# Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

> Oregon Supreme Court · July 3, 2025 · 373 Or. 790

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11089335

## Case

- **Court:** Oregon Supreme Court
- **Decided:** July 3, 2025
- **Citations:** 373 Or. 790
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Flynn
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11089335

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- describing limited circum- stances under which later legislative enactments can inform the meaning of related, earlier-adopted provisions
- describing the statutory standard for judicial review by the Court of Appeals as applicable to review in this court as well

## Opinion text

790 July 3, 2025 No. 26

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON

FRIENDS OF YAMHILL COUNTY,
Respondent on Review,
v.
YAMHILL COUNTY,
Respondent,
and
GRANGE HILL LLC,
Petitioner on Review.
(LUBA 2022-081) (CA A180472) (SC S070290)

En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 1, 2024, at Willamette
University College of Law, Salem, Oregon.
Andrew Mulkey, 1000 Friends of Oregon, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.
Kevin H. Kono, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.
Also on the briefs were Elaine Albrich and Meagan A. Himes.
Steve Elzinga, Sherman, Sherman, Johnnie & Hoyt LLP,
Salem, filed the brief for amicus curiae The Ground LLC.
Also on the brief was Mark Hoyt.
Alexandria E. Dolezal, Crag Law Center, Portland, filed
the brief for amici curiae Jason Lett, Mike McCarthy, and
Shelley Wetherell. Also on the brief was Meriel L. Darzen.
FLYNN, C.J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part
and reversed in part. The final order of the Land Use Board
of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Land
Use Board of Appeals for further proceedings.
________________
* On judicial review from a final order of the Land Use Board of Appeals. 325
Or App 282, 529 P3d 1007 (2023).
Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 791
792 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

FLYNN, C.J.
Although Oregon’s land use laws strictly limit how
Exclusive Farm Use (EFU) land may be used, a county
generally has authority to approve “home occupations” in
that zone, subject to numerous specified conditions. ORS
215.283(2)(i); ORS 215.203(1). In this case, Yamhill County
approved a “home occupation” permit for Grange Hill to
operate a nine-guestroom bed and breakfast adjacent to its
vineyard, on land zoned for EFU, in a structure that Grange
Hill had not yet built. Friends of Yamhill County (Friends)
challenges the approval, contending that the proposed bed
and breakfast does not meet one of the specified conditions
for a home occupation on EFU land—that it must be oper-
ated “substantially in * * * [t]he dwelling” or “[o]ther build-
ings normally associated with uses permitted in the zone in
which the property is located.” ORS 215.448(1). At issue is
the meaning of the “dwelling” within which a home occupa-
tion may operate under ORS 215.448(1).
The Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) affirmed
the county’s approval of the home occupation. LUBA rea-
soned that the county permissibly concluded that Grange
Hill’s bed and breakfast would be operated in a “dwelling”
because Grange Hill had approval from the county to con-
struct a category of “dwelling” normally allowed in the
zone—a “primary dwelling in conjunction with farm use”—
and because the county had found that the proposed struc-
ture “meets the design standards for [a] single-family resi-
dence” and would be used as a residence for the innkeeper.
In doing so, LUBA rejected Friends’ argument that, in order
to qualify as a “dwelling” for purposes of ORS 215.448(1),
the structure in which Grange Hill proposed to operate its
home occupation needed to satisfy all of the requirements
for the “primary dwelling in conjunction with farm use”
that Grange Hill had authority to construct, including that
a “primary dwelling” must be a structure designed and used
as a home for a farm operator. Friends of Yamhill County
v. Yamhill County, ___ Or LUBA ___, ___ (LUBA No 2022-
081, Dec 27, 2022) (slip op at 11-12). According to LUBA,
that general requirement for a “primary dwelling” was not
relevant to whether the structure would be a “dwelling” as
Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 793

required by ORS 215.448. The Court of Appeals reversed
LUBA’s decision, however, concluding that the proposed
structure—as a matter of law—is not a “primary dwelling”
because it is a “motel.”
This court granted Grange Hill’s petition for
review, and we now affirm the Court of Appeals in part and
reverse in part. Although we are not persuaded by the Court
of Appeals’ reasons for concluding that the structure fails
to qualify as a “dwelling” as a matter of law, we agree, for
other reasons, that LUBA erred in affirming the county’s
approval of Grange Hill’s home occupation permit. As we
will explain, we conclude that the legislature intended the
“dwelling” requirement for a home occupation under ORS
215.448 to mean a structure that satisfies the requirements
for a particular category of “dwelling” that the land use laws
normally allow on property in the zone. When, as here, the
purported category of dwelling is a “primary dwelling” on
EFU land, those requirements include that the structure
will be the home for a farm operator. Because LUBA errone-
ously dismissed that requirement as irrelevant to whether
the proposed structure satisfies the “dwelling” require-
ment in ORS 215.448, we reverse LUBA’s decision, and
we remand the case to LUBA for further consideration of
Friends’ challenge to the county’s approval of the proposed
home occupation.
I. OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE LAND USE LAW
Before turning to the details of this case, we pro-
vide a brief overview of the pertinent statutory land use
protections. In 1973, Oregon enacted a comprehensive and
unified statewide land use planning system. SB 100 (1973);
Lake Oswego Preservation Society v. City of Lake Oswego,
360 Or 115, 118, 379 P3d 462 (2016). As part of that com-
prehensive statutory scheme, the legislature established the
Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC),
to which it delegated the setting of statewide land use goals.
ORS 197.030; ORS 197.040. One of those statewide goals,
Goal 3, is “[t]o preserve and maintain agricultural lands.”
OAR 660-015-0000(3); Goal 3: Agricultural Lands, Oregon’s
Statewide Planning Goals and Guidelines, https://www.
oregon.gov/lcd/OP/Documents/goal3.pdf (accessed June 25,
794 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

