# K.B. v. Delaware County Office of Judicial Support, and Mary J. Walk, in her official capacity as Director of the Delaware County Office of Judicial Support

> Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · June 27, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11085166

## Case

- **Court:** Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 27, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Dumas
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

K. B., :
Petitioner :
: No. 446 M.D. 2023
v. :
: Argued: December 11, 2024
Delaware County Office of Judicial :
Support, and Mary J. Walk, in her :
official capacity as Director of the :
Delaware County Office of Judicial :
Support, :
Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

OPINION BY
JUDGE DUMAS FILED: June 27, 2025

Currently before us is K.B.’s (Petitioner) Application for Summary
Relief in the Form of Judgment on the Pleadings (Application). Through his
Application, Petitioner requests judgment on the pleadings in his favor regarding his
original jurisdiction petition for review (PFR) against Respondents Delaware
County Office of Judicial Support and Mary J. Walk, in her official capacity as
Director of the Delaware County Office of Judicial Support (individually Office and
Director, and collectively Respondents). After thorough review, we grant the
Application in part and deny it in part.
I. BACKGROUND1
In January 2023, Petitioner received an unconditional pardon from
then-Governor Tom Wolf regarding Petitioner’s 2019 conviction in Delaware
County for marijuana possession. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a “Petition for
Expungement Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 790” (Expungement Petition) in the Court
of Common Pleas of Delaware County (Common Pleas), through which he requested
that his marijuana possession conviction be expunged in accordance with the terms
of the pardon. In April 2023, the Honorable Anthony D. Scanlon granted the
Expungement Petition and, in doing so, ordered Respondents to expunge Petitioner’s
criminal record regarding that conviction; Judge Scanlon’s order was also
unconditional, in that it did not require Petitioner to take any additional steps in order
for the expungement to take place.2 Despite this, Respondents declined to expunge

1
We draw the substance of this section from Petitioner’s PFR, the exhibits attached thereto,
and Petitioner’s Application. See generally Appl., 4/2/24; PFR, 10/5/23.
2
Judge Scanlon’s order reads as follows, in relevant part:
All criminal justice agencies upon which this order is served shall
expunge all criminal history record information from [Petitioner’s]
arrest record pertaining to the charges below [in attachment listing
2019 marijuana possession conviction and “[a]ny and all additional
charges association with the same [Offense Tracking Number.]”]
Criminal history record information includes information collected
by criminal justice agencies concerning this individual and arising
from the initiation of these criminal proceedings including but not
limited to all fingerprints, photographs, identifiable descriptions,
dates and notations of arrests, indictments, informations or other
formal criminal charges, any dispositions arising from the above-
captioned proceedings, and all electronic or digital records
regarding any of the foregoing.
The Pennsylvania State Police shall request the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to return to them all records pertaining to said arrest(s),
which shall be destroyed by said agency upon their receipt of same.

2
Petitioner’s marijuana possession conviction unless and until he settled the
outstanding balance of court costs that had accrued as a consequence of his
conviction.
This intransigence prompted Petitioner to file suit against Respondents
in our Court. Therein, Petitioner asserts that Respondents violated parts of the
Criminal History Record Information Act (CHRIA),3 the Judicial Code (Code),4 the
Pennsylvania Constitution, and the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure by
declining to expunge his criminal record unless he first paid all outstanding court
costs. Petitioner consequently seeks declaratory judgment to that effect, injunctive
relief barring Respondents from conditioning the expungement upon such payment,
and damages, costs, and fees. Petitioner subsequently filed his Application, in which
he asserts that he is entitled on the face of the pleadings to the full breadth of the
relief he requested in his PFR, while also stating that Respondents eventually
processed Judge Scanlon’s order and expunged Petitioner’s marijuana possession
conviction, but only after Petitioner had filed suit against them. Thereafter,
Respondents filed a response to Petitioner’s Application, via which they oppose his
requested relief.

The information required under Pa.R.Crim.P. 790 appears on the
attached page(s) which is hereby incorporated into this ORDER by
reference.
PFR, Ex. A.
3
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 9101-9183.
4
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9913.

