# PARDUE v. SANFORD

> District Court, D. Maine · July 8, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11092056

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maine
- **Decided:** July 8, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

KYRA L. PARDUE, )
)
Plaintiff )
)
v. ) No. 2:23-cv-00332-LEW
)
ANDREW RAYMOND, )
THOMAS SAYRE, )
CHRISTOPHER BROWN, )
AMY GAGNE, TRAVIS BELLEARD )
ERIC BILODEAU, ERIC SMALL, )
& CRAIG ANDERSON, )
)
Defendants )

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Kyra L. Pardue, proceeding pro se, advances constitutional and state claims against
several Sanford Police Officers, the Chief of Police, and the Deputy Chief. Before the
Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 87). After review of the
appropriate summary judgment materials, and for the following reasons, Defendants’
Motion will be granted.
BACKGROUND
A. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the facts, some law on the facts. Summary judgment is governed by both
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the District of Maine Local Rules. This District
imposed local rules on summary judgment filings so that judges “would not have to search
the record to uncover factual disputes[,] becom[e] the lawyer for the unrepresented
plaintiff[,] or devot[e] an excessive portion of [its] time to such cases.” Clarke v. Blais,
473 F.Supp.2d 124, 129 (1st Cir. 2007). The Local Rules therefore provide that

Defendants’ “motion for summary judgment must be supported by a separate, short, and
concise statement of material facts, each fact in a separately numbered paragraph [and]
[e]ach fact asserted . . . must be supported by a record citation.” D. Me. Loc. R. 56(b)(1).
The rules also require that Ms. Pardue, as the opposing party, submit her own statement of
material facts “limited to any additional facts.” D. Me. Loc. R. 56(d). Her statement also
“must admit, deny, or qualify the facts by reference to each numbered paragraph of the”

Defendants’ facts.” Id.
Following these procedural rules is important. I “may disregard any statement of
fact not supported by a specific citation to record material properly considered on summary
judgment.” D. Me. Loc. R. 56(f). And “[f]acts contained in a supporting or opposing
statement of material facts, if supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall

be deemed admitted unless properly controverted.” Id.
Ms. Pardue’s Response (ECF No. 92) largely fails to comply with the Local Rules.
It begins, “Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P56(c)(1) and D. Me. Local Rule 56(b) Plaintiff Kyra
Pardue submitted their statement of Disputed Material facts in support of my Objection to
Summary Judgment.” Pl.’s Response at 1. The Response contains no explicit admissions,

denials, or qualifications. The “Reasons for Objection” section does claim there is a
“disputed fact” several times, but these disputes are either legal conclusions or do not
reference Defendants’ facts. Occasionally, these disputes cite to Ms. Pardue’s Supporting
Documentation (ECF No. 92-1). The supporting documentation itself is various
photographs, letters, and unsworn, unnotarized “affidavits.”1

In Defendants’ Reply (ECF No. 100), they contend that their statement of material
facts must be deemed admitted and Ms. Pardue’s additional facts should be disregarded.
Following Defendants’ Reply, Ms. Pardue filed a Motion to Strike (ECF No. 101) her own
summary judgment response and sought permission to file a new response. In a companion
order, I denied Ms. Pardue’s Motion to Strike. Being left with Ms. Pardue’s original
Response, I consider what, if any, of her facts and disputes are appropriate to consider at

this stage.
I am mindful that Ms. Pardue is self-represented and apparently unfamiliar with
procedural rules despite direction by the Court to make herself familiar with them. Where
a self-represented party fails to comply with the summary judgment rules, “the obligations
of the court . . . are not well defined.” Clarke v. Blais, 473 F.Supp.2d 124, 128 (D. Me.

2007). The First Circuit has noted that an unrepresented plaintiff’s summary judgment
papers should be read “liberally.” Posadas de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Radin, 856 F.2d 399,
401 (1st Cir. 1988). But wait, there’s more. At the same time, it has “consistently held
that a litigant’s pro se status [does not] absolve him from compliance with [either] the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [or] a district court’s procedural rules.” F.D.I.C. v.

Anchor Props., 13 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1994) (cleaned up). The First Circuit has enforced

1 As is, Ms. Pardue’s papers likely do not meet the Federal Rules definition of an affidavit or declaration,
which requires that affidavits or declarations “be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be
admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.”
the procedural rules against self-represented parties at least where they have “clear notice
of the rule and the deficiencies of [their] response.” Mas Marques v. Digital Equip. Corp.,

