# Probst v. Beckett

> District Court, N.D. Texas · May 29, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11086182

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** May 29, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AMARILLO DIVISION
JAMES EDWARD PROBST, §
TDCJ-CID No. 01699988, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § 2:24-CV-14-Z-BR
§
ARTURO BECKETT, et al., §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
TO GRANT DEFENDANTS MITCHENER AND AUNG’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court is the Motion to Partially Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Motion”) filed by Defendants Michael Mitchener (“Mitchener”)
and Htoo Aung (“Aung”). (ECF 16). After considering said Motion and the Response thereto, the
Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge GRANT the Motion, as follows:
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff James Edward Probst (“Probst”) alleges that Defendants violated his
constitutional rights when Mitchener conducted a series of “retaliatory cell searches” in response
to Probst releasing cell phone video footage to the media of “officers abusing prisoners and
inhumane living conditions.” (ECF 11 at 7). During one such search, Mitchener allegedly threw
Probst’s property onto the floor “for enemy inmates to access”. (Id. at 8). Probst subsequently was
taken to medical and placed on suicide watch. (Id.) Hours after Michener’s actions, Aung reviewed
security footage and determined that Probst’s property was taken by other inmates. (Id.).
Mitchener and Aung ask the Court to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) and (6). (ECF 16). Probst responded, alleging that he stated valid claims against them.
(ECF 17). Defendant Arturo Beckett did not file a Rule 12(b) motion, and Defendant Stephanie
Moore has not yet entered an appearance.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standards.

1. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard.
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must presume that factual allegations in the Complaint
are true and determine whether they establish subject matter jurisdiction. Paterson v. Weinberger,
644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, the Court accepts Probst’s allegations as true and
will determine whether those allegations allow him to proceed against Defendants, who claim that
sovereign immunity deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over Probst’s claim for
monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1)
is permitted only when “it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support
of his claim that would entitle Plaintiff to relief.” Gilbert v. Donahoe, 751 F.3d 303, 307 (5th Cir.

2014).
2. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard.
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption
that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations and footnote omitted). “Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” do not establish
facial plausibility. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A claim has facial plausibility “when the plaintiff pleads
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factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Because he proceeds pro se, Probst’s pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
those drafted by attorneys. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); see also
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed”)

(quotation omitted). Nevertheless, if the plaintiff’s complaint has not set forth enough facts “to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” it must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
B. Sovereign Immunity on Section 1983 Claims.
As a sovereign entity, a state may not be sued without its consent. Read literally, the text
of the Eleventh Amendment prevents only non-citizens of a state from suing that state. See U.S.
Const. amend. XI. However, courts uniformly have held that the Eleventh Amendment provides
protections beyond its text, shielding states from suits brought by their own citizens, as well as
citizens of other states. See Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011).
Therefore, under the Eleventh Amendment, “[f]ederal courts are without jurisdiction over suits

against a state, … unless that state has waived its sovereign immunity or Congress has clearly
abrogated it.” Moore v. Louisiana Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 743 F.3d 959, 963 (5th
Cir. 2014).
This sovereign immunity bar extends to actions against state officers in their official
capacities. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663–69 (1974). Suits against state officials in their
official capacities should be treated as suits against the state. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S, 21, 25 (1991).
Moreover, state officials acting in their official capacities are not ‘persons’ under Section 1983.
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71. As a result, it is well established that suits
for monetary damages against state officials in their official capacities cannot succeed under
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Section 1983. See Almond v. Tarver, 468 F. Supp. 2d 886, 892-95 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (collecting
authorities and holding that claim against state official in his official capacity was barred by
sovereign and Eleventh Amendment immunities).
Probst sues the moving Defendants for “compensatory damages for loss of property and
injuries” and punitive damages. (ECF 11 at 7). His request for monetary damages against

Mitchener and Aung in their official capacities should be dismissed without prejudice for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
C. Probst’s Claims for Declaratory Relief.
Probst seeks a declaration that Defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights by their actions. He also seeks a declaration that, because of his known “activism,” his
personal safety at TDCJ is at risk so he should be removed from Texas state custody and placed in
the custody of either another state or the U.S. Bureau of Prisons. (ECF 11 at 11). The Court also
will construe this as a request for injunctive relief for a facility transfer.
Assuming for the purposes of this Motion that Probst’s transfer request is viable, such

request is moot. At the time Probst filed his original Complaint, he was housed at the Clements
Unit; however, since that time, he has been transferred to the Coffield Unit. (ECF 30). He has
alleged no facts showing that he is “at risk” at the Coffield Unit from the Defendants. Accordingly,
his request for declaratory relief is moot. See, e.g., Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir.
2001) (holding that even if an inmate was able to establish a Constitutional violation, his transfer
to another prison rendered moot his claim for declaratory and injunctive relief); Hood v. Alford,
3:04-cv-0473-D, 2004 WL 1146582 at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 20, 2004), R. and R. adopted, 2004 WL
1393374 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2004) (“Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at the Johnson County
Jail. His transfer … renders his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief moot as to all
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Defendants.”). Further, any suggestion of relief based on the possibility of Probst’s transfer back
to Clements is too speculative to warrant relief. See Bailey v. Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 279 (5th
Cir. 1987). Probst’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief should be dismissed as moot.
D. Claims Against Defendant Aung.
Probst alleges that Aung violated his civil rights when Aung failed to prevent other inmates

