# MOORE v. DAVIS

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · July 11, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11098531

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** July 11, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11098531

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting as important that plaintiff "never lost custody of her daughter" and that the intact family services she received "interfered only minimally with her family structure"
- holding that removal of child to grandmother's house was justified by reasonable suspicion, even though it was "far from clear" that "the state's interest would have justified a greater intrusion on the [plaintiffs'] right to familial integrity"

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
KELLI MOORE, CHARLES )
MOORE, J. S. M., )
J. L. M.,1 )
)
)
Plaintiffs, )
v. )
) No. 1:23-cv-00089-JPH-MG
CHARLA DAVIS, )
REECIA BELLAMY,2 )
LEIGH ANNE MOORE, )
DAVID BALMER, )
)
)
Defendants. )
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs Kelli and Charles Moore allege that Indiana Department of
Child Services ("DCS") caseworkers violated their Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process rights to familial integrity by conducting a wellness
check at the Moores' home of two minors who the Moores had recently adopted.
The remaining Defendants have moved for summary judgment. Dkt. [85].
For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS that motion.
1 The parties use "J.D.M." instead of "J.L.M." For consistency, the Court does the
same.
2 The clerk is directed to update the docket to reflect that Ms. Bellamy's first name is
spelled "Reecia." See dkt. 86 at 6.
I.
Facts and Background
Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule
56(a), the Court views and recites the evidence "in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party's
favor." Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
A. The Moores' foster period
Plaintiffs Kelli Moore and Charles Moore, a married couple, began

fostering J.S.M. and J.D.M. in June 2020. Dkt. 82-1 at 18; dkt. 83-1. On
September 23, 2020, J.S.M. and J.D.M. were adjudicated by a judge in a
Marion County court to be in need of services. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. v.
C.M., 202 N.E.3d 446 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (unpublished table decision).
Between February and April 2021, DCS received four allegations of child
abuse and neglect against the Moores as to J.S.M., J.D.M., and the Moores'
biological children. Dkt. 83-2. DCS investigated and concluded that these
reports were unsubstantiated. Dkts. 83-5; 83-6; 83-7; 83-8; 83-9.

Defendant Charla Davis, the ongoing permanency Family Case Manager
("FCM") assigned to J.S.M. and J.D.M.'s child in need of services ("CHINS") case
pending in Marion County, remained concerned that the children suffered
abuse and neglect in the Moores' home. Dkt. 82-5 at 9, 34–37, 164. She
found the children's multiple reports of abuse and neglect credible because the
children made those reports numerous times to her and their reports were
consistent in her separate meetings with them. Id.
In April 2021, the Marion County CHINS court granted a motion to
modify the children's foster placement. Dkt. 83-3. From that time until
December 2021, J.S.M. and J.D.M. remained in a foster placement outside the

Moores' home. C.M., 202 N.E.3d at 446. In November 2021, the Moores filed
petitions in Hamilton Superior Court to adopt the children. Id.
B. The Moores' adoption petition is granted and J.S.M. and J.D.M.
are transferred to their custody
The Hamilton County adoption court granted the Moores' petition to
adopt J.S.M. and J.D.M. on December 2, 2021. Id. The Moores received notice
of the adoption decree at about 8:30 a.m. the next morning, on December 3,
2021. Id. By 10:00 a.m. that morning, the Moores had taken custody of the
children. Id.; see also dkt. 82-1 at 70.
At about 3:30 p.m. that day, FCM Davis, Guardian Ad Litem ("GAL")
Monique Miller, and a Henry County sheriff's deputy arrived at the Moores'
home. C.M., 202 N.E.3d at 446. FCM Davis had learned that morning that
J.D.M. had a strong negative reaction to learning about the adoption and had

to be placed in the car while kicking and screaming about it. Dkt. 82-5 at 119–
20. She had also learned that the children were sick, and she wanted to
ensure that the Moores knew about their illness and that J.D.M. had her
prescribed medicine. Id. at 118–19, 124–25. FCM Davis did not observe these
events firsthand. Dkt. 90-1 at 68–70. Upon learning this information,
Defendant Reecia Bellamy, an FCM Supervisor, instructed FCM Davis to go to
the Moores' home to check on the children. Dkt. 82-3 at 58. The Marion
County CHINS case remained open at this time, and FCM Davis believed that
she was still responsible for the children's wellbeing. Dkt. 82-5 at 124–25; see
also dkt. 82-1 at 73, 77.