637 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1980).
In this case, as with most cases in a court of law, even in the First Circuit,
enforcement of the rules is appropriate. Multiple times this Court has requested Ms. Pardue
read the Handout for Self-Represented (Pro Se) Parties after she misunderstood the
procedural rules. See ECF Nos. 81, 83. That handout details motions for summary
judgment and provides a link to Local Rule 56. Ms. Pardue’s Response indicates some

attempt to comply with the procedural rules—it even begins by citing them. It seems Ms.
Pardue had notice of the rules surrounding summary judgment and failed to comply with
them. I may then disregard her additional facts and deem Defendants’ facts admitted. See
Marcello v. Maine, 489 F.Supp.2d 70, 78 (D. Me. 2007) (“The Court concludes [plaintiffs]
were on notice of the requirements contained in Local Rule 56(c), and their failure to

comply with them must have consequences.”).
Even if I were to pore over Ms. Pardue’s filings to build a case for her and construe
genuine disputes of material fact it seems that attempt would fail.2 Nearly all Ms. Pardue’s
factual disputes are either immaterial and/or misconstrue Defendants’ facts.3 Likewise,

2 I have the discretion to accept some or all of Ms. Pardue’s procedurally defunct additional facts. See D.
ME. LOC. R. 56(f) (“The Court may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation . . .
.). But I have “no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced
in a statement of facts.” Id. Even so, scrutinizing Mr. Pardue’s papers to construe an argument abandons
the judicial role.

3 For example, Ms. Pardue states that the two officers who arrested her in her house entered seventeen feet
into her home instead of three. First, Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts only states Ms. Pardue was
“two or three feet into the house” when she was told she was under arrest, not that the officers only went
three feet into the house to arrest her. Second, for her claims of unlawful entry, and unlawful arrest, a
Ms. Pardue’s additional facts are simply legal conclusions, go well beyond her original
complaint, and are unsupported by the record.4 As I explain in my companion order, this

pattern suggests that any further “affidavits or responsive papers that [Ms. Pardue] would
have filed would not have raised genuine issues of material fact and would not have
altered” my below decision on summary judgment. Marcello, 489 F.Supp.2d at 78-79
(quoting United States v. Ninety-Three Firearms, 330 F.3d 414, 428 (6th Cir. 2003)).
On top of that, much of the underlying summary judgment facts are captured on
video. Ms. Pardue contends that some of this video footage—recordings from officers’

body-worn cameras—has been doctored. She offers no admissible or relevant evidence to
support this claim. At most, she submits an “affidavit” of Stefaun Corrigan, that claims he
was present while Ms. Pardue was in police custody and saw officers place Ms. Pardue in
wooden boxes. This “version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no
reasonable jury could have believed [them].” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

Accordingly, I “view[] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Id. at 381.
I sympathize with Ms. Pardue’s unfamiliarity with this Court’s procedural rules.
But she has been afforded many opportunities to familiarize herself with the rules and

difference of fourteen feet does not matter. Police were either entitled to enter Ms. Pardue’s home and
arrest her or they were not. While I do not provide a laundry list of other alleged factual disputes, they are
similarly unproductive.

4 For instance, Ms. Pardue’s Response states, “I guess we have to be half Black . . . to get protection from
the Sanford Police Department cruisers.” Pl.’s Response at 4. Even with the most generous reading, this
ill-conceived disparate treatment claim is nowhere in Ms. Pardue’s complaint. And its only support in the
record is an unsworn “affidavit” attributed to Ms. Pardue’s minor son, which gives the same unfounded
statement. Pl.’s Supporting Doc. at 3. “It is well settled that plaintiffs are generally not permitted to raise
brand new theories of their case in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.” Agri-Mark, Inc. v. Niro,
Inc. 233 F.Supp.2d 200, 207 (D. Mass. 2002) (collecting authority).
continually failed to carry her procedural burden. I will not carry it for her. Ms. Pardue is
not “entitled to extra procedural swaddling.” Eagle Eye Fishing Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of

Comm., 20 F.3d 503, 506 (1st Cir. 1994). Defendants’ facts are deemed admitted and I
draw the following background from their Statement of Material Facts (ECF No. 86).
While I treat those facts as undisputed, I consider them in a light most favorable to Ms.
Pardue5 and draw reasonable inferences in her favor.
B. THE FACTS
Ms. Pardue has had numerous interactions with Sanford police. However, her

present claims relate specifically to two separate incidents where she was arrested by
Sanford police officers.
1. 2021 Arrest
In September 2021, Ms. Pardue’s adult son, Tyler, called 911 to report that Ms.
Pardue had hit him. Defendants Officer Raymond and Sergeant Sayre responded.6 Both

had responded to similar calls in the past and were familiar with Ms. Pardue and Tyler.
Officer Raymond arrived first and found Tyler outside. The two spoke and Tyler
reported Ms. Pardue had punched him in the head. Tyler showed Officer Raymond where
he had been hit, and Officer Raymond saw a raised lump in the spot. Sergeant Sayre arrived
next and he, Tyler, and Officer Raymond approached Ms. Pardue’s home. Officer

Raymond stood on the porch and knocked on the door to no immediate response. While

