# LEWIS v. SCI FOREST

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · June 2, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11088091

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 2, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERIE
SYLVESTER LEWIS, )
)
Plaintiff ) 1:24-CV-00090-SPB-RAL
)
vs. ) SUSUAN PARADISE BAXTER
) United States District Judge
SCI FOREST; WELLPATH; NP ELEANOR __ )
DORRION, NP RAJU GEENANDER; RN RICHARD A. LANZILLO
BRADLEY M. AVENALI; MEDICAL Chief United States Magistrate Judge
DIRECTOR KIMBERLY SMITH; UNIT
MANAGER BRUMBAUGH; CO ROOK; ) Report and Recommendation on DOC
CO MILLER; LT. BEATTY, SECURITY; ) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
AND L. REEHER, GRIEVANCE )
COORDINATOR, ECF NO. 4
Defendants )

I. Recommendation
The DOC Defendants! have moved to dismiss certain claims of Plaintiff's Complaint
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. 4. For the following reasons, it is respectfully
recommended that the DOC Defendants’ motion be GRANTED.
Il. Report
A. Background and Relevant Procedural History
Plaintiff Sylvester Lewis (“Lewis”), an inmate in the custody of the DOC, commenced this

pro se action in the Court of Common Pleas of Forest County, Pennsylvania. His Complaint asserts
Eighth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law tort law claims. ECF No. 1-2. It

DOC Defendants are the State Correctional Institution at Forest (“SCI-Forest”) and Pennsylvania Department
of vorrections (“DOC”) employee eeeCO” Nurse Bradley vena Unit Manager Brumbaugh, Meare Director
Kimberly Smith, Correctional Officer (“CO”) Rook, CO Miller, Grievance Coordinator Reeher, and Lt. Beatty.
Lewis’s Complaint also refers to a Defendant “Sgt. HOV.” This defendant has not been properly identified or served.
The Court has ordered Lewis to do so or face dismissal without prejudice of all claims against him pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).

names eleven defendants, including SCI-Forest, where Lewis was previously housed, and seven
individuals employed by the DOC at that prison (collectively, “DOC Defendants”). The
Complaint also names Wellpath, a private company with which the DOC contracted to provide
medical care to inmates at DOC facilities, including SCI Forest, and Nurse Practitioner Eleanor
Dorrion, a Wellpath employee (collectively (“Wellpath Defendants”). The final defendant is

Nurse Practitioner Raju Geenander.? The Wellpath Defendants removed the action to this Court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446 based on federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 2
B. Factual Allegations and Claims
The Complaint presents Lewis’s factual allegations in a running narrative rather than in

separately numbered paragraphs. While the Complaint is often difficult to decipher, the Court has

identified the following material allegations of fact, which the Court accepts as true for purposes
of the DOC Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Beginning in 2017, Lewis served part of his incarceration at SCI-Forest. In December
2021, Defendant Brumbaugh, the Unit Manager on D Unit, assigned Inmate Ivy to be Lewis’s

cellmate. According to the Complaint, Ivy was under investigation because he had been stabbed

by another inmate. On December 4, 2021, he complained to CO Miller, CO Rook, and Sgt. HOV

that he did not want to be placed in a cell with Ivy, but they refused to move Lewis or Ivy. Lewis

2 Geenander’s employment status and possible association with the DOC or Wellpath are unclear as no attorney has
entered an appearance on his behalf.
3 On November 11, 2024, Wellpath and related entities filed a petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Texas for relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Thereafter, the Bankruptcy Court entered
a series of orders staying all cases against the debtor entities and their employees. This Court, in turn, entered an order
staying this case. See ECF No. 31. On May | and 9, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court entered orders that resulted in the
lifting of the automatic stay, and this Court, in turn, lifted its stay of the case on June 2, 2025. See ECF No. 36.

