting, it
has clarified that both are merely “two paths to the same destin-
ation — the ordinary summary judgment standard.” McCreight v.
AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322, 1335 (11th Cir. 2024).
The first element of retaliation is met.1 As to the second

element, actions are “adverse” when they are likely to chill the
exercise of protected speech. Turner, 65 F.4th at 580. A refusal
to hire, when proven, may be adverse. Akins v. Fulton Cnty., Ga.,
420 F.3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir. 2005). The critical question is
whether the challenged conduct would, “objectively, chill or
deter” protected speech. Bell v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty., 6 F.4th
1374, 1379 (11th Cir. 2021). That question is resolved “narrowly,”
on the “circumstances” of the case. Id. at 1378–79.2
The third element requires the plaintiff to show a “causal
connection” between the defendant’s “retaliatory animus” and the
plaintiff’s “subsequent injury.” Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1722
(quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 259 (2006)). The desire

to retaliate must be the “but-for” cause of the challenged conduct.
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013).
The plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s retaliatory motive
caused it not to hire him — that but for the defendant’s ill will

1 The Board does not dispute that Riegel’s speech is protected.
2 In Bell, the Eleventh Circuit conformed to Dahlia v. Rodriguez,
735 F.3d 1060, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (considering
whether in the “circumstances” an action is adverse), over the
categorical approaches of other circuits, Breaux v. City of
Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 2000); Sensabaugh v.
Halliburton, 937 F.3d 621, 629 (6th Cir. 2019).
towards his exercise of protected speech, he would not have been
denied employment. Turner, 65 F.4th at 581.
Even if a plaintiff makes an adequate showing on all three

elements, the defendant may still prevail on a “same-decision def-
ense” by proving that it “would have made the same decision even
if the plaintiff never engaged in protected activity.” See Warren
v. DeSantis, 90 F.4th 1115, 1127 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Mount
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977)), opinion vacated and superseded, 125 F.4th 1361 (11th Cir.
2025). See also Fla. Stat. § 1112.3187(10).
Whenever a Section 1983 action is brought against a local
unit of government, the plaintiff must also prove that an official
government policy was the moving force behind his injury. Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
A plaintiff can establish [Monell liability] in three
ways: (1) identifying an official policy; (2) identify-
ing an unofficial custom or widespread practice . . . ;
or (3) identifying a municipal official with final poli-
cymaking authority whose decision violated the plain-
tiff’s constitutional rights.3
Chabad Chayil, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 48 F.4th 1222,
1229 (11th Cir. 2022). See also Christmas v. Nabors, 76 F.4th

3 The third method is met only if the official has “final autho-
rity to establish municipal policy with respect to the action
ordered.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986).
In Florida, superintendents do not have final policymaking autho-
rity over employment decisions. Chabad Chayil, Inc., 48 F.4th at
1230 (citation omitted); Mizzell-Bullock v. Seminole Cnty. Pub.
Sch., 23-11599, 2024 WL 65199, at *4 (11th Cir. Jan. 5, 2024).
1320, 1329 (11th Cir. 2023).
It is not sufficient for a government body’s policy to
be tangentially related to a constitutional deprivation.
The official policy or custom must be the moving force
of the constitutional violation in order to establish
liability of a government body under § 1983. A plaintiff
must demonstrate a direct causal link between the muni-
cipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.
Cuesta v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 285 F.3d 962, 966– 67 (11th
Cir. 2002) (citation modified).
II.
Riegel asserts two counts: Count I is a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 that the Board refused to hire him because of his protected
speech, U.S. Const. amend. I; Count II is a claim against the Board
under the Florida Public Whistleblower Act (“PWA”), Fla. Stat. §
112.3187(8)(b) and (c), for the same alleged conduct.
In 2011, Riegel was employed by the Board as a math teacher
and athletic coach at Immokalee High School. In 2013, his contract
was not renewed. His co-workers had reported that he was “unpro-
fessional”; “inappropriate”; given to “rant[ing],” “rav[ing],” and
fits of “visibl[e] ang[er]”; and created an “unsafe,” “uncomfor-
table,” and “hostile” working environment.4 (Doc. #38-1, pp. 161–

