# Sackey v. United States

> United States Court of Federal Claims · July 7, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11090356

## Case

- **Court:** United States Court of Federal Claims
- **Decided:** July 7, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Matthew H. Solomson
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11090356

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that statutorily provided discretion to award payment is limited “because once a condition is met, namely that the head of an agency states that a position meets the criteria listed . . . , the statute requires payment to employees with that position”
- holding that the Civil Service Reform Act precluded Tucker Act jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims
- holding that a moiety statute is money mandating, even when using a “sliding scale . . . [for] determining the appropriate amount of an award for 5 an informant,” because “the statute continues to mandate the payment of some award” (emphasis added

## Opinion text

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 24-1223C
(Filed: July 7, 2025)

)
SAMUEL SACKEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. )
)
THE UNITED STATES, )
)
Defendant. )
)

ORDER

On August 9, 2024, pro se Plaintiff, Mr. Samuel Sackey, filed a complaint in this
Court, alleging that he is owed a whistleblower reward pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5323(b)(1)
for information he gave to the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (“FinCEN”). See ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). The government moves to dismiss
Mr. Sackey’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted. ECF No. 14 (“MTD”). This Court grants the government’s motion
because this Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Sackey’s claim; 31 U.S.C. § 5323(f) vests
jurisdiction over § 5323 whistleblower claims solely in “the appropriate court of appeals
of the United States.” 31 U.S.C. § 5323(f)(2)(A). Furthermore, as FinCEN informed
Mr. Sackey, it has yet to issue regulations governing the processing of whistleblower
claims or the disbursement of funds under the statute. Id. § 5323(b)(1). In the absence of
any such regulations, this Court could not grant Mr. Sackey relief — even if the statute
did not have a jurisdictional bar.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1

Between August 2023 and January 2024, Mr. Sackey provided whistleblower
information concerning the banking practices of JPMorgan Chase — his employer at the
time — to FinCEN. Compl. at 3. Mr. Sackey alleges that the information he provided
demonstrated that JPMorgan Chase was in violation of “title 31 of the United States
Code.” Compl. at 2. On August 8, 2023, Mr. Sackey received an email response from
FinCEN that advised him that FinCEN was “tracking [the] matter,” and provided him
with a specific “Tip, Complaint, or Referral code” to reference in future correspondence.
Id. at Ex. 1.

Two months after Mr. Sackey’s last alleged tip to FINCen — sometime between
March and May of 2024 — the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, and the Federal Reserve Board initiated enforcement
actions against JPMorgan Chase. Compl. at 2–3. Mr. Sackey has attached documentation
of the enforcement actions as Exhibits 4, 5, and 6 to his complaint in this Court.
Mr. Sackey argues that there are indicia that he “provided the information used for the
enforcements.” Id. at 3. Such indicia include: “the matching violation in the plaintiff’s
report and the multiple enforcements, the close time frame between the plaintiff’s
whistleblower report and the enforcement releases, statute of limitations pertaining to
the violation, and other undisclosed reasons.” Id.

On June 16, 2024, Mr. Sackey submitted a request for a monetary award to FinCEN.
FINCen’s response — which the government attached in an appendix to its motion to
dismiss — informed Mr. Sackey that “a response to and/or disposition of” his application
for an award “may not occur until after the promulgation of program regulations.” 2 MTD
at Def. App. 1.

1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts are taken from Mr. Sackey’s Complaint, ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).

Complaint page numbers reference the PDF number at the top of the ECF document pages. For
purposes of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Court of Federal
Claims, this Court assumes that all non-conclusory facts in the operative complaint are true.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[F]or the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must
take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true.” (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
2 As of the date of this order, the Department of the Treasury has not promulgated implementing

regulations, nor has the agency issued a notice of proposed rulemaking as contemplated by 31
U.S.C. § 5323(i). See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
2
On August 9, 2024, Mr. Sackey filed a complaint against the government in this
Court, alleging that, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5323(b)(1), he is entitled to collect a
whistleblower award in the amount of “approximately $134,000,000,” and “potential
punitive damages due to a breach of duty.” Compl. at 3. In his complaint, he also seeks
to “obtain Freedom of Information Act disclosure documents” to “help confirm the
plaintiff’s claim to the whistleblower monetary award.” Id. at 1. 3

On January 8, 2025, the government filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Sackey’s
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Court of
Federal Claims (“RCFC”). MTD at 1. On February 3, 2025, Mr. Sackey filed a “motion to
strike” the government’s motion to dismiss, which this Court treated as Mr. Sackey’s
response. ECF No. 17 (“Pl. Resp.”). The government filed its reply on February 18, 2025.
ECF No. 20.

II. DISCUSSION: THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER MR. SACKEY’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and this Court generally holds a pro se plaintiff’s
pleading to “less stringent standards.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per
curiam). The Court, however, “may not . . . take a liberal view of [a] jurisdictional
requirement and set a different rule for pro se litigants only.” Kelley v. Sec’y of Dep’t of
Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987). In other words, even a pro se plaintiff “bears
the burden of proving that the Court of Federal Claims possesse[s] jurisdiction over his
complaint.” Sanders v. United States, 252 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Colbert v.
United States, 617 F. App’x 981, 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“No plaintiff, pro se or otherwise,
may be excused from the burden of meeting the court’s jurisdictional requirements.”). In
the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court “must dismiss the action.” RCFC
12(h)(3); see also Kissi v. United States, 493 F. App’x 57, 58 (2012) (“If the Court of Federal
Claims determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the claim.”)
(citing RCFC 12(h)(3))).

