# INGRAM, III v. ABINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT AUTHORITY

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · July 3, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11089729

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 3, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11089729

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming district court’s rejection of claims based solely on the plaintiff’s own testimony, stating “a plaintiff cannot rely on unsupported assertions, speculation, or conclusory allegations to avoid a motion for summary judgment.”
- affirming district court’s holding that there was no adverse action where Plaintiff consented to postponing his tenure review
- applying McDonnell Douglas to Title VII racial discrimination claims

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN INGRAM, III, :
Plaintiff, : Civil Action
:
v. : No. 24-cv-0174
:
ABINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT :
AUTHORITY, :
Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM
J. Younge July 3, 2025
Currently before the Court is an uncontested Motion for Summary Judgement filed by
Defendant, Abington School District Authority. The Court finds this Motion appropriate for
resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78, L.R. 7.1(f).
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
A. Procedural History:
Plaintiff initiated this action on January 15, 2024. In his original complaint, Plaintiff
asserted that Defendant created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter “Title VII”) through disparate treatment, retaliation, along with
associated violations of the ADA, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (hereinafter
“PHRA”) (Complaint, ECF No. 1.) Shortly thereafter, Defendant filed a partial Motion to
Dismiss the original complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) – seeking to
dismiss Counts I, II, and VII, and parts of Counts III and VI. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff subsequently
filed an Amended Complaint. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff removed all language related
to the theory that Defendant created a hostile work environment. Instead, Plaintiff now alleges
(1) disparate treatment based upon race/color and disability under Title VII (Count I); (2) failure
to accommodate under the ADA (Count II); (3) retaliation purportedly under the ADA (Count
III); and (4) claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) restating Counts I
through III of the Amended Complaint as state law claims (Count IV).
Defendant subsequently filed a partial Motion to Dismiss which the Court granted in part
and denied in part. (Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, ECF 10.) Plaintiff’s claims for race
or color retaliation under Counts One and Four of the Amended Complaint were dismissed with

Prejudice. Currently, before the Court for Summary Judgement are Plaintiff’s claims for (1)
disparate treatment based upon disability under Title VII (Count I); (2) failure to accommodate
under the ADA (Count II); (3) retaliation purportedly under the ADA (Count III); and (4) claims
under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) restating Counts I through III of the
Amended Complaint as state law claims (Count IV).
B. Relevant Factual History:
Plaintiff, John Ingram, III, is an African American former employee of Defendant.
Central to this Motion for Summary Judgement are Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant,
through its Director of Human Resources, Mrs. Williams, subjected him to

mistreatment/disparate treatment based on his race. (Amended Complaint ¶ 3 (hereinafter “AC”),
ECF No. 8.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that during his time with Defendant, he received fewer
workplace accommodations compared to his Caucasian colleagues. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff also
alleges that he was given disciplinary write-ups for “no-call/no-shows” that were not as stated
and that Caucasian bus drivers who committed similar or more severe infractions were not
disciplined in the same manner. (Id.) Plaintiff also brings a disability discrimination claim as well
as a retaliation claim under the Americans with Disability Act (hereinafter “ADA”). Claims pled
under the ADA are primarily based on allegations that Plaintiff suffered from a weakened
immune system caused by cancer and/or cancer treatment and purported complications cause by
the COVID-19 virus.
Plaintiff began working as a bus driver for Defendant in May 2017 and his employment
relationship continued until February 2021, although his final day of in-person, paid employment
was in March 2020, at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. (Id. at ¶ 3-4.) Many bus drivers,

including Plaintiff, made claims for unemployment insurance, but Defendant denied all claims.
(See Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (hereinafter “SMF”), ECF No. 20-1 at ¶ 19.) In
September 2020, Defendant instructed Plaintiff that all in-person work would resume. (AC, at ¶
3). Plaintiff thereafter communicated to Mrs. Williams that he was battling cancer, among other
health issues, which resulted in a compromised immune system, and which would require a
reasonable accommodation in the form of unpaid leave. (Id.)
Defendant granted Plaintiff unpaid leave through November 30, 2020. On or around
November 1, 2020, Plaintiff requested an extension on his unpaid leave and was granted an
extension through February 2021. (Id. at ¶ 5.) On February 12, 2021, Plaintiff requested a third

