# Todd v. Derry Township

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · June 2, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11088125

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 2, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JASON R. TODD, : Civil No. 1:25-CV-435
:
Plaintiff, :
: (Chief Judge Brann)
v. :
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
DERRY TOWNSHIP, et al., :
:
Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Factual Background

This case comes before us for a screening review of the
plaintiff’s amended complaint.1 (Doc. 278). The plaintiff, Jason Todd,
filed this action against Derry Township, Selective Insurance Company,
and various individual employees of these entities on March 10, 2025.
(Doc. 1). Todd also filed a motion for leave to proceed ,
which was granted by the court. (Docs. 2, 28). Magistrate Judge Schwab
performed a screening review of Todd’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

1 This matter was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Schwab, and the
parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. (Doc. 68). The matter
has been reassigned to Chief Judge Brann and referred to the
undersigned for further consideration of the plaintiff’s amended
complaint. (Doc. 413).
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and found that the complaint failed to state a claim but
permitted Todd an opportunity to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 276).

On May 12, 2025, Todd filed an amended complaint and attached
exhibits, which is currently the operative pleading. (Doc. 278).
Todd’s amended complaint raises claims of First Amendment

retaliation and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due
Process violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Racketeer Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act violation and a state law claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. 278 at 3-4). Todd’s
claims arise out of an incident in September of 2024 in Derry Township,

Pennsylvania when he was assaulted by an individual named William
Shoemaker. ( at 3). Todd claims that he suffered a traumatic brain
injury from this assault, and that despite evidence of this injury being

provided to the Derry Township Police Department, Shoemaker was only
charged with and pleaded guilty to summary harassment. ( ).
Todd believes that Derry Township suppressed evidence of his

injuries and mishandled the investigation. (Doc. 278 at 3). He further
claims that certain individual defendants engaged in retaliatory and
harassing behavior toward him, including issuing him a cease and desist
letter, which caused him severe psychological distress. ( ). Todd also
asserts that Derry Township denied his Right to Know requests in 2020

and 2024, which he claims “block[ed] access to key evidence.” ( ). With
respect to the insurance defendants, Todd alleges that these defendants
issued him improper correspondence and ignored his claims. ( ).

Based on these averments, Todd asserts a First Amendment
retaliation claim against Defendant Armstrong; an Equal Protection and

Due Process claim against all defendants; a RICO claim against the
individual insurance defendants, Defendant Armstrong, and Derry
Township; and a state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional

distress against all defendants. (Doc. 278 at 3-4). As relief, Todd seeks
monetary damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. ( at
4).

After review, we conclude that the plaintiff’s amended complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, we
recommend that the amended complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion

A. Screening of Complaints – Standard of Review
We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review
complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We review such complaints to
determine whether there are frivolous or malicious claims, or if the

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
This statutory preliminary screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a

complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this legal benchmark, under federal pleading

standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief

under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations
in the complaint as true, , 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from

them after construing them in the light most favorable to the non-
movant.” , 20 F.3d 1250,
1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal

conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
; , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice”).
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:

[A]fter , when presented with a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-
part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim
should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any
legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then
determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for
relief.” at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more
than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint
has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. ,
515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme Court instructed in ,
“[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint
has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’ ” , 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility”
determination will be “a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.”

, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on
the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public

record. , 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court
can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant
attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are

based on the [attached] documents.”
, 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally,

if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically
attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the
court may consider such document in its determination.

, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002).
However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when
deciding a motion to dismiss. , 20 F.3d at 1261.

Finally, when reviewing a complaint, we are reminded that
such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial
justice.’” , 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(f)). We must apply the relevant law even if the plaintiff
does not mention it by name. , 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d
Cir. 2003) (citing , 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)).
B. This Complaint Should be Dismissed.

After a review of the plaintiff’s amended complaint, we conclude
that the plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted and should be dismissed.
1. Section 1983 Claims

The plaintiff asserts several claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging violations of his constitutional rights under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Section
1983 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any
person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another
individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.”
, 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Section
1983 “does not create any new substantive rights but instead provides a
remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.”
(citation omitted).