5 At least where the facts are not made clear from video evidence.

6 At the time, neither Officer Raymond nor Sergeant Sayre had a body-worn camera. However, Tyler
recorded part of the incident on his cellphone. Def.’s Ex. 2 (ECF No. 85-5). Officer Raymond also wore
the three waited, Tyler and Sergeant Sayre stood just off the porch. Tyler repeated his story
and showed Sergeant Sayre his head injury. Eventually, Tyler’s girlfriend, Desiree,

answered the door and, upon request, went to get Ms. Pardue.
Ms. Pardue came to the doorway, whereupon she and Tyler got into it. Tyler tried
to plead that he would not be charging Ms. Pardue with any crimes while Ms. Pardue
screamed at Tyler for not respecting the rules of her house. Officer Raymond asked Ms.
Pardue what her side of the story was. Ms. Pardue was not particularly forthcoming, and
instead insisted Officer Raymond get off the porch. Officer Raymond attempted to get Ms.

Pardue to step outside and away from Tyler by offering to step off the porch if she came
outside and let Tyler inside to collect his things. Ms. Pardue repeated that she had nothing
to say to the police and continued arguing with Tyler.
At this point, Officer Raymond decided to arrest Ms. Pardue for domestic violence
assault. He made a hand signal to Sergeant Sayre indicating he was going to handcuff Ms.

Pardue. Officer Raymond then asked Tyler to go inside and again asked Ms. Pardue to
come outside. She refused and turned back into her house. After a few steps, Officer
Raymond told Ms. Pardue she was under arrest and entered her house. Ms. Pardue retreated
further into her home closely followed by Officer Raymond and Sergeant Sayre.
Both officers grabbed Ms. Pardue on either side. Officer Raymond attempted to

cuff Ms. Pardue, but she attempted to pull away and fought having her arms placed behind
her back. Then, Ms. Pardue’s minor son and her three dogs got into the mix. The son tried
tugging on Ms. Pardue’s arm while the dogs bit Sergeant Sayre in the leg. By this time,
Officer Raymond had finished handcuffing Ms. Pardue but he had not double locked the
handcuffs. Double locked handcuffs will not move in either direction so they cannot
tighten on an arrestee’s arm. Given the ongoing chaos, Officer Raymond decided to

remove Ms. Pardue from the house before finishing her arrest.
The police forcibly led Ms. Pardue out of the house. Officer Raymond finished
double locking Ms. Pardue’s handcuffs while Ms. Pardue complained that the cuffing
and/or removal hurt. The officers then placed Ms. Pardue in Officer Raymond’s cruiser
and she was taken to jail.
About eight months after her arrest, Ms. Pardue sent a misconduct complaint against

Defendants Raymond and Sayre to Defendant Chief Andersen. Chief Andersen assigned
Defendant Deputy Chief Small to investigate Ms. Pardue’s allegations. Deputy Chief
Small interviewed Officer Raymond, Sergeant Sayre, Ms. Pardue, Tyler, and Desiree. He
also watched a video of the arrest Tyler recorded on his phone. He concluded “Ms.
Pardue’s allegations of unlawful arrest, excessive force, and assault against Officer

Raymond and Sergeant Sayre were unfounded, and the unlawful entry allegation was not
sustained.” Aff. of Eric Small (ECF No. 85-15) at ¶ 9. In December 2022, Ms. Pardue
filed a Notice of Claim with the Sanford Police department, as required by the Maine Tort
Claims Act, alleging injury from her arrest.
2. 2023 Arrest

The second incident occurred when Tyler again called 911. This time, Tyler
reported that both Ms. Pardue and his younger sister had punched his girlfriend, Desiree.
Four Sanford police officers responded.7 Officer Jarrett (not named in this suit) and
Defendant Officer Belleard were initially dispatched. Defendants Officers Bilodeau and

Gagne also went to the Pardue house believing multiple officers may be best. All four
officers had been dispatched to Ms. Pardue’s home several times before in response to
reports of domestic altercations.
Officers Jarrett and Belleard arrived within moments of each other. Officer Jarrett
approached Ms. Pardue, who was standing on her porch, to ask her what had happened.
Ms. Pardue strongly and immediately demanded the officers leave her property. This back

and forth continued while Officers Bilodeau and Gagne arrived. A few minutes after all of
the officers arrived, Tyler left the house carrying his belongings. Ms. Pardue followed
Tyler insisting he get off her property too. As Tyler walked down the road, Ms. Pardue
knocked his belongings out of his hands.
Officer Belleard then got between Tyler and Ms. Pardue and ordered her to get back

inside. As she walked back toward the house, Ms. Pardue continued yelling at Tyler and
Officer Belleard gave her a “disorderly conduct warning” and advised her to stop. Defs’
Ex. 3 (ECF No. 85-3) at 6:50-6:54. As Ms. Pardue returned to the porch she turned and,
with great aim, threw her drink at Officer Belleard. Immediately afterward, Desiree came
to the front door carrying her belongings and joined Tyler outside the house.

