# McClain v. Strada

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · July 15, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11100561

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** July 15, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11100561

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing absolute prosecutorial immunity from suit under Section 1983 for all actions taken in capacity as officers of the court
- noting that “individuals sued in their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they represent,” such that the entities that employ such individuals “are the only true defendants in th[e] case”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JOHNNY EUGENE McCLAIN, #117427, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) NO. 3:25-cv-00557
)
F/N/U STRADA, et al., ) JUDGE RICHARDSON
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Johnny McClain, a state inmate incarcerated at the Trousdale Turner Correctional Center
(TTCC), filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1, “the Complaint”)
and paid the civil filing fee. (Doc. No. 2.)
The Complaint is now before the Court for the initial screening required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). See 28 U.S.C § 1915A(a) (“The court shall review, . . . as soon as
practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity[.]”).
I. PLRA SCREENING STANDARD
In cases filed by prisoners, the Court must conduct an initial screening and dismiss the
Complaint (or any portion thereof) if it is facially frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
To determine whether the Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, the
Court reviews for whether it alleges sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face,” such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)). At this stage, “the Court assumes the truth of ‘well-pleaded factual allegations’
and ‘reasonable inference[s]’ therefrom,” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 181
(2024) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79), but is “not required to accept legal conclusions or

unwarranted factual inferences as true.” Inner City Contracting, LLC v. Charter Twp. of Northville,
Michigan, 87 F.4th 743, 749 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). The Court must afford the pro se
Complaint a liberal construction, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), while viewing it in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Inner City, supra.
II. REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT
The Complaint is filed under Section 1983, which authorizes a federal action against any
person who, “under color of state law, deprives [another] person of rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution or conferred by federal statute.” Wurzelbacher v. Jones-
Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Complaint
must therefore plausibly allege (1) a deprivation of a constitutional or other federal right, and (2)

that the deprivation was caused by a “state actor.” Carl v. Muskegon Cnty., 763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th
Cir. 2014).
A. Allegations and Claims to Relief
Plaintiff alleges that he was stabbed multiple times by another inmate during an altercation
on August 21, 2024. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) He alleges that CoreCivic1 staff had “clear knowledge of
escalating tensions” between Plaintiff and inmate Jeremiah Key, as well as “specific threats posed
by [Key],” yet failed to take any action to protect him from Key’s attack. (Id.) During the

1 CoreCivic is a private corrections management firm that operates TTCC pursuant to contract with the
State of Tennessee. https://www.tn.gov/correction/state-prisons/state-prison-list/trousdale-turner-
correctional-center.html (last visited July 14, 2025).
altercation, correctional officers Hunt and Jane Doe watched without intervening. (Id.) As a result
of Key’s attack, Plaintiff suffered injuries including “a stab wound to his eye that now impairs his
vision.” (Id.) For over eleven hours after the attack, Plaintiff was denied medical care. (Id.) After
Plaintiff filed grievances, he “experienced retaliation orchestrated by CoreCivic staff, and physical

assault by correctional staff” on September 9, 2024, when Lt. Hill and three other, unnamed
officers “drug [him] into the showers and attempted to drown him while in handcuffs and fully
dressed.” (Id. at 2–3.) While this was going on in the showers, correctional officer Rickey Hill
sprayed pepper spray all over Plaintiff’s cell, causing further trauma to Plaintiff’s injured eye. (Id.
at 3.) Nurse Jane Doe witnessed the incident in the showers but “ran away when [Plaintiff] was
crying for help and did not report” the matter. (Id.)
In January 2025, Plaintiff and Key were placed in the same vehicle for transport to the
county jail in Hartsville, Tennessee. (Id.) On May 12, 2025, “high ranking officials” placed
Plaintiff in further danger by openly stating in the Pod that he was “running their Pod hot.” (Id.)
As a result of the August 2024 altercation with Key, Plaintiff was investigated and

