# Settle, Justin v. Florida Department of Corrections

> District Court, S.D. Florida · June 30, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11087169

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** June 30, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-cv-14186-ALTMAN

JUSTIN W. SETTLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

RICKY DIXON, SECRETARY,
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.
__________________________________/

ORDER
The Plaintiff, Justin Settle, has filed a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
Complaint [ECF No. 1]. In that Complaint, Settle alleges that, while he was incarcerated, ten
Defendants (1) violated his “Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment”
by acting with deliberate indifference to his safety and medical needs; (2) violated his “Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process” by “impound[ing]” his “personal clothing and jewelry”; (3) and
violated his “First Amendment right to freedom of speech” by, among other things, “threaten[ing] to
gas” him because he was “talking in his sleep[.]” Id. at 36–37 (cleaned up). Settle has also filed a motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”) [ECF No. 3]. After carefully screening Settle’s
Complaint, we find that it violates the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on several fronts. We therefore
DISMISS his Complaint without prejudice and GRANT him leave to file an amended complaint.
THE LAW
The Court “shall review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from
a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (emphasis
added). The definition of a “prisoner” includes “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility
who is . . . accused of [or] convicted of . . . violations of criminal law.” Id. §1915A(c). In conducting
its screening of a prisoner’s complaint, the Court must “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint,” when it is: (1) “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted”; or (2) “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. §
1915A(b).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require, in relevant part, that a well-pled complaint

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). “Every pleading . . . must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s
name—or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a). In this Court, a
civil-rights complaint submitted by a pro se prisoner “must be signed under penalty of perjury.” S.D.
FLA. L.R. 88.2; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a) (“Unless a rule or statute specifically states otherwise, a pleading
need not be verified or accompanied by an affidavit.” (emphasis added)). Additionally, “complaints
must substantially follow the form, if any, prescribed by the Court.” S.D. FLA. L.R. 88.2(a).
To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint’s factual allegations “must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”—with “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). Under this
standard, legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and are insufficient to state a
claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Moreover, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are

merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Courts may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for failure to comply with the Federal Rules, the
Local Rules, or court orders. See, e.g., Brutus v. Int’l Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape
Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1240–41 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The court may dismiss a claim if the plaintiff fails
to prosecute it or comply with a court order.”); Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989)
(“While dismissal is an extraordinary remedy, dismissal upon disregard of an order, especially where
the litigant has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse of discretion.”). And pro se litigants are not
exempt from procedural rules. See Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Despite
construction leniency afforded pro se litigants, we nevertheless have required them to conform to
procedural rules.”); see also Heard v. Nix, 170 F. App’x 618, 619 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Although pro se
complaints must be liberally construed, such complaints still must comply with the procedural rules

governing the proper form of pleadings.” (cleaned up)); S.D. FLA. L.R. 1.1 (“When used in these Local
Rules, the word ‘counsel’ shall be construed to apply to a party if that party is proceeding pro se.”).
The Court may not assist a pro se plaintiff in constructing “a theory of liability from facts never alleged,
alluded to, or mentioned” in the complaint. Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1284 (11th Cir.
2011). Instead, “to prevail on a particular theory of liability, a party must present that argument to the
district court.” Ibid.; see also GJR Inves., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)
(“Yet even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto
counsel for a party.”), overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
ANALYSIS
Settle’s Complaint is defective in three ways. First, it’s a shotgun pleading that doesn’t comply
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, Settle has named five fictitious Defendants and given
us no way of identifying them. Third, Settle improperly joined one of the Defendants—Sergeant

Rogers—to this case. We’ll address each deficiency in turn.
I. Shotgun Pleading
For starters, Settle’s Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading. Rule 8(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint must also
“state its claims . . . in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of
circumstances.” Id. 10(b). “Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often
disparagingly referred to as shotgun pleadings.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313,
1320 (11th Cir. 2015).
Shotgun pleadings can fall into one (or more) of four general categories. In the words of the
Eleventh Circuit, a complaint is a shotgun pleading if it:
(1) contains multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding
counts; (2) is replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously
connected to any particular cause of action; (3) fails to separate into a different count
each cause of action; or (4) asserts multiple claims against multiple defendants without
specifying which defendant is responsible for which act.

