# Walther v. Stange

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · July 14, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11099393

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** July 14, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

SHAWN M. WALTHER, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 1:23-cv-00067-SNLJ
)
BILL STANGE, )
)
Respondent. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On April 24, 2023, Petitioner Shawn M. Walther (“Walther”) filed this Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254. This Court
then ordered Respondent Bill Stange to show cause why the relief requested in Walther’s
motion should not be granted. Based on the reasons set forth below, this Court will
dismiss Walther’s claims as waived and procedurally barred or otherwise deny them
without an evidentiary hearing because they fail as a matter of law.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2018, a jury found Petitioner Shawn Walther guilty of first-degree robbery and
armed criminal action. The Circuit Court of St. Louis County then sentenced Walther to
30 years’ imprisonment. Petitioner is an inmate at the Southeast Correctional Center in
Charleston, Missouri. Respondent Bill Stange is the Warden of the Southeast
Correctional Center and supervises Walther’s custody while he serves his sentence. Thus,
Warden Stange is the proper respondent in this case. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 2(a).
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In federal habeas review, this Court is limited to the evidentiary record presented

in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181–82 (2011).
This Court must presume that facts found by the state courts are correct, unless Walther
rebuts that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. § 2254(e). On direct appeal,
the Missouri Court of Appeals summarized the evidence at trial as follows:
[Walther] approached a Circle K convenience store clerk, outside on a
cigarette break. When the clerk finished smoking, [Walther] followed her
into the store and asked for all the money in the cash register. The clerk
thought [Walther] was joking, but [Walther] insisted he was serious and
pointed a gun at her. The clerk gave [Walther] some of the money in the
register and tried to close the drawer, but [Walther] said, “I want all of it.”
The clerk gave [Walther] all the money, and [Walther] left. The clerk called
the police and described [Walther]’s appearance. The store’s surveillance
camera captured [Walther]’s entire interaction with the clerk. The clerk
testified Appellant did not ask her to call the police

[Walther] fled the scene and approached a Metropolitan Sewer District
worker near the River Des Peres less than a mile away from the Circle K.
[Walther] claimed he had twisted his ankle in the woods nearby and offered
to pay the worker $10 for a ride across the river in his work vehicle. The
worker thought this was odd considering there were no woods nearby and
said he could lose his job if he gave [Walther] a ride. The worker noticed a
police car nearby and suggested [Walther] ask the police for help. [Walther]
then jumped down into a ditch.

The worker summoned the police officer, who was coincidentally responding
to the 911 call from the Circle K. The officer drew her weapon, approached
[Walther] in the ditch, and told [Walther] to raise his hands. [Walther] was
reluctant to move his hands out from under his sweatshirt, but he eventually
complied when a second police officer arrived. The officers arrested
[Walther] without incident and found a .38 caliber pistol on the ground with
a bullet in the chamber. The officers found a large amount of cash in
[Walther]’s right front pocket. The Circle K clerk identified [Walther] as the
robber at the scene of the arrest. [Walther] then apologized to the clerk.

Resp. Ex. E at 2.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. AEDPA1 Deference Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

In deference to the state-court decisions, federal courts cannot grant relief on
claims that were previously denied in state court, unless the state-court decisions on those
claims contradicted or unreasonably applied clearly established federal law or rested on
an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
In reviewing whether a state court’s application of federal law was unreasonable,
federal courts review the legal conclusion reached by the court, not merely its rationale.

Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 2012). Where there is no conspicuous
misapplication of on-point Supreme Court precedent, the proper question is whether there
is “any reasonable argument” that the state court’s judgment is consistent with federal
law. Id. “The state court need not cite or even be aware of the governing Supreme Court
cases, ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision

contradicts them.’” Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Early
v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). A state court’s application of federal law is not
unreasonable simply because it is incorrect. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410
(2000). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas
relief so long as ‘fair-minded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s

decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

1 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
B. Procedural Default
A prisoner seeking federal habeas relief must first exhaust the remedies available

in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). State courts are entitled to the first opportunity to
address and correct alleged violations of the prisoner’s federal rights. Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1991)).
To preserve issues for federal habeas review, a prisoner must fairly present his
claims to state courts during direct appeal or state post-conviction proceedings. Sweet v.
Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1149 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Nave v. Delo, 62 F.3d 1024, 1030 (8th

