# Benavides v. Tesla, Inc

> District Court, S.D. Florida · July 13, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11098989

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 13, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11098989

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that substantial similarity determination depends “on the scenario presented and the desired use of the evidence”
- explaining that dissimilarities are insubstantial for the purpose of notice where the similarities still make it reasonably foreseeable that the type of injury would occur

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 21-cv-21940-BLOOM/Torres

NEIMA BENAVIDES, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Naibel
Benavides Leon, deceased, and
DILLON ANGULO

Plaintiffs,

v.

TESLA, INC., a/k/a. Tesla Florida, Inc.,

Defendant.
_________________________________/

ORDER ON ADMISSIBILITY OF OTHER ACCIDENTS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiffs Neima Benavides, as personal
representative of the Estate of Naibel Benavides Leon, and Dillon Angulo’s (“Plaintiffs”)
Response to the Court’s Order, ECF No. [433], Requiring Additional Information with Respect to
Prior Accidents. ECF No. [441]. The Court permitted Tesla to file a Supplement Regarding the
Admissibility of Other Accidents. ECF No. [452]. The Court has reviewed the supplemental filings
and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs may only introduce evidence
of the following other accidents: (1) the “Brown Crash,” (2) the “Kanagawa Japan Crash,” and (3)
the “Banner Crash.” The Court finds Plaintiffs have not established that any other accidents are
substantially similar to the subject collision in this case.
I. BACKGROUND
This matter arises from a collision that occurred in Key Largo, Florida. George McGee
owned a 2019 Tesla Model S (“Vehicle”) “equipped with automatic driving features, one of which
Tesla termed ‘Autopilot,’ that could navigate without driver input.” ECF No. [205] at 3. On April
25, 2019, McGee was driving the Vehicle when it hit a parked Chevrolet Tahoe, which then struck
Decedent Naibel Benavides Leon and Plaintiff Dillon Angulo, killing Benavides Leon and causing
significant injuries to Angulo. See id. at 3-4.
On April 22, 2021, Plaintiff Neima Benavides, as Personal Representative, brought this
action against Tesla on behalf of the Estate of Decedent Naibel Benavides Leon in the Circuit

Court for Miami-Dade County, Florida, alleging automotive product liability claims against Tesla.
ECF No. [1-1]. Tesla removed the action to this Court on May 25, 2021. ECF No. [1]. On August
16, 2022, Plaintiff Dillon Angulo initiated a similar automotive products liability action against
Tesla in this district, Case No. 22-cv-22607-KMM. See 22-cv-22607, ECF No. [1]. The Court
accepted the transfer of this case and consolidated both actions due to the overlapping issues
presented. ECF No. [50].
Plaintiffs filed a consolidated Amended Complaint on March 11, 2024, asserting the
following claims against Tesla: Strict-Products-Liability—Defective Design (Count I), Failure to
Warn (Count II), Defective Manufacture (Count III), and Negligent Misrepresentation (Count IV).

See ECF No. [205] at 6, ¶¶ 39-46.
On June 25, 2025, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Tesla as to Count III
(Defective Manufacture) and Count IV (Negligent Misrepresentation) while allowing Count I
(Defective Design) and Count II (Failure to Warn) to proceed to trial. ECF No. [428]. The Parties
are scheduled to begin trial on July 14, 2025. ECF No. [354]. In anticipation of the upcoming trial,
the Parties submitted Motions in Limine. See ECF No. [329]; ECF No. [320]. The Court issued an
Omnibus Order on the Parties’ Motions in Limine. ECF No. [433]. In the Omnibus Order, the
Court attempted to address whether Plaintiffs would be permitted to introduce evidence of other
car accidents at trial. However, the Court lacked sufficient information to determine whether the
car accidents were substantially similar to the subject collision in this case. Accordingly, the Court
ordered Plaintiffs to “provide the Court with all the relevant facts regarding the accidents they seek
to introduce at trial.” Id. at 31. Specifically, the Court directed Plaintiffs to provide the following
information for each purportedly similar incident, “(1) the year and model of the vehicle; (2) the
date of the incident; (3) any distinguishing features between the Autopilot in McGee’s Vehicle and