Embree v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 779 F. App’x 658, 662 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Weiland, 792 F.3d at
1322–23). “The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree
or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against
them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323.
Settle’s Complaint is anything but “short and plain.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). It consumes 48
pages, contains 136 factual paragraphs, and lodges 14 claims against ten Defendants. See generally
Compl.; cf. Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1357 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding that the plaintiff’s
amended complaint was “an incomprehensible shotgun pleading” that was “neither ‘short’ nor ‘plain’”
because the complaint was “twenty-eight pages long” and “incorporated all 123 paragraphs of
allegations into all sixteen counts” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). The Complaint also falls under the
second category of shotgun pleading because it’s “replete with . . . immaterial facts not obviously
connected to any particular cause of action[.]” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322. Of the Complaint’s 136
numbered paragraphs, only 74 are directly linked to Settle’s 14 causes of action.1 See Compl. at 35–37;

1 In asserting his claims, in fact, Settle disregarded paragraphs 1–15, 27, 29–33, 38–49, 55–74, 77–84,
94–99, 101, 108, 113–14, 119, and 123–26. See Compl. at 35–37. These forgotten factual paragraphs
include, for instance, assertions that “the Florida Department of Corrections has a flawed . . . file on
record reflecting [Settle] as a member of [the] Aryan Brotherhood,” id. ¶ 33; a literal blow-by-blow
see, e.g., LaCroix v. W. Dist. of Kentucky, 627 F. App’x 816, 819 (11th Cir. 2015) (calling the plaintiff’s
complaint a “classic shotgun pleading” because its “763 numbered paragraphs consist of factual
allegations that are not specifically tied to any of the 69 enumerated causes of action” (emphasis added)).
With the Complaint looking as it does, determining the plausibility of Settle’s claims would be
“a massive waste of judicial and private resources,” PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach Constr., N.V.,
598 F.3d 802, 806 n.4 (11th Cir. 2010), which is why shotgun pleadings are condemned by our

Circuit—and it’s why Settle’s Complaint must be DISMISSED, see Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465,
1518 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Anyone schooled in the law who read these [shotgun pleading] complaints . .
. would know that many of the facts alleged could not possibly be material to all of the counts.
Consequently, [the opposing party] and the district court [must] sift through the facts presented and
decide for themselves which [are] material to the particular cause of action asserted, a difficult and
laborious task indeed.” (cleaned up)); Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305
F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002) (criticizing shotgun pleadings because, “in ruling on the sufficiency
of a claim, the trial court must sift out the irrelevancies, a task that can be quite onerous”).
Although Settle’s Complaint is deficient, we’ll give him a chance to fix these problems in an
amended complaint. See Woldeab v. DeKalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018)
(“When a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one
chance to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice.” (quoting

Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991))). In drafting his amended complaint, Settle must
ensure that his factual allegations are properly pled, meaning that “the allegations in the complaint
‘must be simple, concise, and direct,’” LaCroix, 627 F. App’x at 818 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1)),
and the facts supporting his claims must be presented in a “short and plain statement . . . showing that

account of a fight between Settle and another inmate, see id. ¶¶ 38–49, and an altercation at breakfast
with “C.O. Dunn,” which was apparently observed by an inmate named “Zombie,” see id. ¶¶ 55–74.
the pleader is entitled to relief,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). We warn Settle that, if he fails to file a legally
sufficient amended complaint, we’ll dismiss his case without further leave to amend.
II. The Unnamed Defendants
Next, Settle names five fictitious Defendants—“C.O. One,” “C.O. Two,” “Nurse Three,”
“C.O. Four,” and “C.O. Five.” Compl. at 5. Settle admits that he “has no way to discover [their]
identities until a reasonable opportunity for discovery is presented[.]” Ibid. (cleaned up). “As a general

matter, fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734,
738 (11th Cir. 2010). Still, “[t]here may be times when, for one reason or another, the plaintiff is
unwilling or unable to use a party’s real name.” Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 1992).
And, in certain circumstances, a court may assist a pro se prisoner by ordering a non-party to disclose
a defendant’s identity. See Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1209 n.4 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting “the
difficulties faced by a prisoner in identifying alleged wrongdoers before filing a complaint” and
directing “district courts to assist prisoners in discovering the identity of the proper defendants”).
Before we do any of that, though, Settle must describe the five fictitious Defendants “with
sufficient clarity” so that they can be identified in discovery. Dean, 951 F.2d at 1216; see also Morris v.
Hays SP Warden, 638 F. App’x 880, 881 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e have allowed the initial use of an
unnamed defendant where discovery would likely uncover that defendant’s identity.” (emphasis added &
citations omitted)); Castle v. Cobb Cnty., Georgia, 2023 WL 3772501, at *1 (11th Cir. June 2, 2023) (“This

Court has acknowledged that whether it is clear that discovery would uncover a defendant’s identity
is a relevant consideration when determining whether a plaintiff can pursue a claim against an
unnamed defendant.”). Settle has failed to do that here. We, after all, don’t know any of these five
Defendants’ current employers, badge numbers, or even their physical features. See generally Compl.
So, in Settle’s amended complaint, each “unnamed defendant must be clearly described so as to be
subject to service of process even without a name.” Castle, 2023 WL 3772501, at *1. And, before we
allow Settle to discover these Defendants’ identities, Settle must explain “what efforts [he] took to
identify the unnamed defendants[.]” Id. at *2; see e.g., Morris, 638 F. App’x at 882 (“We note also that
Mr. Morris provided an explanation for not being able to name the officer on the Emergency
Response Team: members of that Team do not wear name tags, and prison officials would not provide
him with information to identify those officers.”).
Until Settle complies with this Order, we won’t allow him to conduct discovery into the

