# HANSEN v. HOMESITE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE MIDWEST

> District Court, D. Maine · July 7, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11090491

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maine
- **Decided:** July 7, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11090491

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding courts may pierce the corporate veil if: (1) the corporation is a mere “alter ego” and (2) “when necessary in the interest of justice”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE

NORMAN RONNIE HANSEN, JR., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:24-cv-00278-JAW
)
HOMESITE INSURANCE )
COMPANY OF THE MIDWEST, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
In a dispute arising from a claim filed under a homeowners insurance policy
that has not been paid, the insurance agent and its parent company move to dismiss
the claims against them, asserting that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over the
parent company and that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for unfair claims
practices against either the agent or its parent. Concluding that the parent company
has no contacts with the state of Maine, such that the court lacks specific or general
jurisdiction, and further that there is no basis for piercing the corporate veil to impute
to the parent the conduct of its subsidiary, the court grants the motion to dismiss the
parent company for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court also grants the motion to
dismiss the insurance agent for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, determining that the plaintiff has made no allegations regarding unfair
claims practices against the insurance agent and has failed to establish a fiduciary
duty in the state of Maine on insurance agents to advise an insured party as to the
adequacy of his coverage.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 2, 2024, Norman Ronnie Hansen, Jr., a citizen of the state of Maine,
filed a civil complaint in this Court against Homesite Insurance Company of the

Midwest (Homesite), a business incorporated in the state of Delaware and with a
principal place of business in the state of Wisconsin; American Family Insurance
Claims Services (AFICS), a business incorporated and with a principal place of
business in the state of Wisconsin; American Family Mutual Insurance Company S.I.
(AmFam Mutual), a business incorporated and with a principal place of business in
the state of Wisconsin; Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO),1 a

business incorporated in the state of Delaware and with a principal place of business
in the state of Maryland; and Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (Berkshire), a business
incorporated in the state of Delaware and with a principal place of business in the
state of Wisconsin (collectively, the Defendants).2 The Parties to This Compl. at 1-2
(ECF No. 1) (Compl.); Compl. for a Civil Case at 5 (ECF No. 21) (Corrected Compl.).
In his complaint, Mr. Hansen alleges that he “had Geico auto insurance and got my

1 Mr. Hansen names this party as Geico Insurance Company. See Compl. for a Civ. Case at 5
(ECF No. 21) (Corrected Compl.). In its motion to dismiss, this Defendant remarks there is no such
entity and that it understands Plaintiff’s suit to be brought against Government Employees Insurance
Company (GEICO), of which GEICO Insurance Agency, LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary. See Defs.
Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s and Geico Ins. Co.’s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Pers. Jurisdiction and/or
Failure to State a Claim at 1 n.1 (ECF No. 28). Assuming this Defendant knows its own name, the
Court adopts Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) as this entity’s proper name in
this order.
2 Mr. Hansen’s original complaint named only Homesite Insurance Company of the Midwest
and American Family Insurance Claims Services as Defendants. Compl. at 1. However, in
correspondence with the Court, Plaintiff recognized this filing was in error and filed a corrected
complaint naming all Defendants. Correspondence (ECF No. 20); Compl. for a Civil Case at 5 (ECF
No. 21) (Corrected Compl.). The United States Magistrate Judge issued a procedural order on
September 19, 2024 recognizing this corrected complaint as “the operative pleading.” Procedural
Order (ECF No. 19).
homeowners insurance through Geico in a ‘bundle’” for his home in Bangor, Maine.
Corrected Compl. at 5-6. After his home experienced significant damage in July 2023,
he filed a claim with “Homesite Insurance Company of the Midwest, Geico’s affiliate

with whom they ‘bundled’ the home and automobile policy,” and alleges Homesite has
declined to approve, reject, or otherwise pay his claim to date. Corrected Compl. at
6-8.
Defendants Homesite, AmFam Mutual, and AFICS jointly moved for a more
definite statement on September 18, 2024, asking the Court to order Mr. Hansen to
submit an amended complaint with enumerated paragraphs and clarified allegations

as to each respective Defendant so moving. Defs. Homesite Ins. Co. of the Midwest,
Am. Fam. Ins. Claims Servs., and Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., S.I.’s Joint Mot. for More
Definite Statement (ECF No. 16). Mr. Hansen responded to the motion for more
definite statement on October 8 and 9, 2024, submitting revised allegations and
eighty-five attachments in support. Answer to Defs. Homesite Ins. Co. of the Midwest,
Am. Fam. Ins. Claims Servs., and Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. S.I.’s Joint Mot. for More
Defin[i]tive Statement (ECF No. 23); Additional Attachs. (ECF No. 24); Additional

Attachs. (ECF No. 25); Additional Attachs. (ECF No. 26). Homesite, AmFam Mutual,
and AFICS jointly replied on October 22, 2024. Defs. Homesite Ins. Co. of the Midwest,
Am. Family Ins. Claims Servs., and Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., S.I.’s Reply in Support
of Joint Mot. for More Definite Statement (ECF No. 27).
On November 14, 2024, the United States Magistrate Judge denied the motion
for a more definite statement, concluding “Plaintiff’s subsequent filings provide the
Moving Parties with sufficient detail regarding the bases of his claims,” deeming
“Plaintiff’s response to the motion to be Plaintiff’s operative pleading,” and directing
the Court Clerk “to docket the response (ECF No. 23) as Plaintiff’s amended

complaint.” Order on Mot. for More Definitive Statement at 3-4 (ECF No. 29). The
Clerk of Court entered Mr. Hansen’s filing on the docket as an amended complaint
that same day. Answer to Defs. Homesite Ins. Co. of the Midwest, Am. Fam. Ins.
Claims Servs., and Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. S.I.’s Joint Mot. for More Defin[i]tive
Statement (ECF No. 30) (Am. Compl.).
Separately, Defendants Berkshire and GEICO (jointly, the Moving

Defendants) moved on November 4, 2024 to dismiss the claims against them in the
corrected complaint, see Corrected Compl., for lack of personal jurisdiction over
Berkshire and for failure to state a claim against either Moving Defendant. Defs.
Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s and Geico Ins. Co.’s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Pers.
Jurisdiction and/or Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 28) (Moving Defs.’ First Mot.
to Dismiss). Mr. Hansen responded opposing the motion to dismiss on November 22,
2024. Resp. to Defs. Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s and Geico Ins. Co.’s Mot. to Dismiss

for Lack of Pers. Jurisdiction and/or Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 28) (ECF No. 31)
(Pl.’s Opp’n).
The Moving Defendants replied to their original motion to dismiss on
December 4, 2024, informing the Court of their understanding that the subsequent
amendment to the complaint had mooted their original motion to dismiss and asking
the Court instead to consider the contents of their motion to dismiss the amended
complaint filed on November 25, 2024. Defs. Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s and Geico
Ins.’s Reply to Pl.’s Resp. to Defs. Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s and Geico Ins. [Co.]’s
Mot. to Dismiss fo[r] Lack of Pers. Jurisdiction and/or Failure to State a Claim (ECF

No. 36) (Moving Defs.’ First Reply); Defs. Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s and Geico Ins.
Co.’s Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Am. Compl. for Lack of Pers. Jurisdiction and/or Failure
to State a Claim (ECF No. 35) (Moving Defs.’ Second Mot. to Dismiss). In the second
motion to dismiss, the Moving Defendants again assert a lack of personal jurisdiction
over Berkshire and that Mr. Hansen had failed to state a claim against either Moving
Defendant. Moving Defs.’ Second Mot. to Dismiss.

Mr. Hansen did not file a response to the Moving Defendants’ second motion
to dismiss within twenty-one days under District of Maine Local Rule 7. D. ME. LOC.
R. 7(b)(1). However, in light of Mr. Hansen’s pro se status and the atypical
mechanism of his complaint’s amendment, on March 10, 2025, the Court issued a
preliminary order on the Moving Defendant’s second motion to dismiss, instructing
the Plaintiff “to file a response within fourteen days of this order, or inform the Court
of his desire that the Court consider his response to the motion to dismiss the

complaint as applicable to the motion to dismiss the amended complaint by the same
deadline.” Prelim. Order on Mot. to Dismiss at 7 (ECF No. 43).
In compliance with the Court’s directive, Mr. Hansen filed a response on March
24, 2025, asking the Court to consider his response to the first motion to dismiss as
applicable to the Moving Defendant’s second motion to dismiss. Res[p]. to Order (Doc.
#43) Issued March 10, 2025 (ECF No. 44) (Pl.’s Resp.); see also Resp. to Order (Doc.
#43) Issued March 10, 2025 (ECF No. 45) (correcting typographical errors). In light
of the Plaintiff’s response, the Court dismissed the Moving Defendants first motion
to dismiss as moot that same day. Order (ECF No. 46). The Moving Defendants

replied to Mr. Hansen’s response to their second motion to dismiss on April 7, 2025.
Defs. Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s and Geico Ins.’s Reply to Pl.’s Resp. to Defs. Berkshire
Hathaway Inc.’s and Geico Ins. [Co.]’s Mot. to Dismiss fo[r] Lack of Pers. Jurisdiction
and/or Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 52) (Moving Defs.’ Second Reply).
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 3
Mr. Hansen purchased a home located at 225 Forest Avenue in Bangor, Maine

(the Property) on August 24, 2022, and resided there until August 4, 2023. Corrected
Compl. at 5-6; Am. Compl. at 2. He reports that he obtained a homeowners insurance
policy through GEICO in a bundle combining his automobile and home insurance;
the policy, number 39352661, was through Homesite and covered the Property from
September 7, 2022 through September 7, 2023. Am. Compl. at 2.

3 As explained, the Magistrate Judge deemed Mr. Hansen’s response to the motion for a more
definite statement to be the operative pleading and directed the Clerk of Court to docket the response
as the Plaintiff’s amended complaint. See Order on Mot. for More Definitive Statement at 3-4; see also
Am. Compl. Typically, once a complaint is amended, any earlier versions of the complaint cease to
exist for the purposes of subsequent motions. See, e.g., Connectu LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 91
(1st Cir. 2008) (“An amended complaint, once filed, normally supersedes the antecedent complaint.
Thereafter, the earlier complaint is a dead letter and no longer performs any function in the case”).
Here, though, Mr. Hansen drafted and submitted his motion not as an amended complaint, but as a
more definite statement to supplement his corrected complaint, and his filing thus references the
allegations of his corrected complaint in his attempt to expand upon them. The Magistrate Judge
logically treated Mr. Hansen’s response as an amended complaint; however, in fairness to the Plaintiff,
who did not move for his response to supersede the corrected complaint, the Court incorporates facts
from his corrected complaint where they provide necessary context for the amended complaint’s factual
allegations.
Mr. Hansen traveled to Greece on July 23, 2023. Id. On the weekend of
Saturday, July 29, 2023 through Monday, July 31, 2023, there were severe
rainstorms in Bangor, Maine. Id. at 2-3. Sandi Richardson and her son, who were

looking after Mr. Hansen’s home while he was in Greece, called to inform the Plaintiff
that “water was coming into the house, running down the walls and stairs, through
the ceilings, soaking the carpets and pads, and there w[ere] a couple inches of water
in the living room and water in the basement.” Id. at 3. After the storms, Ms.
Richardson discovered the source of the water; a roof hatch in the attic was open. Id.
Ms. Richardson closed and secured the roof hatch, and then tried to clean up the