the allegedly similar vehicle; (4) whether Autopilot technology was activated; (5) the type of
collision (e.g., in-lane rear-end collision); (6) the purported defect in the ADAS technology; (7) a
non-hearsay basis for the admission of the accident; and (8) any other facts or circumstances to
assist the Court in determining whether those accidents are substantially similar.” Id. Plaintiffs
filed the requested information on July 7, 2025. ECF No. [441].
Plaintiffs’ supplemental brief included specific details regarding three prior accidents and
a general overview of accidents contained in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(“NHTSA”) Reports and Tesla’s answer to requests for admissions. Tesla responded to Plaintiffs’
supplement,1 wherein it argued that none of the accidents were substantially similar to the subject

collision and must be excluded. See ECF No. [452].
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motions in Limine
“In fairness to the parties and their ability to put on their case, a court should exclude
evidence in limine only when it is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.” United States v.
Gonzalez, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2010). “The movant has the burden of
demonstrating that the evidence is inadmissible on any relevant ground.” Id. “Unless evidence

1 At the Calendar Call held on July 8, 2025, the Court provided Tesla an opportunity to file a response to
Plaintiffs’ supplemental briefing regarding the substantial similarity of the other accidents Plaintiffs seek
to introduce at trial.
meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of
foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” In re Seroquel
Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 6:06-md-1769-Orl-22DAB, 6:07-cv-15733-Orl-22DAB, 2009 WL
260989, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2009). Likewise, “[i]n light of the preliminary or preemptive
nature of motions in limine, ‘any party may seek reconsideration at trial in light of the evidence

actually presented and shall make contemporaneous objections when evidence is elicited.’” Holder
v. Anderson, No. 3:16-CV-1307-J-39JBT, 2018 WL 4956757, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 30, 2018)
(quoting Miller ex rel. Miller v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2:01CV545FTM-29DNF, 2004 WL
4054843, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 22, 2004)); see In re Seroquel., 2009 WL 260989, at *1 (“The court
will entertain objections on individual proffers as they arise at trial, even though the proffer falls
within the scope of a denied motion in limine.”) (citing United States v. Connelly, 874 F.2d 412,
416 (7th Cir. 1989)).
Evidence is admissible if relevant, and evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to prove
or disprove a fact of consequence. Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402; Advisory Comm. Notes, Fed. R. Evid.

401 (“The standard of probability under the rule is ‘more probable than it would be without the
evidence.’”); United States v. Patrick, 513 F. App’x 882, 886 (11th Cir. 2013). A district court
may exclude relevant evidence under Rule 403 if “its probative value is substantially outweighed
by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting
of time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Rule 403 is an
extraordinary remedy which the district court should invoke sparingly, and the balance should be
struck in favor of admissibility.” Patrick, 513 F. App’x at 886 (citing United States v. Lopez, 649
F.3d 1222, 1247 (11th Cir. 2011)); see United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 734 (11th
Cir. 2010). Rule 403’s “major function . . . is limited to excluding matter of scant or cumulative
probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect[.]” United States v.
Grant, 256 F.3d 1146, 1155 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030, 1048
(11th Cir. 1991)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. References to Other Incidents
i. Substantial Similarity of the Brown, Kanagawa Japan, and Banner
Crashes
In its Motion in Limine, Tesla sought to exclude evidence of all accidents involving Tesla
vehicles beyond the subject collision. ECF No. [320] at 6. Tesla argued that such evidence is
irrelevant as it does not tend to prove a defect in the design at issue. Moreover, Tesla maintained
the evidence was not substantially similar “[g]iven the number of variables involved in any one
incident.” Id. at 8. Plaintiffs argued in response that these other crashes are substantially similar

