# Ellis v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · July 15, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11100717

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** July 15, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11100717

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES P. ELLIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:25-cv-642
Judge Algenon L. Marbley
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF
REHABILITATION AND
CORRECTION,

Defendant.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, James P. Ellis, an Ohio inmate who is proceeding without the assistance of
counsel, sues the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”) under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that ODRC and its Bureau of Sentence Computation improperly modified
Plaintiff’s prison sentence without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
matter is before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of
Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1)–(2); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth,
114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). Having performed the initial screen, it is RECOMMENDED
that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2), Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 3),
Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 5), Motion for Immediate Release (ECF No. 7), and
Motion for Status Update (ECF No. 14).
This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2), which is GRANTED. (ECF
No. 1.) Plaintiff must pay the full amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
Plaintiff’s certified trust fund statement reveals that he has $47.49 in his prison account, which is
insufficient to pay the filing fee.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust accounts
(Inmate ID Number A309704) at the Marion Correctional Institution is DIRECTED to submit to
the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an initial partial
payment, 20% of the greater of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate trust account or
the average monthly balance in the inmate trust account, for the six months immediately
preceding the filing of the Complaint.

After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the
inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the
account exceeds $10.00, until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).
Checks should be made payable to: Clerk, United States District Court. The checks
should be sent to:
Prisoner Accounts Receivable
260 U.S. Courthouse
85 Marconi Boulevard
Columbus, Ohio 43215
The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check.
It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute his action without prepayment of
fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs
had been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and
the prison cashier’s office.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In
doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e):
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,
the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—
* * *
(B) the action or appeal—
(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte
dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or
upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See
also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring a court to conduct a screening of “a complaint in a civil action

in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity . . . [to] identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion
of the complaint [that is] frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted”).
Further, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the
basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule
8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual
demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,
727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading
that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”
is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not
“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial
plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The
plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the
strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504
(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,
614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient
treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim
asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).
II. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff was convicted after a jury trial in 1995 of aggravated murder and aggravated

burglary. On March 31, 1995, Plaintiff was sentenced by the Court of Common Pleas for
Hamilton County, Ohio,
to be imprisoned in Department of Corrections for a period of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT IN COUNT #3 [aggravated murder] AND TEN (10) YEARS
TO A MAXIMUM OF TWENTY-FIVE (25) YEARS WITH TEN (10) YEARS
ACTUAL INCARCERATION IN COUNT #4 [aggravated burglary] TO RUN
CONSECUTIVELY TO COUNT #3 WITH CREDIT OF TWO HUNDRED
NINETY-SIX (296) DAYS GIVEN FOR TIME SERVED.
(Judgment Entry, ECF No. 1-1, PAGEID #30.) At Plaintiff’s first parole hearing on May 27,
2015, parole was denied and Plaintiff’s next parole hearing was scheduled for 2025. The
Decision and Minutes for the 2015 parole hearing lists Plaintiff’s sentence as “30 to Life.” (ECF
No. 1-1, PAGEID #44.) On October 30, 2018, the Bureau of Sentencing Computation (“BOSC”)
sent Plaintiff a letter computing his sentence as “20 to Life consecutive to 10 to 25,” which
“translated as 30 to Life.” (ECF No. 1-1, PAGEID #31.) A second parole hearing was held on
February 18, 2025, at which parole was again denied, and the next parole hearing was scheduled
for 2028. Plaintiff’s sentence is again listed on the Decision and Minutes of the 2025 hearing as
“30.00–Life.” (ECF No. 1-1, PAGEID #36.)
Plaintiff asserts that the Hamilton County Court did not sentence him to “30 years to
life,” and that BOSC impermissibly altered his sentence without due process when they
computed his sentence as “30 years to life.” Plaintiff further argues that Ohio Revised Code
§ 2929.03 provides the only permissible sentences for aggravated murder, none of which are “20
to life”; such that BOSC improperly usurped the authority of the judicial branch by altering his
sentence for aggravated murder from “life imprisonment” to “20 to life.”1
Plaintiff advances a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his procedural due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. As relief, he seeks declaratory and injunctive

relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1, PAGEID #18–19).
“The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving individuals of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law.” Johnson v. Morales, 946 F.3d 911, 921 (6th Cir. 2020)
(citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). To establish a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due
process violation, a plaintiff must show that a liberty or property interest is at stake. Wilkinson v.
Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005). Thus, procedural due
process analysis involves two steps: “the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property
interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures
attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” Ky. Dep’t of Corrs. v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted).

