# Cathy Kirkwood v. HCA Healthcare, Inc.

> District Court, C.D. California · July 9, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11093795

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** July 9, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11093795

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that § 6310 “is part of California’s statutory scheme for occupational safety”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA J S □ 6
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-04338-MRA-E Date July 9, 2025
Title Cathy Kirkwood v. HCA Healthcare, Inc., et al.

Present: The Honorable MONICA RAMIREZ ALMADANT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Melissa H. Kunig None Present
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:
None Present None Present
Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
TO REMAND [12]
Before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion to Remand (the “Motion”). ECF 12. The Court
read and considered the moving and opposing papers and deems the matter appropriate for
decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L-R. 7-15. The July 14, 2025,
hearing is therefore vacated and removed from the Court’s calendar. For the reasons stated
herein, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 3, 2025, Plaintiff Cathy Kirkwood (“Plaintiff’ or “Kirkwood”) filed this
workplace retaliation and discrimination case against Defendants Los Robles Regional Medical
Center, Los Robles Hospital & Medical Center, HCA Healthcare, Inc., and Does 1-50
(collectively, “Defendants”) in Ventura County Superior Court. ECF 1-1 (Compl.). The
Complaint alleges as follows:
Kirkwood was employed as a per diem Cytologist in the Anatomic Pathology Department
at Los Robles Medical Center (the “Hospital”) between October 10, 2022, until her termination
on December 20, 2024. Jd. 9] 1, 2. Kirkwood’s employment was governed by a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), and Plaintiff was represented by SEIU United Health Care
Workers — West. ECF 1-13 (Gardner Decl.) § 2, Ex. L (“CBA”). In or about June 2023,
Kirkwood complained to her direct supervisor, Zin Htway (“Htway”), about her breast tissue
being exposed to radiation because the employer-provided lead apron was not custom fitted.
Compl. Jf 2,6. Htway ignored her repeated complaints. Jd. Despite escalating her complaints
to Htway’s supervisor, she continued to work without a properly fitted lead apron for several
months. Jd. §§ 7, 12. Shortly thereafter, her supervisor hired Jeffery Wilks (“Wilks”), a 35-
year-old male, as a per diem Cytologist, and in the weeks following his hire, Htway trained Wilks
in various procedures and assignments that had been previously assigned to Kirkwood, including

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-04338-MRA-E Date July 9, 2025
Title Cathy Kirkwood v. HCA Healthcare, Inc., et al.
training in advanced ION/EBUS robotics and OR EUS procedures. Jd. § 8. Htway refused to
train Kirkwood in the same procedures when she asked. Jd. On or about September 21, 2023,
Kirkwood complained to Htway’s supervisor and the Hospital’s Human Resources Manager. Id.
4 10. On or about September 28, 2023, Kirkwood was informed that the Hospital intended for
Wilks to be the future Cytology Supervisor because he was younger and had a longer employment
future. Jd.§.11. Wilks received his custom fitted lead apron within approximately three months,
whereas Kirkwood did not receive hers for approximately 10 months. Jd. ¥ 12.
Plaintiff alleges that she made several complaints about discrimination, retaliation, and
patient and employee safety issues. Jd. 413. In relevant part, on or about December 5, 2023,
Kirkwood, through her union representative, filed a Grievance Form (the “Grievance”) alleging
that Htway “has been doing bargaining unit work. I was flexed off work on 9/29/23,”
“{rjetaliating against me for performance evaluations,” and “Code of Conduct misconduct
regarding employee safety for radiation exposure.” Jd. § 13(d), (e). The Grievance sought back
pay for the flexed day off, for the Hospital to “[flollow federal and state laws,” “[flollow [the]
CBA and not do[] bargaining unit work,” and “[c]ease and desist all retaliation and harassment
towards employee.” Jd. ¥ 13(f). On or about December 22, 2023, Kirkwood emailed the
Hospital’s Compliance Officer reporting a lack of laboratory compliance and indifference to
employee health and safety with respect to, without limitation, mappropriate disposal of
carcinogenic reagents and other toxic hazardous chemicals/reagents. Jd. § 13(k). On or about
January 15, 2024, Plaintiff emailed the Divisional Lab Director advising that she had been “raising
the concerns about inadequate and absent maintenance log sheets” since September 2023, “but
nothing has been done,” and requesting “the management team to have a daily maintenance log
sheet established for the biological safety cabinet and train employees to read the safety indicator
and how to properly mark the daily maintenance log sheet.” Jd. § 13(1). In or about January
2024, Kirkwood complained about violation of federal and state regulations and inspection
requirements. Jd. § 13(n). On or about February 14, 2024, Kirkwood alerted management to
her supervisor’s “personal vendetta” against her, id. § 13(0). On or about June 10, 2024, she
requested an investigation into the “toxic working environment.” Jd. § 13(r).
Plaintiff alleges that the Hospital harassed, discriminated, and retaliated against her and
subjected her to adverse employment actions. Jd. § 14. In relevant part, she was told that she
was “flexed off’ work. Jd. § 14(a). On or about December 1, 2023, Kirkwood received a
negative job performance evaluation. Jd. § 14(c). On June 17, 2024, Kirkwood received a
Written Warning. Jd. ¥ 14(f). On August 23, 2024, she was issued a Final Written Warning for
“substandard performance and conduct,” which was later revised and reissued on September 12,
2024. Id. §14(g). On December 6, 2024, the Hospital informed Kirkwood that she was
suspended. Jd. § 14(h). On December 20, 2024, Kirkwood was terminated for “substandard

