# Crystal Monique Richard v. Michelle King

> District Court, C.D. California · July 1, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11088249

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** July 1, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11088249

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing the narrow circumstances in 13 || which a court will order a benefits calculation rather than further proceedings

## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11 CRYSTAL M. R., Case No. ED CV 25-405-E

12 Plaintiff,

13
v. MEMORANDUM OPINION
14
FRANK BISIGNANO,
15 Commissioner of Social Security,
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Defendant.
17

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19 Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), IT IS HEREBY
20 ORDERED that the matter is remanded for further administrative action consistent
21 with this Opinion.
22
23 PROCEEDINGS
24
25 Plaintiff filed a complaint on February 13, 2025, seeking review of the
26 Administration’s denial of disability benefits. The parties consented to proceed
27 before a United States Magistrate Judge on March 4, 2025. Plaintiff filed
28 “Plaintiff’s Opening Brief” on May 15, 2025. Defendant filed “Defendant’s Brief”
1 on June 16, 2025. Plaintiff filed “Plaintiff’s Reply, etc.” on June 26, 2025.
2
3 STANDARD OF REVIEW
4
5 Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the Administration’s
6 decision to determine if: (1) the Administration’s findings are supported by
7 substantial evidence; and (2) the Administration used correct legal standards. See
8 Carmickle v. Comm’r, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499
9 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
10 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is “such relevant
11 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
12 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted);
13 see Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).
14
15 INTRODUCTION
16
17 In 2023, this Court reversed and remanded a previous administrative decision
18 against Plaintiff (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 785-95). The Court did so
19 because the Administration materially erred in regard to the opinion by Dr.
20 Chronister that Plaintiff’s ability to maintain regular workplace attendance “is
21 moderately impaired” (id.).
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23 Following remand, the Administration again materially erred in regard to the
24 opinion of Dr. Chronister that Plaintiff’s ability to maintain regular workplace
25 attendance “is moderately impaired.” Another remand is appropriate.
26 ///
27 ///
28 ///
1 DISCUSSION
2
3 The Court’s 2023 rulings included a ruling that the prior Administrative Law
4 Judge (“ALJ”) materially erred by failing to seek clarification from Dr. Chronister
5 regarding the doctor’s intended meaning in using the arguably ambiguous phrase
6 “moderately impaired.” The Court then stated:
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8 At a minimum, the uncertainty regarding the meaning of the
9 operative terms in Dr. Chronister’s report should have prompted the
10 ALJ to seek clarification from Dr. Chronister. Only Dr. Chronister
11 knows for certain the intended meaning of those arguably ambiguous
12 terms. “The ALJ has a special duty to fully and fairly develop the
13 record and to assure that the claimant’s interests are considered. This
14 duty exists even when the claimant is represented by counsel.” Brown
15 v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983); accord Garcia v.
16 Comm’r, 768 F.3d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Sims v. Apfel,
17 530 U.S. 103, 110-11 (2000) (“Social Security proceedings are
18 inquisitorial rather than adversarial. It is the ALJ’s duty to investigate
19 the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting
20 benefits. . . .”); McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d at 885 (ALJ must develop
21 record when there is ambiguous evidence). Here, the ALJ’s failure to
22 seek clarification constituted additional error. See id.; Robin R.A. v.
23 Kijakazi, 2022 WL 1599839, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2022) (“The
24 ambiguity in Dr. Chronister’s opinion [regarding a ‘moderate’
25 impairment in maintaining attendance] . . . should have prompted the
26 ALJ to seek clarification from Dr. Chronister”); see also Widmark v.
27 Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2006) (while it is a claimant’s
28 duty to provide the evidence to be used in making a residual
1 functional capacity determination, “the ALJ should not be a mere
2 umpire during disability proceedings”) (citations and internal
3 quotations omitted).
4
5 (A.R. 792-93).
6
7 Nevertheless, on remand, the ALJ again failed to seek clarification from Dr.
8 Chronister. Again, this failure constituted error.
9