Officer Belleard joined Tyler and Desiree. Desiree told Officer Belleard that Ms.
Pardue had hit her and that she recorded the incident on her phone. Officer Belleard

7 Three of the four officers had body-worn cameras that were on for their entire interaction with Ms. Pardue.
See Def.’s Exs. 3-5 (ECF Nos. 85-3 to 85-5).
watched the video, which recorded Ms. Pardue slapping and pushing Desiree in her face.8
Officer Belleard also saw marks on Desiree’s face and neck. Based on this evidence,

Officer Belleard decided to arrest Ms. Pardue for domestic violence assault.
Officer Belleard returned to the porch and tried to handcuff Ms. Pardue. Ms. Pardue
refused to have her hands placed behind her back. Officer Belleard grabbed Ms. Pardue
by the arm and Officer Bilodeau came to help. As Ms. Pardue had her phone in one hand,
Officer Bilodeau offered to take the phone so it did not break. In turn, Ms. Pardue asked
Officer Bilodeau to arrest Desiree and told him he was the only police officer that was

listening to her. She then stated she wanted to go with Officer Bilodeau and told Officer
Belleard to let her go.
Officer Belleard refused to let Ms. Pardue go and told her he needed to place her in
handcuffs. As Ms. Pardue was adamant she did not want to go with Officer Belleard, he
agreed that Officer Bilodeau could take her to jail but again insisted she cooperate with

being handcuffed. Eventually, Ms. Pardue stepped off the porch and Officer Belleard
handcuffed and double locked the handcuffs. Officer Belleard continued to hold Ms.
Pardue’s arm as he led her to Officer Bilodeau’s cruiser. During the arrest, Officer Gagne
attempted to calm down Ms. Pardue’s minor daughter and son, who were arguing with the
police, Tyler, and Desiree.

Officer Bilodeau took Ms. Pardue to the Sanford Police Department. Ms. Pardue
complained that she was handcuffed too tightly. Officer Bilodeau briefly uncuffed Ms.
Pardue so she could use the bathroom, then he handcuffed one of her hands and one of her

8
ankles to a bench. As Officer Bilodeau filled out a summons, he gave Ms. Pardue his
phone so she could arrange her bail bond. He initially told her she would not be going to

jail because he assumed she could pay her bail. However, Ms. Pardue was not able to make
any bail arrangement, so Officer Bilodeau told her he would have to take her to jail.9
Ms. Pardue became very upset and refused to sign her summons. She also
continually complained that she had been handcuffed too tightly and that Officer Belleard
was too rough in arresting her. Because of her repeated complaints, Officer Bilodeau
decided to take Ms. Pardue to Southern Maine Health Care (“SMHC”) for a “FIT” for

incarceration evaluation. He handcuffed (and double-locked) Ms. Pardue with her hands
in front of her and led her back to his car.
During the drive, Ms. Pardue told Officer Bilodeau that the last time she had gone
to SMHC she had been sexually assaulted in the lobby. Due to that traumatic experience,
she wished to go to a different hospital. As SMHC is where all Sanford police bring

arrestees for such evaluations, Officer Bilodeau could not take her elsewhere. He did
attempt to accommodate Ms. Pardue by driving her to the emergency room entrance to
avoid the lobby. Still, when she arrived, Ms. Pardue requested that she be permitted to
speak to a mental health counselor because of her past experience.
Officer Bilodeau and two SMHC security guards walked with Ms. Pardue into the

hospital without touching her. Ms. Pardue walked into an exam room and Officer Bilodeau
and the other security guards left to stand outside. While he waited, a doctor approached

9 This portion of Officer Bilodeau’s body-worn camera footage lacks audio, as do later sections of footage.
Officer Bilodeau to get his story. He recounted the events leading to Ms. Pardue’s arrest
and warned the doctor that mentioning Tyler or Desiree during the FIT may make Ms.

Pardue irate. Meanwhile, Ms. Pardue stated that she would hang herself if she was taken
to jail. Both the doctor and Officer Bilodeau overheard this. The doctor, however, did not
seem to take the threat seriously and told Officer Bilodeau that Ms. Pardue would be fit for
jail after a ten-minute safety check.
Ms. Pardue was evaluated and deemed fit for incarceration. Officer Bilodeau went
into her examination room to take her to jail. From her examination, Ms. Pardue had

various wires attached to her. As Officer Bilodeau and SMHC security went to remove the
wires, Ms. Pardue took off her shoe. Officer Bilodeau thought she might throw it at the
officers. When Ms. Pardue refused to put her shoe down, Officer Bilodeau requested that
a supervisor respond for assistance. Defendant Sergeant Brown responded.
While waiting for backup, Officer Bilodeau attempted to grab Ms. Pardue’s shoes

while SMHC security removed the wires. Ms. Pardue was less than cooperative, so Officer
Bilodeau physically restrained her legs while the security guards and hospital staff
attempted to remove the wires. While held down, Ms. Pardue spat on one of the security
officers. In response, SMHC security held Ms. Pardue’s head down while Officer Bilodeau
requested a spit hood10 from medical staff. Medical staff first placed Ms. Pardue in a

surgical mask then, as SMHC security held her down, put her in a spit hood.