Cir. 1995)). “A procedural default occurs when a prisoner violates a state procedural rule
and this violation serves as an independent and adequate state-law basis to uphold the
state courts’ dismissal of the claim,” Franklin v. Hawley, 879 F.3d 307, 311 (8th Cir.
2018) (citing Murphy v. King, 652 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 2011)), or when, “a federal
habeas petitioner’s claims [do not] rely on the same factual and legal bases relied on in

state court.” Interiano v. Dormire, 471 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Winfield v.
Roper, 460 F.3d 1026, 1034 (8th Cir. 2006); Osborne v. Purkett, 411 F.3d 911, 919 (8th
Cir. 2005); Jones v. Jerrison, 20 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[F]air presentation”
requires petitioners to, “present the same facts and legal theories to the state court that he
later presents to the federal courts”).

Where a petitioner has procedurally defaulted on his claims, he is barred from
bringing them in a federal habeas corpus petition, unless he can establish cause and
prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Franklin, 879 F.3d at 311 (citing
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995).
C. Evidentiary Limits Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)
Federal law prohibits habeas courts from expanding the record beyond the

evidence presented in state court, unless a habeas petitioner can satisfy the standard
required by § 2254(e)(2). “Although state prisoners may sometimes submit new
evidence in federal court, AEDPA’s statutory scheme is designed to strongly discourage
them from doing so.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). Where a habeas
petitioner seeks to expand the record beyond the evidence presented in state court, “the
conditions prescribed by § 2254(e)(2) must [] be met.” Mark v. Ault, 498 F.3d 775, 788

(8th Cir. 2007). Section 2254(e)(2) states:
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court
proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim
unless the applicant shows that--

(A) the claim relies on—

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously
discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error,
no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of
the underlying offense.

In enacting AEDPA, Congress made the deliberate choice to limit both the types
of claims cognizable in federal habeas proceedings and the evidence that federal courts
can consider in support of those claims. § 2254(a)–(g); Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181.
Section 2254(d) limits the evidence for claims presented in state court and § 2254(e)(2),
“restricts the discretion of federal habeas courts to consider new evidence when deciding
claims that were not adjudicated on the merits in state court.” Id. at 186. Read together,

§ 2254(d) and § 2254(e)(2) work in tandem to prohibit new evidence in federal habeas
review in all but the rarest of cases—those where evidence that could not have been
discovered before sheds new light on the petitioner’s constitutional claims in a way that
would likely acquit them of the underlying offense.
“[U]nder AEDPA and [Supreme Court] precedents, state post-conviction
counsel’s ineffective assistance in developing the state-court record is attributed to the

prisoner.” Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718, 1734 (2022). “[W]hen a federal habeas
court convenes an evidentiary hearing for any purpose, or otherwise admits or reviews
new evidence for any purpose, it may not consider that evidence on the merits of a
negligent prisoner’s defaulted claim, unless the exceptions in § 2254(e)(2) are satisfied.”
Id. at 1738.

D. Statute of Limitations
Walther’s petition appears timely filed within the statute of limitations provided in
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Federal law imposes a one-year statute of limitations for state
prisoners to file for federal habeas relief. § 2244(d)(1). That time begins to run on, “the
date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of time for seeking such review.” § 2244(d)(1)(A); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565
U.S. 134, 150–51 (2012).
Walther filed a timely appeal after he was sentenced, and the Missouri Court of
Appeals issued an opinion on August 20, 2019. Resp. Ex. B at 102, 107; Resp. Ex. E at
1. Walther did not seek rehearing or transfer, and therefore his convictions became final
fifteen days later, on September 4, 2019. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 81.04(a). The statute of

limitations then ran for 75 days until Walther filed a Rule 29.15 motion on November 18,
2019. Resp. Ex. F at 38; § 2244(d)(2) (Statute is tolled while a, “properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending.”); Artuz v.
Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 7–9 Federal (2000). Walther’s post-conviction proceedings tolled
the statute of limitations until the Missouri Court of Appeals issued its mandate affirming
the denial of post-conviction relief on September 22, 2022. Resp. Ex. J at 2;

§ 2244(d)(2); King v. Hobbs, 666 F.3d 1132, 1136 (8th Cir. 2012). The statute of
limitations ran once again for 207 days until Walther mailed the petition in this case in on
April 17, 2023. Doc. 1-5 at 1; Nichols v. Bowersox, 172 F.3d 1068, 1074 (8th Cir. 1999);
King, 666 F.3d at 1136. In total, the statute of limitations ran for 282 days, so Walther’s
petition is timely.