water. Id.
On August 2, 2023, Ms. Richardson was in the kitchen when an individual,
Edward Greenlaw, entered the house, and Ms. Richardson called the Bangor Police
Department to report the break in. Id.; Corrected Compl. at 6. When police officers
inspected the house, they found it unsafe due to the flooding and contacted the City
of Bangor Code Enforcement, which condemned the house on August 4, 2023. Am.
Compl. at 3. AFICS claims adjuster Dexter Greer used this August 4, 2023 date as

the date of loss because that is when the house was condemned and the City of Bangor
boarded up the front door; however, Mr. Hansen explains the rain event occurred
earlier and he has provided the new claims adjuster, Jayne Beezley, with the dates
of the rain events. Id. at 3-4.
The Plaintiff cancelled the remainder of his trip and returned to Bangor from
Greece late in the evening on August 8, 2023; he filed a claim with Homesite on
August 10, 2023. Id. at 4; Corrected Compl. at 6. Mr. Hansen proceeded with efforts
to secure the Property, including “put[ting] a hasp and lock on the hatch in the roof,
chang[ing] the door locks, install[ing] a new roof (eliminating the hatch) and

remov[ing] all of the carpet and pad as it was soaking wet.” Am. Compl. at 4. A
licensed and certified claims adjuster also arrived and prepared a report on the
damage to Mr. Hansen’s home. Id.
In response to Mr. Greer’s request, Mr. Hansen sent him documents itemizing
his expenses from August 3, 2023 through August 24, 2023, totaling $5,593.74,
excluding the extra milage for the loss of use of his home. Id. Mr. Greer informed

the Plaintiff that another department of AFICS would contact him to arrange
temporary housing and provide money for expenses such as dining, gas for traveling
to temporary accommodations, and a per diem. Id. at 4-5. Theodore Alfonsetti of
Covenant Bridge Group later contacted the Plaintiff to request information on his
expenses, id. at 5 (citing id., Attachs. 4-50 (citations corrected)), but a representative
of the department described by Mr. Greer did not contact the Plaintiff, despite Mr.
Hansen calling multiple times and reaching a voicemail box. Id. Mr. Hansen also

spoke with “Lilly Arndt, Josh, Savannah, and Shawn Henry who stated the claim was
now ‘elevated.’” Id. Mr. Hansen subsequently received a letter from Mr. Greer
indicating he had been attempting to contact Mr. Hansen without success, despite no
voicemails or emails being received by Mr. Hansen. Id. Eventually, Mr. Hansen
discussed with Mr. Greer the requirements set by the City of Bangor, including the
required building permit, compliance with the 2022 building code, and Mr. Hansen’s
difficulties in obtaining a contractor’s estimate of the damage. Id.
The City of Bangor required a building permit to begin the process of making

the house livable again; Mr. Hansen submitted plans to the Bangor Code
Enforcement Office and paid for the building permit. Corrected Compl. at 7. Mr.
Hansen received a building permit on November 27, 2023, though the cost estimate
on this permit is an underestimate due to Mr. Hansen’s inability to obtain any
estimate for repairs at that time. Am. Compl. at 5-6. The Plaintiff was
simultaneously attempting to obtain estimates from local contractors; “[a]fter

contacting every contractor in the area, [he] was unable to find one that was able to
do the work.” Id. at 6. The City of Bangor also mandates a licensed electrician rewire
the entire house; even though the wiring in the home was functioning, the walls
containing the wiring had become wet from the rainstorms, posing a fire hazard. Id.
Mr. Hansen has received eight letters from Mr. Greer and two letters from Ms.
Beezley from August 14, 2023 through June 25, 2024, indicating they were not
denying the claim, but rather investigating. Id. (citing Additional Attachs., Attachs.

5-10 (ECF No. 25); Additional Attachs. (ECF No. 26); id., Attachs. 1-3 (ECF No. 26)
(citations corrected)). He has requested from Mr. Greer and Ms. Beezley a Sworn
Statement in Proof of Loss form, as required under Maine law, numerous times since
Ms. Beezley first mentioned that it was required in an email on July 23, 2024. Id. at
6-7. On August 2, 2024, Mr. Hansen submitted a notarized statement and related
claims documents to Ms. Beezley, but in their last conversation in September 2024,
Ms. Beezley stated she was going to get an attorney to draw up a Sworn Statement
in Proof of Loss; as of the date of filing the amended complaint, Mr. Hansen had not
received the form. Id. at 7.

Mr. Hansen received a quote from a licensed electrician for work on his house,
which he submitted to AFICS. Id. Ms. Beezley then called the Plaintiff, stating she
was authorized to pay $48,800 for the claim and wished it to be taken care of.
Corrected Compl. at 7. Mr. Hansen informed her that the bill for the required
electrical work was going to be $35,000 and he had spent $20,000 to gut the house
and $3,000 in dumpster fees, further explaining that there would be expenses relating

to flooring and a fire escape required under the City of Bangor’s building code. Id.
She requested Mr. Hansen get an estimate for these additional expenses; he reported
he has an estimate from Lee J. Bell for the work and would submit it to AFICS. Id.
Further, he states he had to obtain a mortgage for $106,000 and had used up his
retirement savings to pay for expenses. Id.
Mr. Hansen informs the Court that Ms. Beezley is apparently restarting the
investigation; in a recent conversation, she requested the documentation previously

provided to Mr. Alfonsetti a year earlier and the letters she has sent to Mr. Hansen
are reportedly identical to those received a year earlier from Mr. Greer. Am. Compl.
at 7. She also denied previously telling Mr. Hansen that she was authorized to pay
$48,800 for the claim, stating “[she] could not have set that because it’s above [her]
limit,” and that she could not provide a timeframe for the completion of her
investigation. Id. She further stated that the house could not have been flooded
because there was not any rain during the week of August 4, 2023, to which Mr.
Hansen explained the date Mr. Greer had used was the date of the condemnation and
the rain event was from July 29 through July 31 of 2023. Id. Ms. Beezley further

mentioned vandalism, to which Mr. Hansen responded there was none. He informed
her that a vagrant had walked into his home uninvited, but nothing was subsequently
missing or vandalized. Id. at 7-8.
III. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A. The Allegations in the Amended Complaint
Mr. Hansen brings a civil case against the Defendants, asserting federal

jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Corrected Compl. at 3-4. Mr. Hansen alleges the insurance policy states the coverage
limit for loss of use of the home is $131,700. Am. Compl. at 8 (citing Additional
Attachs. at 3 (ECF No. 24) (Ins. Policy) (citation corrected)4). He has been without
use of his home for fourteen months as of the time of filing and sent a list of his
expenses to Mr. Greer on September 6, 2023 and Ms. Beezley on July 22, 2024. Id.
(citing Additional Attachs., Attach. 5, Email re: Demand for Payment Claim (ECF No.

25); id., Attach. 7, Expenses Spreadsheet (ECF No. 25) (citation corrected)). Mr.
Hansen directs the Court to the “Additional Living Expense” section of the insurance
policy, which states:
If a loss covered under Section I makes that part of the “residence
premises” where you reside not fit to live in, we cover any necessary

4 As the attachment containing the insurance policy contains multiple documents, each with
internal pagination, the Court refers to page numbers as listed by the PDF software for the purposes
of its citations in this order.
increase in living expenses covered by you so that your household can
maintain its normal standard of living.
Payment will be for the shortest time required to repair or replace the
damage or, if you permanently relocate, the shortest time required for
your household to settle elsewhere.
Id. (citing Insurance Policy at 23 (citation corrected)). Mr. Hansen reports that, as of
the date of filing, he has neither received any funds from Homesite for loss of use of
the “residence premises” where he resided, nor has he submitted any additional
expenses because Mr. Greer has not paid for the expenses from August 2023 or
requested an accounting of any expenses subsequent to that date, but instead
informed the Plaintiff that he would be paid a per diem rate. Id. at 8-9.
Mr. Hansen quotes a letter from Mr. Greer, sent on August 14, 2023, stating:
Depending on the type and extent of the damages to your property, we
may require a home inspection. In that case, one of our field adjusters
will contact you to schedule the inspection. The field adjuster will create
an estimate for damage to your property. Your desk adjuster will
compare the inspection estimate to your policy to determine if coverage
is available for your damages. If the loss is covered under the terms and
conditions of your policy, then your desk adjuster will review a
settlement with you and provide you with a copy of the estimate.
Id. at 9 (quoting Additional Attachs., Attach. 5, 8/14/2023 Letter (ECF No. 25)
(citation corrected)). Mr. Hansen requested the field adjuster’s name, a copy of his or
her report, and an estimate of the damage, but Mr. Greer responded that such
information is confidential and cannot be disclosed. Id. As of the date of filing, the
requested information had not been provided. Id. Mr. Hansen adds that in another
letter from Mr. Greer, sent on October 13, 2023, Mr. Greet stated he was completing
his investigation. Id. at 9-10 (citing Additional Attachs., Attach. 9, 10/13/2023 Letter
(ECF No. 25) (citation corrected)). However, Mr. Hansen submits he has since
received five more letters from AFICS stating his claim has not been denied and they
were investigating. Id. at 9-10 (citing Additional Attachs., Attachs. 10 (ECF No. 25);
Additional Attachs. (ECF No. 26); id., Attachs. 1-3 (ECF No. 26) (citations corrected)).

Mr. Hansen reiterates his allegation that, despite her subsequent denials, Ms.
Beezely informed him she was authorized to pay $48,800 for his claim and that he
responded by explaining the $35,000 electrical work bill, $20,000 bill to gut the house,
$3,000 dumpster fee, and additional expenses related to flooring and the needed fire
escape. Id. at 10. He insists she replied by asking him to provide an estimate and
telling Mr. Hansen she wanted him “taken care of,” but that she needed to follow

management’s instructions. Id. Mr. Hansen contends “[t]he clear allegation here is
bad faith.” Id.
Turning to the insurance policy, Mr. Hansen points out that the policy states,
in a section describing exclusions, “We do not insure for loss to property described in
Coverages A and B caused by any of the following. However, any ensuing loss to
property described in Coverages A and B not precluded by any other provision in this
policy is covered.” Id. (quoting Ins. Policy at 31 (citation corrected)). Thus, Mr.

Hansen argues, even if the roof is not covered, “the resulting damages from the open
hatch in the roof are covered under the policy.” Id. at 10-11. However, he contends
a conflict provision in the policy offers coverage for the roof; the “Duties After Loss”
section states: “4. Protect the property from further damage. If repairs to the property
are required, you must: a. Make reasonable and necessary repairs to protect the
property; and [b.] Keep an accurate record of repair expenses.” Id. at 11 (quoting Ins.
Policy at 32 (citation corrected)). Mr. Hansen adds that these requirements were
included in the letters from Mr. Greer and Ms. Beezley, respectively, id. (citing
8/14/2023 Letter; Additional Attachs., Attach. 3, 6/25/2023 Letter (ECF No. 26)

(citation corrected)), and contends he complied with such requirements by submitting
an itemized list of ensuing damages. Id. (citing Expenses Spreadsheet). Mr. Hansen
continues by describing in detail the damages to his home, the renovations made to
address them, and why such renovations were the most cost-efficient means of doing
so, including, inter alia, electrical work, gutting the building, stairwell foundation
and utilities. Id. at 11-13 (citing Additional Attachs., Attach. 6, Lee J. Bell Constr.