4 Letters and signed statements from Nate Sund, Depri Hammond,
Jason Plucker, Cyndi Chiorello, and Jackie Corey were read into
the record at Riegel’s deposition. Adams v. Demopolis City Sch.,
80 F.4th 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2023) (explaining that a “diary
entry” read into a “deposition” transcript may be “part of the
summary judgment record”). Riegel has claimed that “a couple of
board members” and “Dr. Adkins” have “acknowledged” that “all of
these [statements]” are “false,” “wrong,” and have been
66.) Riegel was “escorted out by a deputy” because people were
“afraid that [he] might do something.” (Id. at 163.)
Riegel found a job teaching at Oak Creek Charter School.

(Doc. #38-1, p. 22.) He stayed there from 2013 to 2022. (Id. at
23.) He then moved to Gateway Charter, where he still works. (Id.
at 11, 22.) As a charter-school employee, Riegel has not worked
“for” the Board since 2013. (Id. at 11.)
While working at Oak Creek, Riegel engaged in what he des-
cribes as “whistleblowing.” In June 2018, he sent an email alleg-
ing “FRAUD, WASTE, and ABUSE in the Lee County School District.”
(Doc. #39-7, p. 1.) It had many recipients, some seemingly linked
to the Lee County School District (the “School District”).5 Des-

“debunked.” (Doc. #38-1, pp. 145, 160–61; Doc. #39-6, p. 3.) He
provides no evidence in support. Notably, another letter was read
into the record at his deposition from a case where Jaqueline
Perez, on behalf of her minor daughter, sought a restraining order
against him for stalking. (Doc. #38-1, pp. 148–49.) Perez
describes Riegel as “[un]stable,” “delusional, and a “ticking time
bomb.” (Id. at 152–53.) As an example, she mentions him “taking
credit for Dr. Graham’s retirement that he had nothing to do with,”
much like one of the unsubstantiated allegations he has made in
this case. (Id. at 153.) Perez also mentions that Riegel has
“threatened to sue several [] people” and “said he’s going [after]
their state licenses.” (Id. at 156.) Riegel has confirmed that
is at least partly true. (Id.)
5 Riegel submits three purported “whistleblowing” emails, but
only the June 2018 email was addressed to “@leegov.com” and “@lee-
schools.net” recipients. The other two emails went to “oig@fl-
doe.org” and “myfloridalegal.com” domains. (Doc. #39-8, p. 1;
Doc. #39-9, p. 1.) There is no evidence the Board knew of those.
Martin v. Fin. Asset Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 959 F.3d 1048, 1054 (11th
Cir. 2020) (“a decision maker cannot have been motivated to retali-
ate by something unknown to him”). Riegel claims that Jeff Spiro
told him “to stop digging into [the Board’s] illegal acts and
pite the number of recipients, Riegel gives no evidence that anyone
ever responded to him. Even so, he claims that “transformational
changes” occurred due to his “whistleblowing”: “state-level atte-

ntion, changes in law, resignations of key personnel and long-term
structural reforms.” (Doc. #39-1, pp. 3, 4–5.) There is only
evidence of one “change” — Robert Dodig “resigned” as the Board’s
attorney sometime “after” Riegel’s “submissions.” (Id. at 5 n.2.)6
In June 2022 — four years after Riegel’s 2018 email — the
Board posted a job for a newly created Director of Risk Management
position. The posting listed “minimum qualifications” and “know-
ledge, skills, and abilities” for the role, including:

misdeeds.” (Doc. #39-1, p. 2.) Spiro was not, and has never been,
a Board member. Collier v. Harland Clarke Corp., 820 F. App’x
874, 879 (11th Cir. 2020) (“remarks by non-decisionmakers and re-
marks unrelated to the decisionmaking process are of little prob-
ative value”). Riegel claims that Steve Teuber spoke similarly in
2017. (Doc. #39-1, p. 2.) Teuber was not a Board member when the
emails were sent; his words are not evidence of the Board’s know-
ledge at that time. Harland Clarke, 820 F. App’x at 879. Riegel
also says he contacted the Governor’s “fraud hotline” in May 2023
about “RICO activity” and “fraud.” (Doc. #39-1, p. 6.) There is
no evidence that the Board knew of that. Martin, 959 F.3d at 1054.
6 Riegel makes other allegations about the effects of his “whist-
leblowing” (Doc. #14, pp. 5–6), but “allegations are not evidence.”
Olson v. Stewart, 737 F. App’x 478, 480 n.3 (11th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Wright v. Farouk Sys., Inc., 701 F.3d 907, 911 n.8 (11th
Cir. 2012)); Freeman v. Comm'r, Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 46 F.4th
1193, 1225 (11th Cir. 2022) (Pryor, J., concurring). His attorney
makes other assertions (Doc. #39, p. 11 n.5, p. 16 n.15), but as
a general rule, attorney “statements” and “arguments” “are not
evidence.” Likollari v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 352 F. App’x 335, 337
(11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Yun Chen v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 368 F.
App’x 995, 998 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Lawson, No. 20-
14776, 2022 WL 136709, at *2 (11th Cir. Jan. 14, 2022).
(1) A bachelor’s degree in risk management, finance, or a
business-related field.
(2) Seven (7) years of administrative experience with pro-
gressively responsible duties in risk management,
preferably in a public school system.
(3) Proven experience successfully managing multiple bus-
iness or department functions and staff within a large
organization at an administrative level.
(4) Industry certification.
(5) Lean Six Sigma certification.
(6) Knowledge of and expertise in interpretation and appl-
ication of federal, state, and local statutes, laws,
regulations, rules, policies, procedures, and current
research-based best practices in public education.
(7) Knowledge of HIPAA, Public Records, Sunshine Law,
FERPA, and other laws and regulations related to
student and employee privacy, public information, and
records retention.
(Doc. #38-2, p. 1.)
Riegel applied and submitted his resume. Before any decisions
were made, however, the Board “suspended hiring and removed the
job posting due to the hiring manager taking an emergency medical
leave of absence.” (Doc. #38-9, p. 3.) Ten months later, in April
2023,7 the Board put up another post for the position and began
accepting applications. Riegel did not apply. The Board began

7 At his deposition, Riegel insisted the job was reposted “six”
times, (Doc. #38-1, pp. 87–91), but said that if he were “be[ing]
honest,” he may “have to get [that information] from the [Board].”
(Id. at 90.) Riegel now attests to only two postings. He asserts
vaguely that the job would “be posted,” “come down,” “sit dormant,”
and “go back up.” (Doc. #39-1, p. 5.) But the only specific date
on which he attests to seeing the job reposted is “April 2023,”
which is consistent with the Board’s version of events. (Id.)
interviewing the applicants three months later, including Cathy S.
Richards,8 Danielle Jensen,9 and William Warren Wilson. On Septem-
ber 6, 2023 – over five years after Riegel’s June 2018 email — the

Board confirmed Wilson as the new Director of Risk Management.
Wilson has a B.A. in English from Florida A&M University and
a J.D. from Florida State University. (Doc. #38-8, p. 1.) He has
decades of insurance and risk experience as a senior and master
claims representative for Nationwide, as a legal adjuster for the
School District, as an Examiner for Lloyds of London and Canopius
U.S., and as a claims consultant for Prime Insurance Co. (Id.)
Riegel has a B.A. in Parks & Recreation from the College of
St. Francis in Joliet, Illinois. (Doc. #38-3, p. 1; Doc. #42-1.)
He has no other degrees. (Doc. #38-1, pp. 26–27.) He has no risk-
management certificates, association memberships, or experience.
(Id. at 67, 102.) Other than the single application at issue in

this case, Riegel has never applied for a risk-management job, nor

8 Richards has over thirty-five years of experience in the insur-
ance industry. (Doc. #38-5, p. 2.) She has numerous certificates
and memberships, including Six Sigma, CISR, CSRM, PRIMA, RIMS,
FERMA, and is familiar with the laws and regulations of HIPAA,
FERPA, public records, Sunshine law, and Statute 440. (Id. at 1.)
She has worked for over ten years as the School District’s
insurance specialist and coordinator. (Id.)
9 Jensen has a B.S. in Finance from Northern Illinois University.
(Doc. #38-6, p. 1.) She has worked as a financial analyst and
manager for Dial Corporation, a $1.7 billion company. (Id.) She
has experience as a director, manager and coordinator at the Cape
Coral Charter School Authority and the School District. (Id.)
has he done so since. (Id. at 67.) Riegel does not even know the
basics of risk management. (Id. at 30–36, 122–27, 136.)
Even so, Riegel believes he is “objectively more qualified”