IV. DISCUSSION
Walther’s petition appears to raise five grounds for relief.
A. Ground One
Walther first raises a claim of trial court error, arguing that the trial court refused
to submit a diminished capacity instruction to the jury. Doc. 1 at 11. This claim will be

denied because it is meritless under §2254(d).
“As a general rule, jury instructions do not form a basis for habeas corpus relief.”
Williams v. Lockhart, 736 F.2d 1264, 1267 (8th Cir. 1984). “The request for additional
jury instructions is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Wallace
v. Lockhart, 701 F.2d 719, 729 (8th Cir. 1983) (quoting Richards v. Solem, 693 F.2d 760,
766 (8th Cir. 1982)). “A federal court may grant habeas corpus relief only if the trial

judge’s erroneous refusal to accept additional jury instructions denied [the] petitioner due
process.” Wallace, 701 F.2d at 729 (quoting Richards, 693 F.2d at 766). In Missouri,
“[t]he submission of a diminished-capacity instruction ‘is mandatory only if requested by
the Defendant and [] supported by evidence of mental disease or defect relevant to the
existence of [the] required culpable mental state.’” State v. Knight, 355 S.W.3d 556, 559
(Mo. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Moore, 1. S.W.3d 586, 590 (Mo. App. 1999)) (internal

quotation marks and emphasis omitted). “A defendant is presumed to be free from
mental disease or defect unless he presents substantial evidence to the contrary.” Moore,
1 S.W.3d at 590 (emphasis omitted), and demonstrates that, “[t]he existence of [said]
mental disease or defect [] [is] linked to the existence of [the] requi[site] [] mental state.”
Knight, 355 S.W.3d at 559.

Walther’s first claim argues that the trial court erred in refusing to provide the jury
with a diminished capacity instruction. Doc. 1 at 11. The state trial court determined that
Walther had failed to present evidence of a mental disease or defect substantial enough to
necessitate a diminished capacity instruction because his medical records indicated that
the physician who had previously diagnosed him with bipolar disorder had withdrawn

this diagnosis. Resp. Ex. A at 57–59. In addition, the State’s mental health expert
concluded that he did not have a mental disease or defect as defined by the pertinent
statute. Resp. Ex. E at 8. The appellate court on direct appeal also found that Walther’s
mental disease or defect evidence failed to negate his, “intent to permanently deprive
Circle K of money,” because he had “confessed to police [that, before the robbery,] he
was craving methamphetamine and contemplating how to get more money for drugs.”

Resp. Ex. E at 12 (quotation marks omitted).
The findings of the state courts adhere to the Wallace standard because they
clearly demonstrate that Walther was afforded the process he was entitled to. After
requesting a diminished capacity instruction, Walther was provided with the opportunity
to present substantial evidence of a mental disease or defect, as well as the opportunity to
demonstrate how this alleged defect negated his mens rea. He simply failed to establish

either of these elements. Thus, the decisions of these lower courts both reasonably apply
federal law and make apparent the reasons as to why Walther’s first claim lacks merit.
At the very least, Walther has failed to raise facts demonstrating that every fair-minded
jurist could agree that the trial court violated his right to procedural due process in
refusing to submit a diminished capacity instruction. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101

(quoting Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664). Therefore, the Court will give deference to the
rulings of these lower courts as required under § 2254(d) and deny Walther’s first claim
as meritless.
B. Grounds Two, Three, and Four
Walther’s second, third, and fourth claims allege that the Rule 29.15 motion court

erred in denying his state post-conviction motion without a hearing because it denied
Walther’s claim that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to peremptorily strike a
juror, for failing to establish that he suffered from a mental disease or defect using either
a witness or his medical records, and for failing to request a trial court inquiry as to why
the jury foreman signed the “not guilty” verdict forms. Doc. 1. The Court will deny
Walther’s second, third, and fourth claims because they are not cognizable on federal

habeas review. Even if the Court were to consider the merits of Walther’s second, third,
and fourth claims, they are meritless under § 2254(d).
1. Walther’s second, third, and fourth claims do not present a basis for federal
habeas relief.