and are highly relevant to the issue of whether Tesla was on notice of the alleged defects. ECF No.
[348] at 1-4. Plaintiffs also asserted they intended to introduce NHTSA reports that “are admissible
subject to the public records exception.” Id. at 5.
In their supplemental response, Plaintiffs assert that they seek to introduce three primary
accidents at trial—(1) the “Brown Crash,” (2) the “Kanagawa Japan Crash,” and (3) the “Banner
Crash.” See ECF No. [441] at 2-3. Plaintiffs argue that all three crashes “highlighted Autopilot’s
failure at object detection, emergency intervention, poor driver supervision and overly permissive
operating capabilities.” Id. at 1.
Turning first to the Brown Crash, Plaintiffs argue that the crash is substantially similar to
the subject collision because the 2016 accident involved a 2015 Model S Tesla with Autopilot

activated. The Tesla vehicle ultimately crashed, in part, because of the “driver’s inattention due to
his over-reliance on vehicle automation.” Id. at 2. Plaintiffs claim the alleged defect is substantially
similar because the driver’s over-reliance on the vehicle’s automation was a result of Autopilot’s
“operational design, which permitted his prolonged disengagement from the driving task and his
use of automation in ways inconsistent with guidance and warnings from the manufacturer.” Id.
According to Plaintiffs’ “Mr. McGee was just another Josh Brown, in a slightly different model,
in a slightly different location, operating under slightly different software and hardware, but

suffering from the same overreliance on Autopilot and misusing it in the same fashion.” Id.
Plaintiffs next describe the Kanagawa Japan Crash. In that crash, “[t]he [2016] Tesla Model
X was tailing a slower vehicle. When that vehicle signaled and moved to the left to bypass a road
obstruction, the Tesla promptly accelerated to its previously set cruising speed.” Id. at 3. Plaintiffs
maintain that the Kanagawa Japan Crash is substantially similar to the subject collision because,
similar to the subject collision, Tesla’s sensors failed to detect a stationary vehicle, motorcycle, as
well as pedestrians. See id.
Finally, Plaintiffs describe the Banner Crash that occurred just a few months prior to the
subject collision. Banner was driving a 2018 Tesla Model 3 and had engaged Autopilot

approximately ten seconds before impact. “Banner removed his hands and never reengaged the
wheel before his Tesla struck a semi-truck crossing a highway from a private drive, underriding
the trailer and shearing off the roof at 68 miles per hour.” Id. at 3. According to Plaintiffs, similar
to the subject collision, there was no evidence of evasive braking or steering by the Autopilot
system or by the driver. Plaintiffs insist that this incident highlights the defect in “Tesla’s torque-
based driver monitoring system which allowed for a prolonged, hands-off state without
escalation[.]” Id. It also further demonstrates “Autopilot’s failure to detect a truck directly in its
path of travel and its overly permissive operating capabilities allowing the system to operate on
[a] divided highway [ ] with significant cross traffic and private driveways.” Id.
Plaintiffs claim the commonality between all three crashes and the subject collision is that,
similar to the subject collision, Tesla’s Autopilot driver-monitoring system led the driver to either
over rely on the system, or otherwise become distracted. The three other accidents also show
substantially similar limitations in Tesla vehicles’ ability to detect obstacles, engage the emergency
brakes, and take evasive measures to avoid potential collisions. Furthermore, Plaintiffs contend

these incidents demonstrate a similar design flaw in allowing drivers to utilize Autopilot outside
of their operational driving domain.
Tesla responds that none of these three crashes is substantially similar to the subject
collision for four key reasons. ECF No. [452] at 7-8. First, unlike the subject collision, none of the
three crashes involved a driver who was pressing the accelerator, and therefore, the automatic
braking system had not been disabled in the vehicles in those other accidents. See id. at 7. Second,
none of the other accidents involved a driver who briefly looked away from the road to retrieve a
dropped object. See id. at 8 Third, unlike McGee, none of the Tesla drivers in the other accidents
had their hands on the wheel at the time of the incident. Id. Fourth, none of the vehicles crashed
into a horizontally oriented vehicle on the side of the road.2 See id. Given those differences from

the subject collision, Tesla argues that the purported similarities are merely superficial and,
therefore, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the substantial similarity requirements for any of the three
accidents.
It is well settled that “[e]evidence of other accidents may be relevant [and admissible] to
show . . . the existence of a design defect.” Gardner v. Ford Motor Co., 166 F. Supp. 3d 1261,
1269-70 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (quoting Miller ex rel. Miller v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2:01–cv–545,