Repair Estimate (ECF No. 26)).
Mr. Hansen next addresses why AmFam Mutual was included in the
complaint, pointing out that in American Family’s Corporate Chart, “the Homesite
Insurance Group of companies is under American Family, Inc. which falls under
American Family Mutual Insurance Company S.I.” Id. at 13 (citing id., Attach. 51,
Am. Fam. Corp. Chart (citation corrected)). The Plaintiff notes that his corrected
complaint includes claims against AFICS and states that its assets are $38,023,466.

Id. (citing id., Attach. 52, 2023 Annual Rep. (citation corrected)). He continues that
AFICS is not accredited by the Better Business Bureau, has been in business for
seventy years, and has amassed thousands of complaints, many of which describe
claims adjusters making promises that do not come to fruition. Id. at 13-14 (citing
id., Attach. 53, Better Bus. Bureau: Am. Family Ins.; id., Attach. 54, Yelp: Homesite
Ins.; id., Attach. 55, Wallethub: Homesite Ins.; id., Attach. 56, TrustPilot: Homesite
Ins.; id., Attach. 57, Consumer Affairs: Homesite Ins. Reviews (citations corrected)).
He explains that claimants receive letters that their claim is not denied and is under
investigation, before ultimately being denied or claimants being paid far less than

the actual damage. Id. He alleges the denials often occur immediately after the
deadline for filing a lawsuit. Id. at 14.
Mr. Hansen argues the liability of parent companies is governed by the ten
factors enumerated in Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1940) (citation corrected),
which he sets forth as:
(1) parent corporation owns all or majority of subsidiary’s capital stock;
(2) parent and subsidiary have common directors or officers; (3) parent
corporation finances subsidiary; (4) parent corporation subscribes to all
the capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise causes its incorporation;
(5) subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital; (6) parent corporation
pays subsidiary’s salaries, expenses or losses; (7) subsidiary has
substantially no business except with the parent corporation or no
assets except those conveyed to it by the parent corporation; (8) in parent
corporation’s papers, subsidiary is referred to as such or as a department
or division; (9) directors or executives of the subsidiary do not act
independently in the interest of the subsidiary but take direction from
the parent corporation; (10) formal legal requirements of subsidiary as
separate and independent corporation are not observed.
Id. He argues that the corporate organization charts of AmFam Mutual and AFICS
show officers serving in both entities in the same capacity and that each entity lists
the same address. Id. at 14-15 (citing id., Attach. 58, Am. Fam. Ins. Grp. – Co. Profile;
id, Attach. 59, Dirs. and Offs. of AFI MHS, AmFam Holdings, Inc., and Converted
AFMIC (citations corrected)). Mr. Hansen next examines the financial statements of
the American Family Insurance Group, emphasizing that “[w]ithout access to the
workpapers for these financial statements, it isn’t possible to determine the
commingling of assets of [AFICS] and [AmFam Mutual].” Id. at 15. He thus
concludes that “[t]hey are not operating as independent corporations; rather, as
departments in the same building, and the policies stem from the same individuals
acting as board members in [AFICS] and [AmFam Mutual].” Id. at 16.

The Plaintiff avers the reason for delays and inaction of claims adjusters in
meeting their stated obligations cannot be determined without access to the board
meeting minutes, and contends that, as in Fish v. East, “the instrumentality rule can
be applied as many of the conditions are met and others are unanswered.” Id. He
continues that, in order to determine the facts, he needs to see:
the complete claim file, which should include the name of the licensed
public adjuster who assessed the damage on my property, the estimate
of the damage, and the report from Theodore Alfonsetti, the investigator
from The Covent Group. I will also need to see all of Mr. Greer’s and
Ms. Beezley’s notes and communications, claims handling manuals and
training materials, internal emails, and other communications related
to claims goals, directives, and culture. Additionally, information on
claims reserves, how they are set, and reasons for changes, including
internal discussions with offshore reinsurance claims executives on how
to reduce payments; the personnel files of my claims handlers and their
supervisors, including the claims department goals, and the analysis of
how departments and individuals are performing; documents related to
performance evaluations and compensation structures, especially for
claims and company executives; financial goals set by the parent
company, specifically return on investment targets, cash flow analysis,
and ownership stakes or investment in their partners; intercompany
communications regarding claims processing, percentages of claims
denied or approved, the time frame from when a claim is filed to when
it is ultimately denied or approved after investigations are completed;
and the percentage amount of the claim payouts in relationship to the
amount the certified public claims adjuster’s estimate of damage to the
property.
Id. at 17-18.
As relief, Mr. Hansen requests the costs to repair the damage done to his home,
storage of household items, and expenses for the loss of his home for fourteen months,
which includes the expenses related to living in motels, commuting, and eating meals
outside of his home. Id. at 18. He further alleges mental anguish from trying to
contact claims adjusters to no avail, receiving empty promises that are not fulfilled,

and receiving ten letters stating only that they are investigating. Id. at 18-19. He
submits AmFam Mutual intended to “‘run out the time limit for filing a complaint’
and then deny the claim, or somehow bully [him] into accepting $48,800.00 that Ms.
Beezley said she was authorized to pay because I fear receiving nothing,” and
estimates the “the cost of a year of misery, being homeless at 71 years old, and dealing
with [AFICS] he would ask for $1,000,000.00.” Id. at 19.

B. The Moving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint
The Moving Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims against
each of them for lack of personal jurisdiction as to Berkshire pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), and also for failure to state a claim against both Berkshire
and GEICO pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Moving Defs.’
Second Mot. to Dismiss at 1.
Offering their perspective of the case, the Moving Defendants direct the Court
to the attached affidavit of Daniel J. Jaksich, the Vice President and Controller of
Berkshire. Id. (citing Moving Defs.’ First Mot. to Dismiss, Attach. 1, Aff. of Daniel J.
Jaksich in Support of Def. Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Pers.

Jurisdiction and/or for Failure to State a Claim ¶ 1 (Jaksich Aff.)). Mr. Jaksich
submits that Berkshire is a holding company that owns subsidiaries engaged in
numerous business activities. Id. (citing Jaksich Aff. ¶ 4). Mr. Jaksich further attests
that Berkshire is a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in Omaha,
Nebraska; that it does not conduct any business in Maine; that is not registered to do
business in Maine, nor does it have a registered agent in Maine or pay Maine taxes;

that it neither maintains an office or has employees in Maine; that it owns or leases
no property in Maine, nor does it have any personal property in the State; and finally,
that it does not consent to personal jurisdiction in Maine. Id. (citing Jaksich Aff. ¶ 3-
8). Further, Mr. Jaksich states Berkshire was not involved in the events alleged by
Plaintiff, that it is not an insurance company, has not issued an insurance policy to
Mr. Hansen, and was not involved in the adjustment of his claims for damages as a

result of the events described in the amended complaint. Id. at 4-5 (citing Jaksich
Aff. ¶ 14-15).
Addressing the Defendants’ respective business relationships, Mr. Jaksich
says Berkshire is the indirect parent company of GEICO Corporation, Government
Employees Insurance Company, and GEICO Insurance Agency, LLC, but it does not
have a corporate relationship with Homesite or AFICS. Id. at 5 (citing Jaksich Aff.
¶¶ 9, 11). The Moving Defendants emphasize that Mr. Hansen does not allege any

involvement by Berkshire or GEICO in the events giving rise to this case, that either
Moving Defendant had an insuring obligation for the alleged damage, or that either
Moving Defendant was involved in the adjustment of his claim. Id. They also
highlight that he does not allege either Moving Defendant “made any oral or written
representations to Plaintiff in connection with his homeowners[] insurance coverage
or in connection with the adjustment of his damage claims.” Id.
Based on the foregoing, the Moving Defendants move to dismiss Berkshire as
a defendant pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2). Id. at 6. They first submit that, if jurisdiction
is contested via motion to dismiss, “the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating

facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. (citing Dorf
v. Complastik Corp., 1999 ME 133, ¶13, 735 A.2d 984). To meet his burden, the
Moving Defendants say, “the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of
jurisdictional facts,” which requires the plaintiff to “go beyond the pleadings and
make affirmative proof.” Id. (first quoting Dorf, 1999 ME 133, ¶14, 735 A.2d 984;
then quoting United Elec. Radio and Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp.,

987 F.2d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1993)). The Moving Defendants aver that a federal court
sitting in diversity applies the law of the state it sits, that Maine’s long arm statute
is coextensive to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that Due
Process can be satisfied through a showing of general or specific jurisdiction. Id.
The Moving Defendants argue that, here, Mr. Hansen has failed to satisfy his
burden to show Berkshire falls within the reach of Maine’s long arm statute because
he has not alleged any facts to demonstrate Berkshire transacted any business in

Maine, id. at 7-8 (citing Jaksich Aff. ¶¶ 5-10), nor that it owns or uses any real or
personal property in Maine. Id. at 8 (citing Jaksich Aff. ¶ 4). Further, the Moving
Defendants submit that Plaintiff has not established that Berkshire has sufficient
minimum contacts with the state of Maine as would make an exercise of jurisdiction
comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id. at 8-9 (citing
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
First, the Moving Defendants argue Mr. Hansen cannot meet the high burden
of establishing this Court’s general personal jurisdiction over Berkshire based on its
activities in the state of Maine, which “is considerably more stringent” than the

standard applied to specific jurisdiction. Id. at 9 (quoting Platten v. HG Berm.
Exempted Ltd., 437 F.3d 118, 138 (1st Cir. 2006)). The contacts of a wholly owned
subsidiary do not provide a basis for general jurisdiction over a parent corporation.
Id. (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 136 (2014)).
Second, they argue Mr. Hansen cannot establish specific jurisdiction over
Berkshire, submitting that he has failed to show “a demonstrable nexus between the

complaint’s claims and the activities in the forum that properly may be attributed to
the defendants” because Berkshire has no contacts with Maine and was not involved
in the issuance of the policy or handing of the claim giving rise to this case. Id. at 10-
11 (quoting Williams v. Dragone Classic Motor Cars, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61082,
*14 (D. Me. Mar. 30, 2021)). Further, the Moving Defendants say, Berkshire has
neither voluntarily availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Maine, nor
could it reasonably foresee itself being haled into court to defend an action there. Id.

at 11-12. Finally, for the same reasons, the Moving Defendants submit it would be
unreasonable for the Court to assert personal jurisdiction over Berkshire under the
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” articulated by the Supreme
Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). Id. at 12
(citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297).
Turning to its motion to dismiss the claims against each Moving Defendant for
failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Moving Defendants contend Mr.
Hansen has failed to satisfy his burden of pleading “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 13 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). This standard similarly applies to pro se filings, despite the
typically liberal construction applied by the courts to the same. Id. at 14 (citing Cote
v. Murphy, 152 F. App’x 6, 7 (1st Cir. 2005) (“While a pro se complaint is held to less
stringent standards than one drafted by an attorney, courts need not conjure up
unpleaded facts to support conclusory allegations”)).