criminally charged by attorneys Jack Bare and Nicholas Bailey, “despite no evidence he possessed
a weapon or initiated the altercation.” (Id.) The results of their allegedly improper investigation
were used against Plaintiff at his parole hearing. (Id.)
Plaintiff asserts Eighth Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to safety and to
serious medical needs, and for use of excessive force. He asserts Fourteenth Amendment claims
for denial of due process in disciplinary and retaliatory actions. He asserts retaliation claims under
the First Amendment. Finally, he claims violations of his rights under the Tenth Amendment and
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Doc. No. 1 at 3–4.) He sues the following Defendants in
their individual and official capacities:
Commissioner Strada; CEO Damon Hiniger (CoreCivic); Third Party Staffing
Agency; WellPath; Lt. E[d]mond Hill; Sgt. Bonds; SCO Campbell; ACOS
Mitchell; Contract Monitor Rickey Hill; Nurse Jane Doe; C/O Elisha Futrell; C/O
Hunt; Medical Personnel Trombley; Chief of Unit Managers Carter; 15th Judicial
District of TN ADA Jack Bare; Attorney Nicholas Bailey; Classification Crawford;
Chief Mitchell; Warden Huggin; Mrs. Arrington; Two John Doe Transportation
Officers; Warden Secretary Watts; Commanding Officer Ms. Fuqua; Jane Doe C/O
with C/O Hunt at the time of incident; Trousdale County Commissioner; Trousdale
County Judge Brown; Trousdale County, TN.

(Doc. No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff seeks relief including damages and the “[i]mmediate removal of any
detainer or fabricated criminal charge resulting from the August 2024 assault.” (Id. at 4–5.)
B. Legal Analysis
The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause requires that convicted
inmates be protected from known dangers to their personal health or safety and prohibits the use
of excessive force against them. Regarding failure to protect, an Eighth Amendment violation may
occur when prison guards fail to protect one inmate from an attack by another inmate. See Walker
v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1453 (6th Cir. 1990). However, “not all injuries suffered by an inmate
at the hands of another prisoner result in constitutional liability for prison officials under the Eighth
Amendment.” Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 1998). The inmate must show that
the defendant prison official was deliberately indifferent “to a substantial risk of serious harm” to
the inmate. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994); Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 294
(6th Cir. 2004). To meet this standard, the inmate must show “that the official was subjectively
aware of the risk” and “disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”
Greene, 361 F.3d at 294 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations that
“CoreCivic staff” knew of the tension between himself and inmate Key, as well as Key’s specific
threats, falls short of sufficiently pleading any particular official’s deliberate indifference to a
known risk. However, his allegation that correctional officers Hunt and Jane Doe watched the
attack without intervening is sufficient at this early stage to state a colorable failure-to-protect
claim, even though Key had a knife. See Walker, 917 F.2d at 1453 (“Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, the jury could have concluded that officers Ritz and Jordan
had opportunities to prevent the stabbing death . . . by intervening when Eggleston attacked Fails

in the yard as the guards looked on.”); but see Patmon v. Parker, 3 F. App’x 337, 338 (6th Cir.
2001) (affirming summary judgment for prison guards because guards “have no constitutional duty
to intervene in an armed assault by an inmate when the intervention would place the guard in
danger of physical harm”). Development of the factual record may establish otherwise, but at this
point, viewing the Complaint’s allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, they are
sufficient for this claim against correctional officers Hunt and Jane Doe to survive initial screening.
These two Defendants are also plausibly claimed to have been deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
serious need for medical treatment in the eleven hours after his stab wounds––including a stab
wound to his eye––were inflicted. See Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir.
2004) (“When prison officials are aware of a prisoner’s obvious and serious need for medical

treatment and delay medical treatment of that condition for non-medical reasons, their conduct in
causing the delay creates the constitutional infirmity.”).
Regarding excessive force, the “core judicial inquiry” in considering such a claim is
“whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm.’” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (quoting Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). In addition to this subjective inquiry, there is also an objective
component to Eighth Amendment excessive-force claims, which requires the pain inflicted to be
sufficiently serious. Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)). However, the Court may not apply a “de minimis
injury” test to such claims, as “the judicial inquiry should focus on ‘the nature of the force rather
than the extent of the injury.’” Williams, 631 F.3d at 384 (quoting Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 34).
Presuming the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations that Lt. Hill and three other, unnamed officers “drug
[him] into the showers and attempted to drown him while in handcuffs and fully dressed” (id. at

