# United States v. Michael Shane Ragland

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · June 24, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11082863

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** June 24, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** NEW
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding “that a certificate of appealability is required to challenge the choice of remedy under” § 2255

## Opinion text

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12278
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL SHANE RAGLAND,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 2:09-cr-14016-KMM-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12278

Before JORDAN, LUCK, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Shane Ragland appeals his amended sentence of
2,072 months in prison for one count of conspiracy to commit rob-
bery, seven counts of robbery, seven counts of brandishing a fire-
arm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and two counts
of attempted robbery. His case returns to us from resentencing af-
ter Ragland successfully moved to vacate his earlier sentence under
28 U.S.C. § 2255. In addition to the above, Ragland had been con-
victed on one count of carrying a firearm during the commission
of a crime of violence, attempted Hobbs Act Robbery, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The District Court vacated that conviction—
along with Ragland’s sentence—after a Supreme Court case held
that attempted Hobbs Act Robbery does not qualify as a “crime of
violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See United States v. Taylor, 596
U.S. 845, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022).
Ragland essentially raises three issues on appeal: (1) his re-
sentencing was procedurally unreasonable; (2) the Court should
have granted him leave to amend his second successive motion to
vacate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B) and al-
lowed him to argue additional issues at resentencing; and (3) his
2,072-month sentence is substantively unreasonable. After careful
review, we affirm.
I.
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23-12278 Opinion of the Court 3

On April 30, 2009, a grand jury charged Ragland and various
co-defendants with twenty-two counts related to armed robberies
of convenience stores in Martin and St. Lucie Counties, Florida,
between December 2007 and February 2008. Count One of the su-
perseding indictment charged the group with conspiring to com-
mit Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Counts Two,
Four, Six, Nine, Eleven, Seventeen, Nineteen, and Twenty-One
charged the defendants with completed Hobbs Act robbery under
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Counts Three, Five, Seven, Ten, Twelve, Four-
teen, Sixteen, Eighteen, Twenty, and Twenty-Two charged the de-
fendants with brandishing or carrying firearms during a “crime of
violence” under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 924(c)(1)(C)(i). Fi-
nally, Counts Eight and Fifteen charged them with attempted
Hobbs Act Robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
On November 19, 2009, a jury convicted Ragland on eight-
een counts, and he was sentenced to a total of 2,352 months in
prison. Ragland appealed his convictions, and this Court affirmed.
See United States v. Ragland, 434 F. App’x 863 (11th Cir. 2011). On
June 23, 2016, Ragland filed his first motion to vacate his sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the District Court denied. 1 On

1 In his original § 2255 motion, Ragland cited the Supreme Court’s decision in

Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which invalidated
the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Ragland argued that the decision also effectively invalidated § 924(c)’s residual
clause, although that clause was not the subject of Johnson. The District Court
rejected Ragland’s argument, relying mostly on out-of-circuit cases that had
declined to extend Johnson beyond its immediate context.
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October 12, 2022, this Court granted Ragland leave to file a second
or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In that motion,
Ragland collaterally attacked his sentence as to Count Sixteen on
the basis that it violated a new rule of constitutional law, citing
United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), and United
States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022). Ragland argued
that he was legally innocent as to Count Sixteen because that
§ 924(c) charge was predicated on an attempted robbery, which did
not qualify as a “crime of violence.”
On December 8, 2022, the District Court granted relief as to
Count Sixteen, vacated Ragland’s sentence, and ordered a resen-
tencing hearing. On April 10, 2023, Ragland moved to hold his re-
sentencing in abeyance pending the resolution of an appeal in an-
other case, United States v. Louis, No. 21-cr-20252 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 27,
2023), in which the district court, citing Taylor, dismissed a defend-
ant’s § 924(c) charges that were predicated on completed Hobbs Act
robbery.
On June 9, 2023, Ragland moved to amend his § 2255 peti-
tion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B). 2 In the
Rule 15 motion, Ragland argued that he was also “innocent of the
§ 924(c) convictions charged in Counts 3, 5, 10, 12, 18, 20, and 22,
which are predicated on completed Hobbs Act robbery because

2 Rule 15(c)(1)(B) provides that “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to

the date of the original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a claim or
defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or
attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).
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23-12278 Opinion of the Court 5