Here, the Moving Defendants characterize Mr. Hansen’s position as
“presumably trying to hold Berkshire liable for a homeowner[]s insurance policy
issued by an unrelated entity which was ‘bundled’ with a GEICO auto insurance
policy simply because Berkshire is GEICO’s indirect parent company.” Id. However,
they point out, he does not allege Berkshire or GEICO was his insurer; rather, he
makes no specific claims against Berkshire besides as an indirect parent of GEICO
and only alleges GEICO served as his insurance agent,5 not underwriter. Id. at 14-

15. The Moving Defendants reject Mr. Hansen’s claim that GEICO and Homesite are
affiliates—“they are not”—and asserts the only factual statement regarding GEICO

5 The Moving Defendants also point out again that Mr. Hansen brings his claims against Geico
Insurance Agency, LLC, but makes no allegations against Government Employees Insurance
Company, of which Geico Insurance Agency is a wholly owned subsidiary. Id. at 14-15. They
acknowledge that Geico Insurance Agency served as Mr. Hansen’s insurance agent. Id.
is that Mr. Hansen bundled his home and auto insurance through it. Id. at 15. They
assert this allegation is insufficient to state a plausible claim to relief. Id.
At bottom, the Moving Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Mr. Hansen’s claim

against Berkshire for lack of personal jurisdiction and to dismiss his claims against
both Berkshire and GEICO for failure to state a claim. Id.
C. Mr. Hansen’s Opposition6
Mr. Hansen opposes the Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss, first contesting
Berkshire’s statement that it has no physical presence and does not file a tax return
in Maine by citing South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 585 U.S. 162 (2018) (citation

corrected). Pl.’s Opp’n at 1. In Wayfair, the Plaintiff submits, the Supreme Court
“ruled that the state is now free to enforce its Remote Seller Compliance Law (SB
106), which requires out-of-state sellers with more than 200 taxable sales
transactions delivered into South Dakota in a calendar year, or more than $100,000
in gross revenue from the same, to collect and remit sales tax.” Id. at 2 (citing
Wayfair, Inc., 585 U.S. 162). Mr. Hansen avers that in so doing, the Supreme Court
overturned the physical presence rule of Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298

(1992) (citation corrected), by concluding “[n]exus therefore, exists without a physical
presence; an internet connection may be sufficient, or a gross income of $100,000
creates a nexus.” Id. The Plaintiff submits that both GEICO and Berkshire have an
online presence and derive an income in Maine exceeding $100,000 annually. Id.

6 As previously noted, the Court considers Mr. Hansen’s response to the original motion to
dismiss, Pl.’s Opp’n, as an opposition to the Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended
complaint. See Prelim. Order on Mot. to Dismiss; Pl.’s Resp.
Mr. Hansen next responds to Mr. Jaksich’s affidavit, pointing out that Mr.
Jaksich states Berkshire has no day-to-day control or management of operations at
GEICO, but admits to ownership of the entity. Id. at 2-3. The Plaintiff insists that,

as GEICO owners, Berkshire owns the voting stock and appoints the Board of GEICO,
and further that GEICO Board Members’ compensation is tied to specific goals and
objectives in their employment contracts. Id. at 3. Characterizing this compensation
arrangement as “Management by Objective (MBO),” id., Mr. Hansen contends
“[e]ffectively, Berkshire controls the decision-making of its wholly owned subsidiary
GEICO indirectly.” Id. To resolve whether Berkshire falls within the jurisdiction of

Maine’s long arm statute, he submits, it is necessary “to see the employment contracts
of GEICO management and board of directors, the business partnership agreement
with Homesite, and the amount of float funneled back to Berkshire Hathaway from
its subsidiaries like GEICO.” Id.
Elaborating, Mr. Hansen explains “float” means the balance between the
premiums collected and retained by GEICO and the reserves it holds for expected
payouts; he alleges “GEICO provides Berkshire with billions of dollars in insurance

float every year” that serves as “a costless loan” for reinvestment without the
constraints of insurance regulations. Id. at 3-4. Mr. Hansen submits “[t]he float
Berkshire had access to in 2022 was $164 billion, and in 2023, Q3, GEICO accounted
for 2.4 billion of their operating profit,” and calculates that “[i]f Maine residents
account for 1% of the float Berkshire had access to in 2022, the interest savings at
the current bank rate are 4.75% of 1.64 billion, approximately totaling 78 million
dollars.” Id. at 4. Through this deductive reasoning, Plaintiff infers that Berkshire
is purposely doing business in Maine and deriving income in excess of the threshold
mentioned by the Wayfair Court, and “therefore, this court has general and specific

jurisdiction” over Berkshire as a Defendant in this case. Id.
Mr. Hansen then recounts GEICO’s corporate history, recalling Warren
Buffett’s substantial investment in GEICO stock in 1976 and informing the Court
that the directors of GEICO were Mr. Buffett, Marc D. Hamburg, and Forrest N.
Krutter. Id. at 4-5. He compares these with Berkshire’s executive officers—Mr.
Buffett, Charles T. Munger, and Mr. Hamburg—and its directors—Mr. Buffett, Mr.

Munger, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, William H. Gates, David S.
Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald R. Keough, Thomas S. Murphy, Ronald L.
Olson, and Walter Scott, Jr.—to argue that the same officers appear in both entities
and assert “[i]t is widely known that these two entities are essentially the same
company.” Id. at 5.
Returning to the Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Mr. Hansen
emphasizes that the Moving Defendants concede that Homesite is a business partner

of GEICO without providing the business details of their partnership and argues that,
as such, GEICO receives a commission from Homesite when it sells a Homesite
homeowners policy bundled with its automobile insurance. Id. at 6. He extends this
argument to Berkshire, asserting Berkshire receives substantial monetary benefit
from policies sold as the owners of GEICO in the form of free loans. Id. He thus
submits, “[a]lthough Berkshire [] has no offices or has no offices or staff in Maine, and
doesn’t file a tax return in the state, it derives income from policies that are sold
within the state of Maine” such that the Court has personal jurisdiction over
Berkshire. Id.

Furthermore, Mr. Hansen argues “[i]nsurance agencies have a clear obligation
to provide a homeowner[]s policy that will fulfill its obligations” and that this
obligation extends to GEICO by virtue of GEICO selling him a Homesite policy to
cover his home. Id. He questions what due diligence GEICO performed in choosing
to partner with Homesite and what financial incentive there is to GEICO in selling
such a policy, and alleges “GEICO is acting in the capacity of an insurance agent, not

merely as a broker, because GEICO regularly bundles Homesite homeowners[]
policies with its automobile policies.” Id. at 6-7. Therefore, the Plaintiff says, GEICO
“has the fiduciary duty to procure insurance that the consumer can rely on in the
event of a disaster,” and failed to satisfy this duty by selling Homesite policies despite
a record of complaints against it for noncompliance with insurance regulations. Id.
Reiterating the factual underpinning of his claims, Mr. Hansen submits
Homesite’s and AFICS’s conduct violates 24-A M.R.S. § 2164-D as an unfair claims

practice by “[k]nowingly misrepresenting to claimants and insureds relevant facts or
policy provisions,” “[f]ailing to acknowledge with reasonable promptness pertinent
written communications with respect to claims arising under its policies,” “[f]ailing
to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation and
settlement of claims,” “[f]ailing to develop and maintain documented claim files
supporting decisions made regarding liability,” “[r]efusing to pay claims without
conducting a reasonable investigation,” “[f]ailing to affirm coverage or deny coverage,
reserving any appropriate defenses, within a reasonable time after having completed
its investigation related to a claim,” “[u]nreasonably delaying the investigation or

payment of claims by requiring both a formal proof of loss and subsequent verification
when subsequent verification would result in duplication of information appearing in
the formal proof of loss,” “[f]ailing in the case of claims denials or offers of compromise
settlement, to promptly provide an accurate written explanation of the basis for those
actions,” and by “[f]ailing to provide forms, accompanied by reasonable explanations
for their use, necessary to present claims within 15 calendar days of such a request.”

Id. at 10 (quoting 24-A M.R.S. § 2164-D(3)(A-F), (I-K)). Mr. Hansen continues that
Homesite and AFICS engaged in unfair claims practices by compelling an insured to
institute a suit to recover the amounts due under its policies by, as a general business
practice, offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in suits
brought against it in violation of 24-A M.R.S. § 2164-D(4), and by failing to deal with
the insured in good faith to resolve claims without just cause as a general business
practice in violation of 24-A M.R.S. § 2164-D(5). Id. at 10-12.

The Plaintiff insists GEICO “was clearly negligent in not providing [him] with
a homeowners policy that could be relied upon.” Id. at 12. He reports the Moving
Defendants’ counsel told him Homesite “just ‘popped up’ on GEICO’s computer
system,” but alleges GEICO’s criteria in selecting suitable business partners is not
ascertainable and infers the low standard it uses is financially motivated. Id. He
submits GEICO is obligated to provide its customers with policies underwritten by
trustworthy companies, citing caselaw interpreting state laws in New Jersey,
Louisiana, and Idaho. Id. at 12-13. Mr. Hansen concludes that GEICO is selling
policies from its business partner Homesite that are causing financial harm to

policyholders, and that Berkshire is benefitting financially from GEICO’s activities,
such that the Court should deny the Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Id. at 13-14.
D. The Moving Defendants’ Reply
The Moving Defendants’ reply first asserts that the Plaintiff bears the burden
of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that personal jurisdiction exists,

Moving Defs.’ Second Reply at 2 (citing Adams v. Adams, 601 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2010)),
and that, under the prima facie standard applicable to a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, the Court need not credit “conclusory allegations or draw
farfetched inferences” but instead should rely only “on evidence of specific facts set
forth in the record.” Id. (quoting Vapotherm, Inc. v. Santiago, 38 F.4th 252, 257 (1st
Cir. 2022)). The Plaintiff may go beyond the pleadings to proffer affirmative proof,
which the Court accepts as true for the purpose of determining the prima facie

jurisdictional showing. Id. (citing Foster-Miller v. Babcock & Wilcox Can., 46 F.3d
138, 145 (1st Cir. 1995)).
Here, the Moving Defendants submit Mr. Jaksich’s declaration establishes
“that Berkshire has no connection to Maine, does not conduct business in Maine, has
no registered agent in Maine, does not maintain an office in Maine, own or lease any
real estate in Maine or have any personal property in Maine,” and point out that Mr.
Hansen has neither disputed these assertions nor submitted any other evidence to
contradict these statements. Id. at 2-3. Instead, the Moving Defendants say, Mr.
Hansen argues personal jurisdiction exists over Berkshire because “GEICO and

