# People v. Wiley

> California Supreme Court · June 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11084335

## Case

- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 26, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ERIC DAVID WILEY,
Defendant and Appellant.

S283326

First Appellate District, Division Four
A165613

Humboldt County Superior Court
CR1902147B and CR2101049

June 26, 2025

Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Guerrero, Justices Liu, Groban, and Evans
concurred.

Justice Kruger filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice
Jenkins concurred.
PEOPLE v. WILEY
S283326

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

Here we hold that the trial court violated defendant Eric
Wiley’s federal constitutional right to a jury trial by
adjudicating underlying facts related to his prior convictions
and improperly relying on its conclusions in choosing to impose
an upper term sentence. This result is compelled by the recent
case of Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821 (Erlinger).
Erlinger considered the scope of the jury trial guarantee
discussed in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490
(Apprendi) and the prior conviction exception recognized in
Almendarez-Torres v. United States (1998) 523 U.S. 224
(Almendarez-Torres). The majority held that, under the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments,1 “a judge may ‘do no more . . . than
determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was
convicted of.’ ” (Erlinger, at p. 838, quoting Mathis v. United
States (2016) 579 U.S. 500, 511–512 (Mathis).)
Erlinger requires us to overrule our decisions in People v.
Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63 (Towne) and People v. Black (2007)
41 Cal.4th 799 (Black), which construed the Almendarez-Torres
prior conviction exception more broadly than Erlinger now

1
While the essential components of a jury trial are secured
by both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments (Erlinger, supra, 602
U.S. at pp. 830–831), for the sake of brevity we will sometimes
refer to it as the Sixth Amendment guarantee.

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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

allows. Erlinger also bears on the application of Penal Code2
section 1170, subdivision (b)(3)’s provision governing proof of
prior convictions. We interpret that section to reflect Erlinger’s
clarification of federal constitutional guarantees.
Erlinger held that a defendant is entitled to have a jury
determine whether multiple prior convictions occurred on
separate occasions under the provisions of the Armed Career
Criminal Act of 1984 (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)). (Erlinger, supra, 602
U.S. at pp. 833–835, 838–839.) The trial court here sentenced
Wiley to an upper term based on two different aggravating facts:
the increasing seriousness of his prior convictions and his
unsatisfactory performance on previous grants of probation.
Although Erlinger involved a different kind of sentencing
consideration, its analysis compels the conclusion that Wiley
was entitled to a jury trial on these aggravating facts as well,
and the failure to afford one was error of a constitutional
dimension. Because we find that error prejudicial, we reverse
the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which upheld Wiley’s
sentence, and remand the matter to that court.
I. BACKGROUND
In January 2020, Wiley pled guilty to feloniously making
a criminal threat. (§ 422.) The trial court imposed an upper
term prison sentence of three years, suspended execution of that
sentence, and placed Wiley on probation for three years. In
March 2022, while on probation, Wiley pled guilty to a new
charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd.
(a)(1).) The trial court also found that he had violated the terms
of his 2020 probation and revoked that grant. On July 1, 2022,

2
All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

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PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

the court sentenced Wiley on the new possession conviction and
resentenced him on the probation revocation. As to the criminal
threat, it again imposed the upper term of three years in prison
and added a consecutive term of eight months for the firearm
possession. (§ 1170.1, subd. (a).) To justify the upper term, the
court cited Wiley’s “prior convictions, [his] poor performance on
probation, and the fact that the charges are becoming more
serious.”3
The Court of Appeal upheld Wiley’s sentence over his
Sixth Amendment challenge. (People v. Wiley (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 676, 680, 682–683, 688 (Wiley).) It rejected the
argument that the trial court engaged in impermissible
factfinding when it determined Wiley’s felony convictions were
of increasing seriousness and his prior performance on
probation was poor, rather than submitting those questions for
a jury determination. Applying this court’s decisions in Towne,
supra, 44 Cal.4th 63 and Black, supra, 41 Cal.4th 799, the Court

3
Wiley was convicted by plea in both cases. Neither plea
included an agreement to an upper term sentence. The 2020
agreement called for probation with no jail time. Wiley argued
against imposing any sentence at that time, but, over his
objection, the trial court instead imposed a three-year sentence,
with execution suspended. In 2022, the court did not simply
execute the previously imposed three-year term, but rather
sentenced Wiley anew in recognition of the ameliorative changes
made to section 1170, subdivision (b). (See People v. Esquivel
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 673, 677–680.) The plea bargain on the
new case did provide for an eight-month subordinate
consecutive term for firearm possession, but it did not specify a
negotiated base term sentence on the criminal threats
conviction. Accordingly, the trial court was required to justify
imposition of an upper term sentence based on a finding of
aggravating facts.