10 Defendant appears to contend that any error was harmless, arguing that a
11 “moderate” impairment has no material impact on work functioning. Defendant’s
12 argument fails for the same reasons that the same or similar argument by Defendant
13 failed in 2023. The Court then stated:
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15 Defendant argues that the moderate impairment in Plaintiff’s
16 ability to maintain regular workplace attendance found to exist by Dr.
17 Chronister would not materially affect Plaintiff’s ability to maintain
18 regular workplace attendance. Defendant appears to argue that a
19 “moderate” impairment always permits the impaired person to
20 “function satisfactorily,” citing Social Security Form HA-1152-U3.
21 Defendant’s argument cannot be accepted on the present record. Dr.
22 Chronister did not define the operative terms in the doctor’s report.
23 Dr. Chronister did not employ Social Security Form HA-1152-U3.
24 Examining physicians do not always ascribe to a “moderate”
25 impairment the meaning for which Defendant argues. See, e.g.,
26 Bisconer v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 1041316, at *4 (D. Or. Feb. 1, 2018),
27 adopted, 2018 WL 1040089 (D. Or. Feb. 23, 2018) (“The word
28 ‘moderate’ is ambiguous in the context of work attendance, and
1 neither Dr. Strabinger nor the ALJ clarified the effects of a ‘moderate’
2 impairment. . . . As it stands, therefore, the record is ambiguous as to
3 whether [the claimant’s] moderate impairment translates into more
4 than two missed workdays per month, and the ALJ failed to address
5 the ambiguity in his opinion”); Johnson v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1501789,
6 at *2 (N.D. Cal. March 31, 2015) (in a follow-up questionnaire, the
7 doctor stated that a moderate limitation on the claimant’s ability to
8 maintain regular work attendance is likely to cause the claimant to be
9 absent from work more than four days per month); Colon v. Colvin,
10 2014 WL 6685474, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2014) (“terms like
11 ‘moderate’ are inherently vague and the Commissioner has provided
12 no specific definitions, other than to explain that ‘moderately limited’
13 means only that a claimant’s capacity is impaired; it does not indicate
14 the degree and extent of the limitation”) (citations and quotations
15 omitted); see also Grisham v. Colvin, 2014 WL 7140980, at *3 (E.D.
16 Cal. Dec. 12, 2014) (when a doctor renders a narrative opinion, and
17 does not use Form HA-1152-U3, the form’s definition of “moderate”
18 should not be imputed to the doctor).[1]
19
20 (A.R. 791-92).
21
22 The Court also explained in its 2023 rulings that the ALJ could not properly
23 reject Dr. Chronister’s opinion implicitly, and that any explicit rejection of the
24 opinion must be explained. The Court then stated:
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[1] In any event, the ALJ’s failure to rely on the definition of “moderate” in
26 Form HA-1152-U3 would preclude this Court from utilizing that definition to
27 affirm the ALJ’s decision. See Vasquez v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 2633413, at *7
(E.D. Cal. June 16, 2017) (and cases cited therein).
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1 If, contrary to Defendant’s argument, the ALJ actually rejected
2 Dr. Chronister’s opinion regarding the impairment of regular
3 workplace attendance (in favor of Dr. Paxton’s contrary opinion or
4 otherwise), the ALJ erred by failing to explain the rejection. See
5 Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8P (“If the [residual functional
6 capacity] assessment conflicts with an opinion from a medical source,
7 the adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not adopted”; “The
8 adjudicator must also explain how any material inconsistencies or
9 ambiguities in the evidence in the case record were considered and
10 resolved”);1 accord Millsap v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 4534341, at *5
11 (applying SSR 96-8P to implicit rejection of an impairment in the
12 claimant’s capacity to maintain regular attendance); see also Woods v.
13 Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022) (under the new
14 regulations, the ALJ need not state specific, legitimate reasons for
15 rejecting the opinion of an examining physician, but still must provide
16 some explanation for the rejection); Heather R. v. Saul, 2021 WL
17 3080331, at *22-23 (D. S.D. July 21, 2021) (ALJ erred by appearing
18 implicitly to reject doctor’s opinion that claimant would be
19 moderately impaired in maintaining regular attendance, although the
20 ALJ purportedly had given “great weight” to other opinions by the
21 same doctor); Wiles v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 5186333, at *3 (ALJ erred
22 by failing to state reasons for implicitly rejecting doctor’s opinion that
23 claimant would have moderate limitations in maintaining regular
24 attendance).
25 ///
26