Generally, “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is defined by the
Tucker Act, which gives the court authority to render judgment on certain monetary

3 The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over claims pursuant to the Freedom of
Information Act. Jarvis v. United States, 2017 WL 2735597 at *1 (Fed. Cl. June 26, 2017) (citing
Snowton v. United States, 216 F. App’x 981, 983 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). The Court does not address this
issue further.
3
claims against the United States.” RadioShack Corp. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1358, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)). The Tucker Act provides this Court with
jurisdiction to decide “actions pursuant to contracts with the United States, actions to
recover illegal exactions of money by the United States, and actions brought pursuant to
money-mandating statutes, regulations, executive orders, or constitutional
provisions.” Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1).

The Tucker Act, however, “does not create a substantive cause of action.” Fisher
v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Rather, “a plaintiff must
[also] identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money
damages.” Id. (first citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983); and then citing
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976)). Moreover, “[n]ot every claim invoking
the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the Tucker
Act.” Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216. With respect to “money-mandating” claims, the plaintiff
must identify a law that “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the
Federal Government for the damage sustained.” Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372
F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967).

A. 31 U.S.C. § 5323 is a “Money-Mandating” Statute for Purposes of the
Tucker Act

A statute or regulation is money-mandating where it “can fairly be interpreted as
mandating compensation by the Federal Government . . . .” United States v. White
Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003) (quoting Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 217). A
statute is money mandating if it “require[s] the payment of some award to claimants who
have met the statutory conditions for recovery.” Doe v. United States, 100 F.3d 1576, 1582
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (emphasis added) (holding that a moiety statute is money mandating
when it requires a minimum payment). “The fact that the Secretary retains some
discretion to determine the amount of an award, within prescribed limits, does not
preclude the statute from being money mandating.” Id. (citing Bradley v. United States,
870 F.2d 1578, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Inasmuch as discretion is not unlimited, the statute
must be deemed to be a pay-mandating statute.”)). “A statute is not wholly discretionary
. . . when an analysis of congressional intent or the structure and purpose of the statute
reveal one of the following: (1) the statute has ‘clear standards for paying’ money to
recipients, (2) the statute specifies ‘precise amounts’ to be paid, or (3) the statute compels
payment once certain conditions precedent are met.” Doe v. United States, 463 F.3d 1314,

4
1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (first citing Samish Indian Nation v United States, 419 F.3d 1355, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2005), and then Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).

Section 5323 of Title 31 of the United States Code is a money-mandating statute
pursuant to the Tucker Act. Section 5323 provides:

In any covered judicial or administrative action, or related
action, the Secretary, under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General and
subject to subsection (c), shall pay an award or awards to 1 or
more whistleblowers who voluntarily provided original
information to the employer of the individual, the Secretary,
or the Attorney General, as applicable, that led to the
successful enforcement of the covered judicial or
administrative action, or related action, in an aggregate
amount equal to—

(A) not less than 10 percent, in total, of what has been collected
of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related
actions; and

(B) not more than 30 percent, in total, of what has been
collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action
or related actions.

31 U.S.C. § 5323(b)(1) (emphasis added).

This statute provides clear standards for paying an award: the furnishing of
original whistleblower information that leads to the successful enforcement of the
“covered judicial or administrative action.” Id. Moreover, many statutory terms —
including “original information” and “action” — are further defined within the text of
the statute. 31 U.S.C. § 5323(a). The statute also provides the precise amount to be paid:
“not less than 10 percent” and “not more than 30 percent” of what has been collected of
the monetary sanctions imposed in the actions or related actions. 31 U.S.C. § 5323(b)(1);
see also Doe, 100 F.3d at 1581 (holding that a moiety statute is money mandating, even
when using a “sliding scale . . . [for] determining the appropriate amount of an award for

5
an informant,” because “the statute continues to mandate the payment of some award”
(emphasis added) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 59, 64 (1994)).

Finally, the statute compels payment (by the government) to someone meeting the
statutory standards. The government cites to 31 U.S.C. § 5323(f), see MTD at 3, 9, to
support the claim that this statute payment awards are entirely discretionary: “Any
determination made under this section, including whether, to whom, or in what amount
to make awards, shall be in the discretion of the Secretary.” 31 U.S.C. § 5323(f)(1). But the
government’s reading of the statute ignores other clear language mandating payment.
As explained above, the statute provides that the Secretary “shall pay an award or awards
to 1 or more whistleblowers who voluntarily provided original information . . .” 31
U.S.C. § 5232(b)(1) (emphasis added). Accordingly, once the Secretary has determined
that the whistleblower has met the statutory criteria for payment, the decision to award
money is no longer within the discretion of the Secretary. See Doe, 463 F.3d at 1325
(holding that statutorily provided discretion to award payment is limited “because once
a condition is met, namely that the head of an agency states that a position meets the
criteria listed . . . , the statute requires payment to employees with that position”). 4

In sum, because 31 U.S.C. § 5323 mandates payment (of at least some monetary
award) to a qualified whistleblower upon meeting the statutorily provided conditions, it
is a money mandating statute.