Berkshire have an online presence,” id. at 3 (quoting Pl.’s Opp’n at 2 (citation
corrected)), and based on his unsupported allegation that GEICO and Berkshire
conduct more than $100,000 in sales in the state of Maine. Id.
The Moving Defendants next contest the relevance of Plaintiff’s citation to
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 585 U.S. 162, arguing that Wayfair’s “central dispute
is whether South Dakota may require remote sellers to collect and remit the tax

without some additional connection to the State,” id. at 3-4 (quoting Wayfair, 585
U.S. at 177), which the Moving Defendants distinguish from the Plaintiff’s purported
proposition that having an online presence constitutes physical presence in a state.
Id. Instead, the Moving Defendants submit the scope of personal jurisdiction is
guided by Chen v. United States Sports Academy, Inc., 956 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2020), in
which the First Circuit held that the “mere availability of a defendant’s primarily
informational website in a forum is insufficient, without more, to subject a defendant

to jurisdiction there. Otherwise, the universality of websites in the modern world
would overwhelm constitutional limitations on the exercise of personal jurisdiction.”
Id. at 4 (quoting Chen, 956 F.3d at 56).
Responding to Mr. Hansen’s allegations that the directors and owners of
Berkshire and GEICO overlap and these entities should thus be considered the same,
the Moving Defendants collect First Circuit caselaw supporting the proposition that
parent companies and their subsidiaries are legally distinct, such that jurisdiction
over the subsidiary does not confer jurisdiction over the parent. Id. (citing Escude
Cruz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 905 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that the “mere

fact that a subsidiary company does business within a state does not confer
jurisdiction over its nonresident parent, even if the parent is the sole owner of the
subsidiary”); Gonzalez v. Walgreens Co., 878 F.2d 560, 561 (1st Cir. 1989) (“a parent
company may not be subject to jurisdiction merely because its subsidiary resides in
the forum”); Donatelli v. Nat. Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 465 (1st Cir. 1990) (“In
general, the courts have presumed the institutional independence of parent and

subsidiary when determining whether jurisdiction may be asserted over the parent
solely on the basis of the subsidiary’s contacts with the forum”)).
The Moving Defendants argue the presumption of corporate separateness
“must be overcome by clear evidence that the parent in fact controls the activities of
the subsidiary, id. at 5 (quoting Escude Cruz, 619 F.2d at 905), and “individuals on
the boards of [a parent’s] subsidiaries and vague allegations of control will not suffice
to meet plaintiff’s burden.” Id. (quoting Amburgey v. Atomic Ski, USA, Inc., No. 2:06-

CV-149-GZS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36424, at * 18-19 (D. Me. May 17, 2007)).
Rather, the level of control of a parent must render the subsidiary “a mere shell.” Id.
(quoting Rodriguez-Rivera v. Allscripts Healthcare Sols., Inc., 43 F.4th 150, 161 (1st
Cir. 2022)). The Moving Defendants contend Mr. Hansen has provided no evidentiary
proof that Berkshire has exercised such control over GEICO. Id.
More importantly, the Moving Defendants argue, is that Mr. Hansen has
presented no evidence in support of his factual allegations or legal support for his
analysis. Id. In this Circuit, they say, “it has long been the rule…that plaintiffs may

not rely on unsupported allegations in their pleadings to make a prima facie showing
of personal jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Boit v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc., 967 F.2d 671,
675 (1st Cir. 1992)).
Turning from their jurisdictional argument to their request for dismissal for
failure to state a claim, the Moving Defendants emphasize that Mr. Hansen’s
amended complaint “contains no mention of Berkshire and mentions GEICO only as

follows: ‘“I obtained my homeowner[]s policy through Geico Insurance Company in a
bundle combining my auto and home. The policy Geico obtained for me was through
Homesite Insurance Company of the Midwest . . ..’” Id. (quoting Am. Compl. at 2
(citation corrected) (Moving Defendants’ emphasis)). Mr. Hansen’s citations to
attached copies of the insurance documents confirm his homeowners insurance policy
was underwritten and provided through Homesite. Id.
Despite acknowledging that Homesite was his property insurer and that

GEICO acted as his agent, the Moving Defendants submit, Mr. Hansen cites
obligations associated with an insurer under the Maine Insurance Code to allege
Homesite’s actions violated the law. Id. at 5-6. However, the Moving Parties argue
neither GEICO nor Berkshire meets the statutory definition of an insurer, which
Maine law defines as “every person engaged [a]s a principal and as indemnitor, surety
or contractor in the business of entering into contracts of insurance.” Id. at 6 (quoting
24-A M.R.S. § 4). Further, they say, Mr. Hansen has not alleged either Berkshire or
GEICO was involved in the handling of his property insurance claim; rather, all
allegations of unfair claims practices in the amended complaint are made against

Homesite, AFICS, and AmFam Mutual. Id.
The Moving Defendants characterize Mr. Hansen’s argument to be asserting
that the Moving Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by “offering GEICO
customers the option to bundle their auto insurance with a home insurer that
Plaintiff believes to be subpar based on references to online customer complaints.”
Id. The Moving Defendants respond that an insurance agent “generally assumes only

those duties found in an ordinary agency relationship, that is, to use reasonable care,
diligence and judgment in obtaining the insurance coverage requested by the insured
party.” Id. at 7 (quoting Szelenyi v. Morse, Payson & Noyes Ins., 594 A.2d 1092, 1094
(Me. 1991)). An insurance agent does not, however, have “a duty to advise an insured
about adequacy of coverage merely because an agency relationship exists between the
parties. Before such a duty can arise, a special agency relationship must exist
between the parties.” Id. (citing Szelenyi, 594 A.2d at 1094). The Moving Defendants

submit that Mr. Hansen has not alleged any special relationship exists between him
and either GEICO or Berkshire, and thus reiterates its request that the Court enter
an order granting their motion to dismiss. Id.
IV. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
1. Standard for Personal Jurisdiction

To hear a case, a court must have personal jurisdiction over the parties; “that
is, the power to require the parties to obey its decrees.” United States v. Swiss Am.
Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 1999). The plaintiff bears the burden of
persuading the court that personal jurisdiction over each defendant exists. McNutt
v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); accord Mass. Sch. of Law
at Andover, Inc. v. Amer. Bar Ass’n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998).

When sitting in diversity jurisdiction, as this Court does here, a federal court
serves as “the functional equivalent of a state court sitting in the forum state.” N.
Laminate Sales, Inc. v. Davis, 403 F.3d 14, 24 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
omitted). Thus, to establish personal jurisdiction over the Defendants, Mr. Hansen
must establish that Maine’s long-arm statute permits an exercise of jurisdiction and
that doing so would not offend the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution. Id. However, because Maine’s long-arm statute extends “to the fullest

extent permitted by the due process clause of the United States Constitution,” 14
M.R.S. § 704-A(1), the two inquiries merge as functionally coextensive. See, e.g.,
Harlow v. Children’s Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2005); Elec. Media Int’l v. Pioneer
Commc’ns of Am., Inc., 586 A.2d 1256 (Me. 1991). The limits of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause thus determine the extent of the Court’s personal
jurisdiction in the present action. See Henderson v. Laser Spine Inst. LLC, 815 F.
Supp. 2d 353, 367 (D. Me. 2011).
For a defendant not present within the forum—here, within the state of

Maine—due process requires “certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’” Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden Am., Inc., 591 F.3d 1, 9 (1st
Cir. 2009) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319). Sufficient minimum contacts can
be established through two means. First, a non-resident defendant may be subject to
“general jurisdiction” for a “cause of action [which] may be unrelated to the

defendant’s contacts, [when] the defendant [has] continuous and systematic contacts
with the state.” Lechoslaw v. Bank of Am., N.A., 618 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2010)
(quoting Harlow, 432 F.3d at 57).
Alternatively, a non-resident defendant may be subject to “specific jurisdiction”
“where the defendant[] availed [itself] of the opportunity to do business in the state,
the claim in question is related to that access and the so-called gestalt factors are
consistent with requiring an out-of-state defendant to defend within the state.” N.

Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc., v. Cardinale, 567 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir.
2009). The First Circuit has explained the so-called “Gestalt factors” as assessing the
reasonableness of exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
based on:
(1) the defendant’s burden of appearing; (2) the forum state’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief; (4) the judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most effective resolution of the controversy; and (5) the
common interests of all sovereigns in promoting substantive social
policies.
United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960
F.2d 1088 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477
(1985); see also Donatelli v. National Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 462-65 (1st Cir.
1990) (calling these five criteria the “Gestalt factors”).
2. Evidentiary Standard Applicable to a Rule 12(b)(2) Motion

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a defendant may assert by
responsive motion that the court should dismiss the plaintiff’s claims against the
defendant for “lack of personal jurisdiction” over the defendant. FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(2).
In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a district
court “may choose from among several methods for determining whether the plaintiff
has met [its] burden.” Adelson v. Hananel, 510 F.3d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting

Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 50-51 (1st
Cir. 2002)). Specifically, a district court selects between “a trio of standards, each
corresponding to a level of analysis, that might usefully be employed when a trial
court comes to grips with a motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction.”
Foster-Miller, Inc., 46 F.3d at 145. Those available standards are prima facie,
preponderance of the evidence,7 and likelihood of existence of necessary facts.8 Id.
For the present motion, the Court applies the prima facie standard as the “most
conventional” and “a useful means of screening out cases in which personal

jurisdiction is obviously lacking.” Id.
Under the prima facie standard, a district court considers “only whether the
plaintiff has proffered evidence that, if credited, [is] enough to support findings of all
facts essential to personal jurisdiction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
court “accept[s] the plaintiff’s (properly documented) evidentiary proffers as true for
the purpose of determining the adequacy of the prima facie jurisdictional showing”

and “construe[s those proffers] in the light most congenial to the plaintiff’s

7 Under the preponderance of the evidence standard, a court must “embark on a factfinding
mission in the traditional way, taking evidence and measuring the plaintiff's jurisdictional showing.”
Foster-Miller, 46 F.3d at 145. A court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant when it:
determines that in the circumstances of a particular case it is unfair to force an out-of-
state defendant to incur the expense and burden of a trial on the merits in the local
forum without first requiring more of the plaintiff than a prima facie showing of facts
essential to in personam jurisdiction. A court may so determine, for example, when
the proffered evidence is conflicting and the record is rife with contradictions, or when
a plaintiff’s affidavits are “patently incredible[.]”
Id. at 145-46 (quoting Boit, 967 F.2d at 676). The First Circuit has warned that the preponderance of
the evidence standard “must be used discreetly” on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
because it requires “a full-blown evidentiary hearing at which the court will adjudicate the
jurisdictional issue definitively before the case reaches trial.” Id. at 146.
8 Under the “likelihood standard,” a court asks “whether the plaintiff has shown a likelihood of
the existence of each fact necessary to support personal jurisdiction.” Foster-Miller, 46 F.3d at 146
(quoting Boit, 967 F.2d at 676). The First Circuit described the “likelihood standard” as “a middle
course” between prima facia and preponderance of the evidence and instructed it may be applicable:
[i]n the special circumstance in which the assertion of jurisdiction is bound up with the
claim on the merits, the possibility of preclusion renders use of the preponderance
standard troubling, while the possibility of permitting a dubious case to proceed
beyond the pleading stage, and even to trial, though the court eventually will be found
to lack jurisdiction, renders use of the prima facie standard undesirable.
Id. at 145-46.
jurisdictional claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also
considers facts put forward by the Defendant but “only to the extent that they are
uncontradicted.” Id.

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
1. Standard for Failure to State a Claim
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires dismissal of a complaint that
“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). To
state a claim, a complaint must contain, at minimum, “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). In

other words, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when
“the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Plausible means “‘something more than merely possible’
or ‘merely consistent with a defendant’s liability.’” Germanowski v. Harris, 854 F.3d

68, 71-72 (1st Cir. 2017) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Schatz v. Republican
State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012)); Ocasio-Hernández v.
Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Evaluating the plausibility of a claim is a “‘context-specific’ job that compels [judges]
‘to draw on’ [their] ‘judicial experience and common sense.’” Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
2. Evidentiary Standard Applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes a defendant to assert, in
the responsive pleading, that the plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for “failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
The Court’s review of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a “two-
step analysis.” Cardigan Mountain Sch. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir.
2015). “First, the court must distinguish ‘the complaint’s factual allegations (which
must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be
credited).’” García-Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 2013)

(quoting Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012)); see also
Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55 (stating that a court may “isolate and ignore statements in the
complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-
action elements”). “Second, the court must determine whether the factual allegations
are sufficient to support ‘the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.’” García-Catalán, 734 F.3d at 103 (quoting Haley v. City of
Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011)).

