# Tate v. Culver & Cain Production

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · June 25, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11083908

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** June 25, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11083908

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”
- stating that “[a] non- frivolous claim of a right or remedy under a federal statute is sufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

REBECCA LEE TATE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 4:25-CV-00913 RHH
)
CULVER & CAIN PRODUCTION, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
This matter is before the Court on the motion of self-represented plaintiff Rebecca Lee Tate
for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. [ECF No.
2]. Upon consideration of the financial information provided with the motion, the Court finds
plaintiff is unable to pay any portion of the filing fee. As a result, plaintiff will be granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Additionally, for the reasons discussed
below, plaintiff will be directed to show cause as to why this case should not be dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of
counsel will be denied at this time. [ECF No. 3].
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To
state a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere
possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether
a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must “accept as
true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir.

2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating
that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true but is not required to “accept as true
any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
When reviewing a self-represented complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court
must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A
“liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court
should construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered
within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015).
However, even self-represented complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim
for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See

also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not
required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would
have formed a stronger complaint”). In addition, affording a self-represented complaint the benefit
of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be
interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United
States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
The Complaint
Plaintiff Rebecca Tate is a self-represented litigant who filed the instant civil action against
six defendants: Culver & Cain Production; Culver Oil & Gas; Griffin Operating Company, Inc.,
Harman Operating Company, Inc., Hunt Oil Company, and Sunoco. Plaintiff has listed defendants’
addresses in Texas.
Plaintiff indicates her mailing address is in Florissant, Missouri. And she asserts this Court
has jurisdiction over this action because it deals with “land condemnation, theft of property,

contractual fraud, including an unconscionable oil and gas lease.” However, she fails to indicate
the actual jurisdictional basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, i.e. the statutory basis for jurisdiction
Under the section titled, “Amount in Controversy,” plaintiff states that she is seeking
“$100,000,000” because defendants “stole” her late mother’s land, “along with its wealth.” She
states that she no longer has an inheritance. However, plaintiff fails to articulate the value of the
alleged land.
Plaintiff’s “Statement of Claim” in the complaint consists of the following:
1. I have been deprived of my inheritance, including Mineral interests, Royalty
payments, and monies owed to me accumulated over the years.
2. The year my mother signed an oil & gas lease (in 1963) . . . till today.
3. In the U.S. (in the state of Texas).
4. Emotional, Financial and Economic Hardships (and distress).
5. The Defendants cheated me out of my inheritance, and wealth, through my
Theft of my late mother’s land.

Plaintiff asks the Court to terminate the oil & gas lease her mother signed relating to her
mother’s property in Texas which she believes “disproportionately favors the energy sector.” She
seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
Discussion
The Court has carefully reviewed the instant complaint and determined plaintiff has not
carried her burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to decide a certain class of cases.
LeMay v. U.S. Postal Serv., 450 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir. 2006). “Federal courts are not courts of
general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution

and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.,
475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). See also Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (“Federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute”).
The presence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold requirement that must be assured in every
federal case. Kronholm v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 915 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1990). See also
Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1987) (“The threshold requirement in every
federal case is jurisdiction and we have admonished the district court to be attentive to a
satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements in all cases”). As such, the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by any party or the court. Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo.,
567 F.3d 976, 982 (8th Cir. 2009).

Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over both federal question cases and
diversity of citizenship cases. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Tribal Court of Spirit Lake Indian
Reservation, 495 F.3d 1017, 1020 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking
if neither diversity of citizenship nor federal question jurisdiction applies); McLaurin v. Prater, 30
F.3d 982, 984-85 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting Congress has directed that district courts shall have
jurisdiction in both federal question and diversity cases). The burden of proving subject matter
jurisdiction belongs to the plaintiff. V S Ltd. P'ship v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 235 F.3d
1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2000).
B. Federal Question Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
Federal question jurisdiction gives district courts “original jurisdiction over civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids &
Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1188 (8th Cir. 2015). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Whether a

claim arises under federal law is determined by reference to the “well-pleaded complaint.” Great
Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. P'ship v. Essar Steel Minn. LLC, 843 F.3d 325, 329 (8th Cir. 2016).
The well-pleaded complaint rule provides that jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is
presented on the face of a plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint. Markham v. Wertin, 861 F.3d
748, 754 (8th Cir. 2017). See also Thomas v. United Steelworkers Local 1938, 743 F.3d 1134,
1139 (8th Cir. 2014) (“Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal question must exist on the
face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint in order to establish federal question subject
matter jurisdiction”).
Plaintiff’s complaint must establish “either that federal law creates the cause of action or
that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial question of

federal law.” Williams v. Ragnone, 147 F.3d 700, 702 (8th Cir. 1998). See also Northwest South
Dakota Production Credit Ass'n v. Smith, 784 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that “[a] non-
frivolous claim of a right or remedy under a federal statute is sufficient to invoke federal
question jurisdiction”). “If the asserted basis of federal jurisdiction is patently meritless, then
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is appropriate.” Biscanin v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 407 F.3d
905, 907 (8th Cir. 2005).
C. Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), district courts have original diversity jurisdiction over civil
actions when the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000, without considering interest and costs,
and when the citizenship of each plaintiff is different from the citizenship of each defendant.” Ryan
ex rel. Ryan v. Schneider Nat. Carriers, Inc., 263 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 2001).
With regard to the amount in controversy, a complaint making a good faith allegation of
the jurisdictional amount is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Universal Crop

Prot. All., LLC, 620 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir. 2010). However, a “complaint will be dismissed if it
appears to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.” Id. See
also Kopp v. Kopp, 280 F.3d 883, 884 (8th Cir. 2002). “The legal certainty standard is met where
the legal impossibility of recovery is so certain as virtually to negative the plaintiff’s good faith in
asserting the claim.” Peterson v. The Travelers Indem. Co., 867 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 2017).
Additionally, “[c]omplete diversity of citizenship exists where no defendant holds
citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff holds citizenship.” OnePoint Solutions, LLC v.
Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 346 (8th Cir. 2007). Diversity jurisdiction requires that the parties be
citizens of different states, not merely residents. Sanders, 823 F.2d at 216. For purposes of
diversity, state citizenship requires an individual’s physical presence in the state coupled with an

indefinite intention there to remain. Blakemore v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 789 F.2d 616, 618 (8th
Cir. 1986).
D. Failure to Prove Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction belongs to the plaintiff. V S Ltd. P’ship,
235 F.3d at 1112. In this case, plaintiff has failed to establish the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction.
As to federal question jurisdiction, plaintiff does not meet the requirements because he
simply does not assert any issues arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States. Federal question jurisdiction is only proper where a plaintiff asserts “[a] non-frivolous
claim of a right or remedy under a federal statute.” Northwest South Dakota Prod. Credit Ass'n,
784 F.2d at 325. “If the asserted basis of federal jurisdiction is patently meritless, then dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction is appropriate.” Biscanin, 407 F.3d at 907. Here, plaintiff does not cite to a
specific federal statute or provision of the United States Constitution which is at issue in this case.

As to diversity jurisdiction, plaintiff has not shown that the amount in controversy exceeds
the jurisdictional threshold. Moreover, plaintiff has not established diversity between the parties.
For diversity of citizenship to exist, plaintiff cannot be a citizen of the same state as the defendants.
Here, plaintiff provides a Missouri address for herself, and she lists Texas addresses for defendants,
but she fails to list states of citizenship for either herself or the Texas defendants.1
In the section of the form complaint for demonstrating the citizenship of the parties,
plaintiff purposefully does not indicate the state in which she is a citizen. Similarly, she has not
listed in the complaint the states of citizenship of any of the defendants. Thus, plaintiff has not
shown subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
E. Venue