2025). The legislature has directed every county in the
state to adopt and maintain a comprehensive land use plan
that complies with the statewide goals. ORS 197.175(2).
Consistent with those plans, counties may adopt ordinances
that “zone designated areas of land within the county as
exclusive farm use zones.” ORS 215.203(1).
Generally, land that a county has designated as
an EFU zone under its master land-use plan “shall be used
exclusively for farm use,” except as otherwise provided by
specific statutes. ORS 215.203(1). The legislature has iden-
tified uses of EFU land that are permitted “as of right” and
others that are permitted as “conditional uses.” Brentmar v.
Jackson County, 321 Or 481, 496, 900 P2d 1030 (1995);1 ORS
215.283(1), (2). A county may not restrict the uses that are
allowed “as of right,” but it may restrict, or opt not to allow,
“conditional uses.” Brentmar, 321 Or at 496.
Only a few types of structures are permitted on
EFU land as of right under ORS 215.283, including “pri-
mary or accessory dwellings and other buildings customar-
ily provided in conjunction with farm use.” ORS 215.283(1)
(e). Additional, conditional, uses may be permitted by the
local governing body as long as the proposed use satisfies
the statutory criteria for the particular conditional use.
ORS 215.283(2). As pertinent here, conditional uses that
counties may permit on EFU land include so-called “[h]ome
occupations,” which are subject to numerous specified condi-
tions and subject to approval by the local governing body or
its designee. ORS 215.283(2)(i).
Although the land use statutes contain no express
definition of “home occupation,” some of the more descriptive

1
In Brentmar, we addressed ORS 215.213(1), which lists a number of uses
that “may be established,” and concluded that “the legislature intended that
the uses delineated in ORS 215.213(1) be uses ‘as of right[.]’ ” 321 Or at 496.
Throughout this opinion, we primarily cite to provisions of ORS 215.283, which
contains an essentially duplicate list of permitted uses “in any area zoned
for exclusive farm use.” The primary difference between the lists is that ORS
215.213, which predates ORS 215.283, applies only to counties that had adopted
“marginal lands provisions” under a process that the legislature eliminated in
1993. See Or Laws 1993, ch 792, § 29 (providing that counties that previously had
adopted “marginal lands provisions under ORS 197.247 (1991 Edition) * * * may
continue to apply those provisions,” but that “[a]fter January 1, 1993, no county
may adopt marginal lands provisions”).
Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 795

statutory conditions create a general picture of what the
legislature had in mind. At least in an EFU zone, a “home
occupation” is “operated by a resident or employee of a res-
ident of the property on which the business is located,” is
operated at least “substantially in * * * [t]he dwelling” or “[o]
ther buildings normally associated with uses permitted in
the zone,” and has no more than five on-site employees. ORS
215.448(1).
II. BACKGROUND
As described above, the dispute focuses on whether
the proposed bed and breakfast will satisfy the require-
ment of ORS 215.448 that it operate substantially within a
“dwelling.” The pertinent background facts are undisputed
for purposes of the issue before us.
Grange Hill owns property consisting of nearly 19
acres of high-value EFU land in Yamhill County, including
approximately 13 acres of vineyard. The property’s prior
owner had obtained county approval to build a “principal
dwelling customarily provided in conjunction with farm
use”—the county’s term for a type of use that the land
use statutes refer to as a “primary dwelling.” See Yamhill
County Zoning Ordinance (YCZO) 402.03 (providing that
a “[p]rincipal dwelling customarily provided in conjunction
with farm use on high-value farmland,” shall be permitted
in the county’s exclusive farm use district, subject to spec-
ified criteria); see also ORS 215.283(1) (providing that uses
permitted on land zoned for exclusive farm use include “pri-
mary or accessory dwellings and other buildings customar-
ily provided in conjunction with farm use”).
The prior owner also had sought, and obtained, a
conditional use permit to operate a nine-guestroom bed and
breakfast in the approved “principal farm dwelling.” That
previously approved application described the intended
structure as “a two-story, single-family dwelling containing
a dining area, living room, kitchen, one resident bedroom
suite, and nine guest bedrooms.” Friends of Yamhill County,
___ Or LUBA at ___ (slip op at 8). After obtaining the
dwelling permit and the conditional use permit, but before
796 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

constructing the intended dwelling, the prior owners sold
the property to Grange Hill.
The transfer of the property to Grange Hill trans-
ferred the permit to build a “principal farm dwelling cus-
tomarily provided in conjunction with farm use” on the
property, but it did not transfer the conditional use permit,
which expressly required any subsequent owner to seek new
approval for any home occupation. Accordingly, after pur-
chasing the property, Grange Hill submitted its own appli-
cation for a home occupation. As set out by the county, the
application sought approval to operate a bed and breakfast
with nine guestrooms “from a single-family dwelling, once it
has been built.”
The county described the design of the “proposed
single-family dwelling” as a structure having “ten bedrooms
with ensuite bathrooms,” each of which “can be accessed
from a shared heated hallway that shares common atmo-
sphere with the rest of the house.” In addition, the design
plans showed “[c]ommon areas and living space” with an
adjacent kitchen “next to an area marked as a common
space on the first floor.” Based on that description, the
county found that “[t]he structure meets the design stan-
dards for a single-family residence,” which it described as
“a building normally found in the” EFU zone. The county
thus determined that the proposed bed and breakfast met
the “dwelling” requirement for a home occupation. It also
determined that the proposal met the other statutory and
county-specific requirements for the requested conditional
use permit.
Friends appealed the county’s decision to LUBA,
challenging the county’s determination that Grange Hill’s
proposed bed and breakfast would meet the requirement of
ORS 215.448 that the home occupation operate “substan-
tially in” a “dwelling.” Friends raised several assignments of
error, including that the proposed “dwelling,” although pur-
portedly allowed in the EFU zone as a “primary dwelling
in conjunction with farm use,” would not qualify as a “pri-
mary dwelling” because it would not be “designed and used
as a home or primary residence for a farm operator.” Friends
also contended that the design of the proposed structure,
Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 797