from stealing Probst’s personal property. (ECF 11 at 8). The Fifth Circuit has stated that “direct
participation is not necessary for liability under § 1983. Any official who ‘causes’ a citizen to be
deprived of [his] constitutional rights can also be held liable.” Morris v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657,
672 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir. 1990)). Nevertheless,
there must be some showing of personal involvement by a particular individual defendant.
Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office, 188 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1999); Thompson v.
Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983). “In order to state a cause of action under section 1983,
the plaintiff must identify defendants who were either personally involved in the constitutional
violation or whose acts are causally connected to the constitutional violation alleged.” Woods v.

Woods, 51 F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1995). The requisite causal connection is established if the
defendant set in motion a series of events that would foreseeably cause the deprivation of the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Morris, 181 F.3d at 672.
Probst fails to allege facts showing that Aung was either personally involved in the
deprivation of Probst’s property or that Aung “set in motion” events that caused Probst’s
constitutional rights to be violated. Instead, the Amended Complaint alleges that Aung reviewed
security footage “hours after the use of force” and wrote a statement indicating that the footage
showed inmates taking Probst’s property. (ECF 11 at 8). He further alleges that Aung “had the
authority and opportunity to prevent property loss” but instead “chose to allow inmates to steal it,”
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and that Aung could have retrieved the property but did not. (ECF 11 at 8; ECF 17 at 2).
Assuming the truth of these allegations, Probst fails to state a claim against Aung. Probst
alleges, at best, that Aung became aware after the fact that Probst’s property was stolen by other
inmates. (Id.). Probst indicates no personal involvement by Aung in the alleged constitutional
violation. A supervisor may only be held liable if one of the following exists: (1) his personal

involvement in the constitutional deprivation, (2) sufficient causal connection between the
supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violations, or (3) the supervisory official
implements a policy that itself is a repudiation of civil rights and is the moving force of the
constitutional violation. Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3d 264, 274 (5th Cir. 2008); Thompkins v. Belt,
828 F.2d 298, 303B304 (5th Cir. 1987). Probst does not allege a plausible constitutional violation
claim against Aung. Accordingly, his claim against Aung should be dismissed.
E. Claims Against Defendant Mitchener.
Probst alleges that Mitchener violated his due process rights by leaving Probst’s personal
property where it could be stolen by other inmates. (ECF 11 at 7-8). Mitchener asks the Court to

dismiss the claim against him because Probst has not alleged an intentional violation by Mitchener.
(ECF 15-16). “Prisoners have a cognizable constitutionally protected property interest in their
personal property.” Eubanks v. McCotter, 802 F.2d 790, 793-94 (5th Cir. 1986). Nevertheless,
under the Parratt/Hudson doctrine, “a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest
caused by a state employee’s random, unauthorized conduct does not give rise to a § 1983
procedural due process claim, unless the State fails to provide an adequate post[-]deprivation
remedy.” Allen v. Thomas, 388 F.3d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). In Texas, the administrative and judicial systems allow prisoners to raise ordinary tort
claims such as conversion or an administrative remedy for lost or damaged property. See Cathey
6
v. Guenther, 47 F.3d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1995); Spurlock v. Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d 733, 737 (Tex.
App.--Corpus Christi 2002).
Therefore, the question is whether Probst has alleged that Mitchener abandoned Probst’s
personal property pursuant to a state policy or as “random, unauthorized conduct”. The U.S.
Supreme Court has noted that conduct is not considered “random and unauthorized” if the state

“delegated to [the defendants] the power and authority to effect the very deprivation complained
of.” Zinerman v. Burch, 494 US. 113, 115 (1990) (quoted in Allen, 388 F.3d at 149). Probst clearly
and undisputedly alleges that Michener was acting illegally in not securing his property, rather
than pursuant to a state policy. (See ECF 11 at 7 (“Michener began a malicious and calculated
campaign of retaliatory cell searches…”)). Because Probst alleges that Michener’s conduct was
unauthorized, the Parratt/Hudson doctrine applies.
As a result, although Probst has a protected property interest in his personal property, “[a]
prison official’s failure to follow the prison’s own policies, procedures or regulations does not
constitute a violation of due process, if constitutional minima are nevertheless met.” Brewster v.

Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In Brewster,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a due process claim was properly dismissed because
Texas law provides the adequate post-deprivation remedy of conversion when property is taken
without proper procedures. Id. Probst does not allege that his personal property was thrown to the
floor pursuant to anything other than “random, unauthorized conduct” by Mitchener. Because
Probst has an adequate post-deprivation remedy under Texas law in that he has the right to sue for
conversion in state court, he does not have a Section 1983 due process claim in connection with
his loss of property. As a result, his claim against Mitchener for property loss should be dismissed.

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F. Qualified Immunity.
Qualified immunity protects government officials from suit and liability for civil damages
under Section 1983 insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Once qualified immunity is asserted, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to

demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense. McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323
(5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam), citing Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d
481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001).
“When a defendant asserts a qualified-immunity defense in a motion to dismiss, the court
has an obligation to carefully scrutinize the complaint before subjecting public officials to the
burdens of broad-reaching discovery.” Longoria Next Friend of M.L. v. San Benito Indep. Consol.
Sch. Dist., 942 F.3d 258, 263-64 (5th Cir. 2019). “Qualified immunity is a two-step process. The
first [step] asks whether the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The second step
adds the protection for the defendant that liability attaches only if the right was clearly established”

at the time the violation occurred. Sims v. City of Madisonville, 894 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 2018).
The Court may address either or both prongs. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. at 242.
As shown above, Probst failed to state a cognizable claim against Aung and Mitchener of
a constitutional violation in connection with loss of personal property as described in the Amended
Complaint. Therefore, these Defendants are entitled to dismissal of the claims against them
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) based upon their affirmative defense of qualified immunity.
G. Leave to Amend.
While the general rule is that the Court should not dismiss a pro se complaint for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend, the Court
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“need not permit futile amendments.” LaCroix v. Marshall Cnty., Miss., 409 F. App’x 794, 802
(5th Cir. 2011). Allowing Probst to amend his claim for money damages against Aung and
Mitchener in their official capacities would be futile for the reasons set forth above. Allowing
Probst to amend his claims against these Defendants for declaratory and injunctive relief also
would be futile, as shown above.

Allowing Probst to amend his claims against Aung and Michener in connection with his
personal property loss would be futile pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Probst added his claims against Aung and Michener in his Amended
Complaint, after his initial Complaint had undergone PLRA screening. Under the PLRA, no
“[f]ederal civil action may be brought by a prisoner ... for mental or emotional injury suffered
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.” 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The Fifth Circuit has held that this requirement “applies to all federal civil
actions in which a prisoner alleges a constitutional violation.” Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 375
(5th Cir. 2005). The application of Section 1997e(e) is based on “the relief sought, and not the

underlying substantive violation.” Id.; see also Mayfield v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 529 F.3d 599,
603, 605 (5th Cir. 2008) (“We have held that the application of [Section 1997e(e)] ... turns on the
relief sought by a prisoner, and that it prevents prisoners from seeking compensatory damages for
violations of federal law where no physical injury is alleged.”).
Probst does not allege that he suffered any physical injuries in connection with these
claims; instead, he claims only loss of personal property. (ECF 11). Because he does not allege
physical injury, he is not entitled to recover compensatory damages. See Hill v. Fagan, No. 1:16-
CV-185-BL, 2018 WL 3244617, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 4, 2018) (recommending dismissal of
prisoner’s claim for compensatory damages against defendant because prisoner failed to allege a
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physical injury arising from the purported due process violation), R. & R. adopted by 2018 WL
3242274 (N.D. Tex. July 3, 2018). Accordingly, allowing Probst to amend his claims for loss of
property would be futile due to his failure to meet the PLRA’s physical injury requirement in
connection with these claims.
RECOMMENDATION
As set forth above, the U.S. Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss be GRANTED; specifically, that the Court dismiss without prejudice all claims for
monetary damages against Defendants Aung and Mitchener in their official capacities, and dismiss
with prejudice the claims against them in their individual capacities.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE
The United States District Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Findings, Conclusions
and Recommendation to each party by the most efficient means available.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
ENTERED May 29, 2025.

LEE es RENO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

* NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT *
Any party may object to these proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation. In the
event parties wish to object, they are hereby NOTIFIED that the deadline for filing objections is
fourteen (14) days from the date of filing as indicated by the “entered” date directly above the
signature line. Service is complete upon mailing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), or transmission by
electronic means, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E). Any objections must be filed on or before the
fourteenth (14th) day after this recommendation is filed as indicated by the “entered” date. See 28
10

U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d).
Any such objections shall be made in a written pleading entitled “Objections to the
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation.” Objecting parties shall file the written objections
with the United States District Clerk and serve a copy of such objections on all other parties. A
party’s failure to timely file written objections shall bar an aggrieved party, except upon grounds
of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings, legal
conclusions, and recommendation set forth by the Magistrate Judge and accepted by the district
court. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc),
superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), as recognized in ACS Recovery
Servs., Inc. v. Griffin, 676 F.3d 512, 521 n.5 (5th Cir. 2012); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275,
276–77 (5th Cir. 1988).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11086182. Public record. Not legal advice.
