# Luna v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

> United States Court of Federal Claims · July 3, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11089498

## Case

- **Court:** United States Court of Federal Claims
- **Decided:** July 3, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Jennifer A. Shah
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11089498

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming the special master’s reduction of attorney and paralegal hours
- stating that medical opinion evidence is required to support an on-Table theory where medical records fail to establish a Table injury

## Opinion text

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 19-1843V

************************* *
*
QUANDA LUNA, *
*
*
Petitioner, * Special Master Jennifer A. Shah
*
v. *
*
* Filed: June 11, 2025
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND *
HUMAN SERVICES, *
*
*
Respondent. *
*
*
************************* *

Courtney Christine Jorgenson, Siri & Glimstad, LLP, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioner.
Benjamin Patrick Warder, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

DECISION AWARDING INTERIM ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1

On December 4, 2019, Quanda Luna (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for compensation under
the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10, et seq.2 (the “Vaccine
Act” or “Program”), alleging that she suffered a vaccine-induced anaphylaxis, inflammatory
syndrome, and muscle weakness causing Paradoxical Vocal Cord Motion (“PVCM”) as a result of
the influenza (“flu”) vaccination she received on December 7, 2017. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”) at 1.

On March 2, 2021, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) Report, contending that entitlement to
compensation should be denied. ECF No. 32.

1
Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, it must be made publicly
accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ website, and/or
at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government
Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government
Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In
accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other
information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review,
I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.
2
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease
of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa
(2012).

1
On February 11, 2022, Petitioner filed an application for interim attorneys’ fees and costs,
seeking $27,098.80 in fees and $861.28 in costs for work performed from October 31, 2019,
through January 27, 2022. ECF No. 39. On August 19, 2022, former Special Master Katherine E.
Oler granted Petitioner’s application in part, awarding $25,326.78. ECF No. 51.

Thereafter, the parties submitted expert reports and medical literature. See ECF Nos. 45-
48, 57, 60-62, 64. On September 23, 2023, Petitioner filed a motion for a ruling on the record.
ECF No. 66. Respondent filed a response to Petitioner’s motion on February 5, 2024, and
Petitioner filed a reply brief on February 14, 2024. ECF Nos. 69-70. Petitioner then filed updated
medical records and her expert’s updated curriculum vitae. See ECF Nos. 71, 73, 75.

Petitioner filed a second motion for interim attorneys’ fees and costs on December 31,
2024, requesting a total of $57,643.35, comprised of $50,074.50 for attorneys’ fees and $7,568.85
for attorneys’ costs. ECF No. 76 (“Fees App.”) at 38.3 Respondent filed a response on January 6,
2025, deferring to me as to whether Petitioner has met the legal standard for an award of interim
attorneys’ fees and costs. ECF No. 78 (“Fees Resp.”) at 2-3. Petitioner did not file a reply brief.
Petitioner has not incurred any personal costs. Fees App. at 1, 42.

Petitioner was initially represented by Mr. Mark Sadaka. On March 2, 2022, Mr. Andrew
D. Downing filed a motion to substitute as counsel for Petitioner. ECF No. 42. On January 3,
2025, Mr. John Beaulieu filed a motion to substitute as counsel for Petitioner. ECF No 77. On
February 3, 2025, Ms. Courtney Christine Jorgenson filed a motion to substitute as counsel for
Petitioner. ECF No. 79.

I hereby GRANT IN PART Petitioner’s application and award a total of $56,694.35 in
interim attorneys’ fees and costs.

I. Legal Standard

A. Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

The Federal Circuit has held that an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs is
permissible under the Vaccine Act. Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 609 F.3d 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 2010); Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 515 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In Cloer, the
Federal Circuit noted that “Congress [has] made clear that denying interim attorneys’ fees under
the Vaccine Act is contrary to an underlying purpose of the Vaccine Act.” Cloer v. Sec’y of Health
& Hum. Servs., 675 F.3d 1358, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

In Avera, the Federal Circuit stated that “[i]nterim fees are particularly appropriate in cases
where proceedings are protracted, and costly experts must be retained.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352.
Likewise, in Shaw, the Federal Circuit held that “where the claimant establishes that the cost of
litigation has imposed an undue hardship and there exists a good faith basis for the claim, it is

3
Although Petitioner requested $57,643.35 for interim attorneys’ fees and costs, she has provided
documentation supporting only $57,639.35 for such fees and costs. Fees App., Ex. A at 1-10, 27-31.