particularly the number of rooms devoted to lodging rooms,
made the structure a “hotel or motel” as a matter of law, nei-
ther of which is a dwelling or other building allowed in the
EFU zone.
LUBA agreed with some aspects of Friends’ argu-
ments, but it ultimately affirmed the county’s decision.
Friends of Yamhill County, ___ Or LUBA at ___ (slip op
at 32). LUBA agreed that, in order to issue the original
approval for a primary dwelling “customarily provided in
conjunction with farm use,” the county needed to determine
that the dwelling would be “occupied by a person or persons”
involved in the farm operation, citing OAR 660-033-0135(4)
(c).2 Id. at ___ (slip op at 10-11). But LUBA concluded that the
occupancy determination was an initial—not an ongoing—
requirement, and that it was not pertinent to whether the
structure qualified as a “dwelling” within which the home
occupation must operate under ORS 215.448. Id. LUBA
emphasized that the county had found that the structure
“meets the design standards” for a single-family residence
and would be used as a residence for the innkeeper, which
LUBA described as “consistent with the term ‘dwelling,’ ” and
LUBA affirmed those findings. Friends of Yamhill County,
___ Or LUBA at ___ (slip op at 14-15). Thus, LUBA reasoned
that the county had not erred in concluding that Grange
Hill’s application to operate a bed-and-breakfast home occu-
pation satisfied the “dwelling” requirement of ORS 215.448.
Id. at ___ (slip op at 16).
The Court of Appeals reversed. The court described
the key inquiry as “whether the proposed structure is pri-
marily dedicated as a dwelling for the use of a farm family,
or whether it is a motel, primarily dedicated to the lodging
of guests or tourist[s].” Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill
County, 325 Or App 282, 289, 529 P3d 1007 (2023). The court
then answered that inquiry by concluding that “the design
features of the proposed structure as a whole are those of a
motel, for transient lodging” and, thus, that “the proposed

2
LUBA cited OAR 660-033-0135(4)(c), which refers to occupancy by “a per-
son or persons who produced the commodities[.]” Friends of Yamhill County, ___
Or LUBA at ___ (slip op at 11). But it also accepted Friends’ premise that a pri-
mary residence must be occupied by a “farm operator.” Id. at ___ (slip op at 12).
798 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

structure is not itself a ‘dwelling’ ” under ORS 215.283. Id. at
294-95. According to the court
“[t]he statutory scheme makes clear that the entire struc-
ture—not merely a portion of it—must be a farm dwelling
that provides a home occupied by a group of people sharing
a household—not by individuals and groups who share no
social or legal relationship—on a long-term or permanent
basis—not in a transitory way.”
Id. at 295 (emphasis in Friends of Yamhill County, internal
quotation marks omitted). The court added that “the struc-
ture within which the bed and breakfast inn exists must
be, first, a dwelling.” Id. at 295. Grange Hill sought review,
which this court allowed.
In arguments on review, Grange Hill contends that
the Court of Appeals’ conclusion—that, as a matter of law,
the structure at issue here is not a “dwelling”—miscon-
strues the “dwelling” requirement of ORS 215.448. Grange
Hill primarily argues that the plain meaning of “dwelling”
is “a home occupied by a person as their household or by
a group of people sharing a household.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, according to Grange Hill, the only pertinent ques-
tion regarding the “home occupation” permit is whether the
structure will serve as a home for someone. It emphasizes—
as did LUBA—that the structure will be a home for the
“innkeeper” of the bed and breakfast and that the structure
will have some characteristics commonly associated with
dwellings, such as bathrooms, a kitchen, and bedrooms con-
nected to a common living space. “That alone is sufficient,”
Grange Hill contends, to satisfy the “dwelling” requirement
of ORS 215.448(1)(c)(A).
Friends, on the other hand, contends that LUBA
erred in construing the “dwelling” requirement, although
Friends does not embrace the Court of Appeals’ focus on
whether the “entire structure” will be used as a home.
Rather, Friends faults LUBA for having adopted a construc-
tion of the “dwelling” requirement that “allows an applicant
to build any type of building so long as the building is capable
of being used in whole or in part as a home.” Friends reiter-
ates the arguments that LUBA rejected, including that ORS
215.448 requires a “dwelling” that is “customarily provided
Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 799

in conjunction with farm use” and that a structure purport-
ing to satisfy the requirement as a “primary dwelling cus-
tomarily provided in conjunction with farm use” must be a
dwelling that is designed and used as a residence for a per-
son who operates the farm. Friends also contends that the
county’s approval of a nine-guestroom bed and breakfast is
inconsistent with the legislature’s declared priority for pre-
serving farmland for agricultural use. See ORS 215.243
(declaring that “[t]he preservation of a maximum amount of
the limited supply of agricultural land is necessary to the
conservation of the state’s economic resources” and that, for
a variety of reasons, “[e]xpansion of urban development into
rural areas is a matter of public concern”).
III. DISCUSSION
As indicated above, the only home occupation
requirement in dispute in this court is the requirement
in ORS 215.448(1)(c)(A) that the proposed bed and break-
fast “shall be operated substantially in * * * [t]he dwelling.”
Whether the Court of Appeals, or LUBA, correctly construed
that requirement presents a question of statutory construc-
tion that we resolve by employing the analytical framework
described in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or
606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), and modified in State v. Gaines,
346 Or 160, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). Under that framework, we
examine the text of the statute in context, as well as any
helpful legislative history, all with the “paramount goal” of
determining the intent of the legislature that enacted the
disputed provision. Gaines, 346 Or at 171-72.
As we will explain, the statutory text, context, and
legislative history persuade us that the legislature intended
the “dwelling” required under ORS 215.448 to mean a struc-
ture that satisfies the requirements for a particular cate-
gory of “dwelling” that the land use laws allow as of right in
the zone. Here, the only identified category of allowed dwell-
ing is a “primary dwelling in conjunction with farm use,”
and, as we will explain, the legislature intended such dwell-
ings to mean a farm operator’s home. Because LUBA con-
cluded that Grange Hill could satisfy the “dwelling” require-
ment of ORS 215.448 without proof that the proposed home
occupation will operate in a structure that satisfies the
800 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