2 Tesla also noted a number of other distinctions between the other accidents and the subject collision such
as: (1) different year and models, (2) different version of the Autopilot Hardware and Software, (3) different
versions of the Autopilot itself, (4) different firmware, and (6) different environmental factors and traffic
conditions. See ECF No. [452] at 8-9.
2004 WL 4054843, at *3–4 (M.D. Fla. July 22, 2004)). Specifically, “evidence of similar accidents
might be relevant to the defendant’s notice, magnitude of the danger involved, the defendant’s
ability to correct a known defect, the lack of safety for intended uses, the strength of a product, the
standard of care, and causation.” Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 661 (11th Cir. 1988).
“However, ‘[b]ecause there is a strong potential for prejudice resulting from the admission of

evidence of other accidents,’ the Eleventh Circuit imposes special conditions on the admissibility
of such evidence.” Jones, 861 F.2d at 661 (quoting Ford Motor Co., 2004 WL 4054843, at *3–4);
see Heath v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 126 F.3d 1391, 1396 (11th Cir. 1997) (same). “[P]rior similar
incidents illustrating a potential design defect are admissible [only] if (1) the proponent makes a
showing that the prior accidents are substantially similar, (2) the prior accidents are not too remote
in time, and (3) the probative value of the evidence outweighs any potential prejudice or
confusion.” Crawford v. ITW Food Equip. Grp., LLC, 977 F.3d 1331, 1350 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing
Sorrels v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 796 F.3d 1275, 1287 (11th Cir. 2015); Borden, Inc. v. Fla. E.
Coast Ry. Co., 772 F.2d 750, 755 (11th Cir. 1985)). The burden of satisfying all three requirements

is on the party seeking admission of the allegedly similar accidents. See Gardner, 166 F. Supp. 3d
at 1271; see also Nakajima v. Gen. Motors Corp., 857 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D.D.C. 1994) (“The
burden is on the party seeking admission to prove that substantially similar circumstances exist.”).
However, determinations of substantial similarity are ultimately subject to the court’s sound
discretion. See Heath, 126 F.3d at 1395-96.
“The ‘substantial similarity’ doctrine does not require identical circumstances, and allows
for some play in the joints depending on the scenario presented and the desired use of the
evidence.” Sorrels v. NCL (Bah.) Ltd., 796 F.3d 1275, 1287 (11th Cir. 2015). Consequently, “the
central question is [whether] ‘the two incidents were similar enough to allow the jury to draw a
reasonable inference’ defendant has the ‘ability to foresee this type of’ incident.” Davis v. Little
Giant Ladder Sys., LLC, No. 2:19-CV-780-SPC-NPM, 2022 WL 3924144, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug.
31, 2022) (quoting Borden, Inc., 772 F.2d at 755). When determining the degree of similarity
required, courts must consider “the purpose for which the evidence is offered[.]” Nakajima, 857
F. Supp. at 102.