2–3), the Court finds that the serious nature of the force, the maliciousness of its application, and
the seriousness of the resulting injury are colorably established for purposes of initial review.
Further factual development may reveal otherwise, but at this early stage, Plaintiff’s allegations
are sufficient to allow his claim for excessive force to proceed against Lt. Hill and the three
unnamed officers (whose identities must soon be ascertained) in their individual capacity, whether
those Defendants used force against Plaintiff themselves or failed to protect him from another
officer’s use of force. See Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Our cases teach
that, in order to hold Officer Scott liable for the use of excessive force, Mrs. Turner must prove
that he (1) actively participated in the use of excessive force, (2) supervised the officer who used
excessive force, or (3) owed the victim a duty of protection against the use of excessive force.”)
(citing cases).2

Plaintiff alleges that the excessive use of force occurred “[u]pon filing grievances”
concerning the assault and its aftermath. (Doc. No. 1 at 2–3.) Regardless of whether subsequent
disciplinary proceedings resulted in a finding that Plaintiff was responsible for misconduct related
to his altercation with Key, he may assert a plausible claim of First Amendment retaliation based
on the alleged shower incident and Defendant Rickey Hill’s dousing of his cell with pepper spray

2 Nurse Jane Doe on the other hand, who allegedly witnessed the shower incident and ran away, cannot be
held liable for her “mere presence during the altercation, without a showing of some direct responsibility”
or a showing that she “had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring.” Burgess
v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 475 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Turner, supra). The Complaint’s allegations do not
support a plausible claim that Nurse Jane Doe can be held liable for failing to intervene in the correctional
officers’ use of excessive force.
in response to his protected conduct of filing a nonfrivolous grievance. See Maben v. Thelen, 887
F.3d 252, 262–64 (6th Cir. 2018). To state such a claim, Plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged
in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of
ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was

motivated at least in part by his protected conduct. Id. at 262, 264. Liberally construing the
Complaint’s allegations in Plaintiff’s favor, they are sufficient to plausibly establish these three
elements and allow his retaliation claim to proceed against Lt. Hill, correctional officer Rickey
Hill, and the three unnamed correctional officers, all in their individual capacity.
Plaintiff’s claims to denial of his Tenth Amendment rights, his Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights “in disciplinary . . . actions,” and of “[d]iscrimination in federally assisted programs”
under Title VI (see Doc. No. 1 at 3–4), are stated sparsely and in conclusory fashion. They are not
supported by any facts concerning the alleged discrimination or the procedures during prison
disciplinary proceedings against him, nor do they identify the Defendant(s) to which they are
directed. The rules governing pleading in federal court require that a complaint contain only “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). But that short and plain statement must be supported by “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true,” to make the claimed right to relief not just possible, but plausible. Hill, 630 F.3d
at 470–71. This standard does not require detailed factual allegations, but it does require “more
than labels[,] conclusions, [or] a formulaic recitation” of the elements of a cause of action. Ryan
v. Blackwell, 979 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007)). The Complaint’s factual allegations must be “sufficient to give notice to the defendant
as to what claims are alleged” against him, Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722
(6th Cir. 2010), and to enable the Court to determine the viability of those claims. Here, the
Complaint is devoid of factual material which would enable the Court to analyze the viability of
Plaintiff’s Tenth, Fourteenth, and Title VI claims under the standards discussed above. Those
claims therefore will be dismissed.
As stated above, Plaintiff’s First and Eighth Amendment claims will proceed against

Defendants Hunt, correctional officer Jane Doe, Lt. Edmond Hill, Rickey Hill, and three unnamed
correctional officers. All other individual Defendants named in the Complaint’s caption (see Doc.
No. 1 at 1) but not otherwise referred to in its factual allegations or claims (see id. at 2–3)3 will be
dismissed from this action. See Green v. Correct Care Sols., No. 3:14-cv-01070, 2014 WL
1806997, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. May 7, 2014) (citing cases) (“It is a basic pleading essential that a
plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. Where a person is named as a
defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal as to that
defendant, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints.”); see also Murphy
v. Grenier, 406 F. App’x 972, 974 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Personal involvement is necessary to establish
section 1983 liability.”) (citing Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1991)).