requirements for the “primary dwelling” that the structure
purports to be, we conclude that LUBA based its decision on
an incorrect interpretation of the statute.
A. The Meaning of the “Dwelling” in ORS 215.448
The term “dwelling” is not defined in the land use
statutes, and the arguments of the parties, as well as the
decisions of LUBA and the Court of Appeals, present a spec-
trum of competing interpretations. We begin with the con-
struction arrived at by the Court of Appeals, under which
the proposed structure is—as a matter of law—not a “dwell-
ing,” because that is the conclusion that Grange Hill chal-
lenges on review.
As described above, the Court of Appeals concluded
that “the proposed structure is not a ‘dwelling’ ” under the
land use laws “for which a ‘home occupation’ can be autho-
rized” and, thus, that LUBA’s affirmance of the conditional
use permit “is unlawful in substance.” Friends of Yamhill
County, 325 Or at 292.
Grange Hill contends that, in concluding as a matter
of law that the proposed structure is not a “dwelling” under
the land use laws, the Court of Appeals erroneously added
limitations to the meaning of “dwelling” in ORS 215.448
that go beyond the meaning that the legislature intended.
Grange Hill primarily argues that the legislature intended
the “dwelling” requirement in ORS 215.448 to mean only
that the structure is “a home occupied by a person as their
household or by a group of people sharing a household.” It
insists that questions about whether the proposed structure
qualifies as a “dwelling” are addressed through other aspects
of the land use permitting processes that govern whether
the structure can be built, and it contends that questions
about whether the structure can be built are not at issue in
this challenge to the conditional use permit. Emphasizing
the county’s findings that there is no dispute that the pro-
posed structure will be a home for the “innkeeper” of the bed
and breakfast, and that the structure will have characteris-
tics commonly associated with dwellings, i.e., bathrooms, a
kitchen, and bedrooms connected to a common living space,
Grange Hill contends that LUBA correctly affirmed the
Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 801

county’s determination that the proposed home occupation
will operate substantially in a “dwelling.”
Although we ultimately agree with Grange Hill
that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the pro-
posed structure as a matter of law is not a “dwelling,” we
are not persuaded by Grange Hill’s argument that the legis-
lature intended the “dwelling” required by ORS 215.448 to
mean any structure that is occupied by at least one person
as their household. Instead, we conclude that the legislature
intended the “dwelling” requirement in ORS 215.448 to be
met only by a structure that satisfies the requirements for a
category of dwelling that may be established as of right on
the property.
1. Text and context
To aid our analysis of what the legislature intended
the “dwelling” requirement to mean, we set out the text of
that requirement in the broader statutory context:
“(1) he governing body of a county or its designate
may allow, subject to the approval of the governing body or
its designate, the establishment of a home occupation and
the parking of vehicles in any zone. However, in an exclu-
sive farm use zone, forest zone or a mixed farm and forest
zone that allows residential uses, the following standards
apply to the home occupation:
“(a) It shall be operated by a resident or employee of a
resident of the property on which the business is located;
“(b) It shall employ on the site no more than five full-
time or part-time persons;
“(c) It shall be operated substantially in:
“(A) The dwelling; or
“(B) Other buildings normally associated with uses
permitted in the zone in which the property is located; and
“(d) It shall not unreasonably interfere with other uses
permitted in the zone in which the property is located.
“(2) The governing body of the county or its designate
may establish additional reasonable conditions of approval
for the establishment of a home occupation under subsec-
tion (1) of this section.
802 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

“(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the governing
body or its designate to permit construction of any struc-
ture that would not otherwise be allowed in the zone in
which the home occupation is to be established.
“(4) The existence of home occupations shall not be
used as justification for a zone change.”
ORS 215.448 (emphases added).
According to Grange Hill, “dwelling” is a term of
common usage, meaning a structure that a person uses
as a home, and we should presume that the legislature
intended the term to have its ordinary meaning. See Brown
v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC, 372 Or 225, 231, 548 P3d 817
(2024) (explaining the “common usage” general presump-
tion and exceptions); Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary
706 (unabridged ed 2002) (defining “dwelling” as referring
to “a building or construction used for residence”); id. at
1931 (defining “residence” as referring to “a temporary or
permanent dwelling place, abode, or habitation to which one
intends to return as distinguished from a place of temporary
sojourn or transient visit” and “a building used as a home”).
Pointing to the structure of ORS 215.448(1)(c),
Grange Hill contends that the legislature intentionally did
not further limit the “dwellings” in which a home occupation
may operate. ORS 215.448(1)(c)(B)—the “[o]ther buildings”
provision—includes the qualifying phrase “normally associ-
ated with uses permitted in the zone in which the property
is located”:
“[The home occupation] shall be operated substantially
in:
“(A) The dwelling; or
“(B) Other buildings normally associated with uses
permitted in the zone in which the property is located.”
ORS 215.448(1)(c). And Grange Hill urges us to under-
stand that the legislature failed to similarly qualify the
term “dwelling” in subparagraph A because the legislature
wanted “dwelling” to remain unqualified.
Although we have sometimes concluded that the leg-
islature’s failure to qualify a statutory term means “that the
Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 803