2 .

alleges that the following day, December 5, he again asked not to be placed in a cell with Ivy, but
prison personnel again refused his request.
On December 13, 2021, Lewis was watching TV in his cell when Ivy entered. Lewis told
Ivy he did not want to share a cell with him, and Ivy made disparaging remarks about Lewis
because he is a convicted sex offender. Another inmate brought alcohol to the cell and Ivy began
drinking. Ivy then grabbed Lewis by the collar and attempted to punch him. Lewis managed to
evade Ivy’s blow but struck his knee on a stool during the altercation. Ivy continued to throw
punches at Lewis. Ultimately, Lewis successfully placed Ivy in a “submission” hold and hit the
call button in his cell. During this phase of the altercation, Lewis’s knee struck the concrete. Lewis
alleges that medical personnel at SCI-Forest failed to properly treat the injuries to his knee. He
also alleges that his television was damaged in the altercation with Ivy and that prison officials
have refused to replace it.
While Lewis’s Complaint invokes a multitude of legal labels the Court has identified the
following five claims that are potentially implicated by his factual allegations:
□ (1) An Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants CO Miller, CO Rook, Unit
Manager Brumbaugh, and Sgt. HOV based on their failure to protect Lewis from
Ivy. See ECF No. 1-2, pp. 7-8.
(2) An Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants NP Dorrian, NP Geenander,
Medical Director Kimberly Smith, Reeher, and Lt. Beatty based on their alleged
deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. See ECF No. 1-2, pp. 9-10.
(3) A due process claim based on the prison’s failure to fix or replace Lewis’s
television. Jd., p. 9.

(4) A medical malpractice claim against Defendants Dorrian and Geenander. /d., pp.
18-19; and
(5) A negligence claim against Defendants Dorrian, Geenander, and Smith. Id., p. 20.

The DOC Defendants have moved to dismiss certain claims against certain of them under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See ECF No. 4. Specifically, they argue that (1) Defendant SCI-Forest is

not a person for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or otherwise subject to suit; (2) the Complaint fails

to allege Defendants Beatty and Reeher’s personal involvement in actionable conduct; (3) the □

Complaint fails to state a deliberate indifference to medical needs claim against Defendant Smith
because she is a non-medical prison administrator ; (4) sovereign immunity bars Lewis’s state law
negligence claim; and (5) the Complaint fails to state a claim against any DOC Defendant for
damage to or loss of his property.’ Lewis filed a brief in opposition to the DOC Defendants’
motion. See ECF No. 21. □

C. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, | F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a

motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the

merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5

C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)); see
also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-
pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.
U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).

4 The DOC Defendants have not moved to dismiss Lewis’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim.

While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss,
a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A
“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Jd. (citing Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if
they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret.
Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch.
Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as
factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286). See also
McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court

must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.”).
Finally, because Lewis is proceeding pro se, his complaint will be held to “less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521
(1972). If the court can reasonably read his pro se pleading to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, it will do so despite his failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories,

poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552,
555 (3d Cir. 1969).
D. Discussion
1. SCI-Forest is not a person for purposes of § 1983 or otherwise an entity
subject to suit.
SCI-Forest is not a person within the meaning of § 1983 and, therefore, it is not subject to
suit under that statute. See Stanford v. Walton, 2019 WL 5068666, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2019)
(citing Mincy v. Deparlos, 2011 WL 1120295, at *7 (M.D. Pa. March 24, 2011) (“[A] prison or