identities of these fictitious Defendants. And, if he fails to provide us with enough information about
these fictitious Defendants in his amended complaint, we’ll dismiss these Defendants from the case
without further notice.
III. Joinder
Lastly, Settle has improperly joined Sergeant Rogers as a Defendant. Rule 20 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allows defendants to be joined in the same action if “any right to relief is
asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and if “any question of law or fact
common to all defendants will arise in the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2). We have “discretion to
deny joinder” if we find that “the addition of a party under Rule 20 will not foster the objectives of
the rule, but will result in prejudice, expense[,] or delay.” Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 923 F. Supp. 2d
1339, 1342 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (Howard, J.) (cleaned up).

Nine of Settle’s claims “arose [out of] Okeechobee Correctional Institution,” Compl. at 40
(cleaned up), and several of the Defendants work there, see id. at 2–3 (alleging that “Sergeant Yates,”
“C.O. Dunn,” “C.O. Cannado,” and “Sergeant Hernandez” are employed by “Okeechobee
Correctional Institution”). Settle avers (among other things) that Yates “paid [an] inmate . . . to stab”
him, id. at 35; that Hernandez “failed to protect” him from the hostile inmate, ibid.; and that Yates,
Dunn, and Cannado “paid [another] inmate . . . to rape and/or sexually assault” him, id. at 36. Crucially,
these incidents purportedly occurred at Okeechobee C.I before Settle’s “transfer to Florida State
Prison” in Raiford, Florida, around February 5, 2025, id. ¶ 84. Settle then asserts four entirely unrelated
counts against Rogers—the only Defendant employed at Florida State Prison—in which he alleges
that Rogers “failed to protect [him] from an inmate”; made “retaliatory threats to [Settle]’s life,”
including threatening “to gas [him] with chemical agents”; and “fail[ed] to provide [Settle] with pain
medication for a serious back injury[.]” Id. at 37 (cleaned up).

These four counts against Rogers fail Rule 20’s requirements. For one thing, given Settle’s
transfer to Florida State Prison, his claims against Rogers didn’t arise “out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” as the claims that arose from his stint at
Okeechobee C.I. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A). For another, there don’t seem to be “any question of
law or fact common” between Rogers and the Defendants who are employed by Okeechobee C.I., id.
20(a)(2)(B), since their alleged violations are totally different, see Daker v. Holmes, 2022 WL 2129076,
at *6 (11th Cir. June 14, 2022) (“[W]hile it may be true that all of these individuals allegedly violated
his rights in the same way, giving rise to the same cause of action, the facts underlying the violations
were different. That the defendants merely worked for the same municipal government—in separate
offices in separate roles at separate times—does not create a common question of fact.” (emphases
added)). While Settle concedes that “new claims arose” at Florida State Prison, he insists that his “new
claims [against Sergeant Rogers] were directly related . . . to [his] original claims” of “retaliation[.]”

Compl. at 40 (cleaned up). But nothing in the Complaint demonstrates that his Okeechobee C.I.
retaliation claims are in any way related to his Florida State Prison claims. See generally Compl. In his
amended complaint, Settle must explain this connection. If he doesn’t, we’ll sever Settle’s claims
against Rogers and require Settle to file a separate lawsuit only as to Rogers.
* * *
We therefore ORDER AND ADJUDGE as follows:
1. By July 23, 2025, the Plaintiff must file an amended complaint correcting the
deficiencies we’ve identified in this Order. The amended complaint must be no longer than 20 double-
spaced pages, must be signed under the penalty of perjury, and must contain a short and plain
statement of the Plaintiffs claim for relief, a basis for federal jurisdiction, and a demand for judgment.
The amended complaint must also include a separate paragraph for each Defendant, explaining what
that Defendant did wrong, and it must present all allegations in numbered paragraphs. ‘The Clerk is
DIRECTED to attach a copy of this Court’s form titled “Complaint for Violation of Crvil Rights
(Prisoner).”
2. The amended complaint must be labeled “Amended Complaint” and must reflect the
case number referenced above, so that it will be filed in this case. The Court will only consider the
claims raised in the amended complaint, which will be the operative pleading for the rest of this case.
The Plaintiff may not incorporate by reference past claims.
3. The Plaintiffs failure to file the amended complaint on time and in compliance with
this Court’s Order shall result in dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply
with court orders. See FED. R. CIv. P. 41(b).
4, Settle’s IFP Motion [ECF No. 3] is DENIED as moot. Settle must refile his IFP
motion when he files his amended complaint.
5. ‘The Clerk’s Office shall administratively CLOSE this case. If the Plaintiff's amended
complaint survives screening, the Court will reopen this case once all of the Defendants have been
served.
DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District df Florida on June 2025.

ROY K. ALTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: Justin W. Settle, pro se

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11087169. Public record. Not legal advice.