legislature intended that provision to be read in an expan-
sive sense,” we have also emphasized that there can be mul-
tiple reasons for the legislature to omit a limiting phrase
from one part a statute. See Lake Oswego Preservation
Society, 360 Or at 129-30 (explaining that, “[w]hereas the
absence of narrowing language in [a statute] could mean
that the legislature intended that provision to be read in an
expansive sense, an equally plausible inference is that the
omission means nothing at all, except that the legislature
did not perceive the need to clarify its intent”). Here, text
and context persuade us that the legislature intended the
“dwelling” to which ORS 215.448(1)(c)(A) refers to mean a
“dwelling” that is “normally associated with uses permitted
in the zone in which the property is located.” The legisla-
ture’s failure to separately include the requirement in ORS
215.448(1)(c)(A) “means nothing at all, except that the legis-
lature did not perceive the need to clarify its intent” in that
way. Lake Oswego Preservation Society, 360 Or at 129-30.
Three aspects of the statutory text and context
point to that conclusion. First, the “substantially in * * * [t]
he dwelling” requirement of ORS 215.448 applies to home
occupations located in “an exclusive farm use zone, forest
zone or a mixed farm and forest zone that allows residential
use.” And in each of those zones, the land use laws limit the
permissible types of “dwelling.” See ORS 215.283 (farm use);
ORS 215.720 - ORS 215.757 (forest use). Second, regardless
of whether a home occupation is located within a dwelling
or other building, the legislature has specified that the
approval of a home occupation does not authorize “construc-
tion of any structure that would not otherwise be allowed in
the zone.” ORS 215.448(3). Third, the legislature has speci-
fied that home occupations “shall not be used as justification
for a zone change.” ORS 215.448(4). Together, those provi-
sions suggest that the legislature intended to require that
a home occupation would be conditionally permitted only if
it will operate substantially within a structure—dwelling
or other building—that the land use laws normally allow in
the zone in which the property is located.
That meaning, in turn, points to a legislative intent
that the “dwelling” requirement incorporates the land use
804 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

laws and regulations that govern whether a proposed struc-
ture qualifies as a “dwelling” allowed on property in the par-
ticular zone. And when the structure is in any area zoned
for exclusive farm use, the categories of dwelling normally
allowed, or allowed “as of right,” are limited to dwellings
that facilitate the farming operation: “primary or accessory
dwellings * * * customarily provided in conjunction with
farm use,” ORS 215.283(1)(e), and a “dwelling” that “is occu-
pied by a relative of the farm operator or the farm operator’s
spouse” if “the farm operator does or will require the assis-
tance of the relative in the management of the farm use,”
ORS 215.283(1)(d). In other words, it is not enough that the
structure will be occupied by “a person as their household.”
We thus disagree with Grange Hill’s primary argument for
reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
We nevertheless agree with Grange Hill that the
Court of Appeals erred in concluding, as a matter of law,
that the proposed structure is not a “dwelling.” In explaining
its conclusion that “the proposed structure is not a ‘dwell-
ing’ ” under the land use laws, the court did not articulate
a specific construction of “dwelling,” but it stated that “[t]
he statutory scheme makes clear that the entire structure—
not merely a portion of it—must be a farm dwelling that
provides a ‘home [is] occupied by a group of people sharing
a household—not by individuals and groups who share no
social or legal relationship—on a long-term or permanent
basis—not in a transitory way.’ ” Friends of Yamhill County,
325 Or App at 295 (quoting 1000 Friends of Oregon v.
Clackamas County, 320 Or App 444, 453, 514 P3d 553 (2022))
(emphasis in original);3 see also Webster’s at 1082 (defining
“home” as “the house and grounds with their appurtenances
habitually occupied by a family : one’s principal place of resi-
dence : domicile”). The court also characterized the ultimate
inquiry as whether the structure is “primarily dedicated” as
a “dwelling” or a “motel,” id. at 289, and it concluded that
“the design features of the proposed structure as a whole are
those of a motel, for transient lodging,” id. at 294. Because

3
The court in 1000 Friends of Oregon defined a “home” for the purposes of
explaining why the allowance under ORS 215.283 of “dwellings” did not implic-
itly include allowance of “the short-term rental use of dwellings.” 320 Or App at
459.
Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 805

the court decided the “dwelling” question as a matter of law,
we understand the court to have concluded that those lim-
itations are part of the statutory requirements for a “dwell-
ing” under ORS 215.448.
Text and context do not suggest, however, that the
legislature intended the term “dwelling” to incorporate a
requirement that the “entire structure” will be used as a home
for long-term residents or to exclude every structure that can
be said to have design features of a motel in addition to the
design features of a single-family residence. As indicated, the
land use statutes contain no definition of “dwelling,” and the
plain meaning of the term adds little except to suggest that
a structure qualifying as a “dwelling” must be used by some-
one as their residence or home. See Webster’s at 706 (defining
“dwelling” as referring to “a building or construction used for
residence”); id. at 1931 (defining “residence” as “a building
used as a home” and dwelling place “to which one intends to
return as distinguished from a place of temporary sojourn
or transient visit”). Although we have concluded from the
broader statutory context that the legislature intended the
“dwelling” requirement to incorporate other provisions of the
land use laws that define the categories of dwelling normally
allow in the zone in which the property is located, those pro-
visions do not limit the number of bedrooms or bathrooms
that the dwelling may include. Nor do they preclude a res-
ident who meets the requirements for a “home occupation”
conditional use permit from using many of those bedrooms to
operate a bed and breakfast, or other home business.4
Indeed, adding such limitations to the meaning of
the “dwelling” in which the home occupation may operate
would create tension with the type of small businesses that
the legislature intended to allow as “home occupations.”
The conditions that the legislature has imposed for a home
occupation allow a resident—or employee of the resident—to
operate a home business large enough to employ up to five

4
Friends has argued that a bed and breakfast facility with more than five
guest rooms must be considered a “hotel or motel” because that is how the state
building code’s structural specialty code (OSSC) classifies such occupancies.
OSSC 310.2; OSSC 310.4. The Court of Appeals reasoned that those code stan-
dards are relevant to the nature of a structure but not dispositive of whether the
structure is a “dwelling” for purposes of ORS 215.448, and we agree.
806 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