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-04338-MRA-E Date July 9, 2025
Title Cathy Kirkwood v. HCA Healthcare, Inc., et al.
performance and conduct . . . incompatible with continued employment.” Jd. § 16.
On these factual allegations, Plaintiff brings 19 causes of action: (1)-(6) six claims for age,
sex/gender, race discrimination and harassment in violation of the Fair Employment Housing Act
(“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940, et seg. (““FEHA”); (7)-(8) two claims for discrimination and
harassment in violation of Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926; (9)-(10) failure to investigate and take
reasonable steps to prevent discrimination and harassment in violation of FEHA; (11) violation of
Cal. Regs. Code § 3380; (12) violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 6400, et seq.; (13) unfair business
practices in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; (14) wrongful termination in violation
of public policy; and (15)-(19) retaliation in violation of FEHA, Cal. Lab. Code §§ 98.6, 1102.5,
6310, and Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1278.5.
On May 9, 2025, Defendants filed their Answer to the Complaint. ECF 1-11. On May
14, 2025, Defendants removed the case to federal court. ECF 1. On June 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed
the instant Motion. ECF 12. Defendants oppose. ECF 14. Plaintiff did not file a reply brief
in support of the Motion.
Tl. LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citations omitted). Removal
of a state action to federal court is only proper if the district court would have had original
jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Accordingly, a defendant may remove civil
actions in which either (1) a federal question exists; or (2) complete diversity of citizenship
between the parties exists and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1332. The removing defendant bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of
the evidence that removal is proper. See Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th
Cir. 2015); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1992). “Ifat any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Til. DISCUSSION
In their Notice of Removal, Defendants assert that the Court has federal question
jurisdiction because Plaintiff's claims under Cal. Lab. Code §§ 6310 and 6400 (Claims 12 and 16)
require interpretation of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement and are therefore
preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (““LMRA”). ECF 1 8-20.
Defendants maintain that the remaining claims are within the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-04338-MRA-E Date July 9, 2025
Title Cathy Kirkwood v. HCA Healthcare, Inc., et al.
under 29 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Jd. §§ 21-22. In her Motion, Plaintiff argues that her claims do not
arise from a breach of the CBA, such that “[rJesolution of Plaintiff's Labor Code claims, are, on
their face, based entirely on the Court’s application of California law to the underlying facts.”
ECF 12 at 10. Defendants respond that the CBA contains the relevant procedures that the
Hospital is required to follow regarding work assignments, equipment training, workplace safety
policies, which “pertain directly to the alleged protected activities and adverse employment
actions” underlying Claims 12 and 16. ECF 14 at 8.
Federal courts have jurisdiction over suits “arising under” federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Section 301 of the LMRA provides that “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization . .. may be brought in any district court of the United States.” 29 □□□□□□
§ 185(a). The provision has long been interpreted as “authorizing federal courts to create a
uniform body of federal common law to adjudicate disputes that arise out of labor contracts.”
Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 913 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2019). As such, any suit “alleging a
violation of a provision of a labor contract must be brought under § 301 and be resolved by
reference to federal law.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985). “A state
tule that purports to define the meaning or scope of a term in a contract suit therefore is pre-
empted by federal labor law.” Jd. “Although normally federal preemption is a defense that does
not authorize removal to federal court, § 301 has such ‘extraordinary pre-emptive power’ that it
‘converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes
of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’” Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1152 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)). In other words, “a civil complaint raising claims preempted by
§ 301 raises a federal question that can be removed to a federal court.” Jd.
The Supreme Court has underscored that § 301 “cannot be read broadly to pre-empt
nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law.” Livadas v.
Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123 (1994). Rather, “it is the legal character of a claim, as
‘independent’ of rights under the [CBA] (and not whether a grievance arising from “precisely the
same set of facts’ could be pursued) that decides whether a state cause of action may go forward.”
Id. at 123-24 (internal citations omitted). “Setting minimum wages, regulating work hours and
pay periods, requiring paid and unpaid leave, protecting worker safety, prohibiting discrimination
in employment, and establishing other worker rights remains well within the traditional police
power of the states.” Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 919 (9th Cir. 2018). To
ensure that § 301 preemption “extends only as far as necessary to protect the role of labor
arbitration in resolving CBA disputes,” the Ninth Circuit employs a two-step test. Curtis, 913
F.3d at 1152 (quoting Schurke, 898 F.3d at 913-14). First, courts must determine “whether the
asserted cause of action involves a ‘right [that] exists solely as aresult of the CBA.” Jd. (quoting
Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’! Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016)). “If the court