When FCM Davis arrived with GAL Miller and the sheriff's deputy, Mr.
Moore told them to get off the Moores' property. Dkt. 90-3 at 13. FCM Davis
told the Moores that "they were going to take the kids back from" the Moores if
the Moores did not allow a welfare check on the children3 because "they were
still the State of Indiana's kids." Dkt. 90-4 at 9–11. The sheriff's deputy told
the Moores that they "had to let them in" because FCM Davis and GAL Miller
had "a removal letter, they're wanting to remove the kids." Dkt. 90-4 at 9; dkt.
90-3 at 8–9. That removal letter, however, discussed the removal of the

children from their biological parents, not the Moores. Dkt. 90-3 at 8–9. FCM
Davis did not tell the Moores that the removal letter did not authorize DCS or
the sheriff's deputy to take J.S.M. and J.D.M. Dkt. 90-1 at 91–93.
After this initial interaction, the Moores called their attorney. Dkt. 82-5
at 138. The Moores' attorney then spoke on the phone with DCS's attorney.
Id. After the attorneys conferred, FCM Davis and GAL Miller conducted the
wellness check. Id. The Moores allowed the wellness check only "under the
threat of the kids being removed from [their] house and arrest." Dkt. 90-3 at

14–15.

3 FCM Davis denies making this statement, but the Court recites the facts in the light
most favorable to the Moores. See dkt. 86 at 14 (citing dkt. 82-5 at 139–40).
The wellness check lasted about thirty minutes. Dkt. 82-1 at 88. FCM
Davis was in the Moores' home for about twenty minutes. Id. During the visit,
FCM Davis "searched the house" and observed the children. Id. at 78, 88. She

did not attempt to remove the children from the home during or after the visit.
Id. at 88.
C. Procedural history
The Moores brought constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against FCM Davis, Supervisor Bellamy, Henry County DCS Defendants FCM
Leigh Anne Gebele and Supervisor David Balmer (collectively "State
Defendants"), and GAL Miller. Dkt. 27. The Moores alleged that the
Defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights and Fourteenth

Amendment due process rights. The Court dismissed the claims against GAL
Miller. Dkt. 51. The Moores also voluntarily dismissed their Fourth
Amendment claims. Dkt. 65.
The only claim remaining is the Moores' Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim against the State Defendants, who now move for summary
judgment. Dkt. 85.
II.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party must
inform the Court "of the basis for its motion" and specify evidence
demonstrating "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party meets this
burden, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and identify
"specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324. In

ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence "in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw[s] all reasonable
inferences in that party's favor." Zerante, 555 F.3d at 584 (citation omitted).
III.
Analysis
In their summary judgment briefing, the Moores abandoned their due
process claims against FCM Gebele and Supervisor Balmer. Dkt. 91 at 1, 26–
27. State Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to FCM Gebele and
Supervisor Balmer is therefore GRANTED.
The only remaining claim is the Moores' Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process familial integrity claim against FCM Davis and
Supervisor Bellamy.4 FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy argue that they are
entitled to summary judgment on the Moores' claim based on qualified

immunity. Dkts. 86, 92.
A. Qualified immunity standard
"[Q]ualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their
conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

4 Neither side addresses any Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim in
their summary judgment briefs. Dkts. 86, 91, 92. To the extent the Moores maintain
a procedural due process claim against FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy, the Court
finds they have abandoned that claim. See Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588,
597–98 (7th Cir. 2003).
of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S.
7, 11 (2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). This
"clearly established" standard ensures "that officials can 'reasonably . . .

anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.'" Reichle v.
Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 646 (1987)). Qualified immunity thus "balances two important interests—
the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officers from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
The "difficult part" of the qualified-immunity test is "identifying the level of
generality at which the constitutional right must be clearly established."

Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 2013). A "high level of
generality" is not appropriate; instead, the question is "whether the law was
clear in relation to the specific facts confronting the public official when he
acted." Id.
B. Clearly established law
To meet their burden of showing that a constitutional right is "clearly
established," the Moores must "show either a reasonably analogous case that
has both articulated the right at issue and applied it to a factual circumstance

similar to the one at hand or that the violation was so obvious that a
reasonable person necessarily would have recognized it as a violation of the
law." Leiser, 933 F.3d at 701. FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy are
therefore entitled to qualified immunity unless precedent "squarely governs"
the case at hand. Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 13 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543
U.S. 194, 201 (2004)). The Court assesses qualified immunity "in light of all
relevant precedent," regardless of whether it was cited by the plaintiff. Taylor v.