persons full-time and to operate the business “substantially
in” a structure that qualifies as a “dwelling.” ORS 215.448(1)
(a), (b). In combination, those conditions suggest that the
legislature contemplated that a building can qualify as a
“dwelling” for purposes of ORS 215.448 even when a resi-
dent is operating a home occupation large enough to occupy
a substantial portion—if not a majority—of the space in the
“dwelling,” compared to the space reserved for the resident.
Moreover, a limitation that precluded a struc-
ture from qualifying as a “dwelling” under ORS 215.448 if
part of the structure is used for transient lodgers would be
incompatible with newer land use provisions that expressly
contemplate that a bed and breakfast is one type of home
occupation that may be approved for EFU land. See ORS
215.452(13) (specifying the scale of meal service at “a bed
and breakfast facility” that “is sited as a home occupation on
the same tract as a winery”); ORS 215.453(12) (same); ORS
215.449(10) (same for farm breweries); ORS 215.451(10) (same
for cider businesses). Those newer provisions have effect only
if it is possible for a “bed and breakfast facility” to satisfy
the “dwelling” requirement for a home occupation, and that
informs our understanding that the “dwelling” requirement
can be satisfied even if the dwelling will be occupied at least
in part by transient lodgers. See, e.g., State v. Ofodrinwa, 353
Or 507, 529, 300 P3d 154 (2013) (describing limited circum-
stances under which later legislative enactments can inform
the meaning of related, earlier-adopted provisions).
In short, given the multiple indications that the leg-
islature contemplated home occupations—including bed-and-
breakfast facilities—that would prevent the resident from
continuing to use the “entire structure” as a home for long-
term residents, text and context do not persuade us that the
legislature intended to condition home occupations on proof
that the “entire structure” remain a home for long-term res-
idents. That is, we do not understand the legislature to have
intended to preclude some portion of a residence from being
used for commercial purposes, as opposed to residential pur-
poses, if the requirements for a home occupation are met.
Nor are we persuaded that the legislature intended
to preclude a structure from being a “dwelling” if it has some
Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 807

characteristics of another type of building. We understand
the Court of Appeals’ concern that this structure purporting
to be a “primary dwelling” also has design characteristics
of a “motel,” which is not a category of building allowed in
an EFU zone. But the county found that the same proposed
structure meets the design characteristics of a single-family
residence, and LUBA affirmed that finding. There undoubt-
edly will be structures that seemingly straddle the design
standards for two categories of building—whether it is a
structure that meets the design standards of a single-family
residence but also has nine bedrooms with en suite bathrooms
or a structure that meets the design standards of a single-
family residence but includes an enormous “home theater”
space. When that is the case, the county and LUBA must
determine whether the structure is a “dwelling,” and the fact
that the structure might have characteristics consistent with
a single-family dwelling is not dispositive. But the fact that
the structure has some characteristics of a motel is not dis-
positive either. Thus, to the extent that the Court of Appeals
concluded that a structure that has some characteristics of a
motel cannot be a dwelling, as a matter of law, we disagree.5
2. Legislative history
Those conclusions are consistent with legislative
history, which reflects a general intent to protect agricul-
tural land in an EFU zone while also allowing counties to
authorize home occupations—including bed and breakfast
facilities—subject to limitations imposed by state statutes
and any applicable county ordinances—including that they

5
Because we resolve this case on the basis of LUBA’s erroneous conclusion
that the structure at issue can qualify as a “dwelling” under ORS 215.448 with-
out satisfying the requirements for the “primary dwelling” the structure pur-
ports to be—here, without satisfying the requirement that the structure be occu-
pied by a farm operator—we need not, and do not, address when, as a matter of
law, a structure that has the characteristics of both a single-family residence and
another type of structure is a “dwelling.”
We note, however, that a “dwelling” sharing the design characteristics of a
category of building that is not allowed as of right in the zone might struggle to
satisfy other requirements of ORS 215.448 that give effect to the legislature’s
goal of preserving Oregon’s agricultural economy, including that the home occu-
pation “shall not unreasonably interfere with other uses permitted” in the EFU
zone and that the home occupation process does not authorize “construction of
any structure that would not otherwise be allowed in the zone.” ORS 215.448(1)
(B)(d), (3).
808 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

operate substantially within structures that are allowed in
the zone. “Home occupations” were first permitted in EFU
zones as a conditional “nonfarm” use in 1977, Or Laws 1977,
ch 788, § 2, and specific conditions on the approval of “home
occupations” followed, with the enactment of what became
ORS 215.448 in 1983, Or Laws 1983, ch 743, § 2.6
The 1983 law included an earlier version of the cur-
rent “dwelling” requirement. Or Laws 1983, ch 743, § 2.
The 1983 enactment was the result of the passage of House
Bill (HB) 2625, a bill intended to address concerns about
“cottage industries” in rural areas. Tape Recording, House
Committee on Environment and Energy, HB 2625, Apr 27,
1983, Tape 174, Side A (statement of Rep Verner Anderson).
Proponents of the bill explained that small businesses were
operating in rural areas and that it would be beneficial to
both recognize and regulate them. Tape Recording, Senate
Committee on Energy and Environment, HB 2625, June 27,
1983, Tape 187, Side A. They explained that the businesses
were often just starting out and lacked the capital to rent a
storefront or locate in an industrial park. Tape Recording,
House Committee on Environment and Energy, HB 2625,
Apr 27, 1983, Tape 174, Side A (statement of Rep Peg Jolin).
They articulated their expectation that, when the busi-
nesses grew, they would relocate to industrial areas. Tape
Recording, Senate Committee on Energy and Environment,
HB 2625, June 27, 1983, Tape 186, Side A (testimony of
Manager of the Roseburg Area Chamber of Commerce
Charles Adams).
Legislators expressed concerns about the con-
struction of structures specifically for the businesses. Tape
Recording, House Committee on Environment and Energy,
HB 2625, May 20, 1983, Tape 212, Side B (statement of
Committee Staff Beth Samson). In response, the committee
removed a provision from the originally introduced bill that
would have allowed home occupations to be operated in “[b]