than Wilson, and indeed, any other interviewee, because he has
made “unique contributions in identifying and mitigating institu-
tional risk.” (Doc. #39-1, p. 6.) He insists that the only reason
he was not hired is because the Board has a policy “of categorizing
employees [as] ineligible for rehire when they exercise their right
to petition the government for redress.” (Id. at 3.) At his
deposition, Riegel could not identify a single person affected by
such a policy. (Doc. #38-1, p. 57–59.) Nothing has changed since.
III.
From the Court’s review of the record, Riegel has failed to
identify genuine disputes of material fact on several matters cri-
tical to the survival of his claims: (a) Monell liability; (b)

“adverse" conduct by the Board; (c) a “causal connection” between
his protected speech and the Board’s conduct; and (d) the Board’s
same-decision defense.
Thus, the Board’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
A. Monell Liability
Riegel has three avenues to prove Monell liability. He could
identify: (1) an official policy; (2) an unofficial custom or
widespread practice so permanent and well settled as to constitute
a custom and usage with the force of law; or (3) a municipal
official with final policymaking authority whose decision violated
his constitutional rights. Chabad Chayil, Inc., 48 F.4th at 1229.
Riegel does not rely on an “official policy” of the Board.10

He has not shown a decision by an official with “final decision-
making authority.”11 His only colorable argument is that a decision
not to hire him because of his protected speech was made pursuant
to an “unofficial custom or widespread practice.” But that conten-
tion fails for lack of evidentiary support.
Proving Monell liability from an unofficial custom or wide-
spread practice requires evidence of “persistent” unconstitutional
conduct so “pervasive” and “widespread” as to be the “functional
equivalent of a policy adopted by the final policymaker.” Khoury
v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F.4th 1118, 1131 (11th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342–43 (11th
Cir. 1994)). The government must have “actual or constructive

knowledge” of the challenged conduct. Khoury, 4 F.4th at 1131
(citing Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir.
1986)). Evidence of only a “single incident,” conduct “too remote

10 He neither alleges nor provides evidence of such a policy.
11 “In Florida, school superintendents do not have final policy-
making authority [over] employment decisions.” Chabad Chayil,
Inc., 48 F.4th at 1230; Mizzell-Bullock, 2024 WL 65199, at *4.
Riegel’s attorney asserts otherwise, but cites no contrary
authority; instead, he parrots his client, who is not an attorney.
Compare (Doc. #39, pp. 2–3) and (Doc. #39-1, ¶ 5). See also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).
in time,” or conduct not shown to be unwarranted or “[un]constitu-
tional” will fall short. Khoury, 4 F.4th at 1132–33.
Riegel provides nothing to support his claim of an unofficial

custom or practice. The Eleventh Circuit has affirmed summary
judgment in cases with far more evidence. In Khoury v. Miami-Dade
Cnty. Sch. Bd., the plaintiff gave the following evidence to supp-
ort her claim challenging conduct from 2015: (1) “testimony” from
“whistleblowing employees” about School Board misconduct in 2012;
(2) internal communications and evidence of internal investiga-
tions in 2012 and 2013; and (3) “testimony” about seven incidents
from 2013 to 2016. Id. at 1131–32. The Court affirmed the rej-
ection of that evidence as “either too remote in time” or as “not
show[ing] a constitutional violation.” Id. at 1132–33 (explaining
that conduct from “three years before” was “too remote,” that
leadership changed before the 2015 incident, and that “no evidence”

indicated the prior reported incidents “were unwarranted”). That
left only the plaintiff’s “single incident,” which necessarily
could “not establish a custom.” Id. at 1133.
Here, to support his claim of an “unofficial custom or policy”
of retaliation against whistleblowers, Riegel relies on two asser-
tions with no evidentiary support. First, that the Board has
entered “dozens – if not hundreds – of settlement agreements” which
required employees to “either resign or waive any right to future
employment.” (Doc. #39-1, ¶ 6.) When asked for details at his
deposition, Riegel said he had no personal knowledge of and was
“not [] privy” to such information. (Doc. #38-1, p. 51.) When
asked to name one specific affected person, he could not. (Id. at