V. DISCUSSION
The Moving Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Berkshire for lack of personal
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) and to dismiss both Berkshire and GEICO for failure
to state a claim against them under 12(b)(6). Moving Defs.’ Second Mot. to Dismiss
at 1. Mr. Hansen asserts the Court has specific and general jurisdiction over
Berkshire and that he has stated a cognizable claim for unfair claims practices
pursuant to 24-A M.R.S. § 2164-D against each Moving Defendant. As this Court
cannot act in an absence of jurisdiction, in this order, the Court considers first
whether Plaintiff has established the Court’s personal jurisdiction over Berkshire

and, second, whether he has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted against
GEICO and, if the Court’s jurisdiction is proven, Berkshire.
A. Motion to Dismiss Berkshire for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
The Court understands Mr. Hansen’s position to be that the Court has personal
jurisdiction over Berkshire, in part, based on its alleged control over and profits
derived from GEICO. As such, Plaintiff implicates the legal doctrine of piercing the

corporate veil by attributing the conduct of GEICO to Berkshire for the purposes of
determining jurisdiction and attributing liability. The Court thus addresses, as a
preliminary matter, the propriety of piercing the veil with respect to Berkshire before
turning to whether Mr. Hansen has demonstrated the Court’s personal jurisdiction
over Berkshire in this case.
1. Piercing the Corporate Veil
“There is a presumption of corporate separateness that must be overcome by

clear evidence that the parent in fact controls the activities of the subsidiary.” Escude
Cruz, 619 F.2d at 905. Under Maine law, “[a] court may pierce the corporate veil if a
plaintiff establishes that: (1) the defendant abused the privilege of a separate
corporate identity; and (2) an unjust or inequitable result would occur if the court
recognized the separate corporate existence.” State v. Weinschenk, 2005 ME 28, ¶ 19,
868 A.2d 200 (Me. 2005).
Here, Mr. Jaksich’s declaration plainly states that Berkshire is the indirect
parent company of GEICO, does not exercise day-to-day-control or management over
GEICO’s operations, and is not involved in the daily business activities of GEICO.

Jaksich Aff. at 2-3. Nonetheless, Mr. Hansen argues “[e]ffectively, Berkshire controls
the decision-making of its wholly-owned subsidiary GEICO indirectly” based on
Berkshire’s ownership of GEICO’s voting stock, its appointment of the GEICO Board
members and overlap with Berkshire’s own Board members, and incentives in the
employment contracts of GEICO management. Id. at 3. For the reasons explained
here, Court concludes these allegations fail to constitute an abuse of the privilege of

a separate corporate entity.
First, longstanding precedent in the First Circuit holds that a parent
company’s ownership of a subsidiary is not sufficient to extend a state’s jurisdiction
over a nonresident parent. See Escade Cruz, 619 F.2d at 17 (“The mere fact that a
subsidiary company does business within a state does not confer jurisdiction over its
nonresident parent, even if the parent is sole owner of the subsidiary”). This District
Court has previously extended the holding of Escade Cruz from direct corporate

owners to also apply to parent holding companies of independent corporations. See
Amburgey, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36424 at *17.
Here, Mr. Jaksich clearly stated that “Berkshire [] is a holding company which
owns subsidiaries engaged in a number of business activities” and that “Berkshire []
is the indirect parent company of GEICO Corporation, which in turn owns[]
Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO), which in turn owns GEICO
Insurance Agency, LLC as a wholly owned subsidiary.” Jaksich Aff. at 1-2. Mr.
Hansen has presented no evidence to the contrary that would evidence direct
ownership of GEICO by Berkshire. Following the jurisprudence of this Circuit and

District, the Court concludes that, for the purposes of asserting personal jurisdiction,
the indirect ownership of GEICO by Berkshire as a parent holding company is an
insufficient basis to pierce the veil and attribute the conduct of GEICO to Berkshire.
Next, Mr. Hansen points out that several GEICO officers—specifically, Mr.
Buffett and Mr. Hamburg—also serve as executive officers and directors at Berkshire
and, further, argues Berkshire’s ownership of GEICO’s voting stock functionally

permits an exercise of control by supervising the appointment of GEICO’s corporate
officers. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. However, considering much the same allegations of a parent
company’s executives serving in officer roles of its subsidiary, the Amburgey Court
concluded “a parent corporation’s placement of individuals on the boards of its
subsidiaries and Plaintiffs’ unsupported and vague allegations of control fall far short
of the clear and convincing evidence required to pierce the corporate veil.” Amburgey,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36424 at *18-19. Without evidence on the record to support

Mr. Hansen’s accusations of Berkshire’s illicit control or failure to comport with
corporate formalities, the Court sees no basis in the case at bar to depart from is prior
conclusion in Amburgey by overcoming the presumption of corporate separateness.
Relatedly, Mr. Hansen alleges that GEICO’s Board members and management
are indirectly controlled by Berkshire by virtue of so-called MBO, which he describes
as “specific goals and objectives outlined in their employment agreements” that make
such employees beholden to Berkshire, rather than GEICO. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.
However, Plaintiff neither alleges with any specificity what contractual incentives
are included that would lead the Court to reasonably conclude that Berkshire

operates day-to-day control over GEICO, nor does he provide any evidence to support
his claims of improper MBO. In light of this Circuit’s recognition of a “presumption
of corporate separateness that must be overcome by clear evidence that the parent in
fact controls the activities of the subsidiary,” Escude Cruz, 619 F.2d at 905, the Court
concludes Mr. Hansen has failed to satisfy his burden of proving Berkshire abused
the privilege of a separate corporate identity by exercising direct control over GEICO.

Further, even if Mr. Hansen had demonstrated Berkshire’s abuse of the
corporate form, he has presented no basis for the Court to conclude that “an unjust
or inequitable result would occur if the court recognized the separate corporate
existence.” Weinschenk, 2005 ME 28, ¶ 19, 868 A.2d 200. Plaintiff does not allege,
for example, that GEICO is insolvent or lacks sufficient funds to cover the potential
liabilities relating to this case, as would provide a justifiable reason for piercing the
corporate veil. Cf. Theberge v. Darbro Inc., 684 A.2d 1298, 1301 (Me. 1996) (holding

courts may pierce the corporate veil if: (1) the corporation is a mere “alter ego” and
(2) “when necessary in the interest of justice”). The Moving Defendants do not seek
to dismiss Mr. Hansen’s claim against GEICO for lack of personal jurisdiction, nor
does the Court see any other reason that Mr. Hansen does not have full opportunity
to assert his rights by bringing his claim against GEICO directly as the insurance
agent in this dispute.
For these reasons, the Court declines to pierce the corporate veil by attributing
the conduct of GEICO to Berkshire. Despite Mr. Hansen’s assertion that “[i]t is
widely known that these two entities are essentially the same company,” this Court’s

conclusion accords with other federal courts which have declined to exercise personal
jurisdiction over Berkshire based on the actions of GEICO. See, e.g., Willis v. Gov’t
Emps. Ins. Co., No. 13-280 KG/KK, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189391, at *16 (D.N.M.
Feb. 1, 2016) (“Berkshire’s dealings with GEICO to encourage profits do not provide
a basis for general personal jurisdiction over Berkshire”); accord Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co.
v. Fred Javier Gonzalez Ins. Agency, No. CV 09-6270-GHK (Ex), 2010 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 148481, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2010) (concluding the record provided “says
nothing about the degree of control exercised by Berkshire Hathaway over these
subsidiaries and there is no argument at all that it would result in fraud or injustice
not to impute the subsidiaries’ actions to Berkshire Hathaway”).
2. Specific Jurisdiction
Mr. Hansen bases his assertion of the Court’s personal jurisdiction over
Berkshire on two asserted contacts with the state of Maine: “an online presence” and

“income in Maine significantly exceeding the $100,000 threshold for nexus.” Pl.’s
Opp’n at 2. He explains his allegation of $100,000 in revenue as deriving from the
“billions of dollars in insurance float” that GEICO provides to Berkshire each year,
performing back-of-the-napkin calculations to estimate, based on Berkshire’s access
in 2022 to $164 billion in float, that “[i]f Maine residents account for 1% of the float
Berkshire had access to in 2022, the interest savings at the current bank rate are
1.64 billion, approximately 78 million dollars.” Id. at 4.
The First Circuit has divided the specific jurisdiction analysis into three

inquires: (1) purposeful availment, (2) relatedness, and (3) reasonableness. See N.
Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc., 567 F.3d at 16; accord Henderson,
815 F. Supp. 2d at 368. Based on Supreme Court and First Circuit holdings, the
plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the court that personal jurisdiction over each
defendant exists. See McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189; Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc.,
142 F.3d at 34. The Court thus considers whether Mr. Hansen has established each

element for specific jurisdiction over Berkshire as a defendant in the state of Maine.
a. Purposeful Availment
The First Circuit has instructed that “the defendant’s in-state contacts must
represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum
state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of that state’s laws and making
the defendant’s involuntary presence before the state’s courts foreseeable.” Astro-
Med, 591 F.3d at 10 (quoting N. Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 25). “The question is

whether a defendant has followed a course of conduct directed at the society or
economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign, so that the sovereign
has the power to subject the defendant to judgment concerning that conduct.” J.
McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011). The purposeful availment
inquiry ensures “that personal jurisdiction is not premised solely upon a defendant’s
‘random, isolated, or fortuitous’ contacts with the forum state.” Sawtelle v. Farrell,
70 F.3d 1381, 1391 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770,
774, (1984)); accord Adams, 601 F.3d at 6 (“The focus of the purposeful availment
inquiry is the defendant’s intentionality”).

“The inquiry is ‘highly idiosyncratic, involving an individualized assessment
and factual analysis of the precise mix of contacts that characterize each case.’”
Cossaboon v. Me. Med. Ctr., 600 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Pritzker v. Yari,
42 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 1994)). “The cornerstones upon which the concept of
purposeful availment rest are voluntariness and foreseeability.” Sawtelle, 70 F.3d.
at 1391 (citing Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 206 (1st Cir. 1994)).

i. Voluntariness
“Voluntariness requires that the defendant’s contacts with the forum state
proximately result from actions by the defendant himself. The contacts must be
deliberate, and not based on the unilateral actions of another party.” Id. (emphasis
in original) (quoting Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 2008)
(internal citations omitted).
Beginning with Plaintiff’s argument regarding Berkshire’s revenue derived

from polices sold in the state of Maine, the Court notes the First Circuit’s admonition
that “generally, the jurisdictional contacts of a subsidiary corporation are not
imputed to its parent.” Rodriguez-Rivera, 43 F.4th at 161 (citing De Castro v. Sanifill,
Inc., 198 F.3d 282, 283-84 (1st Cir. 1999)). Mr. Hansen’s speculates that “Maine
residents account for 1% of the float Berkshire had access to in 2022,” Pl.’s Opp’n at
4, but ignores the fact that such float does not represent Berkshire’s profit from direct
sales of insurance policies in Maine, but rather is provided by GEICO as a surplus of
liquidity for investment. As Plaintiff himself stated, GEICO is incorporated in the
state of Delaware and has a principal place of business in the state of Maryland.