Hobbs Act robbery . . . is also categorically overbroad in light of
Taylor.”
On June 13, the District Court denied Ragland’s motion to
hold his resentencing in abeyance. And on June 29, the District
Court denied Ragland’s request to amend his § 2255 petition, hold-
ing that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider issues be-
yond those permitted by this Court’s October 2022 order. There-
fore, the District Court would only consider the effects of the
Count Sixteen vacatur as to Ragland’s sentence.
The Court held Ragland’s resentencing hearing on the same
day. During the hearing, Ragland raised three main objections for
the purposes of this appeal. First, he objected to the Court’s denial
of his Rule 15(c)(1)(B) motion, asserting that it presented “a non-
waivable jurisdictional argument” that could be raised because the
Count Sixteen vacatur effectively “unbundle[d] the entire sentence
that the Court imposed back in 2010.” Second, Ragland argued
that, because the Court had ordered resentencing, he was entitled
to be sentenced under the provisions of the First Step Act, which
came into effect after his 2010 sentencing. And third, Ragland ar-
gued that, under Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360, 142 S. Ct.
1063 (2022), his conspiracy and substantive offenses should have
been treated as a single, continuous offense under § 924(c).
After denying each objection, the Court heard from
Ragland, his attorney, the Government, and a probation officer.
The Government recommended a sentence of 2,052 months, re-
flecting a small downward variance from a U.S. Sentencing
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-12278

Guidelines range of 2,072 months to 2,119 months. Ultimately, af-
ter “consider[ing] the statements of all parties, [and] the Pre-Sen-
tence Report which contains the advisory Guidelines and the stat-
utory factors,” the Court imposed a new sentence of 2,072 months
in prison. Ragland timely appealed.
II.
Ragland asserts various infirmities in the District Court’s re-
sentencing process. We review the reasonableness of his sentence
for an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128
S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). To determine whether a sentence is proce-
durally reasonable, we ask whether “the district court: (1) properly
calculated the Guidelines range; (2) treated the Guidelines as advi-
sory; (3) considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors; (4) did not se-
lect a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts; and (5) adequately
explained the chosen sentence.” United States v. Wayerski, 624 F.3d
1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 2010).
A
We begin with Ragland’s claim that the District Court failed
to afford him a full, “de novo” resentencing. In an appeal from a
§ 2255 proceeding, we review legal issues de novo. United States v.
Brown, 879 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018). We review a district
court’s choice of remedy under § 2255 for an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 1235.
Ragland cites United States v. Brown for the proposition that
the District Court did not conduct the full resentencing required by
§ 2255. In Brown, a federal prisoner attacked his fifteen-year
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23-12278 Opinion of the Court 7

sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e),
on the basis that Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 135 S. Ct.
2551 (2015), rendered him ineligible for § 924(e)’s enhanced penal-
ties. Brown, 879 F.3d at 1233. Although the district court granted
Brown’s § 2255 motion, it “corrected” his sentence to ten years
without holding a resentencing hearing. Id. at 1234. And it did so
even though his new sentence had to be imposed under a different
statutory provision—18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), rather than § 924(e)(1).
Id. at 1240.
On appeal, this Court articulated a “two-step process” for
district courts to follow when granting relief under § 2255: “First,
the court must ‘vacate and set the judgment aside.’ Second, the
court must choose from among four distinct remedies: (1) dis-
charge the prisoner; (2) resentence the prisoner; (3) grant the pris-
oner a new trial; or (4) correct the prisoner’s sentence.” Id. at 1235
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b)). We then described the two questions
courts must consider when deciding whether a defendant is enti-
tled to resentencing under § 2255:
First, did the errors requiring the grant of habeas re-
lief undermine the sentence as a whole? Second, will
the sentencing court exercise significant discretion in
modifying the defendant’s sentence, perhaps on ques-
tions the court was not called upon to consider at the
original sentencing? When these factors are present,
a District Court’s sentence modification qualifies as a
critical stage in the proceedings, requiring a hearing
with the defendant present.
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8 Opinion of the Court 23-12278

Id. at 1239–40.
Here, unlike in Brown, the District Court did hold a resen-
tencing hearing, attended by Ragland, his lawyer, the Government,
and a probation officer. Nevertheless, Ragland essentially argues
that his resentencing was not de novo enough and that “the district
court was required to start anew with meaningful consideration of
the factors set forth in § 3553(a).” 3
But there is nothing in the record to suggest that the District
Court failed in its obligation to consider these factors and the rele-
vant Sentencing Guidelines. Although a district court must con-
sider the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, it is not required to explicitly
discuss or state on the record that it has considered each of them
individually. United States v. Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918, 936 (11th Cir.
2009). Instead, an acknowledgment by the district court that it

