# VALENTI v. FRANK

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · July 10, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11093746

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 10, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11093746

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that the “longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings” generally requires federal courts to abstain from addressing issues in state criminal proceedings absent exceptional circumstances
- explaining that Briscoe extends to pretrial proceedings

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NICHOLAS VALENTI, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-3233
:
JAMES FRANK, et al., :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM
PEREZ, J. JULY 10, 2025
Plaintiff Nicholas Valenti, a pretrial detainee currently incarcerated at the Chester County
Prison, brings Fourth Amendment claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the force used
against him by state troopers and matters related to his pending criminal prosecution. Valenti
seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Valenti
leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the Complaint.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1
The Complaint names as Defendants four Pennsylvania State Troopers—James Frank,
Stephon Galka, Roman Zabolotnyy, and Yochi Charleus.2 On April 6, 2023, Valenti was

1 The following allegations are taken from the Complaint and publicly available dockets of
which this Court may take judicial notice. See Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256,
260 (3d Cir. 2006).

2 In drafting his Complaint, Valenti checked the boxes on the form he used indicating that he
seeks to name the Defendants in their official capacity. (Compl. at 2-3.) Valenti appears not to
have understood the implication of checking the official capacity box. Claims against state
employees named in their official capacity are indistinguishable from claims against the state
itself, which means official capacity claims against the Troopers are barred by Pennsylvania’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)
(“Official-capacity suits . . . generally represent only another way of pleading an action against
an entity of which an officer is an agent.” (quotations omitted)); Atkin v. Johnson, 432 F. App'x
47, 48 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“The District Court correctly determined that the Eleventh
arrested in connection with a criminal complaint charging him with twenty-one offenses,
including attempted murder of a police officer and arson, based on events that allegedly occurred
on April 3, 2023. See Commonwealth v. Valenti, No. CP-15-CR-0001374-2023 (C.P. Chester);
Commonwealth v. Valenti, No. MJ-15306-CR-0000104-2023. He is currently awaiting trial on

those charges.
Valenti’s current Complaint relates to this criminal proceeding. He alleges that the
events giving rise to his claims occurred on April 3, 2023, when the Troopers arrived at an
address in Elverson, Pennsylvania where Valenti was located.3 (Compl. 4-5.) Valenti alleges
that one of the Defendants “use[d] excessive force and maliciously shot [him] in the hand,” and
that Defendants Roman and Zabolotnyy shot him in the leg “while [he] was unarmed.” (Id. at 5.)
Valenti sustained injuries to his right hand and thigh and experienced emotional distress. (Id.)
He also alleges that between May 6, 2023, and May 8, 2023, he “caught an infection in [his]
hand from the lack of medical attention” at the Chester County Prison, for which he was sent to
the hospital and “almost died.”4 (Id. at 4-5.)

Amendment bars claims for damages against the PSP, a state agency that did not waive its
sovereign immunity. To the extent Johnson was sued in his official capacity, he too was immune
from suit.” (citations omitted)). In any event, the Complaint is best construed as raising claims
against the Troopers in their individual capacity, so the Court will analyze it using that
interpretation. See Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2020) (“To
determine whether a plaintiff sued state officials in their official capacity, we first look to the
complaints and the course of proceedings.” (quotations omitted)); Coward v. City of
Philadelphia, No. 21-1619, 2021 WL 4169422, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2021) (permitting claim
against defendant in his individual capacity to proceed even though “[plaintiff] did not check the
box indicating a desire to sue [that defendant] in his individual capacity” where the allegations
clearly sought relief based on the defendant’s conduct).