Corrected Compl. at 5. As such, the Court does not conceive Berkshire’s investment
of funds supplied by GEICO to be deliberate and voluntary contact with the state of
Maine.
Second, Mr. Hansen asserts “GEICO and Berkshire have an online presence.”
Pl.’s Opp’n at 2. This vague allegation does not come close to meeting the Plaintiff’s
burden under the prima facie to present sufficient evidence, taken as true, to support

findings of all facts essential to personal jurisdiction. Foster-Miller, Inc., 46 F.3d at
145. As the First Circuit recently explained in Chen, 956 F.3d 45:
We have made pellucid that “the mere availability” of a defendant’s
primarily informational website in a forum is insufficient, without more,
to subject a defendant to jurisdiction there. A Corp. v. All Am.
Plumbing, Inc., 812 F.3d 54, 61 (1st Cir. 2016). Otherwise, the
universality of websites in the modern world would overwhelm
constitutional limitations on the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See
Cossaboon, 600 F.3d at 35.
Chen, 956 F.3d at 60. The First Circuit highlighted the lack of evidence in the record
that the defendant in Chen had “aim[ed] its website specifically” at persons within
the forum state, had “derived significant revenue from [forum state]-based
individuals through its maintenance of this website,” or had solicited the plaintiff’s
business through this website while the plaintiff was within the forum state. Id. For
these reasons, the First Circuit concluded “without serious difficulty, that [the
defendant] cannot constitutionally be subjected to specific jurisdiction in [the forum
state] simply because it operates a primarily informational website that happens to
be available there.” Id. These facts are reminiscent of the record before this Court,
which presents no evidence that Berkshire aimed its website specifically at persons
within Maine, derived significant revenue from Maine-based individuals through its

website, or solicited the Plaintiff’s business while he was within Maine.
The Chen Court also contemplated the defendant’s interactive online platform,
which it noted “presents a closer question,” noting the First Circuit had previously
“upheld the exercise of specific jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in the United
States when the corporation used its interactive website to sell its services to
customers in the United States and the corporation was aware that it had derived

substantial revenue from those sales over the course of several years.” Id. (for the
latter, citing Plixer Int’l, Inc. v. Scrutinizer GmbH, 905 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2018)).
Ultimately, however, the Chen Court concluded “we cannot say that [the defendant]
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in [the forum state]
simply by virtue of maintaining an interactive online [] platform accessible in [the
forum state] and all other states.” Id. at 61.
Here, the Court concludes based on the record before it that Mr. Hansen has

failed to present prima facie evidence that Berkshire purposefully availed itself of
conducting business in Maine based on his single reference to an online presence. He
offers no details on whether Berkshire’s purported website was informational or
interactive, as would guide the Court’s analysis, nor indeed does he even distinguish
Berkshire from GEICO in his allegation of “an online presence.” See Pl.’s Opp’n at 2
(“GEICO and Berkshire have an online presence”).
ii. Foreseeability
“Foreseeability requires that the contacts with the forum state be of a nature
that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Adams,

601 F.3d at 6 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
For the same reasons described above, the Court concludes Mr. Hansen has
failed to demonstrate Berkshire could reasonably have foreseen being haled into court
in the state of Maine. Berkshire’s investment of the insurance float from GEICO, a
corporation based in Maryland and Delaware, Corrected Compl. at 5, does not provide

a basis to anticipate being subjected to a lawsuit in Maine. Further, based on the
record before it, the Court cannot reasonably conclude that a general “online
presence” would constitute sufficient contacts with the state of Maine to anticipate
being subjected to personal jurisdiction in that forum. There is no evidence that
Berkshire’s website solicited business in Maine or was interactive and Mr. Hansen’s
engagement occurred in the state of Maine.
At bottom, Mr. Hansen has failed to satisfy his prima facie burden of

demonstrating by clear evidence Berkshire’s purposeful availment of conducting
business in the state of Maine. Based on the failure to prove contacts with the forum
state, the Court concludes that it lacks specific jurisdiction over Berkshire in this
case, and that it may end its jurisdictional inquiry there. See United States v. Swiss
Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 621 (1st Cir. 2001) (“there can be no requisite nexus
between the contacts and the cause of action if no contacts exist”). However, in an
abundance of caution, the Court nonetheless explains why Plaintiff’s allegations of
forum-state activity are also unrelated to his claim.
b. Relatedness of Contacts to Plaintiff’s Claims

“[R]elatedness is the divining rod that separates specific jurisdiction cases from
general jurisdiction cases . . .. [I]t ensures that the element of causation remains in
the forefront of the due process investigation.” Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d
708, 714 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 207). On the relatedness
prong, a court considers whether “the claim underlying the litigation directly arises
out of, or relates to, the defendant’s forum-state activities.” Astro-Med, 591 F.3d at 9

(quoting N. Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 25). The Court applies this “flexible, relaxed
standard,” N. Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 25, to Mr. Hansen’s case against Berkshire.
As explained, Mr. Hansen bases his assertion of this Court’s personal
jurisdiction over Berkshire on its “online presence” and its investment of and profiting
from insurance float derived from GEICO’s sale of insurance policies in Maine. Pl.’s
Opp’n at 2, 4. However, neither of these activities has any bearing on the claim
underlying Mr. Hansen’s litigation: Homesite’s alleged failure to comply with the

payment terms of Mr. Hansen’s home insurance policy. In other words, even if the
Court accepts Mr. Hansen’s arguments as demonstrating Berkshire’s purposeful
availment of the state of Maine, his claim is in no way related to Berkshire’s website,
nor does it implicate Berkshire’s alleged practice of investing GEICO’s insurance float
as relevant to his allegations of Homesite’s unfair claims practices.
Therefore, the Court concludes Mr. Hansen has failed to demonstrate his
“claim underlying the litigation directly arises out of, or relates to, the defendant’s
forum-state activities,” Astro-Med, 591 F.3d at 9 (quoting N. Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d

at 25), such that the Court lacks specific jurisdiction over Berkshire in this case.
Accord Swiss Am. Bank Ltd., 274 F.3d at 625 (failure to show relatedness ends the
specific jurisdiction inquiry). As the Court has determined Mr. Hansen failed to
satisfy his burden of proving purposeful availment and relatedness, the Court
declines to reach the third factor of reasonableness as unnecessary. Cf. Keds Corp. v.
Renee Int’l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 220 (1st Cir. 1989) (If purposeful availment

and reasonableness are demonstrated, a defendant “must present a compelling case
that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction
unreasonable”) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477).
3. General Jurisdiction
Mr. Hansen also alleges “Berkshire has purposely directed its activities
towards residents of the forum (in Maine),” such that the Court has general
jurisdiction over it. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. Berkshire cites Mr. Jaksich’s declaration, which

states Berkshire is incorporated in the state of Delaware; has its headquarters in
Omaha, Nebraska; does not maintain an office or own, use, possess, or lease any real
property, facilities, or personal property in Maine; does not have any employees,
officers, or agents in Maine; does not sell insurance in Maine; is not licensed,
registered, or authorized to do business in Maine, nor does it do so; and does not have
a registered agent for service in Maine, nor does it consent to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the state of Maine. Jaksich Aff. at 1-2.
“For general jurisdiction . . . the defendant must have continuous and

systematic contacts with the state . . .[,] the defendant’s contacts with the state must
be purposeful[, and ] . . . the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable under the
circumstances.” Lechoslaw, 618 F.3d at 54 (quoting Harlow, 432 F.3d at 57).
However, “although minimum contacts suffice in and of themselves for specific
jurisdiction under International Shoe, the standard for general jurisdiction is
considerably more stringent.” Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 744 F.2d 213, 216 (1st Cir.

1984); accord Donatelli, 893 F.2d at 463.
a. Continuous and Systematic Contacts
For a court to have general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, the
defendant corporation must have “affiliations with the State [that] are so “continuous
and systematic” as to render them essentially at home in the forum State. Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (citing Int’l Shoe,
326 U.S. at 317). Here, the Court again considers Mr. Hansen’s arguments that this

Court has personal jurisdiction over Berkshire based on an alleged “online presence”
and its investing of and profiting from GEICO’s insurance float derived from sales of
Maine insurance policies. Pl.’s Opp’n at 2, 4. However, for the same reasons
discussed in the context of specific jurisdiction, Mr. Hansen’s allegations,
unsupported by evidence, fail to satisfy his prima facie burden of demonstrating the
Court’s jurisdiction over Berkshire.
First, as explained, Berkshire is a separate and distinct legal entity from
GEICO, and the precedent of the First Circuit, to which this Court owes its allegiance,
mandates that “generally, the jurisdictional contacts of a subsidiary corporation are

not imputed to its parent.” Rodriguez-Rivera, 43 F.4th at 161 (citing De Castro, 198
F.3d at 283-84).
Second, while Mr. Hansen imputes Berkshire’s investment of insurance float
to sales of insurance policies in Maine, he omits the key fact that GEICO is the entity
actually selling and profiting from the sale of insurance policies and that GEICO is a
corporation at-home in Maryland and Delaware. Corrected Compl. at 5. Thus, even

accepting Mr. Hansen’s inferential deductions regarding Berkshire’s investment of
GEICO’s insurance float as true, this business model does not demonstrate
Berkshire’s continuous and systematic contacts with the state of Maine.
Third, Mr. Hansen’s vague reference to an “online presence” does not persuade
the Court that Berkshire is essentially at home in the state of Maine in light of robust
First Circuit caselaw on the issue. See, e.g., Chen, 956 F.3d at 57 (“We do not discount
the possibility that a corporation’s pervasive virtual presence in a forum may be the

linchpin for a finding that its business contacts are so continuous and systematic as
to render it at home in the forum — especially since a corporation, like an individual,
may have a number of homes. But the mere whiff of a virtual presence will not
suffice”); accord Cossaboon, 600 F.3d at 39 (holding “operat[ing] a website accessible
to Maine residents,” among other things “fell ‘well below the levels of contacts that
have previously been found insufficient to support general jurisdiction’”) (quoting
Harlow, 432 F.3d at 66).
Finally, in light of the First Circuit’s instruction that the standard for general

jurisdiction based on contacts with the forum state “is considerably more stringent”
than specific jurisdiction, Glater, 744 F.2d at 216, the Court concludes Mr. Hansen
has failed to satisfy of proving by prima facie evidence that Berkshire is subject to
the general jurisdiction of this Court. While the Court could end its analysis here, it
briefly explains why Mr. Hansen has further failed to demonstrate Berkshire’s
purposeful availment of the state of Maine.