Federal courts may only grant habeas relief to state prisoners if their custody
violates federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)
(“‘[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”). To the extent that
Walther challenges the post-conviction court’s application of Missouri Supreme Court
Rule 29.15(h), which governs when a post-conviction evidentiary hearing is required, his
claims fail to state a basis for federal habeas relief. Williams-Bey v. Trickey, 894 F.2d
314, 317 (8th Cir. 1990). “Because there is no federal constitutional requirement that
states provide a means of post-conviction review of state convictions, an infirmity in a
state post-conviction proceeding does not raise a constitutional issue cognizable in a
federal habeas petition.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, to the extent

that Walther argues that the post-conviction court should have held an evidentiary
hearing on his second, third, and fourth claims, these claims fail to state a basis for
federal habeas relief and will be denied.
2. Walther’s second, third, and fourth claims are meritless under § 2254(d).

Walther’s second claim alleges that the Rule 29.15 motion court erred in denying
his state post-conviction motion without a hearing because it denied Walther’s claim that
his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to peremptorily strike a juror. Doc. 1 at 19.
The lower courts determined that Walther’s trial attorneys were not ineffective in

choosing not to strike the juror at issue. Resp. Ex. F 123–24; Resp. Ex. I at 7–9. While
this juror provided that he had, “always held law enforcement in high esteem, and []
[thought that] they are general[ly] held to a higher standard of trust and honesty than the
average person,” he also stated that he “could set [his opinions] aside and would consider
a police officer’s testimony ‘just like anyone else.’” Resp. Ex. F at 123. The motion
court concluded that, based on this juror’s latter response, it was reasonable for Walther’s

trial attorneys not to strike him. Id. at 123–124. The appellate court on post-conviction
appeal found that this additional response indicated the juror’s intent to be objective and
determined that Walther’s claim was thus refuted by the record. Resp. Ex. I at 9.
Walther’s third claim asserts that the Rule 29.15 motion court erred in denying his
state post-conviction motion without a hearing because it denied Walther’s claim that his

trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to establish that he suffered from a mental
disease or defect using either a witness or his medical records. Doc. 1 at 29-30. The
lower courts concluded that Walther’s trial attorneys were not ineffective in failing to
present such evidence. Resp. Ex. F at 124; Resp. Ex. I at 9. The motion court provided
that Walther’s attorneys, in lieu of calling their own mental health expert, elected to

question the State’s expert, “about her review of [Walther’s] medical notes and
diagnoses[.]” Resp. Ex. F at 123. The post-conviction appellate court found that, even if
Walther’s trial attorneys had presented the evidence at issue, Walther would not have
been entitled to a diminished capacity instruction because he had still not established that
his “bipolar diagnosis conincide[d] with the time of the robbery.” Resp. Ex. I at 10. In
addition, the appellate court provided that Walther’s “attorneys did offer evidence of his

bipolar disorder during the sentencing phase,” specifically referring to his “BJC
Behavioral health records.” Id. at 11.
Walther’s fourth claim argues that the Rule 29.15 motion court erred in denying
his state post-conviction motion without a hearing because it denied Walther’s claim that
his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to request a trial court inquiry as to why the
jury foreman signed the “not guilty” verdict forms. Doc. 1 at 41. The lower courts

determined that this claim did not state a basis for relief. Resp. Ex. F at 124; Resp. Ex. I
at 12. The motion court asserted that Walther could not, “show how the failure to request
the jury to be polled resulted in prejudice to [him].” Resp. Ex. F at 124. The appellate
court on post-conviction appeal provided that the foreperson’s signature on the “not
guilty” verdict forms was crossed out, and that, after the jury entered its guilty verdicts,

the “court poll[ed] the jury and each individual juror orally confirmed the verdicts’
accuracy.” Resp. Ex. I at 12–13.
The findings of the lower courts adhere to the Strickland standard. In denying
Walther’s second claim, the lower courts concluded that Walther’s trial attorneys were
not ineffective. Resp. Ex. F at 124; Resp. Ex. I at 9. The record indicates that the

allegedly biased juror made statements demonstrating objectivity, which establishes both
that Walther’s trial attorneys did not act unreasonably, and that Walther cannot prove
prejudice resulting from their decision not to strike this juror. Resp. Ex. F at 123; Resp.
Ex. I at 8. In deciding Walther’s third claim, the lower courts once again found that
Walther’s trial attorneys were not ineffective. Resp. Ex. F at 124; Resp. Ex. I at 9. The
record makes clear that Walther could not establish his entitlement to a diminished