correctional facility is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983”), aff'd, 497 Fed. Appx. 234,
239 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2012)). In fact, a state correctional institution is simply a collection of buildings
operated by the DOC. See Jones v. Erie Cnty. Prison, 2022 WL 3236939, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 11,
2022) (county prison is not an entity amendable to suit), report and recommendation adopted,
2022 WL 3228113 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2022); Regan v. Upper Darby Twp., 2009 WL 650384, at
*4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2009) (same). As such, it has no legal existence independent of the DOC or
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that would render it subject to suit under any theory. Finally,
to the extent, Lewis intends his inclusion of SCI-Forest to be a claim against the DOC or the
Commonwealth, his claim is also barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Woodell v.
Wenerowicz, 2019 WL 4139264, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2019) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) (“Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many
deprivations of civil liberties, but it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a
remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties.”); Green v. Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., 2016 WL 7239891, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2016) (holding Eleventh Amendment
immunity barred section 1983 claims against DOC)). Accordingly, Lewis’s claims against SCI-
Forest should be dismissed with prejudice.
2. The Complaint fails to allege facts to support Defendant Beatty or
Defendant Reeher’s personal involvement in actionable conduct.
A § 1983 plaintiff “must show that each and every defendant was ‘personal[ly] involve[d]’
in depriving him of his rights.” Kirk v. Roan, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting
Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006)). This means that each defendant must have
played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“Ina § 1983
suit ... [a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is
only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358 Fed. Appx. 297, 300 (3d Cir.

‘ .

2009). In the absence of factual allegations to support that a defendant played a role in depriving
the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swariz, 951 F.
Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the
plaintiffs had failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that certain defendants played an
affirmative part in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation).
These principles apply with equal force where the defendants are supervising prison
officials. See, e. g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that liability
for supervisory officials must still be based on “personal involvement in the alleged wrongs”);
Evancho vy. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[L]iability cannot be predicated solely on

the operation of respondeat superior.”). Although a supervisor cannot encourage constitutional
violations, “a supervising public official has [no] affirmative constitutional duty to supervise and
discipline so as to prevent violations of constitutional rights by his or her subordinates.” Chinchello

vy. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986); Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (d Cir.

1990). Moreover, it is “well established that the filing of a grievance is not sufficient to show the

actual knowledge necessary for a defendant to be found personally involved in the alleged unlawful
conduct.” Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F. Supp. 2d 776, 782 (W.D. Pa. 2013). See also Mincy v.
Chmielsewski, 508 Fed. Appx. 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A]n officer’s review of, or failure to □
investigate, an inmate’s grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite personal
involvement.”). Rather, a supervisor-defendant may only be liable for unconstitutional acts
undertaken by subordinates if the supervisor either: (1) with deliberate indifference to the

consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the]
constitutional harm; or (2) participated in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate
them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s

unconstitutional conduct. A.M. ex rel. J MK. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586
(3d Cir. 2004).
In the instant case, Lewis’s only factual averment regarding Defendant Reeher, a prison
Grievance Coordinator, relates to her conduct after the incident with the guards. He alleges that
Recher did not meet with him or review the video footage Lewis requested be preserved. See ECF □

1-2, p. 12 (“She refused to hold the guards responsible and in doing this assisted them not to replace
or give me correct care.”). Lewis also alleges in his opposition brief that, “[s]o now my Grievance
is seen by L. Reeher and she did not investigate and over looked how to insure C.O’s act in a safe

manner which falls under deliberate indifference.” ECF No. 21, p. 3. Allegations such as these,
which seek to hold a defendant responsible for the unconstitutional actions of other individuals
based upon her supervisory role in the prison system, are insufficient to establish personal
involvement in the deprivation of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Kloss v. SCI-Albion, 2018 WL
4609144, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2018) (allegation that supervisory defendant was “made aware
of several issues of the plaintiff's and .. . failed to help him” is insufficient to state a claim for
reliefs) participation in an administrative appeal process); Rogers v. United States, 696 F.Supp.2d
472, 488 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“Ifa grievance official’s only involvement is investigating and/or ruling

on an inmate’s grievance after the incident giving rise to the grievance has already occurred, there
is no personal involvement on the part of that official”).
Similarly, Lewis’s only allegation against Defendant Beatty is that although Lewis told
him that his knees were sore and that his television had been broken, Beatty did not fix or replace
the television and discounted his claim of injury “because RN Bradley M. Aveali lied on his report
to keep staff members from trouble...” ECF No. 21, p. 3; see also ECF No. 1-2, p. 9. These
allegations are similarly inadequate to support a finding that Beatty personally participated in any