27 1 SSRs are binding on the Administration. See Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 n.1
(9th Cir. 1990).
28
1 (A.R. 789-90).
2
3 The entirety of the ALJ’s discussion of Dr. Chronister’s opinion on remand is
4 indented below:
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6 The opinion by the psychological CE at Exhibit 7F is found
7 somewhat persuasive. The CE opined the claimant has moderate
8 limitation in maintaining regular attendance and completing a
9 normal workday and workweek without psychiatric interruptions, yet
10 also found only mild limitation in performing simple and repetitive
11 tasks, accepting instructions from supervisors, and performing work
12 activities on a consistent basis without special or additional
13 instructions. As noted above, the undersigned finds that despite
14 moderate mental limitations, the claimant is able to maintain
15 attendance and sustain work activity consistent with the RFC detailed
16 above. Therefore, based on supportability with medical signs and
17 laboratory findings, consistency with the objective medical record as
18 discussed herein, and area of specialization, the undersigned finds the
19 psychological CE’s opinion is somewhat persuasive.
20
21 (A.R. 755).
22
23 Thus, the ALJ’s oblique rejection of Dr. Chronister’s “moderately impaired”
24 opinion on remand2 was less than explicit and was explained only with generalized,
25

26 2 The prior ALJ purported to have been “highly persuaded” by Dr.
27 Chronister’s opinions, although the prior ALJ failed properly to translate any
moderate impairment into the residual functional capacity assessment (A.R. 786-
28 89).
1 conclusory references.
2
3 Again, the Court is unable to find these errors to have been harmless. As the
4 Court stated in 2023:
5
6 “[A]n ALJ’s error is harmless where it is inconsequential to the
7 ultimate nondisability determination.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d
8 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations and quotations omitted),
9 superseded by regulation on other grounds as stated in Sisk v. Saul,
10 820 Fed. App’x 604, 606 (9th Cir. 2020); see McLeod v. Astrue, 640
11 F.3d 881, 887 (9th Cir. 2011) (error not harmless where “the
12 reviewing court can determine from the ‘circumstances of the case’
13 that further administrative review is needed to determine whether
14 there was prejudice from the error”). Here, the vocational expert
15 testified that a person absent from the workplace even as infrequently
16 as twice each month could not perform any job (A.R. 39).3
17
18 (A.R. 790-91).
19
20 Remand again is appropriate because the circumstances of this case continue
21 to suggest that further development of the record and further administrative review
22 could remedy the ALJ’s errors. See Treichler v. Comm’r, 775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th
23 Cir. 2014) (“Where, as in this case, an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is
24 uncertain and unambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the
25 agency”); McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d at 888; see also INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12,
26
27 3 At the hearing following remand, a vocational expert testified that a person
having “two to three work absences each month” could not perform any job (A.R.
28 778).
1 || 16 (2002) (upon reversal of an administrative determination, the proper course is
2 || remand for additional agency investigation or explanation, except in rare
3 || circumstances); Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2017) (reversal
4 || with a directive for the immediate calculation of benefits is a “rare and prophylactic
5 || exception to the well-established ordinary remand rule”); Dominguez v. Colvin,
6 || 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Unless the district court concludes that further
7 || administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not remand with
8 || a direction to provide benefits”); Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1180-81 (9th
9 || Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1038 (2000) (remand for further proceedings rather
10 || than for the immediate payment of benefits is appropriate where there are
11 |) “sufficient unanswered questions in the record’); compare Brown-Hunter v. Colvin,
12 || 806 F.3d 487, 495-96 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing the narrow circumstances in
13 || which a court will order a benefits calculation rather than further proceedings).
14 || There remain significant unanswered questions in the present record.
15
16 CONCLUSION
17
18 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Administration is reversed in
19 || part and the matter is remanded for further administrative action consistent with this
20 || Opinion.
21
22 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
23
24 DATED: July 1, 2025
(LEA ELLZ=
—____CHARLESF.FICK.
27 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
28

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11088249. Public record. Not legal advice.