extension, to which Defendant allegedly gave him an ultimatum that he should either return to
work or be terminated (Id.) Furthermore, on February 17, 2021, Plaintiff obtained a letter from
one of his doctors, recommending Plaintiff stay out of work until September 2021, the following
school year. (SMF, Ex. 1, ECF No. 20-6.) In response, Defendant requested that the Plaintiff
complete and submit a HIPAA authorization form to release his medical records. Plaintiff
declined to comply with Defendant’s request and has not returned to work.
In this litigation, Plaintiff advances a theory of constructive discharge and argues that
Defendant terminated its employment relationship with him. (AC, at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff’s
employment, however, was neither terminated by Defendant nor voluntarily terminated by
himself. (See SMF, at ¶¶ 59-60.) Plaintiff’s current status, of record, is that he is on an unpaid
leave of absence (Id. at ¶ 61.) Defendant claims that it is and was willing to grant reasonable
accommodations requested by Plaintiff’s primary care physician. (Id. at ¶ 62.) Plaintiff, himself,
made a request for a protective shield in the bus around the driver as an accommodation. (Ingram
Deposition, at p. 38, SMF, Exhibit E, ECF No. 20-6.) However, Defendant could not

accommodate the request due to the fact that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
(hereinafter “PDT”) denied all requests for installation of interior protective shields because the
PDT did not want to jeopardize passenger safety in an effort to protect drivers from the COVID-
19 virus. (SMF, ECF No. 20-7, at p. 5-6.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD:
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows “that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sweeney, 689 F.3d 288, 292 (3d Cir. 2012). To defeat a
motion for summary judgment, there must be a factual dispute that is both material and genuine.

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202
(1986); Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). A material fact is one that
“might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A
dispute over a material fact is “genuine” if, based on the evidence, “a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of
a material fact. Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2016). When the
movant is the defendant, they have the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff “has failed to
establish one or more essential elements of her case.” Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425
(3d Cir. 2013). If the movant sustains their initial burden, “the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party to go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotations
omitted) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct.
1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)).

At the summary judgment stage, the court’s role is not to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter, but rather to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 253 (3d
Cir. 2007). In doing so, the court must construe the facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. See Horsehead Indus., Inc. v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc.,
258 F.3d 132, 140 (3d Cir. 2001). Nonetheless, the court must be mindful that “[t]he mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 252.

Failure to oppose a motion for summary judgement constitutes a “waiver of the
opponent’s right to controvert the facts asserted by the moving party in the motion for summary
judgement or the supporting material accompanying it.” Anchorage Assocs v. V.I. Bd. Of Tax
Review, 922 F. 2d. 168, 175-76 (3d Cir. 1990)). By failing to file a response within the specified
time, “the nonmoving party waives the right to respond to or to controvert the facts asserted in
the summary judgment motion.” Reynolds v. Rick’s Mushroom Serv., 246 F. Supp. 2d 449, 453
(E.D. Pa. 2003) (quoting Reed v. Nellcor Puritan Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 2002).
By failing to respond to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment within the appropriate
timeframe, Plaintiff places this Court in the position of ruling on the motion without
consideration of Plaintiff’s perspective on any of the pertinent issues.
III. DISCUSSION:
Plaintiff brings this employment discrimination action based on theories of racial and
disability discrimination, retaliation for exercising his rights under the ADA, and failure to

accommodate and engage in the interactive process. Plaintiff offers no direct evidence of
Defendant’s bias to support his employment discrimination claims. In an employment
discrimination lawsuit based on direct evidence of bias, the plaintiff must point to evidence that
“directly reflect[s] the alleged discriminatory attitude” and be “so revealing of discriminatory
animus that it is not necessary to rely on any presumptions of the prima facie case to shift the
burden of production.” Buchsbaum v. Univ. Physicians Plan, 55 F. App’x 40, 45 (3d Cir 2002).
“If the trier of fact must infer discrimination from the employer’s remarks or actions, then the
evidence is not direct evidence of discrimination.” Weightman v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 772
F. Supp. 2d 693, 702 (W.D. Pa. 2011).

Since Plaintiff has failed to come forward with direct evidence of bias, legal theories
asserted by Plaintiff are subject to the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
See Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (applying McDonnell Douglas to Title
VII racial discrimination claims); Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 342 (3d Cir.
2006), as amended (Sept. 13, 2006) (applying McDonnell Douglas to retaliation claims). In the
absence of direct evidence of disparate treatment, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework applies. Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)).1

1 Employment retaliation claims are subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis,
wherein the plaintiff employee must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. To establish a prima
To proceed on a theory of racial discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas
framework, plaintiff must “establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1)
[he] is a member of a protected class; (2) [he] was qualified for the position [he] sought to attain
or retain; (3) [he] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action occurred under
circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.” Id. (citing

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). The McDonnell Douglas burden-sifting framework
applies with equal force to employment disability discrimination claims based on circumstantial
evidence. Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000). To establish a prima facia case
for disability discrimination under the ADA based on circumstantial evidence, Plaintiff must
satisfy the elements of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Id. At the summary
judgment stage, this means Plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to show: (1) that she is a
disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that she is otherwise qualified to perform the
essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) that she
suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch.

Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Sulima v. Tabyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177,
185 (3d Cir. 2010).
At the summary judgment stage, a Plaintiff cannot rely on unsupported allegations in the
pleadings; rather, he/she must come forward with evidence to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that genuine issues of material fact exist for disposition at trial. Solomon v. Soc’y of

facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action
by the employer either after or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal
connection between the employee’s protected activity and the employer's adverse action. Moskowitz v.
Neshaminy Sch. Dist., No. 20-cv-5016, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165102, 2022 WL 4225398, at *9 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 13, 2022) (quoting Krouse v, American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997)). Id. A
plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s adverse employment decision would not have occurred “but for”
the plaintiff’s protected conduct. Univ. of Texas v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 361 (2013).
Auto. Eng’rs, 41 Fed. Appx. 585, 586 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming district court’s rejection of claims
based solely on the plaintiff’s own testimony, stating “a plaintiff cannot rely on unsupported
assertions, speculation, or conclusory allegations to avoid a motion for summary judgment.”)
(citing Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)); see also Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v.
N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding same).

1. Plaintiff Fails to Come Forward with Evidence to Support His Circumstantial
Claims of Employment Discrimination and Retaliation:

Theories of racial and disability discrimination asserted by Plaintiff along with his claims
for retaliation fail because Plaintiff cannot establish that he suffered an adverse employment
action. Plaintiff is completely unable to establish that he suffered an adverse employment action
which is a prerequisite for establishing a prima facia case under the test espoused in McDonnald
Douglas. An adverse employment action is one in which a reasonable person could find that
plaintiff’s conditions of employment were substantially worsened. Dilenno v. Goodwill Indus. of
Mid–Eastern Pa., 162 F.3d 235, 236 (3d Cir.1998).
The undisputed facts of record establish that Plaintiff did not quit his job as a bus driver
and Defendant did not fire him. (SMF ¶¶ 58-60.) Plaintiff was granted a leave of absence and
there is no evidence to show he was terminated or constructively discharged by Defendant. In
fact, Plaintiff is still listed as an employee of Defendant on unpaid leave. (SMF ¶ 87.) For
Plaintiff to claim an adverse employment action based on a theory of constructive discharge he
must establish that “he was discriminated against by his employer to the point where a
reasonable person in his position would have felt compelled to resign.” See Green v. Brennan,
578 U.S. 547, 555-556 (2016). Additionally, he must show that he actually resigned from the
position. Id. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish wrongful termination or constructive discharge.
The Supreme Court has explained that:
A claim of constructive discharge . . . has two basic elements. A plaintiff must
prove first that he was discriminated against by his employer to the point where a
reasonable person in his position would have felt compelled to resign. But he must
also show that he actually resigned. In other words, an employee cannot bring a
constructive-discharge claim until he is constructively discharged. Only after both
elements are satisfied can he file suit to obtain relief.

An ordinary wrongful discharge claim also has two basic elements: discrimination
and discharge. See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct.
2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); 1 B. Lindemann, P. Grossman, & C. Weirich,
Employment Discrimination Law 21–33 (5th ed. 2012) (Lindemann) (“The sine
qua non of a discharge case is, of course, a discharge”). The claim accrues when
the employee is fired.

See Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 555-556 (2016). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish that
he was the victim of an adverse employment action based on a theory of wrongful termination or
constructive discharge.
In this case, Plaintiff requested a leave of absence, and it is undisputed that Defendant
permitted Plaintiff to take the leave of absence that he requested. (See SMF, ¶¶ 28, 32, 46, 61-
62.) The voluntary taking of a leave of absence is not an adverse employment action. See
Obermeyer v. McDonough, 2024 WL 3890686 at *7 (S.D. Ohio August 21, 2024) (rejecting the
claim that a voluntary leave of absence is an adverse employment action). See also, Blum v.
Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1012 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming district court’s holding that there was no
adverse action where Plaintiff consented to postponing his tenure review); Brigette Bodie-
Jernigan v. School Board of Broward County, Florida, 2024 WL 3806880 *3 (S.D. Fla. July 30,
2024) (electing to take an extended unpaid leave of absence is not adverse employment action);
Perez v. N.Y. Presbyterian/Weill Cornell Med. Ctr., 2024 WL 1514216 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8,
2024) (no adverse employment action where hospital permitted Plaintiff to take leave for the
entire period during which she otherwise would have had to be vaccinated).
Plaintiff first requested an accommodation for his medical issues in February 2021. (See
Facts ¶ 71.) To the extent Plaintiff suffered any unnecessary strict review of his work or disparate
discipline, it all occurred prior to March 2020. Therefore, these incidents could not have been in
retaliation for a requested accommodation. Plaintiff’s allegation that a denial of his request for
an accommodation was Defendant’s retaliation against him for requesting an accommodation is,

therefore, simply “a ‘repackaging’ of his failure-to accommodate claim and, as such, fails as a
matter of law.” Gardner v. SEPTA, 410 F. Supp. 3d 723, 745 (E.D. Pa. 2019). With respect to the
assertion that Defendant challenged his claim for unemployment, it is undisputed that Plaintiff
filed his unemployment claim in the Summer of 2020 and that all of the bus drivers were filing
such claims and that the Defendant opposed every single claim for unemployment. (See Facts ¶¶
19-20.) This conduct pre-dated Plaintiff’s first request for leave based on his own medical
issues. Moreover, Plaintiff has not provided evidence that any actions the Defendant took in
connection with Plaintiff’s unemployment application were, in any way, causally connected to
his request for an accommodation. Finally, Plaintiff has not provided evidence to show that any

actions the Defendant took concerning his son’s truancy was causally connected to his request
for an accommodation. (See Facts ¶¶ 66-69.)
Plaintiff presents no evidence that Defendant acted under circumstances that could give
rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. A central focus of the McDonnell Douglas
framework is whether the employer is treating some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789,
798 (3d Cir. 2003). Common circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination include the hiring of someone not in the protected class as a replacement or the
more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff’s protected class.
See Smith v. Sec'y U.S. Navy, 843 F. App’x 466, 469 (3d Cir. 2021); May v. PNC Bank, 434 F.
Supp. 3d 284, 298 (E.D. Pa. 2020). Here, Plaintiff has no evidence that the Defendant treated
anyone more favorably than Plaintiff. Plaintiff was given all the leave he requested, including an
open-ended leave of absence. Plaintiff has no evidence that anyone else was treated more
favorably than he was treated. As such, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facia case under the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
2. Plaintiff Cannot Prevail on Claims for Failure to Accommodate and/or to Engage in
the Interactive Process in Good Faith:

To establish an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) he was
disabled, and his employer knew it; (2) he requested an accommodation or assistance; (3) his
employer did not make a good faith effort to assist; and (4) he could have been reasonably
accommodated. Capps v. Mondelez Global, LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 2017). Employers
cannot assume employees are disabled and need accommodations. Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank,
N.A., 334 F.3d 331, 331 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[N]either the law nor common sense can demand
clairvoyance of an employer.”). A request for an accommodation does not need to be in writing
“or formally invoke the magic words ‘reasonable accommodation,’” but “the notice nonetheless
must make clear that the employee wants assistance for his or her disability.” Taylor, 184 F.3d
296 at 313. Participation in the process “is the obligation of both parties, however, so an
employer cannot be faulted if after conferring with the employee to find possible
accommodations, the employee then fails to supply information that the employer needs or does
not answer the employer’s request for more detailed proposals.” Id. at 317. Finally, employers
will not incur liability for failing to provide a reasonable accommodation that was never
requested. LaGatta v. Pa. Cyber Charter Sch., 726 F. Supp. 2d 578, 589 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
In this case, Plaintiff cannot prevail on theories of failure to accommodate and engage in
the interactive process because: (1) his doctor provided a medical certification which stated that
he was not permanently disabled and Plaintiff provided no evidence to the contrary; (2) he was
provided with all of the leave his doctor’s notes requested; (3) Plaintiff failed to engage in the
interactive process when he failed to respond to requests for medical certifications; and (4)

assuming Plaintiff made a request for installation of an internal shield around the driver as a
reasonable accommodation for his alleged disability, such an accommodation was not legally
permissible.
First, Plaintiff’s doctor submitted a medical certification to Defendant which stated that
Plaintiff was not disabled and that he did not need a reasonable accommodation to perform the
essential functions of his job. (See SMF ¶¶ 44-45.) Plaintiff came forward with no evidence to
establish that he is in fact permanently disabled or that he needs a reasonable accommodation to
perform the essential functions of his job. Under the ADA, disability means “a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities ....” 42 U.S.C. §