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-04338-MRA-E Date July 9, 2025
Title Cathy Kirkwood v. HCA Healthcare, Inc., et al.
determines that the mght underlying the plaintiff's state law claim(s) ‘exists independently of the
CBA,’ it moves to the second step, asking whether the right ‘is nevertheless substantially
dependent on analysis of a[CBA].’” Kobold, 832 F.3d at 1032 (quoting Burnside v. Kiewit Pac.
Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007)). This inquiry “turns on whether the claim cannot be
resolved by simply ‘look[ing] to’ versus ‘interpreting’ the CBA.” Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1153 (citing
Kobold, 832 F.3d at 1033). “Interpretation” is “construed narrowly” such that “claims are only
preempted to the extent there is an active dispute over ‘the meaning of a contract □□□□□□□□
Schurke, 898 F.3d at 921 (quoting Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124). Thus, a state law claim avoids
preemption “if it does not raise questions about the scope, meaning, or application of the CBA.”
Id.
Applying this two-step framework here, the Court finds at the first step that Plaintiffs
claims are not grounded in the CBA. Plaintiff seeks to enforce state worker protections, not
“vindicate a right or duty created by the CBA itself.” See Schurke, 898 F.3d at 921. The claims
do not involve rights that exist solely under the CBA and therefore are “not simply CBA disputes
by another name.” See id.; Kobold, 832 F.3d at 1032. Defendants do not seriously dispute this,
but nevertheless argue that § 301 preemption applies to Claims 12 and 16 at step two because “a
court will need to construe the CBA to determine whether Defendants’ safety policies and
procedures were solely within the discretion of Defendants.” ECF 1919. The Court considers
each claim in turn.
Claim 12 alleges workplace safety violations under Cal. Lab. Code § 6400, et seq. Section
6400 generally provides that “[e]very employer shall furnish employment and a place of
employment that is safe and healthful for the employees therein” and “adopt and use practices,
means, methods, operations, and processes which are reasonably adequate to render such
employment and place of employment safe and healthful . . . [and to] do every other thing
reasonably necessary to protect the life, safety, and health of employees.” Cal. Lab. Code
§§ 6400(a), 6401. In other words, section 6400 “establishes a potential duty of care for an
employer regarding the physical conditions of the workplace.” Brown v. Brotman Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 571 F. App’x 572, 575 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
The Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff's § 6400 claim requires
interpretation of the CBA. Plaintiff's § 6400 claim arises from “her belief that the [personal
protective equipment] provided by [the Hospital] was inadequate to protect her health, personal
safety and well being[.]” Compl.47112. In arguing that this claim depends upon analysis of the
CBA, Defendants cite Article 29 of the CBA, “Safety.” See ECF 14 at 12. Yet Article 29.1
merely states that the Hospital “will comply with applicable federal and California laws and
regulations pertaining to occupational safety and health” and “take reasonable steps to provide a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-04338-MRA-E Date July 9, 2025
Title Cathy Kirkwood v. HCA Healthcare, Inc., et al.
safe, secure, clean and therapeutic environment for patients, guests and employees.” CBA 429.1.
Article 29.2 states that “[n]o employee shall be required to work under conditions that would be
hazardous to the employee’s physical safety.” Article 29.3 states that “[e]mployees who become
aware of hazardous conditions . . . and/or unsafe equipment must notify their immediate supervisor
as soon as possible” and “[n]o employee will be subject to discipline for reporting a health or
safety problem.” Jd. § 29.3. Article 29.4 further provides that if the Hospital does not remedy
a safety issue “within a reasonable period of time,” the employee or the Union may contact the
Industrial Safety Commission of the State of California or other government agencies” and that
“{d]isputes concerning the conditions of health and safety within the Hospital shall not be subject
to the grievance and arbitration procedures of this Agreement, but shall be subject to the applicable
administrative procedures established by federal and California laws.” Jd. § 29.4. Defendants
do not identify with particularity any portion of Article 29 that is in “active dispute” and in fact
must be interpreted to determine whether Defendants breached their duty of care. Schurke, 898
F.3d at 921. Indeed, Articles 29.1 tracks the language of § 6400.
Defendants’ reliance on Brown is unavailing. In that unpublished decision, the Ninth
Circuit recognized that § 6400 “gives employers ‘room for discretion’ in their decisions about
workplace safety.” 571 F. App’x at 576. The court observed that the plaintiffs claim “largely
focuse[d] on the general decisions that [the employer] made in setting up its workplace” and that
the CBA gave the employer “wide latitude in making [those] determinations.” Jd. Thus,
because it was “necessary for a court to interpret the terms of the CBA to determine the standard
of care that [the employer] agreed to assume and, in turn, whether [the employer]’s actions
violated that duty,” the court affirmed the district court’s decision that the plaintiff's § 6400 claim
was preempted. Jd. Unlike Brown, Article 29 of the CBA does not purport to reserve the
employer’s right to set safety rules or otherwise define the duty of care assumed by Defendants.
The standard of care set forth im Article 29.1 and assumed by Defendants is tethered to the
reasonableness standard found in § 6400. Thus, the Court does not find that Plaintiff's § 6400
claim is dependent, much less “substantially dependent,” on interpretation of the CBA. See
Kobold, 832 F.3d at 1033.
Claim 16 alleges retaliation in violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 6310, which prohibits an
employer from terminating an employee because the employee has made “any oral or written
complaint” to, inter alia, their employer about unsafe working conditions or unsafe work
practices. Cal. Lab. Code § 6310(a). “The public policy behind § 6310 is . . . to prevent
retaliation against those who in good faith report working conditions they believe to be unsafe.”
Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 759 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also
Taylor v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 78 Cal. App. 4th 472, 485 (2000) (explaining that § 6310 “is
part of California’s statutory scheme for occupational safety”). Courts interpreting □□□□□□□