Schwarzhuber, 132 F.4th 480, 487 (7th Cir. 2025).
The Moores allege FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy violated their
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to familial integrity by
conducting the December 3 wellness check after the adoption petitions had
been granted. The Moores bear the burden of showing "that a reasonable [DCS
caseworker] would or should know that her conduct is unlawful." Sebesta v.
Davis, 878 F.3d 226, 234 (7th Cir. 2017).
The Fourteenth Amendment protects the "right to freedom from undue

state interference with family relations." Id. at 232. "This includes the parents'
right 'to bear and raise their children' and the child's right 'to be raised and
nurtured by his parents.'" Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d
463, 478 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Siliven v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 635 F.3d
921, 928 (7th Cir. 2011)). "The constitutional right to familial integrity is not
absolute; rather, it must be balanced against the state's interest in protecting
children from abuse." Siliven, 635 F.3d at 928. To achieve that balance,
"caseworkers must have 'some definite and articulable evidence giving rise to a

reasonable suspicion' of past or imminent danger of abuse before they may
take a child into protective custody." Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 478 (quoting
Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also
Sebesta, 878 F.3d at 235 ("[T]he state actors needed evidence supporting a
reasonable suspicion of abuse or neglect in order to report, investigate, and
'indicate' [plaintiff]."). "This 'reasonable suspicion' standard is an objective
one," Sebesta, 878 F.3d at 233, that requires "more than a hunch but less than

probable cause," Siliven, 635 F.3d at 928 (internal quotations omitted).
The following facts are undisputed as to what FCM Davis and Supervisor
Bellamy knew when they initiated the December 3 wellness check at about
3:30 p.m.:
• The Hamilton County adoption petition giving the Moores custody of
J.S.M. and J.D.M. had been granted the day before.

• The Moores took custody of the children by 10:00 a.m. on December
3.

• The Marion County CHINS case was still open and pending at that
time.

• FCM Davis was the ongoing permanency caseworker assigned to that
CHINS case.

• The Defendants had received a report after the Moores took custody
but before initiating the wellness check that one of the children was
sick and had a strong negative reaction when the Moores took
custody, kicking and screaming while being placed into the Moores'
vehicle.

Additionally, the parties dispute whether FCM Davis and the sheriff's deputy
threatened to remove the children from the Moores' home if they did not allow
the wellness check, but the Court assumes for the sake of this analysis that
these threats were made.
The question here is whether a reasonable DCS caseworker would have
known that it was clearly unlawful to conduct a wellness check under these
circumstances. See Sebesta, 878 F.3d at 235; Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 475.
1. Pending CHINS case
The first issue is whether a reasonable DCS caseworker would have
known that even though the CHINS case was still open, they no longer had the

obligation or authority to investigate the wellbeing of the adopted minors
because the adoption petition had been granted.
The Seventh Circuit recently explained the process for closing a CHINS
case:
CHINS cases remain open until "the objectives of the [CHINS]
dispositional decree have been met," Ind. Code § 31-34-21-11, which can
mean several things, such as reunification or termination of parental
rights and adoption, among others. If reunification is not a viable option,
the State may initiate a termination of parental rights (TPR) proceeding.
See, e.g., Ind. Code §§ 31-34-21-7.5, 31-35-2-1. The CHINS case
continues until the child achieves permanency, which often does not
occur until after the TPR proceeding (including any appeals) concludes.
See Ind. Code §§ 31-19-11-6; 31-34-21-11.

Ashley W. v. Holcomb, 34 F.4th 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting State of
Indiana's brief from Nicole K. v. Stigdon, 990 F.3d 534, 536–37 (7th Cir. 2021)).
Here, neither party designates evidence to explain what the CHINS
dispositional decree's objectives were. But drawing all reasonable inferences in
the Moores' favor at this stage, the Court assumes that adoption of the children
was the decree's objective. Given that assumption, by the time FCM Davis and
Supervisor Bellamy sought to initiate the December 3 wellness check, the
dispositional decree's objective—the children's adoption—had already been
met.
FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy argue that FCM Davis believed the
pending Marion County CHINS case obligated and authorized her to investigate
J.S.M. and J.D.M.'s wellbeing after the adoption petitions had been granted.
Dkt. 86 at 27. The Moores argue that "the CHINS action does not give
Defendants the constitutional authority to interfere with the new adoptive