Moreover, Plaintiff’s claims against Trousdale County, Third Party Staffing Agency, and
WellPath, as well as his official-capacity claims against Hunt, correctional officer Jane Doe, Lt.
Edmond Hill, Rickey Hill, and the three unnamed correctional officers, all require the injury
claimed by Plaintiff and attributed to those Defendants to have resulted from the application of a
policy or custom of the entity, or a policy or custom of the employer of those individuals sued in
their official capacity. See Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 2012) (requiring § 1983

3 These Defendants include Commissioner Strada, CEO Hiniger, Sgt. Bonds, SCO Campbell, ACOS
Mitchell, C/O Elisha Futrell, Medical Personnel Trombley, Chief of Unit Managers Carter, Classification
Crawford, Chief Mitchell, Warden Huggin, Mrs. Arrington, Two John Doe Transportation Officers,
Warden Secretary Watts, Commanding Officer Ms. Fuqua, the (unnamed) Trousdale County
Commissioner, and Trousdale County Judge Brown.
claims against private contractors or private corporations employed by a state to be supported by
allegations that a policy or custom of the entity was the moving force behind the constitutional
deprivation); Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 255 (6th Cir. 2010) (requiring that a § 1983
claim against a municipality be supported by a showing that the moving force behind the injury

was a municipal policy or custom); Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that
“individuals sued in their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they represent,” such
that the entities that employ such individuals “are the only true defendants in th[e] case”). No such
policy-or-custom allegations are contained within the Complaint, so the case will not proceed
against the municipal/organizational defendants, or against the aforementioned TTCC employees
in their official capacity.
Finally, the attorneys who (allegedly) “improperly initiated criminal charges against
Plaintiff” and opposed his effort to win release on parole, Jack Bare and Nicholas Bailey, are
immune from suit under Section 1983 over their actions on behalf of the State of Tennessee. As
state employees, prosecutors in their official capacity share the sovereign immunity of the state

that they represent. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66, 169 (1985) (“The Court has
held that, absent waiver by the State or valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment
bars a damages action against a State in federal court. This bar remains in effect when State
officials are sued for damages in their official capacity.”) (citations omitted); Morgan v. Bd. of
Pro. Resp. of the Supreme Ct. of Tennessee, 63 F.4th 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2023) (“As for suits under
§ 1983, Tennessee has not consented to such lawsuits and Congress has not removed states’
sovereign immunity under the statute.”). In their individual capacity as well, Bare and Bailey are
entitled to prosecutorial immunity from suit because their alleged wrongful actions were
“intimately associated with the judicial process,” such as the initiating of criminal charges against
Plaintiff over the August 2024 altercation and the opposition of his release on parole, even if such
actions amount to “unquestionably illegal or improper conduct, including instances where a
defendant is genuinely wronged.” Price v. Montgomery Cnty., Kentucky, 72 F.4th 711, 719–20
(6th Cir. 2023) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Van de Kamp v.

Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341–43 (2009) (recognizing absolute prosecutorial immunity from suit
under Section 1983 for all actions taken in capacity as officers of the court); Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (“We hold only that in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the
State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under [§] 1983.”). And any
constitutional claim of malicious prosecution which might escape the reach of prosecutorial
immunity would require Plaintiff to establish that the criminal proceeding was resolved in his
favor, Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 309 (6th Cir. 2010), which he has not pled.4
III. PENDING MOTIONS
Because the results of PLRA screening will include the dismissal of Defendant Bailey from
this action, “Defendant Bailey’s Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. No. 13) is DENIED as moot.

It is further apparent that many filings in this matter have been made by an individual
Plaintiff identifies as “my legal aid,” Ms. Jacqueline Mayberry. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 1.) Those filings
include the pending “Motion to Add a Name” (Doc. No. 8), “Motion to Amend Complaint” (Doc.