3 The Government seemingly treats this argument as a challenge to the Dis-

trict Court’s choice of remedy under § 2255. It argues, therefore, that this
Court lacks jurisdiction because Ragland did not obtain a certificate of appeal-
ability. See United States v. Cody, 998 F.3d 912, 913 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding
“that a certificate of appealability is required to challenge the choice of remedy
under” § 2255). But Ragland does not argue that the District Court chose the
wrong remedy—indeed, he insists that “[t]he district court’s decision to hold
a de novo resentencing was the appropriate remedy.” Rather, he argues that
the resentencing, though correctly ordered, was improperly conducted. That
argument is best characterized as raising a “direct appeal matter,” much like
“an argument that the district court misapplied the sentencing guidelines at a
prisoner’s resentencing.” See id. at 915 (holding that such matters “do not re-
quire a certificate of appealability”).
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23-12278 Opinion of the Court 9

considered the factors is sufficient. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d
1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007).
Here, the District Court considered Ragland’s testimony
and sentencing memorandum, which reflected his rehabilitation ef-
forts since his original sentencing. Still, the Court concluded, after
hearing from the Government and reviewing the presentence in-
vestigation report (“PSI”), that it had found “nothing . . . that
would cause [it] to alter any of [its] prior determinations, particu-
larly as it takes into consideration the 3553(a) factors, [and] the his-
tory and characteristics of the Defendant.”
Although the District Court was required to reconstruct
Ragland’s sentencing package, it was not required to act as if the
earlier sentencing never happened. “As the architect of a sentence
structure that has been partially dismantled by a conviction being
vacated, the district court can redesign and rebuild it to achieve the
original purpose and conform to code.” United States v. Fowler, 749
F.3d 1010, 1018 (11th Cir. 2014). That is what the District Court did
here, concluding that the earlier sentence was appropriate except
to the extent that it reflected Ragland’s erroneous Count Sixteen
conviction. We cannot say that the District Court erred in doing
so.
B
Next, Ragland argues that the District Court erred by not
resentencing him under the First Step Act. We review a district
court’s authority to reduce a sentence under the Act de novo.
United States v. Jackson, 58 F.4th 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2023). We
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10 Opinion of the Court 23-12278

may affirm for any reason supported by the record. United States v.
Al-Arian, 514 F.3d 1184, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008).
District courts lack inherent authority to modify a term of
imprisonment but may do so to the extent that a statute expressly
permits. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B); see United States v. Phillips, 597
F.3d 1190, 1194–95 (11th Cir. 2010). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), a
district court may modify a defendant’s sentence if: (1) the Bureau
of Prisons or the defendant files a motion and the defendant meets
additional conditions; (2) a statute or Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 35 expressly permits the modification; or (3) the defendant
was sentenced based on a Guidelines range that the Sentencing
Commission later lowered and other requirements are met. See 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c).
Prior to the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) contained a
“stacking” provision that required, in the case of a second or subse-
quent conviction under § 924(c), that a defendant be “sentenced to
a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (2010). Section 403(a) of the First Step Act
amended this language so that the twenty-five-year mandatory
minimum on a second § 924(c) violation only applies after the first
§ 924(c) conviction has become final. First Step Act, Pub. L. No.
115-391, § 403(a), 132 Stat. 5194, 5221–22 (2018). However, § 403
does not apply fully retroactively. See id. § 403(b). It reads: “This
section, and the amendments made by this section, shall apply to
any offense that was committed before the date of enactment of
this Act, if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of
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23-12278 Opinion of the Court 11