capacity instruction, so his trial attorney’s electing not to present evidence of his mental
disease or defect was a reasonable, non-prejudicial attempt to avoid wasting time and
presenting cumulative evidence. Resp. Ex. F at 123–24; Resp. Ex. I at 9–12. In denying
Walther’s fourth claim, the lower courts determined that he failed to establish ineffective
assistance. Resp. Ex. F at 124; Resp. Ex. I at 12. The record makes apparent that the
jury had been polled to confirm its guilty verdicts, indicating that Walther was not

prejudiced by his trial attorney’s alleged failure to request a similar or additional inquiry.
Resp. Ex. I at 12–13.
The decisions of these lower courts both reasonably apply federal law and make
apparent the reasons as to why Walther’s second, third, and fourth claims lack merit. At
the very least, Walther has failed to raise facts demonstrating that every fair-minded jurist

could agree as to the incorrectness of the motion court’s decision to deny these claims
without an evidentiary hearing. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough,
541 U.S. at 664). Therefore, the Court will deny Walther’s second, third, and fourth
claims as meritless.
C. Ground Five

Walther’s fifth claim alleges that the Rule 29.15 motion court erred in denying his
state post-conviction motion without a hearing because it denied Walther’s claim that the
trial court erroneously refused to accept the “not guilty” verdict forms and failed to
inquire as to why the foreman signed these forms. Doc. 1 at 51. The Court will deny
Walther’s fifth claim because it is procedurally defaulted. Furthermore, this claim is not
cognizable on federal habeas review and is meritless under § 2254(d).

1. Walther’s fifth claim is procedurally defaulted.

In Missouri, “a post-conviction motion cannot be used as a substitute for a direct []
[] appeal . . . .” Stallings v. State, 784 S.W.2d 862, 863 (Mo. App. 1990) (citing McCrary
v. State, 529 S.W.2d 467, 471 (Mo. App. 1975)). “A defendant who deliberately
bypasses his right of appeal cannot[,] by post-conviction proceedings[,] raise claims of
error he might have raised on direct appeal.” Id. (quoting Thompson v. State, 651 S.W.2d
657, 657–8 (Mo. App. 1983).
Walther’s fifth claim argues that the trial court erred in not accepting the “not
guilty” verdict forms and not inquiring as to why the foreman signed these forms. Doc. 1
at 51. Walther failed to raise this claim of trial-court error on direct appeal. Resp. Ex. C.
Therefore, because Walther violated Missouri’s rule requiring trial court errors to be

addressed on direct appeal, this Court has an independent and adequate state-law basis for
denying his fifth claim as procedurally defaulted.
Walther attempts to excuse the default of his fifth claim due to, “a very real and
apparent conflict of interest.” Doc. 1 at 56. Specifically, he alleges that his trial
attorneys made promises that they could not keep and ignored his abuse allegations and

requests to present additional evidence of his mental disease or defect. Id. at 56–60. To
prove that a conflict of interest exists for the purpose of establishing cause and prejudice,
a habeas petitioner must show that, “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
lawyer’s performance.” Nave, 62 F.3d at 1034 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Salam v. Lockhart, 874 F.3d 525, 537 (8th Cir. 1989)). Therefore, because
Walther’s petition fails to plead facts establishing an actual conflict that adversely

affected his direct appellate counsel’s ability to raise such a claim, the Court will not
excuse the default of Walther’s fifth claim.
2. Walther’s fifth claim is does not present a basis for federal habeas relief.

Since Walther’s fifth claim is similar to his second, third, and fourth claims, the
argument as to why those claims are not cognizable on federal habeas review is also
applicable here. Therefore, to the extent that Walther argues that the post-conviction
court should have held an evidentiary hearing on his fifth claim, this claim fails to state a
basis for federal habeas relief and will be denied.
3. Walther’s fifth claim is meritless under § 2254(d).