10 A mesh head and face cover.
Officer Bilodeau then wheeled Ms. Pardue out of the hospital on a gurney given her
ongoing resistance. Outside, they were met by Sergeant Brown, who held down Ms.
Pardue’s legs so Officer Bilodeau could apply a transport belt.11 Officer Bilodeau and

Sergeant Brown also attempted to place Ms. Pardue’s legs in a hobble max device.12 But
the two eventually determined the restraint would not be feasible. Instead, Officer
Bilodeau used a second set of handcuffs to attach Ms. Pardue’s hands to the transport belt
and walked her to his cruiser. Officer Bilodeau and Sergeant Brown took her to jail intake
along with the paperwork from her FIT evaluation.

About a week after this arrest, Ms. Pardue sent Chief Andersen a long letter accusing
Defendants Bilodeau, Belleard, Brown, and Gagne of misconduct. He again assigned
Deputy Chief Small to investigate. After reviewing the officer’s body-worn camera
footage and narrative reports, he again concluded Ms. Pardue’s “allegations against the
officers were unfounded.” Aff. of Eric Small ¶ 11.

Based on these two arrests, Ms. Pardue brings a litany of state and federal claims
against the officers involved. Ms. Pardue also seeks to hold then-Police Chief Craig
Andersen and Deputy Chief Eric Small accountable on a theory of supervisory liability.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Disputes are genuine if they can be resolved in favor of either party,

11 A strap to limit arm motion.

12
and facts are “material” if they have the potential to impact the outcome of the case.
Feliciano-Muñoz v. Rebarber-Ocasio, 970 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2020). To raise a genuine

issue of material fact, Ms. Pardue must demonstrate that the record contains evidence that
would permit the finder of fact to resolve the material issues in her favor. See Triangle
Trading Co. v. Robroy Indus., Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1999).
I view the facts in a light most favorable to Ms. Pardue and draw all reasonable
inferences in her favor. Construing Ms. Pardue’s complaint generously, she brings a
Section 1983 action against the defendants, alleging constitutional violations stemming

from her two arrests.13 She also brings supervisory liability claims against Defendants
Andersen and Small, as well as a smattering of state law claims against most defendants.
I address each in turn.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
1. Unlawful Arrest

Ms. Pardue contends that both her 2021 and 2023 arrests were unlawful. She
accuses Defendants Raymond, Sayre, and Belleard of violating her Fourth Amendment
rights.
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. am. IV. A warrantless arrest is

reasonable where there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed.
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). Probable cause requires that the facts

13 Although Ms. Pardue’s complaint lists “Freedom of Expression” as a basis for this Court’s jurisdiction,
I do not read her complaint to bring a First Amendment claim. And even if it did, no reasonable finder of
known to the arresting officer are “sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that
the defendant had committed or was committing an offense.” United States v. Bizier, 111

F.3d 214, 217 (1st Cir. 1997). Probable cause “is not a high bar,” Kaley v. United States,
571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014), and it is satisfied where there is merely “a probability or
substantial chance” a crime has occurred. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57
(2018). A victim’s statement corroborated by their injuries easily creates probable cause.
Nelson v. Moore, 470 F.2d 1192, 1197 (1st Cir. 1972). But even an uncorroborated witness
statement can support probable cause to arrest. Acosta v. Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 386 F.3d

5, 10 (1st Cir. 2004).
In 2021, Ms. Pardue was arrested for domestic violence assault. Maine law defines
this as causing an assault (such as bodily injury or offensive contact) against a family or
household member. 17-A M.R.S. §§ 207(1)(A), 207-A(1)(A). Her unlawful arrest claim
can survive summary judgment if the facts show there was no probable cause to arrest her.

But the relatively low bar of probable cause is met on these facts. Defendants Raymond
and Sayre had more than enough facts to support an arrest for a domestic violence assault.
Both were familiar with the Pardue family. They knew Tyler was Ms. Pardue’s son and
that he lived with her. Prior to Ms. Pardue’s arrest, Tyler told both Officer Raymond and
Sergeant Sayre that Ms. Pardue had hit him in the head. And, most saliently, Tyler’s story

was also corroborated by his own injury. Nelson, 470 F.2d at 1197. At this point, a
reasonably prudent person could conclude that Tyler’s corroborated story made it probable
Ms. Pardue had assaulted her son. Bizier, 111 F.3d at 217.
Probable cause is also easily met for Ms. Pardue’s 2023 arrest for domestic violence
assault. Again, the arresting officer, Defendant Belleard, was given a victim statement

corroborated by matching injuries. Officer Belleard was also shown a video showing Ms.
Pardue slapping and pushing Desiree. Between Desiree’s statements, injuries, and the
video, it was sufficiently probable Ms. Pardue committed domestic violence assault. Id.
The facts, even viewed in a light most favorable to Ms. Pardue, show there was
probable cause supporting both of her warrantless arrests. As such, neither of her arrests
violated her Fourth Amendment rights.