such date of enactment.” Id. We have recently held that a sentence
pronounced pre-Act, but thereafter vacated, qualifies as “a sen-
tence” that “has . . . been imposed” for § 403(b) purposes, and
therefore the defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the Act’s
modified stacking rule. United States v. Hernandez, 107 F.4th 965,
968 (11th Cir. 2024).
In Hernandez, the defendant was originally sentenced in 1999
and resentenced in 2002, when his separate § 924(c) counts were
“stacked” according to § 924(c)(1). Id. at 967. The district court then
vacated one of Hernandez’s § 924(c) convictions, pursuant to a 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion, on the ground that the Supreme Court’s in-
tervening decisions in Johnson v. United States and United States v.
Davis disqualified his attempted-robbery charge as a predicate
“crime of violence” for § 924(c) purposes. Id. At resentencing in
2022, the district court rejected Hernandez’s argument that he was
entitled to the benefit of the First Step Act’s modified stacking rule.
Id. And this Court affirmed, explaining that § 403(a)’s modified
stacking rule did not apply because the district court had pro-
nounced a sentence for Hernandez before the First Step Act passed
in 2018. Id. at 973.
Similarly here, the District Court did not err in resentencing
Ragland without applying § 403(a) of the First Step Act’s modified
stacking rule, because his prior 2010 sentence qualified as “a sen-
tence” that “has . . . been imposed” under § 403(b), and therefore
he did not qualify to be resentenced under that provision of the
First Step Act, even though his original sentence was later vacated.
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12 Opinion of the Court 23-12278

C
Ragland then argues that the District Court failed to con-
sider his post-incarceration rehabilitation under § 3553(a) and Pep-
per v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011).
District courts are required to correctly calculate a defend-
ant’s Sentencing Guidelines range, both initially and upon resen-
tencing, and use that range as “the starting point and the initial
benchmark for their sentencing decisions.” United States v. Fowler,
749 F.3d 1010, 1021 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).
The district court at resentencing must then consider the § 3553(a)
factors in determining whether to impose a sentence within the
Guidelines range. Id. Because a defendant’s post-sentencing reha-
bilitation efforts implicate several § 3553(a) factors, the court at re-
sentencing may consider evidence of that rehabilitation to support
a downward variance from the advisory Guidelines range. Pepper,
562 U.S. at 490–93, 131 S. Ct. at 1241–43.
Here, Ragland argues that the District Court erred because
it mistakenly believed that it lacked the discretion to consider his
rehabilitation efforts during the resentencing hearing. He says that
“the district court misapprehended the relevance of [his] rehabili-
tation,” as evidenced by the Court’s statement that it “didn’t affect
the guidelines.” But that is not quite accurate. Immediately after
being presented with evidence of Ragland’s rehabilitation, the Dis-
trict Court said: “I can tell you that, in my opinion, they don’t affect
the Guideline calculations and they certainly don’t affect where I
would otherwise sentence within the Guidelines.”
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The full quote makes clear that the District Court was exer-
cising its discretion when it discounted the value of Ragland’s reha-
bilitation. The record does not suggest that the Court felt it lacked
the authority to consider that evidence. Rather, the record suggests
that the Court reached its decision having “considered the state-
ments of all parties,” including the rehabilitation evidence pre-
sented at the resentencing hearing and in Ragland’s sentencing
memorandum. Therefore, we cannot say that the District Court
erred in its exercise of discretion under § 3553(a).
D
Similarly, Ragland asserts that the District Court mistakenly
believed that it was precluded from considering § 924(c)’s manda-
tory minimums when fashioning his overall sentence. In other
words, he argues that the District Court did not apply intervening
law from Dean v. United States, 581 U.S. 62, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017),
at his resentencing.
In Dean, the defendant was convicted on two counts of vio-
lating § 924(c), which were predicated on two robbery convictions.
Dean, 581 U.S. at 65, 137 S. Ct. at 1174. At the time, this meant that
Dean faced mandatory five-year and twenty-five-year sentences to
run consecutively with any sentence he received for his other con-
victions. Id. at 65, 137 S. Ct. at 1174–75. At sentencing, he argued
that the district court “should consider his lengthy mandatory min-
imum sentences when calculating the sentences for his other
counts, and impose concurrent one-day sentences for those
counts.” Id. at 65–66, 137 S. Ct. at 1176.
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14 Opinion of the Court 23-12278