The instant complaint also fails to show that venue is proper in the Eastern District of
Missouri. The general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provide the basis for determining the
proper venue for plaintiff’s claims. Section 1391(b) provides:

1 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a corporation is “deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which
it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal business.” 28 U.S.C. §
1332(c)(1). See also Jet Midwest International Co., Ltd. v. Jet Midwest Group, LLC, 932 F.3d 1102, 1104
(8th Cir. 2019). According to the Supreme Court, the “principal place of business is best read as referring
to the place where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.” Hertz
Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010). Normally, this should “be the place where the corporation
maintains its headquarters,” so long that the headquarters is “the nerve center, and not simply an office
where the corporation holds is board meetings.” Id. Only corporations receive this treatment under § 1332,
and the citizenship of non-incorporated entities, such as limited liability companies, depends on the
citizenship of their members. See GMAC Commercial Credit LLC v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 357 F.3d
827, 829 (8th Cir. 2004).
A civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant
resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the
action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be
brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is
subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

Here, it appears that the property at issue in the complaint is in Texas. Moreover, all the defendants
appear to be residents, if not citizens, of the State of Texas. Thus, venue appears to be improper in
his Court.
Section 1406 of Title 28 of the United States Code allows this Court to dismiss or transfer
a case filed in the wrong district. However, it does not appear to be in the interest of justice to
transfer this case to a District Court in Texas where this action should have been brought because
plaintiff has not articulated the jurisdictional basis for bringing her claims in federal Court.
F. Order to Show Cause
As discussed above, plaintiff has the burden of establishing the Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. In this case, plaintiff has failed to articulate an amount in controversy over the
jurisdictional amount (or that the property in question is worth more than the jurisdiction amount),
has not clearly alleged diversity of citizenship, and has not pointed to a federal statute or
constitutional provision to support this case involves a federal matter. Therefore, the Court will
order plaintiff to show cause as to why this action should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiff shall also address why venue would be appropriate in the Eastern District of Missouri.
Plaintiff will be given thirty (30) days to submit a written response. Failure to comply with this
order will result in the dismissal of this case without prejudice and without further notice.
Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Plaintiff has filed a motion for appointment of counsel. [ECF No. 3]. The motion will be
denied at this time. In civil cases, a pro se litigant does not have a constitutional or statutory right
to appointed counsel. Ward v. Smith, 721 F.3d 940, 942 (8th Cir. 2013). See also Stevens v.

Redwing, 146 F.3d 538, 546 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that “[a] pro se litigant has no statutory or
constitutional right to have counsel appointed in a civil case”). Rather, a district court may appoint
counsel in a civil case if the court is “convinced that an indigent plaintiff has stated a non-frivolous
claim…and where the nature of the litigation is such that plaintiff as well as the court will benefit
from the assistance of counsel.” Patterson v. Kelley, 902 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2018). When
determining whether to appoint counsel for an indigent litigant, a court considers relevant factors
such as the complexity of the case, the ability of the pro se litigant to investigate the facts, the
existence of conflicting testimony, and the ability of the pro se litigant to present his or her claim.
Phillips v. Jasper Cty. Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2006).
After reviewing these factors, the Court finds that the appointment of counsel is not

warranted at this time. Plaintiff has demonstrated, at this point, that she can adequately present her
claims to the Court. Additionally, neither the factual nor the legal issues in this case appear to be
complex. The Court will entertain future motions for appointment of counsel as the case
progresses.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
[ECF No. 2] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff is ordered to show cause in writing and within
thirty (30) days of the date of this order as to why this action should not be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and venue.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if plaintiff fails to submit a show cause response in
writing and within thirty (30) days of the date of this order, this action will be dismissed without
prejudice and without further notice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [ECF
No. 3] is DENIED at this time.
Dated this 25" day of June, 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11083908. Public record. Not legal advice.