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-04338-MRA-E Date July 9, 2025
Title Cathy Kirkwood v. HCA Healthcare, Inc., et al.
wrongful termination statutes have applied the three-part burden shifting framework set forth by
the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Yanowitz v.
L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1042 (2005). To demonstrate a prima facie case of
retaliation, the plaintiff must establish three elements: “(1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected
activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a
causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.” Jd. “Once an
employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer is required to offer a legitimate,
nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Jd. Here, Plaintiff alleges that she
engaged in protected activity and suffered adverse employment actions as a result when: (a) the
Hospital refused to provide her with training on certain equipment; (b) Plaintiff was flexed off
work; (c) Plaintiff submitted a grievance requesting her supervisor to “[f]ollow [the] CBA and not
do[] bargaining unit work;” (d) Plaintiff reported a lack of laboratory compliance and indifference
to employee health and safety with respect to inappropriate disposal of carcinogenic reagents;
(e) Plaintiff requested that management have a daily maintenance log sheet established for the
biological safety cabinet. See Compl. § 13.
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs allegation that her supervisor violated the CBA is a
“direct violation of the CBA” that establishes § 301 preemption and that the remaining allegations
implicate the CBA’s provisions regarding the use of and training on new equipment, workload,
and workplace safety. ECF 14 at12. For instance, under Article 15, “Management Rights,” the
Hospital “retain[ed] the exclusive mght to manage the operations of the Hospital and to direct its
working forces,” including the right to “assign and supervise employees,” “determine and change
starting times, quitting times and shifts, and the number of hours to be worked.” CBA § 15.1.
Article 18, “New Technology/Equipment,” further provides that “[u]pon the introduction of the
technology/equipment in the workplace, training will be made available to all employees in the
affected department/unit who will be required to use the new technology/equipment.” Jd. § 18.1.
Article 36, “Workload,” states that “[w]hen an employee is assigned additional duties on his/her
shift, the employee may request from his/her supervisor or designee assistance in determining the
employee’s work priorities for that shift.” Id. 4 36.1.
Defendants misconstrue the preemption standard. That the CBA sets forth relevant
internal rules and procedures regarding the conduct at issue does not mean that the CBA must be
interpreted to adjudicate Plaintiffs § 6310 claim. See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123 (providing that
it is “the legal character of a claim,” not “whether a grievance arising from ‘precisely from the
same set of facts’ could be pursued that decides preemption). Defendants neglect to adequately
explain what language in the CBA requires interpretation and why. As explained above, the crux
of Plaintiff's retaliation claim is that she engaged in protected activity by raising numerous
complaints and that Defendants took adverse employment actions against her in response. The