Accordingly, to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
plead two elements: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a
“person” acting under color of law; and (2) that conduct deprived the

plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States , 219 F.3d

261, 268 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); ,
920 F.2d 1135, 1141–42 (3d Cir. 1990).
Additionally, a plaintiff alleging a Section 1983 claim must plead

each defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrong.
, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988). Personal
involvement may be shown through allegations regarding the

defendant's own conduct, or that the defendant had knowledge of the
unconstitutional conduct and acquiesced in the behavior.
a. Personal Involvement – Derry Township Defendants

At the outset, we note that there are no factual allegations with
respect to Derry Township Defendants Nutt, Wyckoff, Corado,
Giovanniello, Zmuda, Jackson, Warner, and Shearer. The complaint
contains no allegations that these defendants took any action, or failed to
take action, with respect to the alleged constitutional violations.

Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to plead the requisite personal
involvement of these individual defendants, and they should be
dismissed.

b. State Action – Selective Insurance Defendants
Todd asserts his Equal Protection and Due Process claims against

all of the defendants. But Todd has not alleged facts to show that
Selective Insurance Group or its individual employees, were acting under
color of state law and subject to liability under Section 1983. The Third

Circuit has set forth three broad tests to determine if a private entity or
actors can be said to have acted under color of state law:
(1) “whether the private entity has exercised powers that are
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state”; (2)
“whether the private party has acted with the help of or in
concert with state officials”; and (3) whether “the [s]tate has
so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with
the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity.”

, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
, 51 F.3d 1137, 1142 (3d Cir. 1995)).
Here, the only allegations concerning Selective Insurance and its
individual employees are that these defendants issued improper

correspondence to the plaintiff and ignored his claims. (Doc. 278 at 3).
In fact, Todd explicitly states that the individual defendants’ actions were
taken in their capacity “representing SIGI” when they allegedly issued

improper correspondence and ignored his claims. ( ). These facts do
not suggest that these defendants can be characterized as state actors for

purposes of Section 1983 liability. Accordingly, any Section 1983 claims
against them should be dismissed.
c. Equal Protection

Even affording the plaintiff every benefit of the doubt and assuming
that the insurance defendants can be characterized as state actors,
Todd’s amended complaint fails to state an Equal Protection claim

against any of the defendants. The Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state may “deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. To state a claim for

discrimination under the Equal Protection clause, the plaintiff must
show that he endured purposeful discrimination based on membership in
a protected class of individuals. , 120 F.3d
1286, 1293 (3d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, he must establish that he was
subjected to “(1) disparate treatment in relation to other similarly

situated individuals, and (2) that the discriminatory treatment was
based on [the protected characteristic].”
, 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 667 (W.D. Pa.

2015).
Here, Todd’s amended complaint alleges in a completely conclusory

but vague fashion that all of the defendants denied him equal protection,
and that he suffered harm based on his “veteran and disability status.”
(Doc. 278 at 3-4). But nothing alleged in the amended complaint even

remotely suggests that the defendants engaged in purposeful
discrimination because of Todd’s disability or veteran status. Other than
one conclusory sentence to that effect, Todd’s amended complaint is

devoid of allegations that would tend to show that any of the defendants
engaged in purposeful discrimination toward him because of these two
characteristics. Accordingly, the amended complaint fails to state an

Equal Protection claim.
d. Due Process
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to Todd’s Due Process

claim. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: “No state shall ... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...” U.S.
Const. amend XIV. Todd fails to allege that any of the defendants

deprived him of a liberty or property interest. Like his Equal Protection
claim, Todd merely alleges in a conclusory fashion that the defendants

violated his Due Process rights, citing his disabled veteran status.
Without more, we cannot conclude that Todd has sufficiently alleged that
any of the defendants violated his Due Process rights. Accordingly, any

Due Process claims should be dismissed.
e. Retaliation
Todd also asserts a First Amendment retaliation claim against

Defendant Armstrong, alleging vaguely that Armstrong sent him a cease
and desist letter “intended to chill public criticism and deter legal
redress.” (Doc. 278 at 3). To state a retaliation claim under the First