51–53.) Second, Riegel claims that the Board categorizes employees
as “ineligible for rehire” even when no settlement agreements are
reached. (Doc. #39-1, ¶ 6.) But again, at his deposition, Riegel
could not identify a single affected person. (Doc. #38-1, p. 57–
59.) Nothing has changed since.
Unlike Khoury, Riegel gives no evidence of specific inci-
dents, affected individuals, or dates, and like Khoury, he gives
no evidence that the alleged “dozens — if not hundreds — of set-
tlement agreements” involved unwarranted or unconstitutional con-
duct. Thus, even more so than Khoury, his claim turns on a “single
incident,” which cannot “establish a custom.” 4 F.4th at 1133.
Thus, the motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.
B. Adverse Conduct12

As mentioned earlier, the first element of Riegel’s retalia-
tion claim, “protected speech,” is undisputed. As to the second
element, the Board’s action is “adverse” if it would likely chill
the exercise of protected speech. Turner, 65 F.4th at 580. To
answer that question, the Court asks whether the challenged conduct

12 With the exception of the just-concluded section on Monell
liability, throughout this Opinion and Order, the same analysis
applies to Riegel’s Section 1983 claim and his state-law PWA claim.
Elver, 791 F. App’x at 58; Fla. Stat. § 1112.3187(10).
would “objectively” chill or deter protected speech. Bell, 6 F.4th
at 1379. That question is resolved “narrowly,” on the “circumstan-
ces” of this case. Id. at 1378–79.

The basic circumstances of this case are that an employer did
not hire an applicant to a job posting that was taken down and
closed who did not reapply when hiring was reopened, and the job
reposted, almost a year later. That is not conduct, considered
“objectively,” that would chill or deter protected speech. See
id. at 1378–79 (holding that under the narrow circumstances of a
case, a temporary suspension was not adverse). Other circumstances
bolster that conclusion. Riegel was unqualified — on paper and in
fact — for the Director of Risk Management role. A reasonable
person’s protected speech would not be chilled or deterred by the
Board’s refusal to hire Riegel, whose lack of qualifications is
clear to everyone other than himself.

On this ground as well, the motion is due to be granted.
C. Causation
To meet the third element of his claim, Riegel must show a
“causal connection” between the Board’s “retaliatory animus” and
his “injury.” Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Hartman, 547
U.S. at 259). The desire to retaliate must be the “but-for” cause
of the challenged conduct. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352. In other
words, Riegel must prove that the Board’s retaliatory motive caused
it not to hire him — that but for the Board’s ill will towards his
exercise of protected speech, it would not have denied him employ-
ment. Turner, 65 F.4th at 581.
“[I]n the absence of other evidence tending to show causation,

if there is a substantial delay between the protected expression
and the adverse action, the complaint of retaliation fails as a
matter of law.” Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361,
1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211,
1220 (11th Cir.2004) (citing Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257
F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir.2001))).
Here, there was a delay of over five years between Riegel’s
email in June 2018 and the Board’s challenged conduct in September
2023. As discussed below, no other evidence tends to show causa-
tion. So Riegel’s retaliation claims fail “as a matter of law.”13
Cooper Lighting, 506 F.3d at 1364.
Riegel gives no evidence that the 2023 Board knew of any

whistleblowing. In the absence of such evidence, he cannot show
that such activity “motivated [the Board] to retaliate.” Martin,
959 F.3d at 1054. Jeff Spiro was not, and has never been, a Board
member; his statements are irrelevant. Harland Clarke, 820 F.
App’x at 879 (“remarks by non-decisionmakers and remarks unrelated
to the decisionmaking process are of little probative value”).
Steve Teuber was not a Board member when Riegel sent the June 2018