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PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

of Appeal held the Sixth Amendment permitted the judge to
make those determinations because they related to Wiley’s
recidivism. (Wiley, at pp. 682–683.)
The Court of Appeal also rejected Wiley’s contention that
the trial court’s factfinding exceeded the scope of the prior
conviction exception provided for by section 1170, subdivision
(b)(3) (section 1170(b)). (Wiley, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp.
684–686.) It held the statute is consistent with Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence establishing “ ‘ “the right to a jury
trial does not apply to the fact of a prior conviction.” ’ ” (Wiley,
at pp. 683–684, quoting People v. Pantaleon (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 932, 938 (Pantaleon).) It reasoned that “[t]he
statute does not specify the court is limited to finding that a
prior conviction occurred; instead, it states the court may
‘consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining
sentencing.’ [Citation.] And, as our Supreme Court has
recognized in the context of the prior conviction exception to the
constitutional jury trial right, consideration of prior convictions
may establish recidivism-based aggravating factors such as
increasing seriousness of the convictions [citation] or prior
unsatisfactory performance on probation or parole [citation].
The statutory language does not suggest the Legislature sought
to depart from our Supreme Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence on this point by establishing a significantly
narrower statutory prior conviction exception.” (Wiley, at p.
686.)
We conclude the Court of Appeal’s reasoning is
inconsistent with the high court’s holding in Erlinger. Although
Erlinger involved a different sentencing consideration, its
analysis of the federal Constitution’s jury trial right requires
that a jury determine whether the particular details of a

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PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

defendant’s criminal history establish an unsatisfactory
probation performance or demonstrate convictions of increasing
seriousness, before a trial court can rely on those facts to justify
an upper term sentence.
II. DISCUSSION
Under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, “any fact that exposes a defendant to a
greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge,
and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a
preponderance of the evidence.” (Cunningham v. California
(2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281 (Cunningham); accord, Erlinger, supra,
602 U.S. at pp. 830–832.) “Inhering in that guarantee is an
assurance that a guilty verdict will issue only from a unanimous
jury.” (Erlinger, at p. 830; accord, Ramos v. Louisiana (2020)
590 U.S. 83, 90, 92–93.)
Section 1170(b)(2) similarly provides that the trial court
may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when
circumstances in aggravation of the crime justify imposition of
an upper term sentence, and “the facts underlying those
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt” at a jury or court
trial. Construing this statutory scheme in light of the high
court’s holding in Cunningham, People v. Lynch (2024) 16
Cal.5th 730 (Lynch) held that this jury trial right is not merely
a state law entitlement, but is constitutionally required for all
aggravating facts, other than a prior conviction, relied upon to
justify an upper term sentence. (Id. at pp. 755–767.)
The exception to the jury trial right for “the fact of a prior
conviction” has long been recognized in the high court’s
precedent. (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490; accord,

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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

Almendarez-Torres, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 243–244, 247.)
Section 1170(b)(3) likewise allows the court to “consider the
defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based
on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior
convictions to a jury.”
At issue here is just how broadly the concept of “the fact of
a prior conviction” is to be understood and the extent of the
Almendarez-Torres exception. Specifically, in considering a
defendant’s criminal convictions, is the court limited to deciding
what crimes a defendant has previously committed and the
elements of those crimes? Or, may the court make other factual
determinations relating to those prior crimes and the
defendant’s recidivism, without running afoul of the Sixth
Amendment or section 1170(b)’s jury trial provisions?
A. The Federal Constitutional Jury Trial Right and the
Almendarez-Torres Exception for Prior Convictions
We look first to the federal constitutional jury trial
entitlement.4 The prior conviction exception derives from
Almendarez-Torres, supra, 523 U.S. 224. There, the defendant
was convicted of unlawfully reentering the United States after
a prior deportation. Title 8 of the United States Code section
1326(b) provides for longer sentences if a defendant’s prior
deportation occurred after a qualifying conviction. The question

4
As a general rule, “we do not reach constitutional
questions unless absolutely required to do so to dispose of the
matter before us.” (People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667;
accord, Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v.
Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 230.) Here it is necessary to
address the constitutional claim because the presence of a
constitutional violation informs the standard for assessing
prejudice. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 755.)

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PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

was whether this statutory provision “defines a separate crime”
which includes, as an element, the existence of a qualifying prior
conviction, or was simply a “penalty provision.” (Almendarez-
Torres, at p. 226.) The court concluded that due process did not
require that the new indictment allege defendant had been
convicted of a qualifying offense in order to give him proper
notice of the new charges. (Id. at pp. 226–227, 229–235, 239–
247.) It reasoned that “recidivism” is “a traditional, if not the
most traditional, basis for a sentencing court’s increasing an
offender’s sentence.” (Id. at p. 243.)
The high court has repeatedly acknowledged the
Almendarez-Torres holding as a narrow exception to the Sixth
Amendment’s jury trial right for sentencing-enhancing facts.
“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490, italics
added; accord, Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at pp. 274–275;
United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220, 231; Blakely v.
Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 301.) Subsequent high court
opinions have arguably cast doubt on the exception’s scope or
validity, but ultimately have found it unnecessary to confront
those questions. (See, e.g., Pereida v. Wilkinson (2021) 592 U.S.
224, 238 [describing Almendarez-Torres as “an unusual and
‘arguable’ exception to the Sixth Amendment rule”]; Alleyne v.
United States (2013) 570 U.S. 99, 111, fn. 1 (Alleyne) [noting that
the parties had not asked the court to revisit the validity of
Almendarez-Torres]; Apprendi, at pp. 489, 490 [noting “it is
arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided” but
that “Apprendi does not contest the decision’s validity and we
need not revisit if for purposes of our decision today”]; see also

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PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