2
proper for the special master to award interim attorneys’ fees.” 609 F.3d at 1375. Avera did not,
however, define when interim fees are appropriate; rather, it has been interpreted to allow special
masters discretion. See Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352; Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 08-
241V, 2009 WL 775396, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 13, 2009); Bear v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 11-362V, 2013 WL 691963, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 4, 2013). Special
masters have viewed the three Avera criteria -- protracted proceedings, costly expert testimony,
and undue hardship -- as factors to consider in a flexible balancing test. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352;
see Al-Uffi v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 13-956V, 2015 WL 6181669, at *7 (Fed. Cl.
Spec. Mstr. Sept. 30, 2015).

The undue hardship inquiry looks at more than just financial involvement of a petitioner;
it also looks at any money expended by a petitioner’s counsel. Kirk, 2009 WL 775396, at *2.
Referring to Avera, former Chief Special Master Golkiewicz in Kirk found that “the general
principle underlying an award of interim fees [is] clear: avoid working a substantial financial
hardship on petitioners and their counsel.” Id.

B. Good Faith

A petitioner is eligible for an interim award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs only if
the special master finds that the petition was brought in good faith and with a reasonable basis.
§15(e)(1); Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352; Shaw, 609 F.3d at 1372; Woods v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.
Servs, 105 Fed. Cl. 148, 154 (2012); Friedman v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 94 Fed. Cl. 323,
334 (2010); Doe 21 v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 89 Fed. Cl. 661, 668 (2009); Bear, 2013
WL 691963, at *5; Lumsden v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 97-588V, 2012 WL 1450520,
at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 28, 2012). The good faith requirement is met through a subjective
inquiry. Di Roma v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 90-3277V, 1993 WL 496981, at *1 (Fed.
Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 18, 1993). It “focuses upon whether [P]etitioner honestly believed he had a
legitimate claim for compensation.” Turner v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-544V, 2007
WL 4410030, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 30, 2007). Without evidence of bad faith,
“petitioners are entitled to a presumption of good faith.” Grice v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
36 Fed. Cl. 114, 121 (1996). Thus, so long as Petitioner had an honest belief that his claim could
succeed, the good faith requirement is satisfied. See Riley v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No.
09-276V, 2011 WL 2036976, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 29, 2011) (citing Di Roma, 1993
WL 496981, at *1); Turner, 2007 WL 4410030, at *5.

C. Reasonable Basis

Unlike the good faith inquiry, an analysis of reasonable basis requires more than just a
petitioner’s belief in his claim. Turner, 2007 WL 4410030, at *6-7. Instead, the claim must be
supported by objective evidence -- medical records or medical opinion. Sharp-Roundtree v. Sec’y
of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 14-804V, 2015 WL 12600336, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 3,
2015).

Although the statute does not define the quantum of proof needed to establish reasonable
basis, it is “something less than the preponderant evidence ultimately required to prevail on one’s
vaccine-injury claim.” Chuisano v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 276, 283 (2014). The Court of

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Federal Claims affirmed in Chuisano that “[a]t the most basic level, a petitioner who submits no
evidence would not be found to have reasonable basis. . .” Id. at 286. The Court in Chuisano
found that a petition that relies on temporal proximity and a petitioner’s affidavit is not sufficient
to establish reasonable basis. Id. at 290; see also Turpin v. Sec’y Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-
564V, 2005 WL 1026714, *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 10, 2005) (finding no reasonable basis
when petitioner submitted an affidavit and no other records); Brown v. Sec’y Health & Hum.
Servs., No. 99-539V, 2005 WL 1026713, *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 11, 2005) (finding no
reasonable basis when petitioner presented only e-mails between her and her attorney). The
Federal Circuit has affirmed that “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance of proof
could provide sufficient grounds for a special master to find reasonable basis.” Cottingham v.
Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 2019-1596, 971 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (finding
Petitioner submitted objective evidence supporting causation when she submitted medical records
and a vaccine package insert); see also James-Cornelius v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 984
F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (finding that “the lack of an express medical opinion on causation
did not by itself negate the claim's reasonable basis”).

“[I]n deciding reasonable basis the [s]pecial [m]aster needs to focus on the requirements
for a petition under the Vaccine Act to determine if the elements have been asserted with sufficient
evidence to make a feasible claim for recovery.” Santacroce v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 15-555V, 2018 WL 405121, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 5, 2018). Special masters cannot award
compensation “based on the claims of petitioner alone, unsubstantiated by medical records or by
medical opinion.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1). Special masters and judges of the Court of Federal
Claims have interpreted this provision to mean that petitioners must submit medical records or
expert medical opinion in support of causation-in-fact claims. See Waterman v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., 123 Fed. Cl. 564, 574 (2015) (citing Dickerson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 35
Fed. Cl. 593, 599 (1996) (stating that medical opinion evidence is required to support an on-Table
theory where medical records fail to establish a Table injury)).