13 Even if Riegel’s retaliation claims do not fail as a matter
of law, causation still is not established on this record.
email; his statements cannot be used to attribute knowledge to the
Board. Id. at 879.
Riegel’s claims turn on his generous — some have said,
“delusional”14 — assessment of his significance in matters of

State. Notably, despite the forcefulness and detail of Riegel’s
allegations, his affidavit uses only conclusory, vague, and gener-
al terms. See (Doc. #39-1, pp. 3, 4–5) (claiming “state-level
attention, changes in law, resignations of key personnel[,] and
long-term structural reforms” because of his “whistleblowing”).15
Indeed, Riegel only attests to one specific “change” caused by his
“whistleblowing”: Robert Dodig’s resignation at some point “af-
ter” certain “submissions” were made. (Doc. #39-1, p. 5 n.2.)
That Dodig resigned sometime “after” those submissions —
whose contents, dates, and recipients are unknown — is irrelevant;
“proving a temporal relationship . . . does not establish a causal

relationship.” Kilpatrick v. Berg, 613 F.3d 1329, 1343 (11th Cir.
2010) (rejecting the “post hoc ergo propter hoc16 fallacy which
assumes causation from temporal sequence”); Montgomery v. Bd. of

14 See (Doc. #38-1, pp. 152–53).
15 Conclusory statements in an affidavit cannot withstand summary
judgment. United States v. Stein, 769 Fed. App’x 828, 832–33 (11th
Cir. 2019). Statements about what an affiant “subjectively bel-
ieved” “as opposed to” actually “knew” do not give rise to genuine
issues of material fact. Id. Affidavit statements that do not
“set out facts . . . admissible in evidence” are disregarded. Id.
16 A Latin phrase that translates roughly to “after this, there-
fore because of this.”
Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama, No. 2:12-CV-2148-WMA, 2015 WL 1893-
471, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 2015) (explaining that in post-
Nassar Eleventh Circuit rulings, “post hoc, ergo propter hoc” does

not prove “activity was the ‘but-for’ cause of [adverse conduct]”).
Despite the breadth of Riegel’s allegations, there is no evidence
anyone has ever cared one way or the other about his “submissions.”
On this ground, too, the motion is due to be granted.
D. Same-Decision Defense
Even if Riegel could establish all three elements of retalia-
tion (he cannot), the Board would still prevail by proving that it
would have made the same decision, i.e., hired Wilson instead of
Riegel, even if Riegel had “never engaged in protected activity.”
See Warren, 90 F.4th at 1127 (citing Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287); Fla.
Stat. § 1112.3187(10).
The Board hired Wilson, who has a J.D. (Doc. #38-8, p. 1), a

business-related degree, (Doc. #38-2, p. 1.) Wilson has extensive
experience in insurance and risk and worked as the School Distr-
ict’s legal adjuster (Doc. #38-8, p. 1), which met the Board’s
need for experience in “risk management . . . in a public school
system,” (Doc. #38-2, p. 1.) As Wilson was the only candidate who
was an attorney in good standing, see William W. Wilson, FLORIDA
BAR, http://bit.ly/4eEriXB, he was far and above the most likely
to have expertise interpreting and applying federal, state, and
local laws and regulations, including those “related to student
and employee privacy, public information, and records retention.”
(Doc. #38-2, p. 1.) As for Riegel’s lack of qualifications, his
deposition speaks for itself. (Doc. #38-1, pp. 26-27, 30-36, 98-
100, 102, 117, 122-37.)
Thus, even if Riegel could overcome summary judgment on all
three elements of retaliation, the Board would still prevail ona
same-decision defense. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED :
(1) Defendant The School Board of Lee County, Florida’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #37) is GRANTED.
(2) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor
of Defendant The School Board of Lee County, Florida and
against Plaintiff Kevin Riegel, who shall take nothing.
(3) The Clerk of Court is further DIRECTED to terminate all
pending motions and deadlines and to close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 17th day of
July 2025.

if Afr
aff | fy Zz. Ab Zo0b
J9GHN E. STEELE
SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies: Parties of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11101221. Public record. Not legal advice.