As an initial matter, to the extent that Plaintiff advances claims for compensatory and
punitive damages against ODRC or BOSC, those claims must be dismissed under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment operates as a bar to federal-court jurisdiction
when a private citizen sues a state or its instrumentalities unless the state has given express
consent. Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1983); Lawson v. Shelby
Cty., 211 F.3d 331, 334 (6th Cir. 2000). “There are three exceptions to sovereign immunity:

1 Plaintiff moves for leave to file an addendum to his Complaint (ECF No. 12), which is
GRANTED. Plaintiff emphasizes in an addendum that he does not challenge the sentence as
imposed by the Hamilton County Court. Thus, his claim is not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477.
(1) when the state has waived immunity by consenting to the suit, (2) when Congress has
expressly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity, and (3) when the doctrine set forth in Ex
Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), applies.” Boler v. Earley, 865
F.3d 391, 410 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). None of these exceptions apply to Plaintiff’s

claims for damages. First, “Ohio has not waived sovereign immunity in federal court.” Mixon v.
State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999). Second, “Section 1983 does not abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Boler, 865 F.3d at 410 (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)). Third, the Ex Parte Young doctrine applies only when a plaintiff
brings “claims for prospective relief against state officials sued in their official capacity to
prevent future federal constitutional or statutory violations.” Boler, 865 F.3d at 412. Plaintiff’s
claims for compensatory and punitive damages fall outside the scope of Ex Parte Young.
Accordingly, any claims for damages must be dismissed.
As to Plaintiff’s requested declaratory and injunctive relief, there are several problems
with Plaintiff’s claims. First, Plaintiff’s allegations do not plausibly suggest that BOSC altered

the Hamilton County Court’s sentence. The Ohio Administrative Code explains the meaning of
the Hamilton County Court’s “life imprisonment” sentence:
A sentence of life imprisonment imposed pursuant to section 2929.03 of the
Revised Code for the offense of aggravated murder is presumed to be a sentence of
life imprisonment with parole eligibility after twenty years, . . . unless the journal
entry of the court specifies that parole eligibility is to be after twenty full years or
thirty full years.
Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-2-10. Thus, the Hamilton County Court’s sentence of “life
imprisonment” for aggravated murder is equivalent to a sentence of “life imprisonment with
parole eligibility after twenty years.” Plaintiff cannot seriously argue that there is a meaningful
difference between “life imprisonment with parole eligibility after twenty years” as provided by
the Ohio Administrative Code and “20 to life” as computed by BOSC. Thus, BOSC simply did
not alter Plaintiff’s murder sentence, impermissibly or otherwise.
Moreover, Plaintiff can demonstrate no due process injury from BOSC’s computation of
either his murder sentence (20 to life) or his aggregate sentence (30 to life). He expressly does

not challenge the underlying Hamilton County Court’s sentence; thus, he concedes that he was to
be incarcerated for a term constituting life imprisonment followed by a term of at least ten years.
As evidenced by his Motion for Immediate Release (ECF No. 7), Plaintiff’s ultimate goal is his
speedy release from prison. Plaintiff does not specify when he thinks he was entitled to his first
parole hearing under the Hamilton County Court’s sentence. But the Ohio statute he relies on for
permissible sentences for aggravated murder lists a minimum sentence of “[l]ife imprisonment
with parole eligibility after serving twenty years of imprisonment.” Ohio Rev. Code.
§ 2929.03(1)(b). Plaintiff received a parole hearing after being incarcerated for 20 years and
again after 30 years, and he has another parole hearing scheduled for 2028. Thus, Plaintiff
received consideration for release at the earliest possible time under the statute on which he

relies. Plaintiff does not identify what additional process he is due as a result of BOSC’s alleged
modification of his sentence. Without any denial of process, his due process claim necessarily
fails.
Finally, any claim under § 1983 based on the alleged modification of Plaintiff’s sentence
is time-barred. “In § 1983 suits, the applicable statute of limitations is determined by state law,
while the ‘date on which the statute of limitations begins to run . . . is a question of federal law.’”
King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dep’t of
Child.’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original)). Ohio Revised Code
§ 2305.10 sets forth a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. Browning v. Pendleton,
869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989). That statute of limitations “begins to run when the plaintiff
knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action.” Scott v. Ambani, 577
F.3d 642, 646 (6th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff was advised of BOSC’s computation of his sentence as
“30 to Life” at least as far back as his 2015 parole hearing. (See Ohio Parole Board Decision and

Minutes, ECF No. 1-1, PAGEID #44.) Plaintiff was again advised of BOSC’s computation by
letter in 2018. (ECF No. 1-1, PAGEID #31.) Thus, Plaintiff’s 2025 Complaint was filed well
outside the two-year limitations period.
The undersigned therefore recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety.
As a result, the undersigned also recommends that the Court deny Plaintiff’s Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2), Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 3),
Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 5), Motion for Immediate Release (ECF No. 7), and
Motion for Status Update (ECF No. 14) as moot.
III. DISPOSITION
For the reasons above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF
No. 1) is GRANTED;

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Addendum to Complaint (ECF No. 12) is
GRANTED;
It is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to
state a claim on which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2);
and
It is further RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2), Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 3),
Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 5), Motion for Immediate Release (ECF No. 7), and
Motion for Status Update (ECF No. 14).
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those
specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with
supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive
further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura
CHELSEY M. VASCURA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11100717. Public record. Not legal advice.