Amendment, the plaintiff must show: (1) that he engaged in
constitutionally protected conduct; (2) that he suffered “retaliatory action
sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his
constitutional rights”; and (3) a causal connection between the protected
activity and the retaliatory act. , 463 F.3d

285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006).
In his amended complaint, arguably Todd alleges that he engaged
in protected activity when he made Right to Know requests, reached out

to the victim coordinator regarding his concerns of suppressed evidence,
and publicly criticized Derry Township. (Doc. 278 at 2-3). He also seems

to allege that the receipt of a cease and desist letter had a chilling or
deterring effect on his exercise of his constitutional rights. ( at 3). But
there are no allegations from which we can infer causation. In fact, the

amended complaint is devoid of allegations pertaining to what the cease
and desist letter contained, when it was sent, or if it was in any way
related to Todd’s alleged protected activity. Accordingly, we conclude

that the amended complaint fails to state a First Amendment retaliation
claim against Armstrong.
f. Monell

Because Todd asserts claims against Derry Township, we read any
such claim under § 1983 as asserting liability against the
Township. , 436 U.S.
658, 695 (1978). A municipal entity may be liable for a constitutional
violation under § 1983 if the violation was a direct result of the entity's

policy, custom, or practice. However, an entity may not be held liable
“solely because injuries were inflicted by its agents or employees.”
, 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir.

2007). Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate a “direct causal link”
between the alleged constitutional violation and the municipal policy or

custom. , 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
In cases where a plaintiff is alleging a failure to train officers, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the “municipality’s failure to train police

officers ... amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with
whom the police come into contact.” , 489 U.S. at 388. To
establish such a claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate “contemporaneous

knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of
similar incidents,” coupled with “circumstances under which the
supervisor’s actions or inaction could be found to have communicated a

message of approval to the offending subordinate.”
, 159 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing
, 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997)).
Initially, we note that because we have concluded Todd’s complaint
fails to state a constitutional violation against any of the individual

defendants, any claim against the Township must fail.
, 644 F. App’x 172, 178 (3d Cir. 2016).
However, even if Todd’s amended complaint stated a claim for a

constitutional violation, there are no allegations to support
liability. The amended complaint fails to assert facts showing that any

alleged constitutional violation was a result of the Township’s policy or
custom, or that any Township supervisor had contemporaneous
knowledge of the incident or knowledge of prior similar incidents. Nor

are there any allegations that a Township supervisor communicated
approval to an offending subordinate. Rather, the amended complaint
seeks to hold the Township liable on a theory of ,

which is insufficient to establish liability. , 436 U.S. at 691
(“[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a
theory.”). Therefore, any claim against the Township

fails.
2. RICO Claim
Todd also brings a RICO claim against Armstrong, Derry

Township, and the individual insurance defendants, Marchioni, Lanza,
and Swartz. “RICO provides for civil actions . . . by which ‘[a]ny person
injured in his business or property’ by a RICO violation may seek treble

damages and attorney’s fees.” , 528 U.S. 549, 552 (2000)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). RICO violations are set forth in § 1962,

and “[a] common thread running throughout § 1962 is that an injured
party must demonstrate that the defendant was engaged in a ‘pattern of
racketeering activity.’” , 47 F.3d 1280, 1289 (3d Cir. 1995)

(en banc). The statute sets forth enumerated acts that constitute
“racketeering activity.” § 1961(1)(A)-(G). Further, the statute
requires that a plaintiff allege injury to business or property as a result

of the alleged RICO violation. § 1964(c); ,
604 U.S. --, 145 S. Ct. 931, 939 (2025).
Todd alleges that these defendants engaged in racketeering

activity, including mail fraud.2 (Doc. 278 at 4). However, other than this

2 We note that the other conduct alleged to constitute racketeering
activity—“suppression of evidence” and “insurance deception”—do not fit
conclusory legal assertion, there are no facts alleged in the amended
complaint from which we can even infer that these defendants engaged

in conduct that constituted mail fraud. , 298
F.3d 228, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2002) (setting forth the elements of mail fraud
as: “(1) a scheme to defraud; (2) use of the mails to further that scheme;

and (3) fraudulent intent.”). Additionally, while Todd has alleged
personal injury due to the defendants’ alleged conduct, the complaint

contains no allegations that Todd’s “business or property” has been
harmed by the defendants. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s RICO claim
should be dismissed.