3 The Complaint does not provide any explanation as to why the Troopers were at that location.

4 Although it appears Valenti intends to bring a claim based on the adequacy of medical care at
the Chester County Prison, there is no plausible basis for concluding that the Defendants, all of
whom are Troopers with the Pennsylvania State Police, would be responsible for that care.
Valenti further contends that the Defendants made unspecified “false statements” that
“provided the essential probable cause for [an] invalid search warrant affidavit,” and that reports
and records “contradic[ted] the defendant’s testimony.” (Id. at 5.) Valenti does not further
describe that testimony, but it presumably occurred in the court of his related criminal

proceedings. Valenti brings constitutional claims for damages based on these events. (Id. at 3,
5.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court will grant Valenti leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that
he is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action.5 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if, among other things, the Complaint
fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which
requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). At the screening stage, the Court accepts the facts
alleged in the pro se Complaint as true, draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor,

Accordingly, if Valenti seeks to pursue any claims based on this allegation, he must file a new
lawsuit naming proper defendants and setting forth in detail how those defendants were
responsible for acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (setting forth deliberate indifference standard); Edwards v.
Northampton Cnty., 663 F. App’x 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“[W]e agree with the
District Court and find no reason to apply a different standard here as we have applied the
‘deliberate indifference’ standard both in cases involving prisoners and pretrial detainees.”
(internal citations omitted)). The Court expresses no opinion on the merits of any such claims.

5 However, as Valenti is currently incarcerated, he will be obligated to pay the filing fee in
installments in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
and asks only whether the complaint, liberally construed, contains facts sufficient to state a
plausible claim. Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other
grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory
allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Additionally, a court may dismiss a complaint

based on an affirmative defense when the “defense is apparent on the face of the complaint.”
Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017). As Valenti is proceeding pro se, the
Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021)
(citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). The Court is also
obligated to dismiss any claims that seek monetary relief from an immune defendant. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
III. DISCUSSION
Valenti brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the vehicle by which federal
constitutional claims may be brought against state actors in federal court. “To state a claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws

of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In a § 1983 action, the
personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged constitutional violation is a required
element, and, therefore, a plaintiff must allege how each defendant was involved in the events
and occurrences giving rise to the claims. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d
Cir. 1998). Valenti’s claims against the Troopers are properly construed as arising under the
Fourth Amendment.6 See Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 580 U.S. 357, 367 (2017) (“If the

6 Although the Complaint invokes other constitutional provisions, (Compl. at 3), none of those
provisions support a basis for a claim against the Troopers based on the facts alleged. That
includes any claims that Valenti intended to raise under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See
complaint is that a form of legal process resulted in pretrial detention unsupported by probable
cause, then the right allegedly infringed lies in the Fourth Amendment.”); Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (holding “that all claims that law enforcement officers have used
excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’

of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’
standard, rather than under a ‘substantive due process’ approach”); see also Albright v. Oliver,
510 U.S. 266, 273-74 (1994) (explaining that “[w]here a particular Amendment provides an
explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government
behavior, that Amendment[] . . . must be the guide for analyzing these claims” (internal
quotations omitted)).
A. Excessive Force Claims
Valenti’s excessive force claims are time-barred. Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of
limitations applies to these claims. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.
384, 387 (2007). A claim accrues “when a plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action,

that is, when [he] can file suit and obtain relief.” Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185
(3d Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). In general, this means that the statute of limitations will
start running at the time the plaintiff “knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his]
action is based.” Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).
A prisoner’s complaint is considered filed at the time he hands it over to prison authorities for
forwarding to the Court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Moody v. Conroy, 680

Plouffe v. Cevallos, 777 F. App’x 594, 601 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[N]or is there a private right of
action for damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution.”); Pocono Mountain Charter Sch. v.
Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 442 F. App’x 681, 687 (3d Cir. 2011) (“No Pennsylvania statute
establishes, and no Pennsylvania court has recognized, a private cause of action for damages
under the Pennsylvania Constitution.”).
F. App’x 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Under the prison mailbox rule, . . . a pleading is
deemed filed at the time a prisoner executes it and delivers it to prison authorities for mailing.”).
Valenti’s excessive force claims accrued on April 3, 2023, because that is when the
Defendants allegedly subjected him to excessive force. It follows that Valenti knew or should