violation of Lewis’s rights. Accordingly, the claims against Reeher and Beatty should be
dismissed.
3. The Complaint does not support a finding that Defendant Smith, a non-
medical employee, was deliberately indifferent to Lewis’s serious medical
need.
Lewis’s claims against Defendant Smith are based on her alleged failure to approve an

x-ray of his knee, and that she as the “boss [of NP Geenander and NP Dorrian] allowed them to

put [Lewis] at risk for infections and permanent knee damage operated without an x-ray.” ECF
No. 1-2, p. 18. Smith, the prison’s healthcare administrator, is not a physician or healthcare
provider. Healthcare administrators such as Smith are “undisputably administrators, not doctors.”
See Thomas v. Dragovich, 142 Fed. Appx. 33, 39 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Whitehead v. Thomas,
2017 WL 2664490, at *7 (W.D. Pa. May 23, 2017) (“Courts in the Third Circuit have recognized
that CHCAs are ‘indisputably administrators, not doctors’”). “As a general rule, non-medical
prison officials are not deliberately indifferent under the Eighth Amendment simply because they
failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated
by the prison doctor or because they deferred to the judgment of the medical staff treating the
inmate.” Dunyan v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 2017 WL 3509243, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 16,
2017) (citing Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993)); See also Judge v. Med. Dep’t
at S.C_L Greene, 2007 WL 1576400, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 31, 2007) (“The rule is that where a
prisoner is being treated by a physician, a non-physician prison administrator cannot be deemed
deliberately indifferent simply because the lay administrator did not challenge the physician’s care

or respond directly to a prisoner's requests for more or different treatment.”) (citing authority). “To

state an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference against” a corrections healthcare
administrator, Lewis must show that he “possessed actual knowledge or a reason to believe that

9 □

‘prison doctors or their assistants [were] mistreating (or not treating)’ him.” Id. (quoting Spruill v.
Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)). The facts alleged in Lewis’s Complaint do not support
such an inference against Smith.> He therefore has no basis for a deliberate indifference to medical
needs claim against Smith. See, e.g., In re Wetzel, 2016 WL 4945315, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sep. 16,
2016) (rejecting a claim of deliberate indifference against a non-medical defendant because the
plaintiff acknowledged that he had received treatment from prison physicians). This claim against
Smith should be dismissed.
4. Sovereign Immunity bars Lewis’s state law claims against any Corrections
Defendant.
The DOC Defendants next argue that Lewis’s state law negligence claims are barred by
sovereign immunity. It is well-established that employees of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
are entitled to sovereign immunity from common law tort claims so long as they are acting within
the scope of their duties.© See PA CONST. Art. 1, § 11; 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 2310. This grant of
immunity “applies to Commonwealth employees in both their official and individual capacities.”
Larsen v. State Employees’ Ret. Sys., 553 F.Supp.2d 403, 420 (M.D. Pa. 2008). See also Nguien v.
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 2021 WL 3563373, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2021) (“In other words,
if the Commonwealth is entitled to sovereign immunity . . . then its officials and employees acting
within the scope of their duties are likewise immune.”) (quoting Moore v. Commonwealth, 538
A.2d 111, 115 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988)). The allegations of the Complaint place each of the DOC

5 Although Lewis alleges that he “was told that Kimberly Smith will not approve an x ray all your getting is a shot,”
ECF No. 1-2, p. 10, this cryptic allegation is insufficient to support that Smith was aware that medical personnel were
mistreating Lewis or that she interfered in his treatment.
6 Pennsylvania law recognizes ten exceptions to sovereign immunity: (1) vehicle liability; (2) medical-professional
liability; (3) care, custody or control of personal property; (4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and sidewalks;
(5) potholes and other dangerous conditions; (6) care, custody or control of animals; (7) liquor store sales; (8) National
Guard activities; (9) toxoids and vaccines; and (10) sexual abuse. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8522. None of the foregoing
exceptions applies to any claim against a DOC Defendant in this case.
10