The district court acknowledged Dean’s minor role in the
offenses and his minimal criminal history, and it agreed that a sen-
tence of thirty years and one day was “more than sufficient for a
sentence in this case.” Id. at 66, 137 S. Ct. at 1175. However, the
court believed that § 924(c) required it to disregard the thirty-year
minimum when fashioning the rest of Dean’s sentence. Id. In other
words, the court thought it had to craft a sentence on the robbery
counts independently, rather than “as part of a combined package,”
in which case “those counts plainly warranted sentences longer
than one day.” Id.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Id. The Court noted that “[s]entencing
courts have long enjoyed discretion in the sort of information they
may consider when setting an appropriate sentence.” Id. After sur-
veying the relevant sentencing statutes, the Court reasoned that
“[n]othing in § 924(c) restricts the authority conferred on sentenc-
ing courts by § 3553(a) and the related provisions to consider a sen-
tence imposed under § 924(c) when calculating a just sentence for
the predicate count.” Id. at 67–69, 137 S. Ct. at 1175–77. The Court
therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 70,
137 S. Ct. at 1178.
Here, Ragland suggests that the District Court made the
same mistake as the district court in Dean. But again, the record
does not support Ragland’s claims. At resentencing, Ragland raised
the Dean issue at the same time as he advocated for the applicability
of the First Step Act. In that discussion, the District Court indicated
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23-12278 Opinion of the Court 15

that, regardless of whether the Act applied, it was “the Court’s in-
tention to impose an advisory Guideline sentence similar to—or
identical to the sentence that was previously imposed, with the ex-
ception of the 924—the Count 16 conviction.” At no point did the
Court suggest that it was prevented from considering the length of
Ragland’s mandatory § 924 sentences during resentencing. There-
fore, we cannot say that the Court misunderstood its discretion un-
der Dean.
E
Finally, as to the District Court’s alleged procedural errors, 4
Ragland argues that the Court incorrectly calculated his criminal
history category by treating a Pennsylvania robbery conviction as
a “prior offense” under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, rather than as “relevant
conduct” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. Ragland notes that the charged
conspiracy started in December 2007 and the Pennsylvania robbery
occurred in February 2008, when he was finally arrested and later
transferred into federal custody. At trial, the Government insinu-
ated that Ragland’s Hobbs Act conspiracy continued at least until
his arrest. For instance, in the Government’s closing argument, it
stated that “the conspiracy . . . finally came to an end in

4 Ragland also characterizes the District Court’s alleged failure to apply
Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360, 142 S. Ct. 1063 (2022), as a procedural
error. But because we conclude that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
consider that issue, we discuss it infra, in Part III, along with the claims raised
in Ragland’s Rule 15(c) motion.
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16 Opinion of the Court 23-12278

Pennsylvania” and described the Pennsylvania robbery as sharing
the same characteristics as the earlier robberies in Florida.
Under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1, a defendant’s criminal history score
is calculated based on the number and severity of any prior sen-
tences the defendant has received. Section 4A1.2(a) defines a “prior
sentence” as “any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication
of guilt . . . for conduct not part of the instant offense.” The Guide-
lines commentary suggests that conduct is not considered part of
the instant offense if it would be considered “relevant conduct” un-
der § 1B1.3. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (n.1). 5
Section 1B1.3 explains what conduct is “relevant” in deter-
mining a defendant’s Guidelines range. Id. § 1B1.3. Specifically, the
guideline instructs that “solely with respect to offenses of a charac-
ter for which § 3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple
counts, all acts and omissions . . . that were part of the same course
of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of convic-
tion” are attributable to the defendant. Id. § 1B1.3(a)(2).
As to the rules regarding grouping, § 3D1.2 provides that, in
general, counts involving substantially the same harm shall be
grouped together into a single group for sentencing purposes. Id.
§ 3D1.2. Counts embody substantially the same harm

5 This Court considers Guidelines commentary only to the extent that a guide-

line’s substantive text is ambiguous. United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269,
1273–77 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc). We need not consider whether the appli-
cable guidelines are ambiguous here, because the answer would not affect our
holding, as explained infra.
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23-12278 Opinion of the Court 17

when, among other things, “the offense behavior is ongoing or
continuous in nature and the offense guideline is written to cover
such behavior.” Id. § 3D1.2(d). The guideline applicable to robbery,
§ 2B3.1, is specifically excluded from the operation of subsection
(d). Id. § 3D1.2(d). Grouping exclusions under § 3D1.2(d) do not
necessarily preclude grouping under another subsection. Id.
“A conviction on a count charging a conspiracy to commit
more than one offense shall be treated as if the defendant had been
convicted on a separate count of conspiracy for each offense that
the defendant conspired to commit.” Id. § 1B1.2(d). The guideline
commentary states that the application of § 1B1.2(d) requires par-
ticular care because there are cases in which the verdict does not
establish which offenses were the object of the conspiracy, and in
such cases, the court, sitting as the trier of fact, must make the de-
termination of which offenses the defendant conspired to commit.
Id. § 1B1.2, comment. (n.4).
Ultimately, it is “not necessary to decide guidelines issues or
remand cases for new sentence proceedings where the guidelines
error, if any, did not affect the sentence.” United States v. Keene, 470
F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).
[W]hen a district court states that the sentence it has
imposed would not have changed even with a differ-
ent guideline calculation—we assume there was an
error, reduce the guideline range according to the
way the defendant argued, and analyze whether the
sentence would be substantively reasonable under
that guideline range.
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18 Opinion of the Court 23-12278