When determining if a reasonable basis exists, a special master may consider a myriad of
factors, including “the factual basis of the claim, the medical and scientific support for the claim,
the novelty of the vaccine, and the novelty of the theory of causation.” Amankwaa, 138 Fed. Cl.
at 289. This approach allows the special master to look at each application for attorneys’ fees and
costs on a case-by-case basis. Hamrick v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-683V, 2007 WL
4793152, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 19, 2007).

II. Discussion

A. Undue Financial Hardship

The Federal Circuit has noted that interim fees “are particularly appropriate in cases where
proceedings are protracted, and costly experts must be retained.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2008). Petitioner’s former counsel, Mr. Downing, worked on this case from March 2022
through December 2024; Petitioner was last awarded interim fees and costs on August 19, 2022,
for Mr. Sadaka’s work. ECF Nos. 42, 51, 77; Fees App., Ex A. As counsel, Mr. Downing retained
an expert, filed two expert reports and supporting medical literature, filed a motion for a ruling on
the record and reply brief, and filed updated medical records. See ECF Nos. 45-48, 60-62, 66, 70-

4
71, 73, 75. Although successive awards of interim fees and costs are generally disfavored, under
these circumstances I find that Petitioner would suffer undue hardship without such an award.

B. Good Faith and Reasonable Basis

Respondent has not raised any specific objection to Petitioner’s good faith or reasonable
basis for this claim, and he leaves the determination to my discretion. Fees Resp. at 2-3. I find
that the petition was filed in good faith.

As discussed above, the threshold for reasonable basis is much lower than the burden to
prove entitlement to compensation, which requires preponderant evidence. Petitioner filed
extensive medical records and multiple expert reports with supporting medical literature, and this
case proceeded to a motion for a ruling on the record. I find that Petitioner has maintained a
reasonable basis for her claim.

As there is no other reason to deny an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs, I will
award Petitioner’s reasonable fees and costs as described below.

C. Attorneys’ Fees

Petitioner requests a total of $50,074.50 in attorneys’ fees for Downing, Allison &
Jorgenson, LLC (“Downing, Allison & Jorgenson”); however, Petitioner only provided
documentation for $50,070.50 in attorneys’ fees. Fees App. at 38, Ex. A at 1-10, 27-31. Petitioner
bears the burden of establishing that the rates charged, hours expended, and costs incurred are
reasonable. Wasson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 484 (1993).

1. Reasonable Hourly Rate

A reasonable hourly rate is defined as the rate “prevailing in the community for similar
services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Avera, 515 F.3d
at 1348 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11). In general, this rate is based on “the forum rate for
the District of Columbia” rather than “the rate in the geographic area of the practice of
[P]etitioner’s attorney.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 632 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (citing Avera, 515 F. 3d at 1349).

McCulloch provides the framework for determining the appropriate compensation for
attorneys’ fees based upon the attorneys’ experience. See McCulloch v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.
Servs., No. 09–293V, 2015 WL 5634323 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015). The Office of
Special Masters has accepted the decision in McCulloch and has issued a Fee Schedule for
subsequent years.4

4
The Office of Special Masters Attorneys’ Forum Hourly Rate Fee Schedule for 2015 through 2025 can be
accessed at: https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/osm-attorneys-forum-hourly-rate-fee-schedules. The hourly
rates contained within the schedules are updated based on the decision in McCulloch, 2015 WL 5634323.

5
Petitioner requests compensation for her counsel, Mr. Andrew Downing, at the following
hourly rates: $445.00 per hour for work performed in 2022; $445.00 per hour for work performed
in 2023; and $485.00 for work performed in 2024. Fees App. at 41. Petitioner also requests
compensation for Ms. Ann Allison, counsel, at the following rates: $415.00 per hour for work
performed in 2022; $415.00 per hour for work performed in 2023; and $435.00 per hour for work
performed in 2024. Id. Petitioner requests compensation for Ms. Courtney Jorgenson, counsel,
at the following rates: $345.00 per hour for work performed in 2022; $345.00 per hour for work
performed in 2023; and $375.00 per hour for work performed in 2024. Id.