family's relations" because, under Indiana law, the CHINS court was required
to dismiss its case once the children were adopted. Dkt. 91 at 15–16. The
Moores contend that under the legal framework for CHINS proceedings, it was
clear that J.S.M. and J.D.M. no longer met the statutory standard for CHINS
once the adoption petition was granted. Id. at 16. The Moores argue that this
is self-evident—the CHINS proceeding was opened based on danger presented
to J.S.M. and J.D.M. by their biological parents, not the Moores, so the danger
to J.S.M. and J.D.M. disappeared when the adoption petition was granted. Id.

The Moores cite In re Infant Girl W., 845 N.E.2d 229, 245–46 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006), as support for that proposition. In that case, the Indiana Court of
Appeals interpreted Indiana Code § 31-34-21-11, which states that "[w]hen the
[CHINS] juvenile court finds that the objectives of the dispositional decree have
been met, the court shall discharge the child and the child's parent/guardian
or custodian." Id. at 245. There, the probate court had granted the parents'
adoption petition of a child for whom the dispositional goal was adoption, but
five days later, the juvenile court denied the parents' motion to dismiss the

open CHINS case. Id. at 236–37. At the time the parents filed their motion to
dismiss the CHINS action, the goal of the child's dispositional decree had been
met because the child had already been adopted. Id. at 245. Also, the court
reasoned that the child no longer met the statutory standard for a CHINS
"inasmuch as there is universal agreement that [the child] has been well cared
for by the Parents since she was two days old." Id. The court concluded that
"[u]nder these circumstances, the Juvenile Court was statutorily required to

dismiss the CHINS case." Id.
The Moores also designate evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy expected the CHINS case to be
dismissed since the adoption petition had been granted. FCM Davis testified
that she expected the CHINS case to be dismissed and agreed that if the CHINS
case had been dismissed, she would not have had the authority to conduct the
December 3 wellness check. Dkt. 90-1 at 73. And Supervisor Bellamy testified
that she had never seen a case where a CHINS juvenile court did not close an

open CHINS case after an adoption petition was granted. Dkt. 90-2 at 22.
However, the Moores' case law and designated evidence do not address
the timing question presented—whether a DCS caseworker still has the
obligation and authority to demand a wellness check after an adoption petition
has been granted but before the CHINS case has been dismissed. In re Infant
Girl W. stands only for the proposition that a CHINS court does not have
discretion to deny a motion to dismiss an open CHINS case once an adoption is
granted. It says nothing about what DCS caseworkers can or cannot do before

a motion to dismiss the CHINS case is filed. Here, there's no designated
evidence suggesting that a motion to dismiss the CHINS case had been filed on
December 3. On the contrary, the CHINS case wasn't closed until December
26, 2021. Dkt. 51 at 15 (citing C.M., 202 N.E.3d at 446). So, the DCS
caseworkers' legal obligations and authority where an adoption petition has
been granted but a CHINS case involving the same children remains open is, at
minimum, not obvious.

Indeed, testimony from FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy taken in the
light most favorable to the Moores shows only that the caseworkers believed
that the CHINS case would be dismissed at some undefined point in the future.
The Moores do not cite any case that would have clearly put FCM Davis and
Supervisor Bellamy on notice that the grant of the adoption petition
immediately terminates the CHINS case, along with DCS's legal authority to act
in response to a reasonable suspicion of past or imminent abuse. See Doe v.
Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 528 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding qualified immunity where

caseworkers relied on state statute that was determined to be unconstitutional
as applied to the plaintiff but the statute's constitutionality had never been
challenged prior to that case and there was "no reported decision (state or
federal) addressing the precise issues" before the court). So, there's no case
clearly establishing that a court's grant of an adoption petition immediately
extinguishes DCS's obligations and authority to investigate the wellbeing of
children with a pending CHINS case.
The Moores, who bear the burden of showing "that a reasonable [DCS

caseworker] would or should know that her conduct is unlawful," Sebesta, 878
F.3d at 234, therefore have not shown that under the circumstances presented
here, a reasonable DCS caseworker would or should know that it would clearly
be unlawful to demand a wellness check after the adoption petition was
granted.
2. Reasonable suspicion of abuse