3. ADA Claim
Based upon some of his filings, the plaintiff may be attempting to
assert a claim of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”). While the amended complaint does not actually assert such
a claim, out of an abundance of caution, we will address the plaintiff’s
allegations as asserting a claim under Title II of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. §

12132.

within the definition of “racketeering activity” under the statute. §
1961(1).
Title II provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be

denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. §
12132. To state a claim under Title II, a plaintiff must show (1) that he

is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was excluded from
participation in or denied the benefits of services or programs; and (3)

that the exclusion or denial was because of his disability.
, 82 F.4th 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2023).
Assuming Todd’s amended complaint sufficiently alleges that he is

a qualified individual with a disability, he fails to allege how, if at all, he
was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of services
provided by Derry Township because of a disability. Rather, as we have

noted, the amended complaint vaguely asserts that the defendants’
conduct was directed toward Todd because he is a disabled veteran. This
type of conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a claim against this

public entity under the ADA.3 Moreover, to the extent any ADA claim is

3 To the extent Todd’s claims extend to Selective Insurance, they would
not be a proper defendant to an ADA claim since “the proper defendant
for a Title II ADA claim is the public entity or an individual who controls
asserted against an individual defendant, courts within this circuit have
concluded that there is no individual liability under the ADA.

, 2024 WL 2401983, at *4 (M.D. Pa. May 23, 2024) (citing
, No. 3:24-cv-00335, 2024 WL 1916725, at *4-5 (M.D.
Pa. May 1, 2024); , 505 F. Supp. 3d 360, 405-06 (M.D.

Pa. 2020)). Therefore, we conclude that the amended complaint fails to
state a claim under the ADA.

4. Intentional Inflicton of Emotional Distress
Todd also asserts a state law claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress against all defendants, alleging that their conduct—

intimidation, obstruction, and targeting against him because he is a
veteran—was extreme and outrageous and caused him severe emotional
distress. A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under

Pennsylvania law requires that a plaintiff establish: (1) extreme and
outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) that the conduct is intentional
or reckless; (3) that the conduct causes emotional distress; and (4) that

the distress suffered is severe. , 691 A.2d 476, 481 (Pa.

or directs the functioning of a public entity.” , 2023 WL
3674336, at *8 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 2023).
Super. Ct. 1997) (citations omitted). For conduct to be considered
extreme and outrageous, it must go “beyond all possible bounds of

decency,” so as to be “regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized society.” , 158
F.Supp.2d 553, 561 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (quoting

, 527 A.2d 998, 990-91 (Pa. 1987)).
Here, Todd’s allegations regarding the defendants’ conduct are

conclusory in nature and cannot support a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. The amended complaint merely asserts that the
defendants engaged in conduct such as “intimidation,” “obstruction,” and

“veteran-targeting.” (Doc. 278 at 4). Todd further alleges that Swartz
and Armstrong “engaged in harassing, retaliatory, and obstructive
behavior—including verbal threats, intimidation, and misleading legal

correspondence—causing Plaintiff severe psychological distress.” ( at
3). But the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has found that “liability . . .
does not extend to mere insults, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions,

or other trivialities.” , 527 A.2d at 991 (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d). We cannot conclude from Todd’s vague and
conclusory allegations of threats and intimidation that this conduct rises
to the level of extreme and outrageous necessary to support a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the amended

complaint fails to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress under Pennsylvania law and should be dismissed.4
C. The Plaintiff’s Motions for Miscellaneous Relief should be
Denied.

The plaintiff has filed over 20 motions for various miscellaneous
relief. (Docs. 287, 298, 304, 308, 310, 323, 330, 349, 351, 356, 359, 362,
365, 369, 383, 386, 397, 404, 406, 408, 415, 418, 419, 420, 421). We

conclude that these motions should be denied.
Several of these motions seek the recusal of Magistrate Judge
Schwab and reassignment of this matter to a district court judge. (

Docs. 298, 308, 349, 351). These motions should be denied as moot, as
this matter has been reassigned. Two such motions also seeks to add
Magistrate Judge Schwab as a defendant to this action. (Docs. 404, 415).