Mathis, supra, 579 U.S. at p. 522 (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.)
[calling for Almendarez-Torres to be overruled].)
1. The High Court’s Holding in Erlinger
Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. 821, considered “whether a judge
may decide that a defendant’s past offenses were committed on
separate occasions under a preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard, or whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require
a unanimous jury to make that determination beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 825.) In that case, the trial court,
over objection, found that Erlinger had suffered four prior
convictions for burglary “ ‘committed on occasions different from
one another,’ ” thus increasing the sentencing range for the
current offense from a maximum of 10 years to 15 years to life.
(Id. at p. 825, quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); see also Erlinger, at
pp. 826–827.)
The high court held that the trial court’s factual finding on
this requirement ran afoul of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’
jury trial guarantee. The court pointed out that the “separate
occasions” inquiry is not as straightforward as it might appear.
It “can require an examination of a ‘range’ of facts, including
whether the defendant’s past offenses were ‘committed close in
time,’ whether they were committed near to or far from one
another, and whether the offenses were ‘similar or intertwined’
in purpose and character.” (Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 828.)
Surveying several of its past decisions in the face of “a variety of
. . . recent sentencing innovations” (id. at p. 833), the court
emphasized that it had “come to the same conclusion in one
decision after another” (id. at p. 843) and forcefully stated its
conclusion. “Virtually ‘any fact’ that ‘ “increase[s] the prescribed
range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed” ’

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PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

must be resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable
doubt (or freely admitted in a guilty plea).” (Id. at p. 834.)
Turning to the Almendarez-Torres exception, the court
observed that the holding had come under scrutiny (Erlinger,
supra, 602 U.S. at pp. 837–838), but, as it had done before, it
noted that “no one in this case has asked us to revisit
Almendarez-Torres” (id. at p. 838). Nor had Erlinger challenged
the trial court’s authority to find that he had suffered four
burglary convictions and that each qualified as a “ ‘violent
offense.’ ” (Id. at p. 835.) But Erlinger did challenge the court’s
authority to find that his convictions occurred on separate
occasions. On that score, the court rejected the argument
advanced by court-appointed amicus curiae that the
Almendarez-Torres exception “permits a judge to find perhaps
any fact related to a defendant’s past offenses,” including that
one. (Id. at p. 837.) Instead, it described Almendarez-Torres “as
a ‘narrow exception’ permitting judges to find only ‘the fact of a
prior conviction.’ [Citation.] Under that exception, a judge may
‘do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than
determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was
convicted of.’ ” (Id. at p. 838, quoting Alleyne, supra, 570 U.S. at
p. 111, fn. 1 & Mathis, supra, 579 U.S. at pp. 511–512.)
In so holding, the court acknowledged that, “[t]o conduct
the narrow inquiry Almendarez-Torres authorizes, a court may
need to know the jurisdiction in which the defendant’s crime
occurred and its date in order to ascertain what legal elements
the government had to prove to secure a conviction in that place
at that time. And to answer those questions, a sentencing court
may sometimes consult ‘a restricted set of materials,’ often
called Shepard documents, that include judicial records, plea
agreements, and colloquies between a judge and the defendant.

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PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

[Citations.] [¶] None of that, however, means that a court may
use Shepard documents or any other materials for any other
purpose. To ensure compliance with the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, a sentencing judge may use the information
[gleaned] from Shepard documents for the ‘limited function’ of
determining the fact of a prior conviction and the then-existing
elements of that offense. [Citation.] ‘[N]o more’ is allowed.”
(Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 839.)5
Applying these principles, the high court held that the
trial court exceeded Almendarez-Torres’s narrow exception by
finding that Erlinger’s offenses occurred on separate occasions.
(Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 840.) To determine whether the
convictions triggered an enhanced penalty, the trial court “had
to do more than identify his previous convictions and the legal
elements required to sustain them. It had to find that those
offenses occurred on at least three separate occasions.” (Id. at
pp. 838–839.) That finding, in turn, required a qualitative
assessment of the offenses’ “time, location, character, and
purpose.” (Id. at p. 840.) “The Fifth and Sixth Amendments
‘contemplat[e] that a jury — not a sentencing court — will find

5
The articulated limitation on a trial court’s permissible
use of “Shepard documents” seems to make clear that a
California trial court’s reliance on information in a probation
department presentence report (see § 1203, subd. (b)(1)) to
impose an upper term sentence is now precluded. (Erlinger,
supra, 602 U.S. at pp. 839–842; see also § 1170(b)(3) [requiring
that prior convictions be established by a certified record of
conviction].) As a general matter, it does not appear that the
trial court is prevented from considering the report’s contents in
deciding other issues, such as whether to impose a lower or
midterm sentence, or to exercise its discretion to withdraw its
conditional approval of a bargain. (See People v. Stamps (2020)
9 Cal.5th 685, 705–706.)

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PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

such facts, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
(Ibid.) This is true notwithstanding that the inquiry will in
many cases be “ ‘ “straightforward.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 842.) The court
explained: “Often, a defendant’s past offenses will be different
enough and separated by enough time and space that there is
little question he committed them on separate occasions. But
none of that means a judge rather than a jury should make the
call. There is no efficiency exception to the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. In a free society respectful of the individual, a
criminal defendant enjoys the right to hold the government to
the burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt to a
unanimous jury of his peers ‘ “regardless of how
overwhelmin[g]” ’ the evidence may seem to a judge.” (Ibid.)
2. Absent Waiver or Stipulation, the Increasing
Seriousness of Prior Convictions and the
Defendant’s Unsatisfactory Performance on
Probation Must Be Found by a Jury
Under the principles articulated in Erlinger, both parties
agree that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury determination
of the two aggravating facts at issue here: the “increasing
seriousness” of a defendant’s prior convictions (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)) and “unsatisfactory” “performance on
probation” (id., rule 4.421(b)(5)), before those facts can be used
to justify an upper term sentence. We agree as well.
Under current case law, the determination that a
defendant’s prior convictions are of increasing seriousness may
be made by “reference to the range of punishment provided by
statute for each offense.” (Black, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 820.)
Or it may be determined by “a comparison of the offenses’
respective elements.” (People v. Quiles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th