3
II. DISCUSSION5
Petitioner offers several arguments in support of his Application, which
we summarize as follows. First, he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings regarding
Count I of his PFR, because Respondents had a ministerial, nondiscretionary duty to
process and implement Judge Scanlon’s order as written, but nevertheless failed to
do so. Petitioner’s Br. at 9-15. Second, he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings
regarding Count II, because Respondents’ refusal to give effect to that order violated
the duties imposed upon them through CHRIA; relatedly, he must be awarded actual
damages and attorney’s fees on account of this CHRIA violation and, because
Respondents’ CHRIA violation was willful, punitive damages as well. Id. at 17-27.
Finally, he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings regarding Count III, because
Respondents’ refusal to process the expungement order harmed his reputation in
violation of article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.6 Id. at 23-25.
We agree with Petitioner that he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings
regarding Count I. It is beyond cavil that lower courts’ clerks of court and
prothonotaries occupy a purely ministerial role, in which they may exercise only the

5
When ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we view all
of the opposing party’s allegations as true, and only those facts that
the opposing party has specifically admitted are considered against
the opposing party. We consider only the pleadings themselves and
any documents properly attached to them[, and will] grant judgment
on the pleadings only when there is no genuine issue of fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Stilp v. Gen. Assembly, 929 A.2d 660, 662 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (cleaned up). “Such a motion may
be granted only where the law is clear that a trial would be a fruitless exercise.” Stoppie v. Johns,
720 A.2d 808, 809 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
6
“All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing
and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.” PA. CONST. art. I, §
1.

4
power vested in them via rule or statute, but do not have the discretionary ability to
apply their own interpretation to those sources or to choose which ones to follow or
disregard. See In re Admin. Ord. No. 1-MD-2003, 936 A.2d 1, 9 (Pa. 2007); Warner
v. Cortese, 288 A.2d 550, 552 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1972); see also 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 2737,
2757 (enumerating the office of the prothonotary and the office of the clerk of courts’
statutory powers and duties); PA. CONST. art. V, Sched. to Judiciary art. § 15 (“Until
otherwise provided by law, . . . the offices of prothonotary and clerk of courts of the
court of common pleas of the judicial district . . . shall . . . perform the duties of the
office and . . . maintain and be responsible for the records, books and dockets[.]”).
“Nothing in this grant of authority suggests the power to interpret statutes and to
challenge actions of the court that the clerk [or prothonotary] perceives to be in
opposition to a certain law.” In re Admin. Ord., 936 A.2d at 9; accord Com. v.
Williams, 106 A.3d 583, 588 (Pa. 2014) (“The clerk of courts and prothonotary are
not permitted to interpret statutes or challenge court actions.”). “Therefore, if
documents tendered for filing are proper on their face and in conformity to rules of
court, a prothonotary [or clerk of courts] does not have discretion to refuse to enter
them[.]” Thompson v. Cortese, 398 A.2d 1079, 1081 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979).
In this instance, Respondents clearly exceeded their legal authority by
attempting to condition expungement of Petitioner’s marijuana possession
conviction upon his satisfaction of all related, outstanding court costs. As our
Supreme Court has made unmistakably clear, an unconditional pardon necessitates
expungement of the implicated criminal offense. Com. v. C.S., 534 A.2d 1053, 1054
(Pa. 1987). Accordingly, a trial court must issue an order directing that a criminal
conviction be expunged upon receiving notice that a pardon has been issued. See
id.; 18 Pa.C.S. § 9122(a.1). There is nothing in either rule or statute that allows a

5
clerk or prothonotary to ignore such an order once it has been issued, or to place
additional, extratextual conditions upon its docketing or the implementation of its
terms.7 Given this, Respondents were required to perform their ministerial duties by
following Judge Scanlon’s order and expunging Petitioner’s marijuana possession
conviction, and acted unlawfully by failing to do so.
Next, we turn to Petitioner’s claim in Count II that Respondents’ failure
to docket and disseminate the expungement order violated CHRIA. Per Section
9111(a) of CHRIA, “[i]t shall be the duty of every criminal justice agency within the
Commonwealth to maintain complete and accurate criminal history record
information and to report such information at such times and in such manner as
required by the provisions of this chapter or other applicable statutes.” 18 Pa.C.S. §
9111(a). CHRIA expressly defines “criminal justice agency,” in relevant part, as
“[a]ny court, including the minor judiciary, with criminal jurisdiction[.]” Id. at §
9102. Notably, this does not state that a court’s employees or officers are subsumed
within the definition; rather, by its plain terms, Section 9102 establishes that only a
court itself can constitute a criminal justice agency. Cf. Kmonk-Sullivan v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 788 A.2d 955, 962 (Pa. 2001) (cleaned up) (although a
court must “listen attentively to what a statute says[,] [a court] must also listen
attentively to what it does not say”). It therefore stands to reason that the duties
imposed by Section 9111 fell upon the Office as a subsidiary component of Common
Pleas, but not upon Director. See Haron v. Pa. State Police, 171 A.3d 344, 353 (Pa.