2. Unlawful Entry
Ms. Pardue also alleges that the police unlawfully entered her house in 2021 and her
driveway in 2023. She therefore accuses Defendants Sayre, Raymond, Gagne, Belleard,
and Bilodeau of violating her Fourth Amendment rights.14
With respect to the 2021 arrest where officers entered Ms. Pardue’s house,

“[n]onconsensual entries by government agents into a residence without a search or arrest
warrant are presumptively ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.” McCabe v. Life-
Line Ambulance Serv., Inc., 77 F.3d 540, 544 (1st Cir. 1996) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984)). But the general warrant requirement
rule has exceptions. One such exception is the presence of “exigent circumstances.”

14 Defendants suggest that Ms. Pardue does not bring an unlawful entry claim against Officer Bilodeau.
Defs’ Mot. at 22 n.6. Ms. Pardue’s complaint states “violations continue to March 29, 2023 trespassed on
my property.” Compl. at 11. It goes on to detail that specifically Officers Gagne and Belleard did not leave
Ms. Pardue’s property when she asked them to. Id. at 11-12. Reading the complaint generously, I think
Ms. Pardue brings an unlawful entry claim against all Defendants present for her 2023 arrest. But the
defenses and the arguments Defendants Gagne and Belleard raise here are equally applicable to Officer
Exigent circumstances are those that create “a compelling necessity for immediate
action as will not brook the delay of obtaining a warrant.” United States v. Almonte, 952

F.2d 20, 22 (1991). Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971). The best
examples of exigent circumstances include: (1) “hot pursuit” of a felon into a residence;
(2) imminent destruction of evidence inside the house, (3) a threat of potentially successful
escape by a suspect inside the house, and (4) the imminent threat to the life or safety of the
public, police, or a person within the house. United States v. Rodriguez-Pacheco, 948 F.3d
1, 7 (1st Cir. 2020); McCabe, 77 F.3d at 545.

Hot pursuit and imminent threat are most relevant here. Ms. Pardue was not a felony
suspect, but that does not categorically exclude the exigent circumstance of hot pursuit.
The more serious the crime underlying the arrest is, the more reasonable warrantless entry
into the home may be. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750; see also Lange v. California, 594 U.S.
295, 305, 312-13 (2021) (“[A] felon is not always more dangerous than a misdemeanant.”

(internal quotations and citations omitted)). Although domestic violence assault is a
misdemeanor in Maine, domestic disputes nonetheless have a “combustible nature” and
courts give “great latitude to an officer’s belief that warrantless entry was justified.”
Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 197 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Fletcher v. Town of
Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir. 1999) (“In [domestic] disputes, violence may be lurking

and explode with little warning . . . . The signs of danger may be masked.”).
The undisputed facts of record depict exigent circumstances warranting entry into
Ms. Pardue’s house to arrest her in 2021. At the time of their entry, Defendants Sayre and
Raymond had probable cause to believe Ms. Pardue had assaulted her son. Ms. Pardue had
not provided a separate story, but instead continued to yell at Tyler. The underlying threat
of violence to Tyler, Tyler’s girlfriend, and potentially Ms. Pardue’s minor children

remained. In such a volatile situation, there was a compelling need for Defendants
Raymond and Sayre to dispense with the warrant requirement and pursue and arrest Ms.
Pardue inside her house.
As to the 2023 arrest, no officers entered Ms. Pardue’s house. Instead, they stood
outside the house, in Ms. Pardue’s driveway near her porch. The “curtilage” or area
“immediately surrounding and associated with the home,” is protected under the Fourth

Amendment. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013). But even accepting that Ms.
Pardue’s driveway was within the curtilage of her home,15 Defendants Bilodeau, Gagne,
and Belleard were entitled to enter and remain in the driveway.
“[P]olice officers have an implied license to approach the home through the
curtilage and . . . request to speak to the occupant . . . .” United States v. Mumme, 985 F.3d

25, 39 (1st Cir. 2021). So, Defendants Bilodeau, Gagne, and Belleard were entitled by
implied license to initially encroach on Ms. Pardue’s property as part of their response to
Tyler’s 911 call. And although Ms. Pardue revoked that license, Defendants were still
entitled to stay and investigate because exigent circumstances existed. Just as in the 2021
arrest, police had probable cause to believe Ms. Pardue had committed domestic violence

assault, this time on Desiree. As they attempted to get Ms. Pardue’s story, she continued
to argue with Tyler and Desiree. As before, the undercurrent of violence created an exigent