6
The 1977 legislature amended ORS 215.213 to authorize the approval of
“[h]ome occupations carried on by the resident as an accessory use within their
dwelling” as a conditional “nonfarm” use in any area zoned for exclusive farm
use. Or Laws 1977, ch 788, § 2. And the 1983 legislature adopted a list of condi-
tions for approval of “home occupations,” which were codified as ORS 215.448(1)
(1983). Or Laws 1983, ch 743, § 2.
Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 809

uildings constructed for the purpose of operating the home
occupation if the buildings are similar in appearance and
size to buildings normally associated with uses permitted in
the zone in which the property is located.” HB 2625, A-eng
(1983). It was explained that the provision was removed to
address concerns “that buildings would be specifically con-
structed in order to start these industries in EFU zones.”
Tape Recording, House Committee on Environment and
Energy, HB 2625, May 20, 1983, Tape 212, Side B (statement
of Committee Staff Beth Samson); see also Tape Recording,
Senate Committee on Energy and Environment, HB 2625,
June 27, 1983, Tape 186, Side A (testimony of Manager of
Roseburg Area Chamber of Commerce Charles Adams)
(explaining intent was to use existing structures).
In addition, the legislature added the provision
that became ORS 215.448(3), which specifies that nothing
about the process for allowing home occupations authorizes
the “construction of any structure that would not otherwise
be allowed in the zone in which the home occupation is to
be established.” Or Laws 1983, ch 743, § 2. Senator John
Kitzhaber, a proponent of the bill, stated that the provision
was intended to address “the concern that was raised about
the building [of] new structures specifically for this pur-
pose.” Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Energy and
Environment, HB 2625, June 30, 1983, Tape 198, Side A
(statement of Sen John Kitzhaber). He also explained that
he was aware of concerns about potential conflicts between
farm and nonfarm uses and that was why he had been “so
interested in clarifying the language,” stating that “the
activity has to be carried out in buildings normally associ-
ated with the uses permitted in that zone.” Id.
Later legislative history reflects concern with what
advocates viewed as overly restrictive decisions regard-
ing home occupations. The text currently set out at ORS
215.448(1) is the product of legislative amendments in 1995,
through House Bill (HB) 2561. Or Laws 1995, ch 465, § 1.
HB 2561 amended ORS 215.448 in four main ways. First,
it provided that a home occupation could be operated by
the resident’s employee, expanding the concept of a home
occupation beyond a business operated by a resident of the
810 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

property. Or Laws 1995, ch 465, § 1. Second, it specified that
the five-employee limit was for on-site employees, expand-
ing the size of business that could be a home occupation. Id.
Third, it modified what had been a requirement that home
occupations operate “in” a dwelling or other building nor-
mally associated with uses permitted in the zone, allowing
home occupations that operate “substantially in” those loca-
tions. Id. Fourth, it modified what had been a requirement
that a home occupation “not interfere” with other uses per-
mitted in the zone, requiring instead that a home occupa-
tion “not unreasonably interfere” with those uses. Id.
The legislative history indicates that legislators in
1995 were reacting to permit denials by county boards of
directors, LUBA, and the Court of Appeals that proponents
viewed as applying an overly restrictive construction of the
home occupation requirements, including a decision by the
Columbia County Board of Commissioners to reject a home
occupation request for a bed and breakfast because the guests
would be allowed to walk on the owner’s property. Exhibit
E, House Natural Resources Committee, Subcommittee on
Environment and Energy, HB 2561, Mar 10, 1995 (writ-
ten testimony of Attorney Robert VanNatta). Although the
initial bill proposed a limited amendment to permit activ-
ities such as parking vehicles at home occupations, at an
early hearing, an attorney practicing land use law, Robert
VanNatta, also specifically reported that restrictive text in
ORS 215.448 had defeated car repair, daycare center, car
repossession, and bed-and-breakfast home occupations.
Id. And the subcommittee chair encouraged advocates to
work with the Association of Oregon Counties (AOC) to
“make whatever appropriate amendments you feel need to
be made to this whole concept of home occupations and not
just deal with the vehicles.” Tape Recording, House Natural
Resources Committee, Subcommittee on Environment and
Energy, HB 2561, Mar 10, 1995, Tape 30, Side B. Those
amendments added the new provisions, described above,
that somewhat expanded the operations that counties could
approve as “home occupations.”
The legislative history confirms our conclusion,
based on the text and context, that the legislature intended
Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 811

to allow home occupations—including bed and breakfasts—
to operate in a “dwelling” allowed as of right in the zone, even
if the home occupation itself prevents the “entire structure”
from being used as a home. It also confirms our conclusion
that the legislature intended the “dwelling” requirement to
incorporate the land use laws and regulations that govern
whether a proposed structure meets the requirements for a
category of “dwelling” that is normally allowed on property
in the particular zone. Because Grange Hill, the county, and
LUBA all have identified the relevant dwelling category in
this case as a “primary dwelling,” we turn to the land use
requirements for that category of dwelling.
B. The Meaning of a “Primary Dwelling” in an Exclusive
Farm Use Zone
Although the land use laws do not include an
express definition for a “primary” dwelling “customarily pro-
vided in conjunction with farm use,” several limitations are
clear from context. Collectively, those limitations point to the
“primary dwelling” on EFU land as meaning, among other
requirements, a structure that is the home of a “farm opera-
tor.”7 First, the term “farm use” is defined to mean “the cur-
rent employment of land for the primary purpose of obtain-
ing a profit in money by * * * agricultural or horticultural
use or animal husbandry or any combination thereof.” ORS
215.203(2)(a).8 The primary “dwelling” provided in conjunc-
tion with such use suggests the structure occupied as a home
by the person primarily engaged in that use of the land.