Construing these motions as ones for leave to amend his complaint to add
Judge Schwab as a defendant, we conclude that any amendment would

4 We further note that the court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over this state law claim upon a finding that the plaintiff’s
federal claims fail. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); ,
383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
be futile because Judge Schwab would be entitled to absolute immunity
from claims arising out of her performance of her judicial duties.

, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991); , 228 F. App’x 238, 243
(3d Cir. 2007). Accordingly, these motions should be denied.
Other motions seek various rulings regarding orders Judge Schwab

entered in this matter, previous motions that were filed and unopposed,
judicial “audits” and investigations into judicial officers, and the

plaintiff’s offers of various pieces of evidence to support his claims. (Docs.
287, 304, 310, 323, 330, 356, 359, 362, 365, 369, 383, 386, 397, 406, 408,
418, 421, 422). In our view, because we have concluded that the plaintiff’s

amended complaint fails to state a claim, and because many of these
motions are procedurally improper and are not accompanied by a
supporting brief in violation of Local Rule 7.5, these motions should be

denied or deemed withdrawn.5
Todd also filed a motion for preliminary injunction, which appears
to assert that he would prevail on the “unopposed motions” he has filed

5 It appears that the plaintiff has filed one, three-page brief in support of
several of these motions. (Doc. 411). This filing does not address the
substance of the plaintiff’s motions and should not be construed as
complying with Local Rule 7.5.
in this matter. (Doc. 419). But Todd has not met the substantive
requirements under Rule 65 to show he is entitled to any preliminary

injunctive relief. “A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show:
(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable
harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will

not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the
public interest favors such relief.”

, 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing
, 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999)). The Supreme Court has
underscored that “a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and

drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a
clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” ,
520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Because

we have concluded that Todd’s amended complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, Todd cannot show a likelihood of
success on the merits of his claims. Accordingly, any motion for

injunctive relief should be denied.
Todd also filed a motion to compel records from the court. (Doc.
420). In this motion, he seeks to compel the court to provide him with
internal communications regarding this case, as well as metadata
concerning docket entries, citing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

governing discovery between parties, as well as the United States
Constitution and the judicial code of conduct. ( ). Put simply, the
discovery process outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the

Constitution, and the judicial code of conduct do not give a litigant
unfettered access to internal court communications, if any exist. The

plaintiff provides no authority for the disclosure of such information.
Accordingly, this motion should be denied.
In closing, we make the following observations. The plaintiff

appears to take issue with this court’s handling of his case, from ruling
too quickly on motions to not ruling quickly enough. He also complains
of the court “suppressing” evidence of his mental health impairments and

disability, which he claims violates his rights under the ADA. There has
been no suppression of documents by this court. The plaintiff’s filings
remain on the docket as he filed them. Many documents that the plaintiff

characterizes as “unopposed motions” are not motions at all but are
“notices” of random pieces of evidence he has filed. However, documents
concerning the plaintiff’s mental health impairments, injuries, or
disability, as well as veteran status, shed no light on the claims asserted
in his amended complaint. Nor can we consider such documents in

determining whether the claims in the amended complaint state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, as they are not attached to the
plaintiff’s amended complaint. , 502 F.3d 263, 268

(3d Cir. 2007).
In addition, while Todd continues to complain of judicial

misconduct and ethical violations against the judges of this court, there
is no indication that any judge of this court has exhibited bias or prejudice
against Todd because of his disability or veteran status, or for any other

reason. Rather, the court has attempted to address Todd’s myriad filings,
and in doing so, has concluded that Todd’s amended complaint legally
fails to state a claim against the defendants he has sued.

III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED
that the amended complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that
Todd’s outstanding motions for miscellaneous relief (Docs. 287, 298, 304,
308, 310, 323, 330, 349, 351, 356, 359, 362, 365, 369, 383, 386, 397, 404,
406, 408, 415, 418, 419, 420, 421) be DENIED.

The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule
72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or
matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a
habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.
The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall
apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or
her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge
may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or
recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.

Submitted this 2nd day of June 2025.

Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11088125. Public record. Not legal advice.