Despite the differences identified by Tesla, the Court finds that the Brown Crash, the
Kanagawa Japan Crash, and the Banner Crash are all substantially similar enough to the subject
collision to be admissible. First, none of the accidents is too remote in time to be excluded. Each
of the accidents occurred within three years of the subject collision. The Court also finds the
remaining dissimilarities between other accidents and the subject collision go to the weight of the
evidence, not the admissibility.
Tesla points out that, unlike McGee, none of the drivers briefly looked away from the road
and reached for an object on the floorboard. However, the substantial similarity doctrine does not
require identical circumstances, but rather only relevantly substantially similar circumstances. In

all three accidents, the Tesla drivers were distracted, notwithstanding Tesla’s driver monitoring
system. One driver was watching a movie, one was asleep at the wheel, and the third was distracted
for some indeterminate reason. The fact that all three drivers were distracted tends to show that
Tesla was on notice prior to McGee’s accident that its monitoring and warning system did not
ensure drivers were staying sufficiently engaged when utilizing their vehicle’s Autopilot system.
See Sorrels, 796 F.3d at 1287-88 (explaining that dissimilarities are insubstantial for the purpose
of notice where the similarities still make it reasonably foreseeable that the type of injury would
occur) (citing Borden, 772 F.2d at 755). Accordingly, the fact that the accidents all involve
distracted drivers is sufficiently similar to avoid exclusion.
Tesla also argues that the accidents are substantially different from the subject collision
because none of the three accidents involved undetected traffic control signage, nor did the Tesla
drivers strike a horizontally oriented vehicle off the side of the road. Again, those differences go
to the weight of the evidence. Tesla has not shown that the orientation of the target vehicle would
have made it more or less likely that its vehicles would identify a target vehicle as a dangerous

obstacle.3 Moreover, the presence of traffic control signage suggests that there was an even greater
reason for Autopilot to have warned McGee or otherwise avoided the collision. Therefore, the
absence of any traffic signage in the three other accidents is not a difference that would unfairly
prejudice Tesla.
Tesla’s final two distinctions—McGee’s foot on the accelerator and hands on the wheel—
do not warrant exclusion of the alleged similar accidents either.4 While it may be true that McGee’s
foot on the accelerator might have overridden “the TACC (i.e., [the] longitudinal speed control)
function, essentially turning that feature off,” the complete disablement of the TACC function is a
material fact in dispute, and thus, the materiality of the difference turns on the jury’s findings of

fact at trial. ECF No. [452] at 3. As such, the difference cannot serve as a basis for excluding the
evidence.
Moreover, even assuming McGee’s utilization of the accelerator in the moments before the
subject collision completely disabled the TACC function, according to Tesla, the disablement only

3 Similarly, the fact that the McGee was driving off the roadway toward a large object seems to suggest that
it is more likely that Autopilot would detect an anomaly compared with a vertically oriented vehicle
Autopilot would reasonably expect to be in front of it on the roadway.

4 As for the remaining “significant distinguishing characteristics” identified by Tesla in the table on page 8
of its supplemental briefing, the Court does not find those differences to be substantial. See ECF No. [452]
at 8-9. Tesla fails to offer a reason why those differences materially distinguish the other accidents from
the subject collision, specifically with respect to the purpose the evidence of the other accidents is being
offered. As such, the Court does not find that those differences warrant exclusion of the Brown, Kanagawa
Japan, or Banner accidents.
impacted the automatic emergency braking system. See ECF No. [452] at 3. However, Plaintiffs
contend that there were several other defects in Autopilot’s design besides its failure to trigger the
automatic emergency brakes. Plaintiffs also argue that Autopilot was defective because: (1) it
made McGee more distracted than he otherwise would have been, (2) it could be used outside of
its Operational Design Domain, and (3) the system failed to adequately warn McGee of the

dangerous obstacles in his path. See ECF No. [428]. As the Court previously explained, when
deciding whether an accident is substantially similar, the Court must consider the purpose for
which the evidence is being offered. See Nakajima, 857 F. Supp. at 102; Cf. Sorrels, 796 F.3d at
1287-88. Since Plaintiffs are arguing that these accidents put Tesla on notice of multiple different
defects in Autopilot’s design, it is not dispositive that there is a difference with respect to one
alleged defect, so long as the accidents are otherwise substantially similar. See Sorrels, 796 F.3d
at 1287 (explaining that substantial similarity determination depends “on the scenario presented
and the desired use of the evidence”). Thus, while McGee’s use of the accelerator may limit how
Plaintiffs may use the evidence of these other accidents at trial, this difference does not foreclose