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PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

612, 622.)6 By either measure, the inquiry requires a
comparison and evaluation of the relationship among a
defendant’s prior convictions, and a determination as to their
relative seriousness. As a result, it involves something more
than a narrow factual finding that the convictions were
sustained and what elements were required to prove them.
Erlinger makes clear that, under its interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment, that narrow finding is as much, and all, the
Almendarez-Torres exception allows. (Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S.
at pp. 838–839.) Indeed, the inquiry here is similar to the
finding at issue in Erlinger that the defendant’s offenses
occurred on separate occasions. As noted, Erlinger held the
finding implicates the jury trial right because it requires a
qualitative assessment of the offenses’ “time, location,
character, and purpose.” (Id. at p. 840.) The Attorney General
concedes that a similar conclusion follows here with respect to
the factual finding that a defendant’s offenses are increasing in
seriousness.
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the
aggravating fact that the defendant performed unsatisfactorily
on probation. Under current case law, this fact may be proved
“by evidence demonstrating that, while previously on probation
or parole, [the defendant] committed and was convicted of new
offenses.” (Towne, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 82.) Alternatively,
proof may be “based upon other evidence of misconduct that was
not previously adjudicated in a criminal trial” such as evidence
that the defendant “did not appear for appointments, failed a
drug test, or stopped attending counseling sessions as directed.”

6
Both parties accept these criteria for purposes of resolving
the arguments before us.

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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

(Ibid.) The latter circumstances clearly go beyond the fact of
prior conviction and its elements. (Id. at pp. 82–83.) And even
where a finding of unsatisfactory probation performance is
based on conviction of a new offense, it is not strictly limited to
that fact. Rather, it must be proven that the defendant was
ordered to serve a term of probation and remained on probation
at the time he or she committed the new offense. These facts,
too, go beyond the mere existence of a prior conviction and its
elements. (See Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 838.) Again, the
Attorney General concedes the point.
It could be argued that there is a difference between a
strictly factual determination as to whether a defendant
suffered a particular previous conviction and a more nuanced
discretionary and normative judicial judgment evaluating
whether those convictions were of “increasing seriousness” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)), or whether the fact of those
convictions, along with other customary relied-upon sources like
a presentencing memo from the probation department, showed
that the defendant’s previous probation performance was
satisfactory or poor (id., rule 4.421(b)(5)). For example, suppose
there was a proper determination of the following facts: the
defendant had been convicted of disturbing the peace five years
ago, misdemeanor assault four years ago, felony assault three
years ago, and murder two years ago. Suppose further that the
record established by admissible documents that the defendant
had violated his probation several times in connection with the
first three convictions. In light of those proper factual findings
by an appropriate factfinder, could the court determine that the
convictions were of increasing seriousness or that his probation
performance was poor? As we read Erlinger, it appears that the
high court would firmly say no. We understand Erlinger to

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PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

require that any fact, beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction,
that exposes a defendant to harsher punishment, must be found
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, unless the defendant
stipulates to its truth or waives a jury trial. This jury trial
guarantee retains its vitality even if the inquiry is
“ ‘ “straightforward.” ’ ” (Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 842.)
“There is no efficiency exception to the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.” (Ibid.) Only when aggravating facts have been
proven as the Constitution requires may the court then rely on
them to conclude, in its discretion, that those facts justify an
upper term.
This conclusion requires us to overrule our contrary
holdings in Black, supra, 41 Cal.4th 799 and Towne, supra, 44
Cal.4th 63, which predate Erlinger’s clarification by nearly two
decades. Those decisions broadly construed Apprendi’s
exception to the jury trial right for “the fact of a prior conviction”
(Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490) to encompass “other
related issues” (Black, at p. 819) concerning a “defendant’s
criminal history” or “ ‘[r]ecidivism’ ” (id. at p. 818; accord,
Towne, at pp. 75–81).
Specifically, Black held that the finding at issue there as
to the “increasing seriousness” of the defendant’s prior
convictions did not require a jury determination. It reasoned,
“The relative seriousness of these alleged convictions may be
determined simply by reference to the range of punishment
provided by statute for each offense. This type of determination
is ‘quite different from the resolution of the issues submitted to
a jury, and is one more typically and appropriately undertaken

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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

by a court.’ ” (Black, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 820, quoting People
v. McGee (2006) 38 Cal.4th 682, 706.)7
Towne held that a finding of unsatisfactory probation
performance did not require a jury trial, so long as it was based
on the defendant’s conviction for a new offense during the
probationary period. (Towne, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 82.) It
reasoned, “When a defendant’s prior unsatisfactory performance
on probation or parole is established by his or her record of prior
convictions, it seems beyond debate that the aggravating
circumstance is included within the Almendarez-Torres
exception and that the right to a jury trial does not apply.”
(Ibid.)8
These expansive readings of the Almendarez-Torres
exception do not survive the high court’s more recent
pronouncements in Erlinger. Under the Sixth Amendment,

7
McGee held that the trial court does not run afoul of the
Sixth Amendment by examining the record of a criminal
conviction to “ascertain whether that record reveals whether the
conviction realistically may have been based on conduct that
would not constitute a serious felony under California law.”
(People v. McGee, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 706.) We overruled
McGee on that point in People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120,
124–125, 134–136.)
8
Towne reached a different conclusion when a finding of
poor performance on probation or parole is based on evidence
other than conviction of a new offense, such as a failed drug test
or the failure to appear for appointments or attend counseling
sessions. (Towne, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 82–83.) It held that
“the right to a jury trial applies to such [additional] factual
determinations,” which involve factfinding that is “very
different from what ordinarily occurs in resolving the question
of whether a defendant suffered a prior conviction.” (Id. at pp.
82, 83.) That conclusion is consistent with Erlinger and today’s
holding.