Defendants’ alleged actions squarely within the scope of their employment. See Mitchell vy.
Luckenbill, 680 F.Supp.2d 672, 682 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (identifying the requirements for an action to
fall within the scope of employment under Pennsylvania law). Consequently, Defendants are
protected by sovereign immunity. McGrath v. Johnson, 67 F.Supp.2d 499, 511 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(“The Department of Corrections is an agency of the Commonwealth and the defendants, as
employees of an agency of the Commonwealth, are entitled to the protection afforded by sovereign
immunity.”) (citing Maute v. Frank, 657 A.2d 985, 986 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (state prison officials
enjoy sovereign immunity). Lewis’s state law negligence claims against the DOC Defendants
should be dismissed.
5. The Complaint fails to state a claim against any Corrections Defendant for
damage to or destruction of personal property.
Neither negligent nor intentional deprivations of property violate the due process rights of

a prisoner if the prisoner has a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss. See Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Because the DOC’s grievance procedure provides an adequate □

post-deprivation remedy, it forecloses Lewis’s due process claim based on damage or loss of his
personal property. See Tillman v. Lebanon County Corr. Fac., 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000);
Austin v. Lehman, 893 F. Supp. 448, 454 (E.D. Pa. 1995). A due process claim is foreclosed even
if the inmate is dissatisfied with the outcome of the process. See Iseley v. Horn, 1996 WL 510090,
at * 6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 1996). The availability of the post-deprivation remedy is established where,

as here, the inmate has utilized the grievance process to challenge the deprivation. See Pettaway

y. SCI Albion, 2012 WL 366782, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2012); Williams v. Crowther, 2021 WL
3371283, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2021); ECF No. 1-2, p. 9 (“I put in a Grievance due to my
injuries and situation of TV and on the staff.”). Accordingly, Lewis’s due process claim for damage

or destruction of his personal property should be dismissed.

11

E. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal
for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment unless doing so would
be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 3d Cir. 2002). While
“the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court,” it

may not “outright refus[e] to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the
denial.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). These instructions apply equally to pro se
litigants and those represented by counsel. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
Here, because Lewis may be able to allege additional facts to support a claim against
Defendant Smith, amendment as to her may not be futile. However, amendment as to Lewis’s
claims against SCI-Forest would be futile because it is not amenable to suit. Amendment would
also be futile regarding Lewis’s negligence claim against the DOC Defendants as it is barred by
immunity, his due process claim for loss or destruction of personal property because Lewis had an
adequate post-deprivation remedy, and his claims against Beatty and Recher because they had no
personal involvement in any actionable conduct. Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment claim
against Smith should be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. Lewis’s negligence
claim against the DOC Defendants, his due process claim for loss or destruction of personal
property, and his claims against Beatty and Reeher should be dismissed with prejudice.
F. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the DOC Defendants’ partial
motion to dismiss (ECF No. 4) be GRANTED, and that the following claims against the DOC
Defendants be dismissed with pre} udice: .

(1) Lewis’s negligence claim against all DOC Defendants,

□

. (2) His due process claim for destruction of personal property against any DOC
Defendant; and
(3) All claims against Defendants’ SCI-Forest, Reeher, and Beatty.
It is further recommended that Lewis’s deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
claim against Defendant Smith be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend within a
time specified by the Court.’

III. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, the parties may seek

review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within
fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the
objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See
Brightwell vy. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 201 1); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir.
2007).
DATED this 2nd day of June 2025.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

7 The DOC Defendants have not challenged the legal sufficiency of Lewis’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect
claim against Defendants Brumbaugh, CO Rook, and CO Miller. This claim should proceed.
13

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11088091. Public record. Not legal advice.