Petitioner also requests compensation for paralegal work. Fees App. at 41-42. Petitioner
requests compensation for Mr. Robert Cain, paralegal, at the rate of $135.00 per hour for work
performed in 2022. Fees App. Ex. A at 31. Petitioner requests compensation for Ms. Danielle
Avery, paralegal, at the following hourly rates: $155.00 per hour for work performed in 2022;
$155.00 per hour for work perform in 2023; and $175.00 per hour for work performed in 2024.
Id. at 41. Petitioner requests compensation for Mr. Alex Malvick, paralegal, at the following rates:
$155.00 per hour for work completed in 2023; and $175.00 per hour for work performed in 2024.
Id. at 42. Lastly, Petitioner requests compensation for Ms. Samantha Perez, paralegal, at a rate of
$175.00 per hour for work performed in 2024. Id.

Mr. Downing’s and Ms. Jorgenson’s requested rates for work performed during 2023 and
2024 are consistent with what they have previously been awarded and are in accordance with the
Office of Special Masters’ Fee Schedule; however, the requested rates for Mr. Downing and Ms.
Jorgenson for 2022 require adjustment, as they are inconsistent with previously awarded rates. See
Coons v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-1067V, 2025 WL 1011347, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec.
Mstr. Jan 17, 2025) (awarding Mr. Downing a rate of $415.00 per hour and Ms. Jorgenson a rate
of $325.00 per hour); see also Wakileh v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 21-1136V, 2023 WL
9228198, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 18, 2023). Accordingly, the 2022 rates for Mr. Downing
and Ms. Jorgenson will be reduced to their previously awarded rates: $415.00 per hour for Mr.
Downing and $325.00 per hour for Ms. Jorgenson. This results in a $145.00 reduction.5

Ms. Allison’s requested rates are consistent with what she has previously been awarded
and are in accordance with the Office of Special Masters’ Fee Schedule. See Coons, 2025 WL
1011347, at *2; Wakileh, 2023 WL 9228198, at *3. Accordingly, I find Ms. Allison’s requested
rates are reasonable and that no adjustment is warranted.

Additionally, I find the requested paralegal rates are reasonable, based on the Office of
Special Masters’ Fee Schedule and what Mr. Downing’s staff has previously been awarded. See
Martin v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 22-384V, 2025 WL 996725 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.

5
Applying Mr. Downing’s previously awarded rate of $415.00 for work performed in 2022 results in a
$135.00 reduction ($445.00 - $415.00 = $30.00 x 4.5 hrs. = $135.00 reduction);

Applying Ms. Jorgenson’s previously awarded rate of $325.00 for work performed in 2022 results in a
$10.00 reduction ($345.00 - $325.00 = $20.00 x 0.5 hrs. = $10.00 reduction);

The total reduction is $145.00 (135.00 + 10.00 = $145.00).

6
Feb. 27, 2025).

2. Hours Reasonably Expended

Attorneys’ fees are awarded for the “number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348. Ultimately, it is “well within the Special Master’s discretion
to reduce the hours to a number that, in [her] experience and judgment, [is] reasonable for the work
done.” Saxton ex rel. Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
In exercising that discretion, special masters may reduce the number of hours submitted by a
percentage of the amount charged. See Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 102 Fed.
Cl. 719, 728-29 (2011) (affirming the special master’s reduction of attorney and paralegal hours);
Guy v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 38 Fed. Cl. 403, 406 (1997) (affirming the special master’s
reduction of attorney and paralegal hours). Further, special masters may reduce awards sua sponte,
independent of enumerated objections from the respondent. Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.
Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 208-09 (Fed. Cl. 2009); Savin v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 85 Fed.
Cl. 313, 318 (Fed. Cl. 2008), aff’d, No. 99-573V, 2008 WL 2066611 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr.
22, 2008).

A special master need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of petitioner’s fee application
when reducing fees. Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 729 (Fed.
Cl. 2011). Special masters may look to their experience and judgment to reduce an award of fees
and costs to a level they find reasonable for the work performed. Saxton v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993). It is within a special master’s discretion to make
a global reduction to the total amount of fees requested. See Hines v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.
Servs., 22 Cl. Ct. 750, 753 (1991) (“special masters have wide latitude in determining the
reasonableness of both attorneys’ fees and costs”); Hocraffer v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 99-533V, 2011 WL 3705153 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 25, 2011), mot. for rev. denied, 2011
WL 6292218, at *13 (Fed. Cl. 2011) (denying review of the special master’s decision and
endorsing “a global – rather than line-by-line – approach to determine the reasonable number of
hours expended in this case”).