have known of his injuries on this date. See LeBlanc v. Snavely, 453 F. App’x 140, 142 (3d Cir.
2011) (per curiam) (“Claims for false arrest and assault (which would include LeBlanc’s
excessive force claim) typically accrue on the date of the arrest or the assault, because, at that
point, the plaintiff has reason to know of the injury.”); see also Hickox v. Cty. of Blair, 591 F.
App’x 107, 110 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“Hickox’s cause of action accrued on November
13, 2010, the date on which he alleges he was injured by the defendants’ actions.”). However,
Valenti did not file his Complaint until June 17, 2025 at the earliest,7 which is more than two
years after his claims accrued. Nor is there any basis for tolling here. Indeed, Valenti previously
asserted these (and other) claims in a complaint filed with the Court in March 2025, but his case
was dismissed without prejudice on May 20, 2025, because he abandoned it. Valenti v. Frank,

No. 25-1576 (E.D. Pa.). It is apparent then that he was capable of pursuing his excessive force
claims within the applicable statute of limitations. See Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc.,
547 F.3d 406, 425 (2d Cir. 2008) (courts may take judicial notice of prior lawsuits).
Accordingly, Valenti’s excessive force claims will be dismissed as time barred.
B. Claims Based on Search Warrant
Valenti also alleges that Defendants gave “false statements” that “provided the essential
probable cause for [an] invalid search warrant affidavit.” (Compl. at 5.) “The Fourth

7 The Complaint is dated June 17, 2025, (Compl. at 11), so that is the earliest date that Valenti
could have delivered it to prison authorities for mailing.
Amendment prohibits the intentional or reckless inclusion of a material false statement (or
omission of material information) in a search-warrant affidavit.” United States v. Pavulak, 700
F.3d 651, 665 (3d Cir. 2012). “A § 1983 plaintiff may establish a Fourth Amendment violation
in procuring a search warrant by showing: 1) the officer made false statements or omissions in

the affidavit either deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth; and 2) those
misstatements or omissions were material to the judicial officer’s finding of probable cause.”
Bamont v. Pa. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 163 F. Supp. 3d 138, 145-46 (E.D.
Pa. 2016) (citing Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997)). Valenti’s Complaint
lacks any factual allegations describing the content of the search warrant. He does not allege
what the warrant permitted, nor does he describe the allegedly false statements that were made to
procure the warrant. He also fails to describe any search or seizure that occurred, including
when and where it occurred. Absent this basic information, the Complaint is conclusory and
falls far short of stating a Fourth Amendment claim.
C. Claims Based on False Testimony

Although unclear, it is possible that Valenti may be attempting to pursue a claim against
one of more of the Defendants for testifying falsely during Valenti’s criminal proceeding. If so,
this claim is not factually developed because it is unclear who allegedly testified and what they
said. In any event, individuals are entitled to absolute immunity from civil rights claims based
on testimony in court, including at pretrial hearings. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-
46 (1983) (explaining that § 1983 does not allow recovery of damages against witnesses,
including police officers, for testimony in a judicial proceeding); Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d
138, 141-43 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that Briscoe extends to pretrial proceedings). For these
reasons, any claims based on false testimony will be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (111). Valenti will be given leave to file an amended complaint only as to
his Fourth Amendment claim based on the search warrant.® All other claims against the
Defendants will be dismissed with prejudice because amendment of those claims would be futile.
An appropriate Order follows, which provides further instruction about amendment.
BY THE COURT:

MIA R. PEREZ, J.

8 Valenti should note that “[iJ]f a plaintiff files a... claim related to rulings that will likely be
made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial[], it is within the power of the district court, and
in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood
of a criminal case is ended.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007); see also Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (recognizing that the “longstanding public policy against
federal court interference with state court proceedings” generally requires federal courts to
abstain from addressing issues in state criminal proceedings absent exceptional circumstances);
Rex v. Fisher, No. 12-4045, 2012 WL 3537846, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2012) (staying false
arrest and illegal search claims for damages when plaintiff “ha[d] the opportunity to raise his
Fourth-Amendment challenges in the course of his criminal proceeding”). If Valenti returns with
an amended complaint developing his claim based on the search warrant, the Court will consider
staying his claims until his criminal proceeding is resolved, including any available appeals, if
appropriate.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11093746. Public record. Not legal advice.