7
Neither this court nor the Court of Appeals has had an occasion to construe
the meaning of the term “farm operator,” as used in ORS 215.283, and the issue
is not argued by the parties in this case. But LUBA has concluded that the mean-
ing of the term “farm operator” is informed by OAR 660-033-0130(9), which—for
purposes of an allowed dwelling for a relative of the farm operator—defines a
“farm operator” as the “ ‘person who operates a farm, doing the work and making
the day-to-day decisions about such things as planting, harvesting, feeding and
marketing.’ ” Richards v. Jefferson County, 79 Or LUBA 171, 180 (2019); see also
Kenagy v. Benton County, 22 Or LUBA 356, 358 (1991) (looking to the common
meaning of “operator” as found in Webster’s, which includes “[o]ne that produces
a physical effect or engages himself in the mechanical aspect of any process or
activity”).
8
ORS 215.203(2)(a) lists specific examples of “farm use” activities of “raising,
harvesting and selling crops or the feeding, breeding, management and sale of, or
the produce of, livestock, poultry, fur-bearing animals or honeybees or for dairy-
ing and the sale of dairy products[.]”
812 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

Second, context indicates that, in contrast to “acces-
sory dwellings,” “primary dwellings” are occupied by the
“farm operator.” With respect to “accessory dwellings” that
are “customarily provided in conjunction with farm uses,”
the legislature has indicated that such a dwelling may be
established when “needed to provide opportunities for farm-
worker housing for individuals primarily engaged in farm
use whose assistance in the management of the farm is or
will be required by the farm operator on the farm unit.” ORS
215.278. And the limitations on a dwelling “occupied by a rel-
ative” similarly emphasize the connection to the farm opera-
tor. Such dwellings are permitted only if they will be “occu-
pied by a relative of the farm operator or the farm operator’s
spouse,” only “if the farm operator does or will require the
assistance of the relative in the management of the farm use,”
and only if located “on the same lot or parcel as the dwelling
of the farm operator.” ORS 215.283(1)(d). We thus agree with
Friends’ premise that a structure allowed on EFU land as a
“primary dwelling” means a farm operator’s home.
C. Both the Court of Appeals and LUBA Incorrectly
Construed the “Dwelling” Requirement.
As we have explained, we are not persuaded that the
Court of Appeals correctly construed the “dwelling” require-
ment in ORS 215.448 to mean that the “entire structure”
must be used for long-term residents or that the structure
must not have any of the design characteristics of a building
that is not allowed in the zone. To that extent, we disagree
with the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that LUBA incorrectly construed the meaning of “dwelling,”
because we have concluded that the legislature intended the
“dwelling” requirement under ORS 215.448 to mean a struc-
ture that satisfies the requirements for a category of dwell-
ing that the land use laws allow as of right on property in the
zone. Those laws limit the categories of dwelling allowed on
EFU land to “primary or accessory dwellings * * * customar-
ily provided in conjunction with farm use,” ORS 215.283(1)
(e), and a “dwelling” that “is occupied by a relative of the
farm operator or the farm operator’s spouse” if “the farm
operator does or will require the assistance of the relative in
Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 813

the management of the farm use.” ORS 215.283(1)(d). And
the only category of dwelling that has been identified in this
case is a “primary dwelling.”
Although LUBA recognized that, as we have
explained, a “primary dwelling” means a farm operator’s
home, it dismissed as irrelevant that key requirement that
defines a “primary dwelling.” Friends of Yamhill County, ___
Or LUBA at ___ (slip op at 11). LUBA reasoned that the
requirement does not continue once the county has approved
construction of a “primary dwelling” and, thus, that the
requirement does not govern whether the proposed struc-
ture qualifies as a “dwelling” for purposes of ORS 215.448.
Id. at ___ (slip op at 11-12).
Even if LUBA’s premise is correct, however, its con-
clusion does not follow. A home occupation is a conditional
use under the land use laws that requires its own applica-
tion and approval process. See ORS 215.448 (describing the
approval conditions). One of the conditions for approval is
that the home occupation “shall be operated substantially
in” a “dwelling” or other building “normally associated with
uses permitted in the zone in which the property is located.”
ORS 215.448(1)(c). For the reasons explained above, we are
persuaded that the legislature intended to require, as a con-
dition for approval of a “home occupation,” that the occu-
pation will operate substantially in a structure that meets
the land use requirements for at least one category of struc-
ture allowed in the zone. Thus, it is the new conditional use
permit, not the original dwelling approval, that makes it
essential for the structure to meet the requirements for a
“dwelling” or other building “normally associated with uses
permitted in the zone in which the property is located.”9

9
The Court of Appeals observed that “it does not appear that the proposed
structure could qualify as a ‘primary dwelling,’ because the record does not indi-
cate whether the ‘resident’ would be the person who manages the vineyard,” but
it did not decide the case on that basis, because neither party pointed to the “farm
operator” requirement in briefing to the Court of Appeals. Friends of Yamhill
County, 325 Or at 292. But that meaning of “primary dwelling” is argued by
Friends in the briefing in this court, it was discussed at oral argument, and it
was an argument below that LUBA expressly addressed. Moreover, this court
has “an independent duty to correctly interpret any statute that comes before us,
regardless of the arguments and interpretations offered by the parties.” Strasser
v. State of Oregon, 368 Or 238, 260, 489 P3d 1025 (2021).
814 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

IV. CONCLUSION
On judicial review of a LUBA decision, the appel-
late court may reverse or remand a LUBA order if the order
is “unlawful in substance or procedure.” ORS 197.850(9)
(a); see Craven v. Jackson County, 308 Or 281, 283, 779 P2d
1011 (1989) (describing the statutory standard for judicial
review by the Court of Appeals as applicable to review in
this court as well). Although we agree with the Court of
Appeals that LUBA’s order was unlawful in substance, we
disagree with that court’s reasons for concluding that the
proposed structure, as a matter of law, is not a dwelling.
Instead, we conclude that LUBA erred for a different reason.
Based on our analysis of text, context, and legislative his-
tory, we have concluded that the “dwelling” for purposes of
the home occupation statute must satisfy the requirements
for a category of “dwelling” that the land use laws allow in
the zone. Because LUBA concluded otherwise, its decision
to affirm the home occupation permit in this case was based
on an incorrect construction of ORS 215.448 and, thus, was
unlawful in substance. Accordingly, we reverse and remand
the case to LUBA to consider Friends’ challenge to the coun-
ty’s approval of the conditional use permit under the stan-
dards articulated in this opinion.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in
part and reversed in part. The order of the Land Use Board
of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Land
Use Board of Appeals for further proceedings.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11089335. Public record. Not legal advice.