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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

Wiley was entitled to have a jury determine whether his prior
convictions were of increasing seriousness and whether he had
performed unsatisfactorily on probation, before the court could
rely on those aggravating facts to find justification for an upper
term sentence. We overrule People v. Black, supra, 41 Cal.4th
799 and People v. Towne, supra, 44 Cal.4th 63 to the extent they
are inconsistent with today’s holding.9
B. Section 1170(b)(3)’s Prior Conviction Exception
We likewise hold that the trial court’s factual findings
exceeded the scope of the statutory exception to the jury trial
right for prior convictions that appears in section 1170(b)(3). As
noted, that subdivision authorizes the trial court to “consider
the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing
based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the
prior convictions to a jury.” (Ibid.) Of course any state provision
of this kind must comport with federal constitutional
requirements, which Erlinger has now clarified.
The majority of appellate courts to consider this issue,
including the Court of Appeal in this case, have construed the
statutory jury trial exception as having the same scope as the
Almendarez-Torres exception to the federal Constitution.
(People v. Morgan (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 488, 517–518, review

9
In imposing an upper term sentence, the trial court in this
case also noted that Wiley had been convicted of at least four
prior felonies. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2); see Black,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 819–820 [holding that a finding of
“numerous” prior convictions comes within the Almendarez-
Torres exception].) Wiley has not challenged the trial court’s
purported reliance on this aggravating fact either in the Court
of Appeal or in the briefing before us. Nor is it necessary for us
to consider whether this numerical tally falls within the
Almendarez-Torres exception in order to resolve the case.

16
PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

granted Oct. 2, 2024, S286493 (Morgan); Wiley, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at pp. 683–686; Pantaleon, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th
at p. 938; People v. Ross (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1346, 1353,
review granted Mar. 15, 2023, S278266, review dism. Apr. 30,
2025.) As discussed, at the time those cases were decided, the
Almendarez-Torres exception for prior convictions was
understood to include both “the fact that a prior conviction
occurred” and “other related issues that may be determined by
examining the records of the prior convictions.” (Black, supra,
41 Cal.4th at p. 819.) Applying this precedent, the Courts of
Appeal rejected the defendants’ argument that section
1170(b)(3) should be construed more narrowly than its federal
counterpart to apply only to the fact of a prior conviction.
(Morgan, at p. 518; Wiley, at pp. 684–686.) These cases were
correct in giving the constitutional and statutory exceptions the
same scope. But, after Erlinger, the lower courts’ ultimate
conclusion as to the extent of that scope is not.
To avoid any application that would set section 1170(b)(3)
at odds with the high court’s constitutional interpretation, we
interpret section 1170(b)(3)’s procedure in a manner that is
coextensive with high court dictates. (People v. Engram (2010)
50 Cal.4th 1131, 1161.)10 We disapprove People v. Morgan,

10
Nor is there any longer a viable argument to construe the
statute’s exception more narrowly than the parallel exception
under the Sixth Amendment. Before Erlinger, defendants had
argued that the statute’s exception applied only to the fact of a
prior conviction, in the face of a broader construction of the
federal constitutional exception for prior convictions. (Morgan,
supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 518; Wiley, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 684–686.) But Erlinger’s holding aligns with the
narrower view of the statute that those defendants espoused.

17
PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 488; People v. Wiley, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th 676; People v. Pantaleon, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th
932; and People v. Ross, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th 1346, to the
extent they are inconsistent with today’s holding.
In sum, a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all
aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction
and its elements,11 that expose the defendant to imposition of a
sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm.
The proper procedure for adjudicating such aggravating facts is
as follows: Defendants may assert the right to a jury trial, may
waive jury in favor of a court trial, or may waive trial altogether.
Subject to the standard rules of evidence both parties may
stipulate to the admission of probation reports or other evidence
bearing on a defendant’s social and educational history, as well
as other information relevant to sentencing, including criminal
history. The burden is on the People to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the facts relied on to justify an upper term
sentence. If those facts are properly proven, the court may take
them into account and exercise its discretion under section
1170(b) to determine what sentence to impose, keeping in mind
the statutory limits on upward departures from the midterm
and the requirement for stating its reasons on the record.
(§ 1170(b)(2), (5).)

Our finding that the federal constitution and the statute are
coextensive forecloses both a broader and a narrower
construction.
11
As the high court has noted the trial court is entitled to
consider so called “Shepard documents” as part of the limited
consideration of a prior conviction and its elements. (Erlinger,
supra, 602 U.S. at p. 839.)