4 Relatedly, the “removal of any . . . fabricated criminal charge” filed by Bailey (Doc. No. 1 at 4) is not
relief that is available to Plaintiff under Section 1983. It is well settled that direct challenges to pending
charges, as distinguished from the “circumstances” or conditions of the charged detainee’s confinement,
are not properly lodged under Section 1983 but are within the sole province of habeas corpus. See
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (“Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to
particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus.”); Davenport v. Miller, No. 2:24-CV-
2838, 2024 WL 4440971, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 8, 2024) (habeas corpus is sole remedy for detainee seeking
nonmonetary relief based on defects in criminal pretrial proceedings), report and recommendation adopted,
2024 WL 4665665 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2024); Guzman v. Gadson, No. 1:21-CV-3135-MHC-RDC, 2021
WL 11718275, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2021) (“Plaintiff’s § 1983 action must be dismissed as § 1983 is
not available for a challenge seeking the dismissal of a criminal indictment.”), report and recommendation
adopted, 2021 WL 11718270 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 2021).
No. 26), and “Motion for Injunctive Relief” (Doc. No. 27). These motions arrived via mail from
Ms. Mayberry’s residential address in Madison, Tennessee, signed and submitted for filing by her
as though she were Plaintiff’s attorney. But there is no indication that Ms. Mayberry in a licensed
attorney. Accordingly, she may not represent Plaintiff in this Court. Bass v. Leatherwood, 788 F.3d

228, 230 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Federal law allows parties to plead and conduct their own cases
personally or by counsel. … The rule against non-lawyer representation protects the rights of those
before the court by preventing an ill-equipped layperson from squandering the rights of the party
he purports to represent.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The pending motions
improperly filed by Ms. Mayberry on Plaintiff’s behalf (Doc. Nos. 8, 26, and 27) are DENIED.
Plaintiff and Ms. Mayberry are admonished that all future filings in this pro se case must
be signed personally by Plaintiff, not by Ms. Mayberry (or any other non-lawyer) purportedly on
Plaintiff’s behalf. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). The Clerk SHALL provide Ms. Mayberry with a copy
of this Order at the return address provided on her mailings. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 26 at 2.)
IV. CONCLUSION

As discussed above, the Complaint in this case will be allowed to proceed beyond initial
screening with respect to seven defendants. For three of them (Hunt, Edmond Hill, and Rickey
Hill), there appear to be service returns on file. (See Doc. No. 7.) Having paid the filing fee,
Plaintiff is responsible for ensuring that each of the other remaining Defendant is served with a
summons and a copy of the Complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1). Resources for pro se litigants,
including instructions for how to accomplish service of process, are available free of charge on the
Court’s website as well as by request to the Clerk’s Office so long as the privilege is not abused.
As to correctional officer Jane Doe and the three unnamed correctional officers, process
cannot be served, because process cannot be served upon unidentified individuals. Therefore,
Plaintiff MUST exercise due diligence and conduct a reasonable investigation to promptly
determine the full names of these Defendants so that process can be timely served under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Plaintiff MUST then file a motion to amend the Complaint to name
the Defendants. Upon referral, the Magistrate Judge may take any necessary action related to
service of process upon the unnamed Defendants, including providing for Plaintiff to serve early,
limited discovery to ascertain their identity or ordering the TTCC warden to provide identifying
information.
Defendants Strada, Hiniger, Bonds, Campbell, Mitchell, Futrell, Trombley, Carter,
Crawford, Mitchell, Huggin, Arrington, John Doe Transportation Officers, Watts, Fuqua,
Trousdale County Commissioner, Trousdale County Judge Brown, Trousdale County, Third Party
Staffing Agency, WellPath, Nurse Jane Doe, Bare, and Bailey are DISMISSED from this action.
The Court’s determination that the Complaint states colorable claims for purposes of this
initial screening does not preclude the Court from dismissing any claim at any time for the reasons
set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), nor does it preclude any Defendant from filing a motion to
dismiss any claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12.
This action is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge to oversee service of process, to enter
a scheduling order for the management of the case, to dispose or recommend disposition of any
pretrial motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), and to conduct further proceedings, if
necessary, under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11100561. Public record. Not legal advice.