7
Indeed, the only duty expressly imposed by the relevant rules and statutes is that “[t]he clerk
of courts shall serve a certified copy of the [expungement] order to each criminal justice agency
identified in the court’s order and to all other entities required to be notified by statute.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 790(c)(2). This directive necessarily imposes an implied antecedent responsibility
to both docket that order and to complete the expungement of the subject offense or offenses, for
without doing so, there would be nothing to transmit to the relevant agencies and entities.

6
Cmwlth. 2017) (noting that “the record-keeping provisions of CHRIA apply almost
exclusively to governmental units, with the exception of one provision that relates
to the use of criminal records by employers”); cf. 18 Pa.C.S. § 9183(a) (authorizing
the Attorney General to file suit “against any person [or] agency . . . to enjoin any
criminal justice agency . . . or individual violating the provisions of this chapter or
to compel such agency . . . or person to comply with the provisions of this chapter”).
Accordingly, the Office violated CHRIA by failing to docket and disseminate the
expungement order, whereas Director did not.8
This brings us to Petitioner’s related assertion that he has clearly
established at this juncture that he is entitled to an award of actual damages,
attorney’s fees, and punitive damages on account of Respondents’ violation of
CHRIA. We only agree with him in part. Per Section 9183(b)(1) of CHRIA, “[a]ny
person aggrieved by a violation” of CHRIA itself or any related rules or regulations
may file suit for damages against the alleged perpetrator of the violation. 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 9183(b)(1). In the event a person is determined to have been aggrieved by the
violation, they are “entitled to actual and real damages of not less than $100 for each
violation and to reasonable costs of litigation and attorney’s fees.” Id. § 9183(b)(2).
“Aggrieved” is not expressly defined in CHRIA; however, as our
Supreme Court has noted in the past, that term “has acquired a particular meaning
in the law[,]” which controls unless the General Assembly has seen fit to expressly
define it to mean something else. Spahn v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 977 A.2d
1132, 1149 (Pa. 2009). Specifically, an individual is “aggrieved” only if their
interest in the matter at hand is substantial, direct, and immediate. Ams. for Fair

8
Given this, we need not address Respondents’ argument that Director has official and/or
sovereign immunity against Petitioner’s CHRIA claim. See Resp’ts’ Br. at 11-13; Resp’ts’ Sur-
Reply Br. at 3-4.

7
Treatment, Inc. v. Phila. Fed’n of Teachers, 150 A.3d 528, 533 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).
A substantial interest “must be distinct from and surpass the interest of all citizens
in procuring compliance with the law.” Id. A direct interest requires “a causal
connection between harm to the [petitioner’s] interest and the alleged violation of
law that is the subject of the action.” Id. Finally, an immediate interest exists “if the
causal connection is not remote or speculative.” Id. As the General Assembly did
not see fit to define “aggrieved” in a different way for purposes of CHRIA, we
conclude that this generally understood definition applies here as well.
It follows, then, that Petitioner was aggrieved by the Office’s violation
of CHRIA. As already discussed, Petitioner was pardoned by Governor Wolf and
had his Expungement Petition subsequently granted by Judge Scanlon.
Consequently, Respondents had a ministerial duty to process Judge Scanlon’s order
and expunge Petitioner’s marijuana possession conviction. They, however, failed to
do so, which caused the Office to maintain inaccurate information regarding
Petitioner’s criminal record and to fail to notify all legally mandated entities about
the expungement. In other words, the Office’s intransigence resulted in Petitioner
being improperly listed as having a marijuana possession conviction for some period
of time beyond which it was proper for that conviction to be listed on Petitioner’s
criminal record. Such a state of affairs, which is evident on the face of the pleadings,
undoubtedly renders Petitioner aggrieved for purposes of CHRIA. Petitioner is
therefore entitled at this juncture to an award of actual costs and attorney’s fees
against the Office.
The same is not true regarding his request for punitive damages,
however. In instances where the perpetrator is found to have violated CHRIA or the
related rules and regulations in a “willful” manner, the aggrieved individual is