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-04338-MRA-E Date July 9, 2025
Title Cathy Kirkwood v. HCA Healthcare, Inc., et al.
factual inquiries involved in determining whether Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff—
including those related to Plaintiffs Grievance alleging that her supervisor did not follow the
CBA—will not require the Court to construe the CBA.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399
(1988), is instructive. There, an employee filed a grievance pursuant to a CBA that protected
employees from discharge except for “proper” or “just” cause and that established an arbitration
procedure for grievances. Jd. at 401. While an arbitration was pending, the employee filed a
retaliatory discharge action in state court, alleging that the employer had retaliated against her for
exercising her rights under the state’s worker’s compensation laws. Jd. at 402. The Court held
that the state-law remedy is “independent” of the CBA for purposes of § 301 because the elements
of the employee’s retaliatory discharge claim are “purely factual questions pertain[ing] to the
conduct of the employee and the conduct and motivation of the employer. Neither of the
elements requires a court to interpret any term of a[CBA].” Jd. at 407. As for the employer’s
defense that it had a nonretaliatory reason for the discharge, the Court concluded that “this purely
factual inquiry likewise does not turn on the meaning of any provision of a [CBA].” Jd. Like
the claim in Lingle, § 6310 creates a nonnegotiable statutory right, and as such, California federal
courts have consistently held that § 6310 is an independent statutory right that is not preempted
by § 301. See, e.g., Huitron v. U.S. Foods, Inc., No. CV 14-09402 MMM PLAX, 2015 WL
1524398, at *5-8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2015); Ortiz v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., No. C 13-
00460 SI, 2013 WL 1748049, *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013); Khdrlaryan v. Olympia Med. Ctr., No.
CV09-08141 DDP (FMOx), 2010 WL 2471061, *3 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2010); Perrapato v. The
San Francisco Chron., No. CV 05-1017 PJH, 2005 WL 2171876, *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2005).
The remaining cases cited by Defendants are inapposite. See ECF 14 at 15; see also ECF
1 9§ 8-14. Newberry v. Pac. Racing Ass’n, 854 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1988), considered a claim for
emotional distress arising from an employee’s discharge and the employer’s conduct in the
investigation leading up to it, which the Ninth Circuit held would require the court to decide
“whether her discharge was justified under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.” Id.
at 1149. The plaintiff asserted a common law tort claim, not a nonnegotiable statutory right
against wrongful termination. In Firestone v. S. Cal. Gas Co., the Ninth Circuit held that an
employee’s overtime claim was preempted by § 301 because the parties “disagree[d] on the
meaning of terms in the [CBA]” related to the overtime rights and obligations for purposes of
Califorma law. 219 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000). Defendants fail to identify any such
disagreement as to the terms of the CBA here or to explain why any disagreement, even if it did
exist, is material to Plaintiff's claims. In Levy v. Skywalker Sound, the California court of appeals
held that the plaintiff's tort claims are preempted by § 301 because all are “premised directly or
indirectly on the allegation that [the employer made misrepresentations to him regarding his

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-04338-MRA-E Date July 9, 2025
Title Cathy Kirkwood v. HCA Healthcare, Inc., et al.
inability to join the union, and/or to receive union-level pay and benefits.” 108 Cal. App. 4th
753, 766 (2003). With regard to statutory claims, the court held that plaintiffs claim for unpaid
wages “Tests entirely on his claim that [a] letter agreement entitled him to wages at the level set
by the CBA” and that the viability of his claim for induced relocation through knowingly false
representations under Cal. Lab. Code § 970 also depends on the terms of the CBA. /d. at 769-
70. This case presents different claims based on distinguishable facts. At base, the employers
in each of the above cases clearly identified why the employees’ claims substantially depend on
the interpretation of the CBA. Defendants plainly fail to do so here.
Accordingly, because Plaintiff's claims do not raise questions about the scope, meaning,
or application of the CBA, they avoid preemption under § 301 of the LMRA. See Curtis, 913
F.3dat 1153. Absent § 301 preemption, this case does not present a federal question. The Court
therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction, such that remand is warranted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c)
Iv. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion to Remand is GRANTED. The August 25,
2025, Scheduling Conference is VACATED and removed from the Court’s calendar. This case
shall be REMANDED to Ventura County Superior Court under the following case number:
2025CUWT041517.
IT ISSO ORDERED.

Initials of Deputy Clerk mku

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11093795. Public record. Not legal advice.