15 Defendants dispute this and not without merit. But I do not address their arguments because the
circumstance in the form of an imminent threat of violence to Tyler or Desiree, who stood
at the edge of the yard, waiting for a ride. Police then had a compelling reason to stay

within the curtilage and not leave to seek a warrant because more domestic violence could
have erupted.
Because exigent circumstances existed during both her 2021 and 2023 arrests, Ms.
Pardue has failed to make out a constitutional violation of warrantless entry.
3. Excessive Force
Ms. Pardue asserts a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against (1)

Defendants Sayre and Raymond for her 2021 arrest, (2) Defendant Belleard for her 2023
arrest, and (3) Defendants Bilodeau and Brown for restraining her during her FIT
evaluation. Ms. Pardue’s Fourth Amendment right to be secure in her person applies while
she is being arrested or detained. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). But her
constitutional right does not wholly preempt the use of any force against her. The Fourth

Amendment instead limits the use of force to an “objective reasonable standard.”
Fernandez-Salicrup v. Figueroa-Sancha, 790 F.3d 312, 326 (1st Cir. 2015). Ms. Pardue
must “show not only that [the police] employed force . . . but also that that level of force
was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.” Id. Determining reasonableness
requires the finder of fact to look to the totality of the circumstances, including: (1) the

severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether Ms. Pardue posed an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether she was actively resisting or attempting to
evade arrest. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
Given the undisputed circumstances surrounding Ms. Pardue’s 2021 and 2023
arrests, the Graham factors would not permit the finder of fact to rule in her favor. On

seriousness, domestic violence offenses fall toward the more severe side of misdemeanors
given their powder-keg qualities. Fletcher, 196 F.3d at 50. The same goes for threat to
safety. As to resisting arrest, both the written and video record show Ms. Pardue actively
resisted having her arms placed in handcuffs during both arrests. In the case of her 2021
arrest, she also resisted being moved to a police car from her kitchen. For both arrests the
arresting officers used minimal force. At most, they bruised Ms. Pardue’s arms as they

attempted to bring them behind her back while she kept them stiff and pulled away. In
both arrests, they also double-cuffed her handcuffs to prevent damage to her wrists. Such
force is reasonable and, indeed, was necessary under the circumstances.
Ms. Pardue’s last excessive force claim relates to her forcible restraint by
Defendants Bilodeau and Brown shortly after her FIT evaluation. This too is assessed

under a totality of the circumstances test, and includes “the relationship between the need
for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff ’s injury; any
effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the
security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the
plaintiff was actively resisting.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2021).

Once again, the totality of the circumstances would not support a finding in Ms.
Pardue’s favor. Ms. Pardue resisted at every step of the way—refusing to remove her
medical wires or have them removed, refusing to stand and walk to a cruiser, threatening
to throw her shoe, and screaming or spitting at police and security. All in all, there was a
need to use some force to remove Ms. Pardue from the hospital and prevent her from
attacking police or security officers. Ms. Pardue again suffered at most bruising on her

arms or legs, being put into a spit hood (by hospital staff) and being placed in a transport
belt with her hands cuffed to the belt. While demeaning, this use of force was proportionate
to Ms. Pardue’s resistance and assaultive behavior. Ms. Pardue has thus failed to
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that Defendants Bilodeau and Brown used
excessive force against her.
4. Failure to Protect

Ms. Pardue also claims Defendants Bilodeau and Brown violated the Eighth
Amendment by failing to provide her adequate medical care.
Inadequate care claims, most often brought by prisoners, require that Ms. Pardue
show that (1) Defendants Brown and Bilodeau were “deliberately indifferent” to her health
or safety and (2) her inadequate care was “objectively, sufficiently serious.” Leavitt v.

Corr. Med. Serv., Inc., 645 F.3d 484, 497 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Burrell v. Hampshire
Cnty, 307 F.3d, 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002)). Even if Ms. Pardue’s inadequate care was “serious,”
which is doubtful here, her claims still fail on the deliberate indifference prong.
Deliberate indifference is a subjective, culpable state of mind: Defendants Brown
and Bilodeau must have been “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that

a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” and they must “also draw the inference.” Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Deliberate indifference is a “narrow band of
conduct;” even treatment that would be malpractice under state law may not qualify as
deliberate indifference. Feeney v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 464 F.3d 158, 162 (1st Cir.
2006). Nor does disagreement on what medical care is appropriate create a constitutional
violation. Id.

When Ms. Pardue complained about her wrists hurting, Officer Bilodeau took her
to SMHC. When she told him she had previously been assaulted in the lobby, Officer
Bilodeau took her to a separate entrance to avoid that area. When Ms. Pardue threatened
to kill herself, a doctor immediately informed Officer Bilodeau that Ms. Pardue would be
fit for jail after a ten-minute evaluation and he deferred to the doctor’s opinion. Given the
record, the finder of fact would undoubtedly characterize Officer Bilodeau’s treatment of

Ms. Pardue as active concern, not deliberate indifference. Similarly, Sergeant Brown, who
arrived well after Ms. Pardue’s FIT evaluation, could not have been aware of any facts
indicating serious harm awaited Ms. Pardue. As Officer Bilodeau and Sergeant Brown did
not act with deliberate indifference, Ms. Pardue has failed to make out a constitutional
violation.