18
PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

C. The Failure to Afford Wiley a Jury Trial on
Aggravating Facts Was Prejudicial
When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on
aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term
sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman
standard of review. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 742–743;
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.) Under that
standard, “a sentence imposed under . . . section 1170(b) must
be reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes
beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same
standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts
upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was
justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in
compliance with the current statute.” (Lynch, at p. 743; see also
Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at pp. 849–850 (conc. opn. of Roberts,
C. J.).) Lack of a jury trial is not harmless under Chapman if
“the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a
contrary finding” with respect to the aggravating fact at issue.
(Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 19; accord, In re Lopez
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 581; People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th
819, 832; People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 417 (Mil).)
Applying this standard, we conclude that failure to afford
Wiley a jury trial on whether his prior convictions were of
“increasing seriousness” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2))
was prejudicial. A certified rap sheet from the California Law
Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), which was

19
PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

admitted into evidence at Wiley’s sentencing hearing,12 reveals
the following criminal history:
1998 conviction for driving at an unsafe speed, an
infraction, which resulted in a fine. (Veh. Code, § 22350.)
1998 conviction for possession of marijuana, a felony in
1998 but now an infraction (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd.
(a)); and a
1998 conviction for attempted theft, a misdemeanor
(§§ 484, subd. (a), 664). For these two offenses, Wiley was
ordered to serve a five-year probationary term.
2002 conviction for reckless driving, a misdemeanor,
resulting in a three-year probationary term. (Veh. Code,
§ 23103.)
2003 conviction for driving with a suspended license, a
misdemeanor13 (Veh. Code, § 14601, subd. (b)(2)); and a

12
The fact that Wiley does not challenge the certified rap
sheet’s admissibility makes it unnecessary for us to consider
that point. (See generally People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th
106, 113, 119–134; People v. Morris (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 363,
367, 370–373; People v. Dunlap (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1468,
1476–1481; Evid. Code, § 1280.) Wiley does observe that such
records can be confusing and even erroneous. Indeed, the
CLETS rap sheet in this case contains an error. (See fn. 13,
post.) We held in Martinez that such errors “ ‘ “may be
developed on cross-examination and should not affect the
admissibility of the [record] itself.” ’ ” (Martinez, at p. 132.)
Ultimately, the high court stressed the limitations of this type
of documentary evidence as one reason for requiring a contested
jury trial on findings of fact that go beyond the existence of a
criminal conviction and its underlying elements. (Erlinger,
supra, 602 U.S. at pp. 839–842 & fn. 3.)
13
The CLETS rap sheet incorrectly describes this offense as
an infraction.

20
PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

2003 conviction for driving under the influence, a
misdemeanor (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)). For these two
offenses, Wiley was ordered to serve a five-year probationary
term.
2005 conviction for knowingly driving with a suspended
license, a misdemeanor (Veh. Code, § 14601.5, subd. (a)); and a
2005 conviction for driving under the influence with prior
offenses, a felony (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23550, subd.
(a)). For these two offenses, Wiley was ordered to serve a three-
year probationary term.
2009 conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a
felony in 2009 but now a misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11377, subd. (a)); and a
2009 conviction for driving with knowledge of a suspended
license, a misdemeanor (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a)). For
these two offenses, Wiley was ordered to serve a three-year
probationary term.
2015 conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a
misdemeanor, resulting in a one-year jail term. (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11377, subd. (a).)
2015 conviction for making a space available for the
manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance, a felony
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.5, subd. (a)); and a
2015 conviction for unlawful possession of ammunition by
a felon, a felony (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)). For these two offenses,
Wiley was ordered to serve a three-year probationary term.
2016 conviction for sale of marijuana, a felony in 2016,
now a misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a));
and a
2016 conviction for transportation of a controlled
substance for sale, a felony (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd.

21
PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

(a)). For each of the 2016 offenses, Wiley was ordered to serve
four years in prison, with the sentences to run concurrently.
2018 conviction for possession of marijuana for sale, a
misdemeanor, resulting in a two-year probationary term.
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11359, subd. (b).)
2020 conviction for criminal threats, a felony, resulting in
a three-year prison term with imposition of sentence suspended
and a three-year term of probation. (§ 422.)
The Attorney General argues that the progression of
Wiley’s offenses over time from misdemeanors to felonies
demonstrates a clear trend from less serious offenses towards
more serious ones. That may be. But a rational juror may not
have been persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt by that fact
alone. Given that Wiley’s criminal record began as a young
adult and spanned two decades, we cannot discount the
possibility that, in making the determination as to increasing
seriousness, a rational juror could have either placed greater
emphasis on his felony offenses, or on his more recent criminal
history.
As for Wiley’s felony offenses, none is strikingly more
serious than the others, either by reference to the nature of the
offense or the punishment. The majority of Wiley’s felony
offenses were drug-related and exposed Wiley to a sentencing
range of 16 months, two or three years. (See §§ 18, 1170, subd.
(h)(1).) His 2015 conviction for unlawful possession of
ammunition was punishable alternatively as a felony or
misdemeanor, and carried the standard default felony range of
16 months, two or three years. (§ 30305, subd. (a)(2).) The
conviction with the longest sentence exposure was his 2016
conviction for transporting a controlled substance, carrying a
potential two-, three- or four-year term. (Health & Saf. Code,