B. Although 31 U.S.C. § 5323 is Money-Mandating, Mr. Sackey’s Claim
Nevertheless Falls Outside This Court’s jurisdiction.

This Court’s determination that 31 U.S.C. § 5323 is money-mandating does not
fully resolve the jurisdictional issue, however. That is because, “[e]ven absent explicit
proscription of this court’s authority, . . . the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court of

4 This Court further notes that § 5323 is quite similar to 19 U.S.C. § 1619 (the “moiety statute”).

See Doe, 100 F.3d at 1580. Just like the moiety statute — whose purpose is “to establish an
incentive for persons with information useful to law enforcement to cooperate with the
authorities” in the context of customs fraud, id. — the purpose of 31 U.S.C. § 5323 is clearly to
incentivize those with information to provide it to the Department of the Treasury to aid its
enforcement arm. Reading the whistleblower award as purely discretionary would undermine
§ 5323’s purpose and would be inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s decision in Doe. 100 F.3d
at 1580 (citing Wilson v. United States, 135 F.2d 1005, 1009 (3d Cir. 1943), for the proposition that
“[a]n informer would have little incentive to give original information . . . if his compensation
rested in the absolute discretion . . . of an executive officer”).
6
the United States have frequently held that when a ‘specific and comprehensive scheme
for administrative and judicial review is provided by Congress, the Court of Federal
Claims’ Tucker Act jurisdiction over the subject matter covered by the scheme is
preempted.’” Norman v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 277, 280 (2016) (first citing Vereda, Ltda.
v. United States, 271 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001), and then St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr. v.
United States, 32 F.3d 548, 549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); see also, e.g., United States v. Fausto, 484
U.S. 439, 453–54 (1988) (holding that the Civil Service Reform Act precluded Tucker Act
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims). In other words, “the Tucker Act ‘is displaced’ when ‘a
law assertedly imposing monetary liability on the United States contains its own judicial
remedies.’” Maine Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 520 U.S. 296, 326 (2020)
(quoting United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6, 12 (2012)).

Section 5323 requires whistleblower claimants to file initial claims with the
Secretary of the Treasury: “Any determination made under this section, including
whether, to whom, or in what amount to make awards, shall be in the discretion of the
Secretary.” 31 U.S.C. § 5323(f)(1). The statute also provides that any appeal of an agency
decision should be directly appealed to the relevant court of appeals: “Any determination
. . . may be appealed to the appropriate court of appeals of the United States not more than
30 days after the determination is issued by the Secretary.” 31 U.S.C. § 5323(f)(2)(A)
(emphasis added). Because this statute creates a specific and comprehensive
administrative and judicial scheme of relief — including appeals directly to a circuit court
— the Court of Federal Claims lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over claims invoking
§ 5323. See Vereda, 271 F.3d at 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the Controlled
Substances Act contains a ”statutory scheme” that “evinces Congress’ intent to preempt
any Tucker Act jurisdiction over a money claim that challenges the propriety of an in rem
administrative forfeiture of property seized under 21 U.S.C. § 881”); see also Ricks v. United
States, 159 Fed. Cl. 823 (2022) (“It is well settled that even where Congress has not
expressly stated that statutory jurisdiction is ‘exclusive,’ . . . a statute which vests
jurisdiction in a particular court cuts off original jurisdiction in other courts in all cases
covered by that statute.” (quoting Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. F.C.C., 750 F.2d 70
(D.C. Cir. 1984))).

To the extent that Mr. Sackey’s complaint can be read as seeking an order that the
Treasury Department promulgate regulations pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5323(i), this Court
lacks jurisdiction over that claim, too. A plaintiff may bring a claim to “compel agency
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” pursuant to § 706(1) of the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also, e.g., Am. Anti-Vivisection

7
Soc’y v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 946 F.3d 615, 620–21 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (holding that
plaintiffs may seek to force an agency to take “discrete action” that the law requires it to
take, such as issuing regulations). But this Court lacks jurisdiction over freestanding APA
claims and has no power to issue an injunction to direct an agency to issue regulations.
Curry v. United States, 787 F. App’x. 720, 723 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (noting that the Court of
Federal Claims “lacks jurisdiction over claims alleging violations of the Administrative
Procedure Act” (citing Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).

Because the claim at issue is not within the jurisdiction of this Court, this decision
does not reach the remaining issues raised in the government’s motion to dismiss, nor
does this Court opine on the merits of Mr. Sackey’s whistleblower award claim.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS the government’s motion
to dismiss pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1), ECF No. 14. Plaintiff’s complaint is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk of the Court is directed to
enter JUDGMENT for the government, dismissing this case pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Matthew H. Solomson
Matthew H. Solomson
Chief Judge

8

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11090356. Public record. Not legal advice.