5. State-Created Danger
Ms. Pardue’s failure to protect claim may also be read as a state-created danger
claim. Generally, “a State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply
does not constitute a violation of” the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989). However,

“when the state creates the danger to an individual, an affirmative duty to protect might
arise.” Irish v. Fowler, 979 F.3d 65, 73 (1st Cir. 2020). Much like a failure to protect
claim, the first prong of the state-created danger test requires that Ms. Pardue show the
Defendants “actually knew of a substantial risk of serious harm . . . and disregarded that
risk.” Id. (quoting Coyne v. Cronin, 386 F.3d 280, 288 (1st Cir. 2004)). As previously
discussed, she cannot meet this burden, and as a result she has failed to make out a

constitutional violation.
6. Qualified Immunity Standard
In response to Ms. Pardue’s constitutional claims, Defendants’ raise a qualified
immunity defense. Qualified immunity protects law enforcement officers “from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In essence, only

those “plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” are not shielded by
qualified immunity. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Qualified immunity itself
is a three-part inquiry: (1) do Ms. Pardue’s allegations establish a violation of a
constitutional right, (2) was that right clearly established at the time of the alleged violation,
and (3) would a reasonable officer in the same circumstances understand that the conduct

in question violated that right. Pagán v. Calderón, 448 F.3d 16, 31 (1st Cir. 2006).
Notwithstanding the First Circuit’s recent undermining of qualified immunity under
the “akin to” exception to the clearly established constitutional right prong, the Defendants
are all entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity because their facts are
deemed admitted, and Ms. Pardue has failed to establish any violations of her constitutional

rights.
B. SUPERVISORY LIABILITY
Ms. Pardue’s Complaint attempts to hold Chief Andersen and Deputy Chief Small
accountable on a theory of supervisory liability. Ms. Pardue alleges that Defendants
Andersen and Small ignored her letters complaining of misconduct and allowed Sanford
police to continue violating Ms. Pardue’s rights.

At the motion to dismiss stage, I was skeptical that Ms. Pardue had stated a claim
against Defendants Andersen and Small. See Order on Defs’ Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No.
38) at 5 (“[T]he fact that Pardue believes the police force is out to get her is not enough to
state a claim. Nor is it necessarily enough to allege that she sought help from the Chief or
Deputy Chief and that help was not forthcoming.”). Nonetheless, I found Ms. Pardue had
given enough facts to plausibly state a claim against the supervisory Defendants as they

were likely aware of the long-standing police activity at Ms. Pardue’s home.
However, for the reasons previously related, none of the arresting officers violated
Ms. Pardue’s constitutional rights. Because no officer under Defendants Andersen’s or
Small’s supervision violated Ms. Pardue’s rights, she cannot raise a successful claim
against them. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam)

(“If . . . the [subordinate] officer has inflicted no constitutional harm, neither the
municipality nor the supervisor can be held liable.”). Accordingly, Defendants Andersen
and Small are entitled to summary judgment.
C. STATE CLAIMS
Ms. Pardue’s Complaint asserts multiple state law tort claims: trespass, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and false arrest. These claims are governed by the Maine
Torts Claim Act (“MTCA”), 14 M.R.S. §§ 8101-8118. The MTCA mandates that a would-
be plaintiff must notify government entities “within 365 days after any claim or cause of
action . . . accrues.” Id. § 8107(1). It gives various form requirements for the notice and
provides “no claim or action shall be commenced against a governmental entity or
employee . . . “unless the foregoing notice provisions are substantially complied with.” Id.

§ 8107(4). Put differently, failing to comply with the notice requirement “bars the suit.”
Porter v. Philbrick-Gates, 745 A.2d 996, 998 (Me. 2004). The MTCA does provide a
carve-out for late notices where “a claimant shows good cause why notice could not have
reasonably been filed within the 365-day limit.” Id. § 8107(1).
As to her September 2021 arrest, the record establishes that Ms. Pardue sent a Notice
of Claim to the Sanford Police in December 2022, which is three months past the deadline.

For her 2023 arrest, although she later sent a letter to Chief Andersen complaining of police
conduct, Ms. Pardue never sent any other notice that would fulfill the requirements of
MTCA section 8107. Ms. Pardue also does not raise any good cause arguments as to why
she filed a late notice in 2022 and has yet to file a notice relating to her claims from her
2023 arrest. Because Ms. Pardue has failed to comply with the requirements of the MTCA

her state claims are barred.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
87) is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.

Dated this 8th day of July, 2025.

/S/ Lance E. Walker
Lance E. Walker
Chief U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11092056. Public record. Not legal advice.