b. Purposeful Availment
As with subject matter jurisdiction, for a court to have general jurisdiction over
a defendant, there must be “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws.” Cossaboon, 600 F.3d at 32 (citing Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). The purposeful availment test “focuses on the
defendant’s intentionality,” id. (quoting Swiss Am. Bank, 274 F.3d at 623), and “is

only satisfied when the defendant purposefully and voluntarily directs his activities
toward the forum so that he should expect, by virtue of the benefit he receives, to be
subject to the court’s jurisdiction based on these contacts.” Id. (quoting Swiss Am.
Bank, 274 F.3d at 624).
The Moving Defendants submit Berkshire is incorporated in the state of
Delaware, has its headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska, and does no business in the
state of Maine. Jaksich Aff. at 1-2. Mr. Hansen does not dispute this fact and his
arguments regarding an “online presence” and Berkshire’s investment of GEICO’s
insurance float derived from Maine sales do not convince the Court that Berkshire

should expect to be subject to the jurisdiction of Maine’s judicial system. Again, by
Mr. Hansen’s own admission, GEICO is a corporation at-home in Maryland and
Delaware, Corrected Compl. at 5, such that Berkshire’s investment of GEICO’s
insurance float does not provide a basis to expect being subjected to a lawsuit in
Maine. Further, without further information than a vaguely alleged “online
presence,” the Court cannot conclude that Berkshire’s website, accessible in Maine,

would allow Berkshire to reasonable foresee being haled into court in that forum.
For these reasons, the Court concludes it lacks general personal jurisdiction
over Berkshire,9 and grants the Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss Berkshire for
lack of personal jurisdiction.
B. Motion to Dismiss GEICO10 for Failure to State a Claim
The Moving Parties’ submit that “[b]eyond stating that he bundled his home
and auto insurance through ‘Geico’ and that it and Homesite Insurance Company are

affiliates, which they are not, Plaintiff fails to plead any other facts relating to

9 The Court again declines to reach the reasonableness factors on the basis that, having failed
to demonstrate continuous and systemic contacts or purposeful availment, the Defendant need not
persuade the Court that its assertion of jurisdiction is nevertheless unreasonable. See Keds Corp., 888
F.2d at 220 (for personal jurisdiction to be unreasonable, a defendant “must present a compelling case
that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable”) (quoting
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477).
10 Because the Court is dismissing Berkshire for lack of personal jurisdiction, as explained in the
preceding section, the Court considers the Moving Parties’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
as applicable only to GEICO.
GEICO.” Moving Defs,’ Second Mot. to Dismiss at 14-15. Mr. Hansen responds
Homesite’s conduct constituted unfair claims practices in violation of 24-A M.R.S. §§
2164-D(3)(A-F, I-K); 2164-D(4); 2164-D(5)), and that GEICO acted as an insurance

agent, not merely a broker, in its business partnership with Homesite such that it
“has a fiduciary duty to procure insurance that the consumer can rely on in the event
of a disaster.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 6-7. Here, Mr. Hansen says, “GEICO was clearly
negligent in not providing me with a homeowners policy that could be relied upon,”
alleging that GEICO has a monetary incentive to set an “extremely low” bar for
“suitable business partners” and citing New Jersey, Louisiana, and Idaho state court

decisions that concluded, pursuant to respective state laws, that an insurance agent
or broker owed a fiduciary duty to customers to prudently advise their clients. Id. at
12-13.
The Moving Defendants reply that GEICO does not meet the statutory
definition of insurer under Maine law, that Mr. Hansen has not alleged GEICO was
involved in the handling of his insurance claim, and that he makes no allegations of
unfair claims practices against GEICO. Moving Defs.’ Second Reply at 6. The Moving

Defendants apparently concede that GEICO was his insurance agent, see id. at 5
(“Despite the fact that Plaintiff acknowledges that . . . GEICO was an agent), but
respond to Mr. Hansen’s arguments that GEICO owes him a fiduciary duty as his
insurance agent by contending an insurance agent “generally assumes only those
duties found in an ordinary agency relationship, that is, to use reasonable care,
diligence and judgment in obtaining the insurance coverage requested by the insured
party,” but does not have “a duty to advise an insured about adequacy of coverage
merely because an agency relationship exists between the parties. Before such a duty
can arise, a special agency relationship must exist between the parties.” Id. at 7

(quoting Szelenyi, 594 A.2d at 1094). Here, they say, Mr. Hansen has neither alleged
nor demonstrated any such special relationship or agreement with GEICO.
In Szelenyi, 594 A.2d 1092, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the
Law Court, considered a suit against an insurance agent alleging the agent had a
duty to advise the plaintiff or to give him information as to the adequacy of his
insurance coverage. See Szelinyi, 594 A.2d at 1094. On its review of the record, the

Law Court concluded that over the twelve-year course of dealing between the parties,
“there is no suggestion that they had anything more than an ordinary agency
relationship that generally exists between an insurance agent and an insured party”
and “decline[d] to sustain a judgment that imposes a legal duty on an insurance agent
to advise or give information to an insured party concerning the adequacy of
insurance coverage in the absence of evidence of a special relationship or agreement
between the parties.” Id. at 1095.

The Court thus examines the record of this case for evidence that GEICO and
Mr. Hansen entered an agreement under which GEICO assumed the duty to advise
Mr. Hansen as to the adequacy of his coverage, or that GEICO and Mr. Hansen had
a special relationship or agreement between them.
Of all Mr. Hansen’s attached exhibits, the only document discussing GEICO
is the insurance policy itself. See Ins. Policy. This document begins with a letter from
GEICO to Mr. Hansen, thanking him for “purchasing a homeowners policy through
the GEICO Insurance Agency, underwritten by HOMESITE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF THE MIDWEST.” Id. at 1 (emphasis in original). The document

then contains fifty-five pages describing the policy’s terms, scope, and specific
exclusions. Id. at 2-56. However, on this Court’s review, nowhere does this document
evidence GEICO’s agreement to advise Mr. Hansen on the adequacy of the insurance
underwriter—here, Homesite—nor does it present evidence that GEICO and Mr.
Hansen had a relationship beyond that of a typical insurance agent and insured.
Mr. Hansen directs the Court to state court decisions from New Jersey,

Louisiana, and Idaho to support his assertion that GEICO owed him a fiduciary duty
and violated that duty by partnering with Homesite, but these decisions do not bind
this Court, and indeed interpreted state laws inapplicable in Maine. This Court is
instead obligated to follow the Law Court’s jurisprudence with respect to Maine state
laws. See, e.g., Norton v. McOsker, 407 F.3d 501 (1st Cir. 2005) (explaining a federal
district court sitting in diversity is governed by state law, which it ascertains by, inter
alia, “[r]elying on pronouncements of the state supreme court”). The Law Court has

clearly stated that Maine law does not “impose a legal duty on an insurance agent to
advise or give information to an insured party concerning the adequacy of insurance
coverage in the absence of evidence of a special relationship or agreement between
the parties.” Szelinyi, 594 A.2d at 1095. As Mr. Hansen himself states, “GEICO
regularly bundles Homesite homeowners[] policies with its automobile policies,” Pl.’s
Opp’n at 7, such that doing so for Mr. Hansen does not establish a special
relationship.
This conclusion is bolstered by the Law Court’s decision in Yankee Pride

Transportation & Logistics, Inc. v. UIG, Inc., 2021 ME 65, 264 A.3d 1248, in which
the Law Court explained, in the context of a claim against an insurance agent, that
the “[t]he salient elements of a fiduciary relationship [are] (1) the actual placing of
trust or confidence in fact by one party in another, and (2) a great disparity of position
and influence between the parties at issue.” Id., 2021 ME 65, ¶ 16, 264 A.3d 1248
(quoting Stewart v. Machias Sav. Bank, 2000 ME 207, ¶ 10, 762 A.2d 44) (internal

quotation marks omitted). However, the Yankee Pride Court concluded that the
record contained “no evidence from which a fact finder could find that a fiduciary
relationship existed between the parties,” citing a District of Maine decision applying
the Law Court’s two-part test from Stewart to conclude an insurance agent did not
owe a fiduciary duty to an insured party. Id. (citing Noveletsky v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
No. 2:12-CV-00021-NT, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83762, at *23-*27 (D. Me. June 14,
2013)).

Notably, though Mr. Hansen does not plainly bring a negligence claim against
GEICO, he alleges GEICO was “clearly negligent” in presenting him with a policy
from a purportedly disreputable vendor. Pl.’s Opp’n at 12. However, the Noveletsky
Court specifically addresses an analogous negligence claim against an insurance
agent for providing allegedly inadequate coverage, explaining that the Law Court has
held “[a]part from contractual undertakings between the parties, an agency
relationship, or fraud or misrepresentation, we see no basis upon which to recognize
an action for negligence against the seller of a product like insurance for the seller’s
conduct in advising a purchaser what product to buy.” Noveletsky, 2013 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 83762, at *27 (quoting Ghiz v. Richard S. Bradford, Inc., 573 A.2d 379, 380-
81 (Me. 1990)). The Noveletzy Court noted that “[t]he Law Court declined to impose
liability on the insurance agent for the [plaintiff’s] loss,” and thus concluded that
“[f]ollowing Maine law, this Court cannot impose any greater liability on [the
defendant].” Id. at 29-30 (citing Ghiz, 573 A.2d at 381). Mr. Hansen has not provided
the Court with an adequate evidentiary basis to depart from this precedent here.

Finally, it is true that the Law Court has held “[i]t is the law in Maine that
when an insurance broker or agent undertakes to provide insurance for another but
fails to do so, the agent is liable in the amount that would have been due if the policy
had been obtained.” Bramson v. Chester L. Jordan & Co., 379 A.2d 730, 732 (Me.
1977) (citing Miller v. Liberty Ins. Co., 161 Me. 438, 213 A.2d 831 (1965)). However,
the Court views this holding as inapposite to Mr. Hansen’s case for the fundamental
reason that in Bramson, the appellant held an existing fire insurance policy worth

$12,000 and asked his insurance agent to increase the coverage to $15,000; however,
the agent “neglected to place said increase of coverage, and they never notified the
Plaintiff that the increase in coverage had not been placed.” Id. The Bramson Court
thus considered a situation where the agent “had expressly undertaken to provide
coverage,” but had entirely failed to do so. Id.
That is different in kind from the case at bar, in which Mr. Hansen does not
dispute that GEICO, acting as his insurance agent, secured an insurance policy
underwritten by Homesite but now argues that Homesite has breached the terms of

that contract and GEICO should be held liable for Homesite’s breach. The Law Court
has held in no unclear terms that “[w]hen an agent is not a party to a contract
between the principal and a third party, the agent is not liable to the third party for
a breach of that contract.” Cnty. Forest Prods. v. Green Mt. Agency, Inc., 2000 ME
161, 758 A.2d 59 (citing Mueller v. Penobscot Valley Hosp., 538 A.2d 294, 299 (Me.
1988)). Mr. Hansen nowhere claims GEICO undertook but failed to procure him

insurance coverage or that GEICO is a party to the homeowners insurance contract
between himself and Homesite. The Court thus finds Mr. Hansen’s claim much closer
to County Forest Products than to Bramson.
At bottom, Mr. Hansen does not allege GEICO played any role in the allegedly
unlawful management of his insurance claim and he has presented no evidence that
an insurance agent owes an insured party the fiduciary duty to advise the insured
party as to the adequacy of insurance coverage in the manner he alleges GEICO

breached here. For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Moving Defendants’
motion to dismiss Mr. Hansen’s claims against GEICO for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Defendants Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s and Government
Employees Insurance Company’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and/or for Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 35).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 7th day of July, 2025

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11090491. Public record. Not legal advice.