22
PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

§ 11379, subd. (a).) Two crimes followed in 2018 and 2020. A
misdemeanor marijuana offense carried a six-month maximum
jail term (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359, subd. (b)), and a felony
criminal threats offense, an alternative felony/misdemeanor,
involved a 16 month, two- or three-year prison exposure. (§ 422.)
A jury considering this criminal history could have disagreed as
to whether it demonstrated criminal conduct of increasing
seriousness. We do not suggest that one conclusion is more
reasonable or more likely than the other, only that a rational
juror could conclude that the People had not proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that Wiley’s convictions were of increasing
seriousness.
The Attorney General counters that Wiley’s 2020
conviction for making a criminal threat was his most serious
offense when considering the range of punishment (see Black,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 820) because it is classified as a serious
felony that carries additional penalties if Wiley commits certain
new offenses. (See §§ 667, subd. (a)(1) [five-year enhancement],
667, subds. (b)–(i) [“Three Strikes Law”], 1192.7, subd. (c)
[serious felony defined].) The serious felony designation and the
future consequences, he reasons, “demonstrate the Legislature’s
current assessment that criminal threats is deserving of special
treatment and enhanced deterrence not afforded to nonserious
crimes . . . .” In his estimation, this classification outweighs the
consideration noted above that Wiley’s 2016 transportation
conviction is a nonreducible felony that carries a longer
sentencing potential than his 2020 criminal threats conviction.
(Compare Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a) with Pen. Code,
§§ 422, subd. (a), 1170, subd. (h)(1).) Even accepting the
Attorney General’s argument that the designation of an offense
as a serious felony is a relevant consideration, it is simply one

23
PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

factor the jury could have considered when evaluating whether
Wiley’s crimes were of increasing seriousness. Its relevance as
a factor underscores that the determination is a comparative
and qualitative one. These realities make it “ ‘ “difficult for a
reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue
been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the
facts in the same manner as did the trial court.” ’ ” (Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 775.)
In short, while the evidence may have been sufficient to
support a finding of increasing seriousness, that is not the
proper inquiry when assessing prejudice under Chapman. (Mil,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 418.) Instead, we must ask “whether any
rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion.”
(Ibid.) A rational juror could have reached the opposite
conclusion here based on the totality of Wiley’s criminal conduct
and the applicable sentences for those transgressions.
Accordingly, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
a properly instructed jury would have found Wiley’s criminal
convictions were of increasing seriousness.
Similarly, we conclude that the failure to conduct a jury
trial on the second aggravating fact, unsatisfactory performance
on probation (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(5)), was
prejudicial. Evidence presented at the sentencing hearing was
admitted without objection in the form of a probation report,14
which recited Wiley’s performance on probation in three cases.
In one case, Wiley successfully completed a residential drug
treatment program, obtained his driver’s license, paid all court

14
In imposing sentence, the trial court considered the
probation report and here both parties rely on it to assess
prejudice. We do so as well. (But see fn. 5, ante.)

24
PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

ordered fines and fees, and committed no probation violations.
In two other cases, Wiley’s performance on probation was
“marked by probation violations due to his arrest and conviction
of new misdemeanor and felony law violations.” Probation was
revoked and a prison term was executed. After his release from
prison on post release community supervision, Wiley was
convicted of a new misdemeanor offense, but “was fairly
compliant during the remainder of his supervision term . . . .”
The Attorney General argues that, “[b]ecause committing
an offense on probation is such a clear violation of both the letter
and spirit of probation’s strictures, no rational jury could
conclude that a defendant who committed crimes two out of the
three times that he was on formal probation had performed
satisfactor[ily] on probation.” However, the probation officer’s
assessment in this case demonstrates that the record is also
open to a different interpretation. She characterized Wiley’s
mixed performance on probation as both an aggravating factor
and a mitigating factor. Given this assessment, we cannot
discount the possibility that either counsel in a contested jury
trial might have presented live testimony on this factor that
would have affected the jury’s determination. (See People v.
Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 839–840.) Nor can we discount
the possibility that a rational jury could have disagreed as to
whether the People had proved that Wiley’s overall performance
on probation was unsatisfactory. Accordingly, we cannot
conclude the deprivation of a jury trial was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.15

15
This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider
Wiley’s additional argument that he is entitled to a remand

25
PEOPLE v. WILEY
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

III. DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as
it affirmed Wiley’s sentence. We remand to the Court of Appeal
with directions to return the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
CORRIGAN, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
LIU, J.
GROBAN, J.
EVANS, J.

under People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 because
the trial court failed to appreciate the limitations on its
discretion to impose an upper term sentence under section
1170(b)(1) and (2).

26
PEOPLE v. WILEY
S283326

Concurring Opinion by Justice Kruger

After Eric Wiley pleaded guilty to making a criminal
threat (Pen. Code, § 422), the trial court found multiple
aggravating circumstances and determined that these
circumstances warranted an upper term sentence. The court
cited three circumstances in particular, all related to Wiley’s
criminal history: his “prior convictions, poor performance on
probation, and the fact that the charges are becoming more
serious.” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)–(5).)
Consistent with the constitutional holding in People v.
Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch), the majority today
concludes that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments entitled Wiley
to a jury determination of whether his probation performance
was indeed “poor” and whether his crimes were indeed becoming
increasingly “serious.” (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 4–5, 11–14.)
I agree with the majority that Wiley was entitled to a jury
determination on these questions. But for the reasons I
explained in Lynch, I do not think this is a constitutional issue.
(Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 779–787 (conc. & dis. opn. of
Kruger, J.).) Wiley’s right to a jury determination on these
aggravators stems not from the Fifth or Sixth Amendment, but
instead from the Legislature’s considered decision to expand the
jury right beyond its traditional bounds, to encompass the full
range of qualitative, comparative determinations that have