8
entitled to “[e]xemplary and punitive damages of not less than $1,000 nor more than
$10,000[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 9183(b)(2). “Willful” is not explicitly defined in CHRIA,
so we must construe that term in accordance with its “common and approved usage.”
P.R. v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 759 A.2d 434, 437 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (cleaned
up). “In ascertaining the common and approved usage or meaning, a court may
resort to the dictionary definitions of the terms left undefined by the legislature.”
Mountz v. Columbia Borough, 260 A.3d 1046, 1050 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (quoting
Leventakos v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Spyros Painting), 82 A.3d 481, 484 n.4
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)). Per Black’s Law Dictionary, a “willful” act is one that was
“[d]one wittingly or on purpose, as opposed to accidentally or casually; voluntary
and intentional, but not necessarily malicious. The word connotes
blameworthiness.” Willful, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Furthermore,
“[a] voluntary act becomes willful, in law, only when it involves conscious wrong
or evil purpose on the part of the actor, or at least inexcusable carelessness, whether
the act is right or wrong. The term willful is stronger than voluntary or intentional;
it is traditionally the equivalent of malicious, evil, or corrupt.” Id. (cleaned up). The
high bar set by this definition, when coupled with Respondents’ assertion that their
refusal to process Judge Scanlon’s order was done in good faith,9 necessitates the
creation of a proper factual record in order for us to determine whether the Office’s
CHRIA violation was willful.

9
Respondents assert that they justifiably believed that they were without authority to waive
Petitioner’s court costs because neither Governor Wolf’s pardon nor the Expungement Order or
CHRIA itself expressly authorized them to do so. See Resp’ts’ Br. in Opp. to Appl. at 10-11.
Respondents also maintain that they interpreted an order from Common Pleas’ president judge to
process an expungement order in a similar matter without satisfaction of outstanding court costs
as only applying to that specific case, rather than as a broadly applicable edict. Id. at 10.

9
Finally, we conclude that we are unable to grant judgment on the
pleadings in Petitioner’s favor regarding Count III, in which he claims that
Respondents’ refusal to process and promulgate Judge Scanlon’s order violated his
constitutional right to reputation. Every individual in our Commonwealth has a
fundamental right to protect their reputation, which is secured through article I,
section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. R.W. v. Dep’t of Educ. (Pro. Standards
& Pracs. Comm’n), 304 A.3d 79, 93 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023), appeal granted sub nom.
R.W. v. Dep’t of Educ., 321 A.3d 862 (Pa. 2024). “Although it is not a tangible right,
individuals have a fundamental right to protect their reputation from false or
misleading information that affects how they are regarded by their community.” Id.
Since “[e]xpungement is a mechanism utilized to protect an individual’s reputation
from the stigma that accompanies an arrest record[,]” Com. v. Wallace, 97 A.3d 310,
319 (Pa. 2014), it follows that the failure to properly process and promulgate an
expungement order may violate the affected individual’s reputational rights by
causing them to suffer unnecessary or inaccurate stigma.
Even so, it is important to recognize that an individual’s reputation is
based upon others’ perceptions about them. See Street Road Bar & Grille, Inc. v.
Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 876 A.2d 346, 356-57 (Pa. 2005) (defining “repute” as “the
account or consideration of a person held by others, i.e., what people think of
another, reputation”). Thus, it is theoretically possible for an individual to suffer no
reputational injury on account of inaccurate criminal record information if that
information is not known in their community or by those with whom they interact.
We consequently conclude that a determination regarding whether Respondents’
handling of Judge Scanlon’s order violated Petitioner’s constitutional right to
reputation cannot be made on the pleadings alone.

10
III. CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, we grant Petitioner’s
Application in part regarding Counts I and II. Specifically, we grant declaratory
judgment in his favor as to his claims that Respondents failed to perform their
ministerial, nondiscretionary duty to docket and disseminate Judge Scanlon’s order,
as well as that the Office violated CHRIA and that he is entitled to actual damages
and attorney’s fees as a result. We also deny the Application in part as moot
regarding Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief, due to the fact that Respondents
have already given him the relief he sought by processing and promulgating Judge
Scanlon’s order after the commencement of this litigation. Finally, we deny the
remainder of Petitioner’s Application.

_____________________________________
LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

11
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

K. B., :
Petitioner :
: No. 446 M.D. 2023
v. :
:
Delaware County Office of Judicial :
Support, and Mary J. Walk, in her :
official capacity as Director of the :
Delaware County Office of Judicial :
Support, :
Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 27th day of June, 2025, it is hereby ORDERED:
1. Petitioner K.B.’s Application for Summary Relief in the Form of Judgment
on the Pleadings (Application) is GRANTED IN PART, as to his request in Count I
of his petition for review (PFR) for declaratory judgment against Respondents
Delaware County Office of Judicial Support (Office), and Mary J. Walk, in her
official capacity as Director of the Delaware County Office of Judicial Support, and
his request in Count II of his PFR for declaratory judgment, actual damages, and
attorney’s fees against the Office;
2. Petitioner’s Application is DENIED AS MOOT IN PART, to the extent he
requests injunctive relief through his PFR against Respondents;
3. Petitioner’s Application is otherwise DENIED.

____________________________________
LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11085166. Public record. Not legal advice.