Plaintiffs from introducing the evidence to prove the existence or notice of some other alleged
defect. See Gonzalez, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1345 (“The movant has the burden of demonstrating that
the evidence is inadmissible on any relevant ground.”).
The fact that McGee had his hands on the wheel while the other three drivers did not is
similarly unpersuasive to warrant exclusion of those other accidents. The fact that all four Tesla
drivers were distracted in the moments before their respective crashes, regardless of whether the
Autopilot system detected their hands on the wheel, shows that the purported dissimilarity is
insubstantial in determining whether it was reasonably foreseeable that Autopilot’s design causes
drivers to become over-reliant on assistive driving features, thereby failing to pay adequate
attention to the road.
Accordingly, the Court finds the Brown Crash, the Kanagawa Japan Crash, and the Banner
Crash are substantially similar to the subject collision, occurred sufficiently close in time to the
subject collision, and their admission would not unduly prejudice Tesla.

ii. Use of Government Investigations to Introduce Evidence of the Brown,
Kanagawa Japan, and Banner Crashes
While Plaintiffs may introduce evidence of the Brown, Kanagawa Japan, and Banner
crashes, Plaintiffs may not rely on inadmissible records to introduce those incidents. As Tesla
correctly points out, NTSB Board Reports and Recommendations are not admissible at trial and
witnesses may not rely on such reports to give testimony about another accident. See ECF No.
[444] at 9-10; see also Specter v. Texas Turbine Conversions, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-00194-TMB,
2020 WL 7701484, at *3 (D. Ala. Dec. 28, 2020) (“Federal regulations prevent “Board accident
report[s]” from being admitted as evidence[.]”); United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v.
Aerospatiale, Societe Nationale Industrielle, S.A., No. CIV 02-0824-PHX-EHC, 2005 WL
8161454, at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 1, 2005) (“An expert, therefore, cannot offer an opinion in a civil
action for damages if the opinion is based on an NTSB report containing the NTSB’s
determinations or conclusions.”) (citing Curry v. Chevron, USA, 779 F.2d 272, 274 (5th Cir.
1985)); Credle v. Smith & Smith, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 3d 596, 599 (D.N.J. 2013) (“The clear language
of 46 U.S.C. § 6308(a) and 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b) mandates that expert reports based on . . . NTSB

reports, which rely on the information and conclusions contained in those reports, may not be
introduced into evidence in a subsequent civil trial.”). Only NTSB “Factual Accident Reports” are
admissible at trial. Chiron Corp. & PerSeptive Biosystems v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 198 F.3d
935, 940–41 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“A ‘factual accident report,’ on the other hand, is ‘an investigator’s
report of his investigation of the accident.’ [ ] Because this report is not a ‘report of the Board,’ it
is not barred by the statute and is therefore admissible. . . . [T]he only reports that are admissible
‘are the factual reports that investigators do, not the Board’s findings, either factual or probable
cause, but what individual investigators find[.]”).
Accordingly, while Plaintiffs may utilize the NTSB investigator’s factual accident reports,5

Plaintiffs “are precluded from referencing the NTSB Board’s Accident Reports, the legal
conclusions, opinions, or probable cause determinations of the NTSB before the jury.” Escobar v.
Nevada Helicopter Leasing LLC, No. CV 13-00598 HG-WRP, 2020 WL 104672, at *3–4 (D.
Haw. Jan. 8, 2020) (citing Dowe v. Nat’l Railroad Passenger Corp., 2004 WL 1375692, *6-7
(N.D. Ill. May 28, 2004)). 6
iii. Introduction of All Other Purportedly Substantially Similar Accidents.
In addition to the three crashes outlined above, Plaintiffs also seek to introduce the NHTSA
factual findings regarding “two ‘collections’ of other incidents.” ECF No. [452] at 9. The first is
“211 frontal plane crashes where a vehicle on Autopilot struck an object or person in its path.”
ECF No. [441] at 7. The second is the “18 accidents addressed in Tesla’s answers to requests for

admission.” Id. at 8. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden to show
substantial similarity with respect to these two remaining collections of accidents. Plaintiffs argue
that all 229 accidents are substantially similar to the subject collision because in all of the
accidents, Autopilot was activated but failed to avoid the accident. Additionally, the drivers in