1
PEOPLE v. WILEY
Kruger, J., concurring

historically informed judges’ exercise of their sentencing
discretion.
To briefly review: In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530
U.S. 466 (Apprendi), and follow-on cases, the high court has
distinguished between the right to have a jury determine (1)
facts that increase the sentence range prescribed by statute, and
(2) facts that a judge may rely on in exercising its discretion to
select the appropriate sentence within the statutorily prescribed
range. These two functions are “analytically distinct” (People v.
Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 815 (Black)) and the high court has
consistently made clear that the constitutional jury right
attaches only to the former. Apprendi expressly acknowledges
that judges retain their historical discretion to “tak[e] into
consideration various factors relating both to offense and
offender” in imposing judgment within a prescribed range.
(Apprendi, at p. 481; accord, e.g., Dillon v. United States (2010)
560 U.S. 817, 828–829.)
Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821 (Erlinger),
on which the majority heavily relies, preserves this essential
distinction. Erlinger reiterates that “[v]irtually ‘any fact’ that
‘ “increase[s] the prescribed range of penalties to which a
criminal defendant is exposed” ’ must be resolved by a
unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or freely admitted
in a guilty plea).” (Id. at p. 834, quoting Apprendi, supra, 530
U.S. at p. 490.) But as Justice Jackson explained in dissent,
under this rule “the judge continues to be the sole decisionmaker
with respect to determining the facts she will rely upon to
sentence within the typically broad statutory sentencing range.”
(Id. at p. 833 (dis. opn. of Jackson, J.).)

2
PEOPLE v. WILEY
Kruger, J., concurring

In this case, the aggravating circumstances we’re
concerned with — Wiley’s poor probation performance and the
increasing seriousness of his offenses — did not increase the
prescribed range of penalties to which Wiley was exposed. That
is because there was at least one other aggravating
circumstance that independently rendered him eligible for an
upper-term sentence: the simple fact of his prior convictions.
No one disputes that the fact of Wiley’s prior convictions was
established in accordance with Apprendi and its progeny, which
contains an exception permitting judges to find that the
defendant has suffered prior convictions. In my view, this is all
the Constitution requires.
I recognize, however, that a majority of my colleagues
decided otherwise in Lynch, based on their understanding of the
interaction between Apprendi and the current version of Penal
Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), as it was amended by the
Legislature in 2022. And ultimately, much as in Lynch, I do not
think this point makes any practical difference. Even if the
Constitution does not guarantee a jury trial on the full range of
aggravating circumstances that might inform an exercise of
sentencing discretion, statutory law certainly does: The current
version of Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(2)
unquestionably extends a statutory jury right to every
aggravating circumstance upon which a trial court relies in
imposing an upper-term sentence. (See Lynch, supra, 16
Cal.5th at pp. 755–767.)
Regardless of whether it applies of its own force, Apprendi
is relevant here because Penal Code section 1170, subdivision
(b)(2), as amended, statutorily extends the reach of the Apprendi
rule. As a result, absent waiver, all aggravating circumstances
a trial court relies on in imposing an upper-term sentence —
3
PEOPLE v. WILEY
Kruger, J., concurring

whether or not they are legally necessary to impose such a
sentence — must be either stipulated to by the defendant or
proved by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. And I agree with
the majority that the scope of Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (b)(3), which provides an exception to this jury trial
right for “the defendant’s prior convictions,” tracks the scope of
the prior-conviction exception set forth in Almendarez-Torres v.
United States (1998) 523 U.S. 224. As such, the prior-conviction
exception is limited to “ ‘determin[ing] what crime, with what
elements, the defendant was convicted of.’ ” (Erlinger, supra,
602 U.S. at p. 838, quoting Mathis v. United States (2016) 579
U.S. 500, 511–512; see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 16–17.)
Whether Wiley performed unsatisfactorily on probation, and
whether his prior convictions were of increasing seriousness, may
not be what we typically think of as sentencing “facts”; they are,
rather, qualitative judgments about the offense and the offender of
the sort that have traditionally been reserved for a judge’s
consideration in determining whether to impose an otherwise
authorized upper-term sentence. (See Black, supra, 41 Cal.4th at
p. 813.) But under the rule established by Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (b), this is irrelevant; all that matters is that, to find
the existence of these criminal-history-related aggravators, the
trial court “had to do more than identify his previous convictions
and the legal elements required to sustain them.” (Erlinger, supra,
602 U.S. at p. 838; see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11–14.)
I agree with the majority that the trial court’s error was
prejudicial under the standard set forth in Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 22. But for the same reasons
given by the majority, I would also conclude that the error was
prejudicial under the People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836
reasonable probability standard we apply to state law errors.
4
PEOPLE v. WILEY
Kruger, J., concurring

There was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different had the trial court not relied on the aggravating
circumstances at issue or had those circumstances been
submitted to a jury. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 19–25.)
With these observations, I concur in the majority’s
decision.
KRUGER, J.
I Concur:
JENKINS, J.

5
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Wiley
__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 97 Cal.App.5th 676
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S283326
Date Filed: June 26, 2025
__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior
County: Humboldt
Judge: Kaleb V. Cockrum
__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

J. Bradley O’Connell, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and
Edward Mahler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General,
Michael R. Johnsen, Eric D. Share, Seth K. Schalit and Brady
Baldwin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):

J. Bradley O’Connell
First District Appellate Project
1212 Broadway, Suite 1200
Oakland, CA 94612
(415) 495-3119

Brady Baldwin
Deputy Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94110
(415) 510-3470

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11084335. Public record. Not legal advice.