That raises the second part of the inquiry: whether a reasonable DCS
caseworker would or should have known that there clearly was not reasonable
suspicion that the children had been abused or were in imminent danger of
abuse.5 See Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 478; Sebesta, 878 F.3d at 235. FCM
Davis and Supervisor Bellamy argue that the information they possessed
constituted reasonable suspicion justifying the December 3 wellness check.
Dkt. 92 at 5. They also argue that "it would have been wholly irresponsible for
the Defendants to have ignored the concerns raised on December 3" given

Indiana's statutory requirement that DCS "shall initiate an appropriately
thorough child protection assessment of every report of known or suspected
child abuse or neglect the department receives." Dkt. 86 at 31–32; dkt. 92 at
6. And they contend "the chaotic and ongoing nature of the situation that was
unfolding on December 3" provides further justification for the December 3
wellness check. Dkt. 86 at 27–28; dkt. 92 at 5.
The Moores, who bear the burden of showing "that a reasonable [DCS
caseworker] would or should know that her conduct is unlawful," Sebesta, 878

F.3d at 234, argue that FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy initiated the
December 3 wellness check arbitrarily because they did not have a reasonable

5 For the sake of this analysis, the Court assumes without deciding that Supervisor
Bellamy was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.
suspicion that the children had been abused or were in imminent danger of
abuse. Dkt. 91 at 14–19. The Moores argue that the justifications for the
wellness check offered by DCS were pretext and that FCM Davis's true

motivation for the check was her belief that the unsubstantiated allegations
against the Moores were true. Id. at 25–26.
The reasonable suspicion standard, however, is objective, Sebesta, 878
F.3d at 233, so FCM Davis's true motivation for the visit doesn't carry any
weight. What matters for the qualified immunity inquiry is whether a
reasonable DCS caseworker in FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy's position
would or should have known under clearly established law and considering the
information they possessed at the time that they clearly did not have

reasonable suspicion to conduct the December 3 wellness check. See
Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 475; Sebesta, 878 F.3d at 235.
The parties dispute whether the Moores' removal of the children from the
foster placement on the morning of December 3 could be fairly characterized as
"forcible." But the undisputed designated evidence shows that one of the
children had a strong negative reaction to learning about the adoption and was
kicking and screaming while being placed in the car to go with the Moores and
leave the foster family. Dkt. 82-5 at 118–20, 124–25. The Moores do not cite

any cases that would have put FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy on notice
that initiating a wellness check under those circumstances would have violated
the Moores' constitutional rights. Accordingly, based on the entirety of the
circumstances presented, a reasonable DCS investigator could have believed
reasonable suspicion existed to initiate the December 3 wellness check. In
other words, it would not have been clear to a reasonable DCS caseworker that
conducting a wellness check under these circumstances was unlawful.

This conclusion is bolstered by the limited nature of the intervention that
Defendants sought to conduct—a brief look around the inside of the home to
assess whether J.S.M. and J.D.M. were safe—rather than taking the children
into protective custody and removing them from their adoptive parents. See
Siliven, 635 F.3d at 928 (holding that removal of child to grandmother's house
was justified by reasonable suspicion, even though it was "far from clear" that
"the state's interest would have justified a greater intrusion on the [plaintiffs']
right to familial integrity"); Sebesta, 878 F.3d at 235 (noting as important that

plaintiff "never lost custody of her daughter" and that the intact family services
she received "interfered only minimally with her family structure"). The
Seventh Circuit recently stated that it "doubt[ed] very much" that a child
services welfare check "amounted to interference with family integrity" at all.
Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 111 F.4th 754, 788 (7th Cir. 2024)
(en banc) (discussing welfare check based on anonymous tip that plaintiff and
her child were living in a "garage during hot summer weather").
Here, the December 3 wellness check lasted about thirty minutes, and

FCM Davis was in the Moores' home for about twenty minutes. Dkt. 82-1 at
88. During the visit, FCM Davis "searched the house" and observed the
children, but she did not attempt to remove the children from the home during
or after the visit. Id. at 78, 88. This short wellness check was far less intrusive
than the child's removal to a relative's house in Siliven or the six months of
intact family services in Sebesta. Instead, the December 3 check was more
akin to the welfare check in Gilbank, which the en banc Seventh Circuit

doubted amounted to interference with familial integrity. Given the need to
balance the constitutional right to familial integrity against the state's interest
in protecting children from abuse, Siliven, 635 F.3d at 928, it's not clear that
the December 3 wellness check interfered with the Moores' post-adoption
familial integrity, see Gilbank, 111 F.4th at 788. But even if it did, any such
"intrusion on the [Moores'] constitutional right to familial integrity was no
greater than necessary to address" the facts confronted by FCM Davis and
Supervisor Bellamy. Siliven, 635 F.3d at 928–29.