“Federal courts may not grant relief [on claims of trial court error] unless the []
trial [court] error had ‘a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury’s verdict.’” Jackson v. Norris, 573 F.3d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fry v.
Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007)).
Walther’s fifth claim argues that the Rule 29.15 motion court erred in denying his
state post-conviction motion without a hearing because it denied Walther’s claim that the
trial court instructed the jury that it would not accept the “not guilty” verdict forms and

did not inquire as to why the foreman signed these forms. Doc. 1 at 51. While the
appellate court on post-conviction appeal refused to address the underlying claim of trial
court error because Walther had not raised it on direct appeal, Resp. Ex. I at 14, the
record otherwise demonstrates that this claim lacks merit.
After the jury’s guilty verdicts were read, Walther’s trial attorney requested that
the jury be polled. Resp. Ex. A at 325. This jury polling affirmed that the guilty jury

verdicts were unanimous. Id. at 325–27. Following the jury’s dismissal to deliberate on
Walther’s sentence, the court revealed to both parties that the foreman had signed the
“not guilty” verdict forms but crossed out this signature and placed his initials below it.
Id. at 341–42. The court “note[d] for the record that the jurors were polled . . . they
kn[e]w they found [] [Walther] guilty, and no one said that was not their verdict.” Id. at
342. Walther’s trial attorney then moved for a mistrial, but the court denied this motion

based on its belief that, “the jurors had an opportunity, because they were polled, to say
[what they] meant to say.” Id. at 343. In addition, the jurors were polled once again after
Walther’s sentences were read. Id. at 346–48. Furthermore, when addressing Walther’s
fourth claim, the appellate court on post-conviction appeal found that both jury polls,
“confirmed [the jury’s] intention to find [Walther] guilty,” and also that, “the initially

discovered ‘not guilty’ verdict forms were simply a mistake.” Resp. Ex. I at 13.
The findings of the lower courts adhere to the Jackson standard. The record
demonstrates that the alleged trial court error did not have substantial and injurious effect
or influence on the jury’s verdict. The court actually made Walther aware that the
foreman had accidentally signed the “not guilty” verdict forms and provided the jurors

with several opportunities to declare that their verdicts of guilt were not unanimous.
Resp. Ex. A at 325–27; 341–42; 346–48. Because the jurors did not indicate any intent to
change their minds, the court concluded that the proper verdict had been entered. Id. at
343. Therefore, the decisions of these lower courts both reasonably apply federal law and
make apparent the reasons as to why Walther’s fifth claim lack merit. At the very least,
Walther has failed to raise facts demonstrating that every fair-minded jurist could agree

as to the incorrectness of the motion court’s decision to deny this claim without an
evidentiary hearing. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough, 541 U.S. at
664). Therefore, the Court will give deference to the rulings of these lower courts as
required under § 2254(d) and deny Walther’s fifth claim as meritless.
D. Ground Six
The Court agrees with Respondent that Walther invokes the doctrine of unclean

hands and raises a Brady claim in “Ground Six” of his petition. Doc. 1 at 71–79. The
Court will deny these claims because they were not fairly presented in the lower courts
and are therefore procedurally defaulted. Even if the Court were to consider the merits of
these claims, they will be denied as meritless under § 2254(e)(2).
1. The Court will deny Walther’s sixth claim as procedurally defaulted.

Walther failed to invoke the unclean hands doctrine or raise a Brady claim at any
point during his state court proceedings. Resp. Ex. C; Resp. Ex. F at 79–110; Resp. Ex.
G. Because Walther failed to raise these claims in state court, he cannot rely on factual
and legal bases from his state court proceedings to raise them here. Therefore, these
claims were not fairly presented and are procedurally defaulted. Interiano, 471 F.3d at

856 (quoting Winfield, 460 F.3d at 1034); Osborne, 411 F.3d at 919; Jones, 20 F.3d at
854.
While it does not appear as though Walther attempts to excuse the default of these
claims, he does try to assert that the alleged default of his fifth claim should be excused
due to a conflict of interest. Doc. 1 at 56. Walther’s conflict of interest does not excuse
this default because he fails to establish an actual conflict that adversely affected any of
his lawyer’s abilities to raise these claims.
2. Walther’s sixth claim is meritless under § 2254(e)(2).
The state-court record does not contain any evidence establishing either the
elements of a Brady claim, or that the State acted with unclean hands. Because Walther’s
petition does not plead facts complying with the strict § 2254(e)(2) standard, this Court
cannot expand the record to include additional evidence in support of these claims.
Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1738. Therefore, Walther cannot plead facts demonstrating their
merit, and these claims may also be dismissed for this reason.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court will deny Walther’s § 2254 motion [Doc. 1]
without an evidentiary hearing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED this Court will not issue a certificate of
appealability because Walther has not made a substantial showing of the denial of federal
constitutional right.
SO ORDERED this 14" day of July, 2025.

/ pg Da himsytl; f
STEPHENN. LIMBAUGH, JR.
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11099393. Public record. Not legal advice.