12102(1). Plaintiff alleges that he is “a cancer survivor with various ailments.” (See AC, at ¶ 1.)
However, Plaintiff has no evidence that being a cancer survivor substantially limits one or more
major life activities of Plaintiff. Indeed, Plaintiff’s doctor at Fox Chase Cancer Center advised
the Defendant that Plaintiff is not disabled and did not need any accommodation to perform the
essential functions of his job. (See SMF ¶¶ 44-45.) As a result, Plaintiff has no evidence that he is
actually disabled within the meaning of the ADA and fails to establish the first element of a
failure to accommodate claim.
Second, Plaintiff was granted all sick leave requested in the various doctor’s notes that he
provided to Defendant. (See SMF ¶¶ 46, 61-62.) Employers can show their good faith in a
number of ways, such as taking steps like the following: meet with the employee who requests
an accommodation, request information about the condition and what limitations the employee
has, ask the employee what he or she specifically wants, show some sign of having considered
the employee’s request, and offer and discuss available alternatives when the request is too
burdensome. These steps are consistent with the recommendations in the EEOC’s interpretive

guideline. Taylor, 184 F.3d at 317 (citing 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.9). Courts have found
that where an employer provides the accommodations which are requested in a doctor’s note, it
has engaged in the interactive process in good faith. Fischer v. Pepper Hamilton LLP, 2016 WL
362507, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2016) (adjusting schedule to comport with various doctor’s
notes establish good faith). Moreover, it is undisputed that Plaintiff failed to provide Defendant
with the medical certifications it was requesting. (See SMF ¶¶ 50, 55-58.) “[A]n employer cannot
be faulted if...the employee...fails to supply information that the employer needs.” Taylor, 184
F.3d at 317. See also, Fischer, 2016 WL 362507, at *14 (finding that the employee failed to
engage in the interactive process in good faith when the employee did not timely provide the

medical information the employer requested).
Finally, Plaintiff now claims that he requested an accommodation in the form of an
interior shield installation around the driver’s compartment in the school bus. (See SMF ¶ 76.)
However, Plaintiff has offered no evidence that he requested the installation of the shield as a
means of providing him with “assistance for his [] disability.” Taylor, 184 F.3d at 313. Plaintiff
claims that he requested a shield during a meeting of the entire transportation department after
COVID when he and 15 to 20 other drivers indicated that they would like a shield installed
around the bus driver. (See SMF ¶ 77.) Plaintiff also claimed that he made the request during an
unemployment hearing. (See Id. at ¶ 78.) However, Plaintiff has provided no evidence to indicate
that he was making either request as a reasonable accommodation for “assistance for his []
disability.” Taylor, 184 F.3d at 313. Moreover, even if Plaintiff did make requests for installation
of an interior shield around the bus driver compartment, such a modification was not possible.
Defendant provided evidence to establish that the Pennsylvania State Police directed a
neighboring school district to remove interior shields that had been installed around the driver

compartment in its school buses. (See SMF ¶¶ 97-80.) In fact, during the summer of 2020, the
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation turned down several requests to waive state
regulations to permit the installation of such shields. (See SMF ¶ 81.) See also 67 Pa. Code §
171.58(1) (“The interior of every school bus shall be free of unnecessary projections likely to
cause injury.”).
In a failure to accommodate case, plaintiff has the burden to identify reasonable
accommodations that would help plaintiff perform his or her essential job functions. Walton v.
Mental Health Ass’n. of Se. Pennsylvania, 168 F.3d 661, 670 (3d Cir. 1999). In this case, Plaintiff
provided no evidence to establish that a single school bus within the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania had internal barriers installed around drivers. (See SMF at ¶ 82.) Moreover,
Plaintiff never asked his doctors about whether an internal shield would be an effective safety
measure for his condition; he simply assumed that having a shield would be beneficial. (See SMF
at ¶¶ 83-84.) Furthermore, Plaintiff did not definitely state he would return to work had such a
shield been installed. (See SMF ¶ 85.)
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff cannot prevail on the theory that Defendant failed to
accommodate and/or make a good faith attempt to engage in the interactive process.
IV. CONCLUSION:
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted. An
appropriate order shall follow.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John Milton Younge
Judge John Milton Younge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11089729. Public record. Not legal advice.