The Moores also argue that they did not consent to the December 3
wellness check because FCM Davis and the Henry County sheriff's deputy
threatened to remove the children from the home if the Moores did not allow
the wellness check to proceed, and the coercive nature of the threat did not
dissipate when the parties' lawyers conferred before the wellness check. Dkt.
91 at 19–22. FCM Davis disputes making this threat. See dkt. 86 at 14 (citing
dkt. 82-5 at 139–40). However, even if those threats were made, FCM Davis
and Supervisor Bellamy didn't need to rely on the Moores' consent as

justification for the December 3 wellness check. That's because, as established
above, a reasonable DCS caseworker could have believed she had reasonable
suspicion to justify the check.
The Moores also argue that FCM Davis and the sheriff's deputy did not
have legal authority to make these threats, which undermines the legality of
the December 3 wellness check.6 Dkt. 91 at 21. The Seventh Circuit has

drawn a distinction between "lawful threats" and "threats not grounded in
proper legal authority." Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 482. Only the latter pose
constitutional issues. Id. In contrast, it does not constitute impermissible
duress for a caseworker to make a threat that's supported by proper legal
authority. Id. And "in the context of protecting a child from his parents,
'proper legal authority' means 'some definite and articulable evidence giving
rise to a reasonable suspicion' of past or imminent danger of abuse." Id.
(quoting Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1019). So here, since a DCS caseworker could

have reasonably suspected abuse, it follows that threatening to remove J.S.M.
and J.D.M. if the Moores did not allow FCM Davis to enter the home and
conduct the wellness check did not undermine the wellness check’s legality.
See Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2006) ("It is not a forbidden
means of 'coercing' a settlement to threaten merely to enforce one's legal
rights.").
In sum, there was no case so "closely analogous" as to put FCM Davis
and Supervisor Bellamy on notice that conducting the wellness check on

December 3 would violate the Moores' constitutional rights. Reed v. Palmer,
906 F.3d 540, 547 (7th Cir. 2018). Nor were there cases evincing "such a clear

6 The Moores do not argue that any threats made by FCM Davis or the Henry County
sheriff's deputy, on their own, violated the Moores' right to familial integrity.
trend . . . that we can say with fair assurance that the recognition of the right
by a controlling precedent was merely a question of time." Id.
Finally, the Moores appear to argue that FCM Davis and Supervisor

Bellamy's conduct was "so egregious and unreasonable that no reasonable
official could have thought [she] was acting lawfully." Id. "Officials can still be
on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual
circumstances." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). In "rare cases," a
plaintiff can demonstrate a right is clearly established without pointing to
controlling authority by showing an officer's conduct was "so egregious and
unreasonable that no reasonable official could have thought he was acting
lawfully." Reed, 906 F.3d at 546 (emphasis supplied).

The Moores contend that this is one of those rare cases. It's not. FCM
Davis and Supervisor Bellamy were "called upon to make difficult decisions
without the benefit of extended deliberation." Heck, 327 F.3d at 525.
Confronted by such a decision, they chose to act on the information they
learned earlier that day with a measured, proportionate response—a wellness
check. The Moores have not established that no reasonable DCS caseworker
could have chosen the same course of action as FCM Davis and Supervisor
Bellamy.

In conclusion, the Moores have not overcome FCM Davis and Supervisor
Bellamy's assertion of qualified immunity because they have not shown that
they had a clearly established right under the Fourteenth Amendment to have
DCS not conduct a wellness check on J.S.M. and J.D.M. after the adoption
petition was granted and the CHINS case was still open. FCM Davis and
Supervisor Bellamy are entitled to summary judgment.
IV.
Conclusion
State Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Dkt.
[85]. Final judgment shall issue by separate entry.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 7/11/2025 ands Pat tanlor—
James Patrick Hanlon
United States District Judge
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
All electronically registered counsel

20

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11098531. Public record. Not legal advice.