5 “A NTSB ‘Factual Accident Report’ is defined in the federal regulations as ‘the report containing the
results of the investigator’s investigation of the accident.’” Escobar v. Nevada Helicopter Leasing LLC,
No. CV 13-00598 HG-WRP, 2020 WL 104672, at *4 (D. Haw. Jan. 8, 2020) (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 835.2).

6 To be clear, the Court’s decision does not preclude Plaintiff from relying on NHTSA reports, only NTSB
Board reports. See Noel v. Ford Motor Co., No. 611CV370ORL28DAB, 2013 WL 12160973, at *1 (M.D.
Fla. May 7, 2013) (finding NHTSA reports admissible).
each of the accidents were found not to be sufficiently engaged in the driving task. See ECF No.
[441] at 7-8.
However, Plaintiffs have failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish substantial
similarity.7 The Court specifically requested the following information it needed in order to
determine whether the accidents were substantially similar to the subject collision: “(1) the year

and model of the vehicle; (2) the date of the incident; (3) any distinguishing features between the
Autopilot in McGee’s Vehicle and the allegedly similar vehicle; (4) whether Autopilot technology
was activated; (5) the type of collision (e.g., in-lane rear-end collision); (6) the purported defect in
the ADAS technology; (7) a non-hearsay basis for the admission of the accident; and (8) any other
facts or circumstances to assist the Court in determining whether those accidents are substantially
similar.” ECF No. [433] at 31. With respect to the 229 incidents at issue, Plaintiffs failed to provide
the year and model of the vehicles, whether the accidents occurred before or after the subject
collision, what changes had been made to Autopilot’s design, the nature of the accident, what kind
of object the vehicle collided with, nor any other circumstances of the accidents. While “[t]he

substantial similarity doctrine does not require identical circumstances, Sorrels, 796 F.3d at 1287,
it requires “more than the mere previous occurrence of a similar incident.” Dunkley v. C.I.E.
Trans., Inc., Civ. Act. No. 1:18-CV-116, 2019 WL 13083583, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 29, 2019)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). The movant must show that “the conditions of the
things to be compared are substantially similar.” Id. With so much critical information missing,
the Court is unable to determine whether the accidents occurred under substantially similar
circumstances. See Gardner, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 1270, 1274-75 (excluding accidents for failure to

7 Although Plaintiffs seek to introduce the NHTSA report of the 211 accidents and not the accidents
themselves, the report is still subject to the substantial similarity doctrine. See Fox v. General Motors LLC,
Civ. Act. No. 1:17-CV-209,2019 WL 3483171, at *27 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 4, 2019) (citing Hockensmith v. Ford
Motor Co., No. 03-13729, 116 F. App’x 244, *11 (11th Cir. Aug. 5, 2004)).
Case No. 21-cv-21940-BLOOM/Torres

provide basic factual information relevant to the substantial similarity analysis). Although any
differences between the subject collision and these 229 other accidents with respect to this missing
information may not be dispositive as to whether the accidents are substantially similar, the lack
of information prevents the Court from determining whether any of the differences are indeed
material. Accordingly, the Court precludes Plaintiffs from introducing the 229 accidents or the
NHTSA report analyzing the accidents at trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1. Plaintiffs may only introduce evidence of the Brown, Kanagawa Japan, and Banner
Crashes. Evidence of any other accidents is EXCLUDED.
2. Plaintiffs may not introduce or otherwise rely on NTSB Board Reports to introduce
evidence regarding the Brown, Kanagawa Japan or Banner Crashes.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on July 13, 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: counsel of record

15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11098989. Public record. Not legal advice.