While attorneys may be compensated for non-attorney-level work, the rate must be
comparable to what would be paid for a paralegal or secretary. See O’Neill v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 08–243V, 2015 WL 2399211, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 28, 2015). Clerical
and secretarial tasks should not be billed at all, regardless of who performs them. See, e.g.,
McCulloch, 2015 WL 5634323, at *26. It is well-established that billing for administrative and
clerical tasks is not permitted in the Vaccine Program. Rochester v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 379,
387 (1989).

The overall hours spent on this matter appear to be largely reasonable; however, a minor
reduction is necessary due to excessive paralegal time billed for administrative/clerical tasks and
review of filings. Most of these entries report between 0.1 and 0.3 hours for receiving and
reviewing status reports and scheduling orders. See Fees App., Ex. A. Examples include (but are
not limited to):

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• February 15, 2024: 0.3 hours billed by Ms. Avery to “Finalize and file Notice of
Filing; receive and review Court’s ECF notification; memo to file re: completion.”;

• August 13, 2024: 0.3 hours billed by Ms. Perez to “Receive and review ECF
Notification re; Notice of Reassignment; brief to file”;

• August 15, 2024: 0.1 hours billed by Mr. Malvick to “Receive and review Court’s
ECF notification for Notice of Filing; memo to file re: completion.”

Id. (emphasis added). The paralegals billed approximately 5.1 hours for these tasks, resulting in
charges of $836.50. These issues have previously been raised with Mr. Downing. See Coons,
2025 WL 1011347 at *3; Wakileh, 2023 WL 9228198, at *3; Hoover on behalf of L.H. v. Sec’y of
Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-1394V, 2021 WL 5575768, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 1,
2021). Because these tasks were performed over three years by the paralegals and billed at
different hourly rates, I will apply a flat $800.00 deduction from the requested attorneys’ fees for
these charges.

Accordingly, Petitioner is awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $49,125.50. 6

D. Reasonable Costs

Petitioner requests a total of $7,568.85 for attorneys’ costs, consisting of $168.19 for
medical record requests; $0.66 for postage; and $7,400.00 for Dr. Axelrod’s expert costs. Fees
App., Ex. A at 10.

Petitioner provided documentation for the costs associated with the medical record requests.
Fees App., Ex. A at 17-26. I find these costs to be reasonable and award them in full. Petitioner
did not provide documentation for her postage costs; however, because these costs are normal
business expenses and not unreasonable, I will award them in full. I discuss Petitioner’s expert
costs below.

1. Petitioner’s Expert Costs for David Axelrod, M.D.

Petitioner requests $7,400.00 for Dr. Axelrod’s fee at a rate of $400.00 per hour. Fee App.,
Ex. A at 12-17. Dr. Axelrod has been awarded his requested hourly rate by other special masters,
and I see no reason to disturb his request. See Druery v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 17-1213V,
2020 WL 5743105, at 5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 17, 2020); see also Sutton v. Sec’y of Health
& Hum. Servs., No. 19-1887V, 2023 WL 9099853, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 1, 2023). I
find Dr. Axelrod’s fee to be reasonable, and I will award it in full. Accordingly, Petitioner is
awarded $7,400.00 for Dr. Axelrod’s expert costs.

6
This total reflects Petitioner’s documented request for $50,070.50 for attorneys’ fees minus the $145.00
reduction for Mr. Downing’s and Ms. Jorgenson’s work in 2022, minus the $800.00 reduction for paralegal
billing. ($50,070.50 - $145.00 - $800.00 = $49,125.50).

8
I award Petitioner a total of $7,568.85 in attorneys’ costs.7

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, in the exercise of the discretion afforded to me in determining the propriety of
awards of interim attorneys’ fees and costs, and based on the foregoing, I GRANT IN PART
Petitioner’s application. Petitioner is awarded interim attorneys’ fees and costs in the total amount
of $56,694.35 as follows:

• A lump sum in the amount of $56,694.35, representing reimbursement of
Petitioner’s interim attorneys’ fees and costs, to be paid through an ACH deposit to
Petitioner’s former counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement.

In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the Clerk of
Court SHALL ENTER JUDGMENT in accordance with this decision.8

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Jennifer A. Shah
Jennifer A. Shah
Special Master

7
Petitioner is awarded $168.19 for medical records requests; $0.66 for postage; and $7,400.00 for Dr.
Axelrod’s work; totaling $7,568.85.
8
Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment by filing a joint notice
renouncing their right to seek review.

9

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11089498. Public record. Not legal advice.