United States v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1, 18 (11th Cir. 2022).
Here, Ragland’s proposed Guidelines range for the Hobbs
Act robbery convictions would be 168 to 210 months’ imprison-
ment, reflecting a criminal history category of II. 6 At resentencing,
the probation office calculated a Guidelines sentence of 188
months, which the District Court adopted. In doing so, the Court
made clear, “to the extent that there is some issue with respect to
the calculation of the Guidelines, that the Court would impose an
identical sentence post [United States v.] Booker as a reasonable sen-
tence based on th[e] 3553(a) factors.”
So, even assuming, without deciding, that the District Court
erred in treating the Pennsylvania robbery as a prior offense, any
error was harmless because the Court’s Keene statement demon-
strates that it would have imposed the same sentence even absent
the alleged errors. After having identified the Court’s Keene state-
ment and calculated the defendant’s proposed Guidelines range,
we need only ask whether the sentences imposed were substan-
tively reasonable under § 3553(a). As discussed infra, we conclude

6 The PSI added three points to Ragland’s criminal history score based on the

Pennsylvania robbery. This brought his total score to six, resulting in a crimi-
nal history category of III. Ragland’s total offense level was thirty-four. There-
fore, the Guidelines advised a sentence of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment.
See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A.
If we subtract the three points from Ragland’s criminal history, keeping all else
equal, he would receive a criminal history category of II and a Guidelines
range of 168 to 210 months’ imprisonment. See id.
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23-12278 Opinion of the Court 19

that the District Court imposed a substantively reasonable sen-
tence.
III.
Ragland also asserts that the District Court should have al-
lowed him to amend his § 2255 motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(c) and raise various additional sentencing issues over
which the Court believed it lacked jurisdiction.
We review questions of a district court’s subject-matter ju-
risdiction de novo. Williams v. Chatman, 510 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th
Cir. 2007). We review the district court’s denial of a motion for
leave to amend a § 2255 motion for abuse of discretion. Farris v.
United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir. 2003). In a § 2255 pro-
ceeding, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo
and its factual findings for clear error. Id. at 1216. And we review
the application of Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) de novo. Mungin v.
Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 89 F.4th 1308, 1321 (11th Cir. 2024).
A district court may apply the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to § 2255 proceedings. Farris, 333 F.3d at 1215. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(c) provides that an amendment to a pleading
“relates back” to the date of the original pleading when “the
amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the con-
duct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set
out—in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).
A prisoner who has filed a prior § 2255 motion and had that
motion adjudicated on the merits must obtain this Court’s author-
ization before the district court may consider a “second or
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20 Opinion of the Court 23-12278

successive” § 2255 motion. Samak v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium,
766 F.3d 1271, 1274 (11th Cir. 2014); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h),
2244(b)(3)(A). Without such authorization, the district court lacks
jurisdiction to consider the motion. Farris, 333 F.3d at 1216. Addi-
tionally, district courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction over
claims that were not raised and authorized in a defendant’s appli-
cation to file a successive motion to vacate. See United States v. Pear-
son, 940 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 2019); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
Naturally, this means that the court does not have the power to
accept or reject these claims on the merits. See United States v.
Salmona, 810 F.3d 806, 810 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Without subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, a court has no power to decide anything except that
it lacks jurisdiction.”).

Here, we authorized Ragland to raise “one claim” in his suc-
cessive § 2255 motion: that he was actually innocent of Count Six-
teen, which charged him with a violation of § 924(c) predicated on
attempted Hobbs Act robbery. In our order, we concluded that
“Ragland ha[d] made a prima facie showing that he [wa]s entitled to
relief under Davis as to his § 924(c) conviction on Count 16.” What-
ever the merits of Ragland’s arguments as to the other counts, he
did not raise those arguments in his application, and we did not
authorize them. Even if those arguments could be said to “relate
back” to the claim raised in Ragland’s successive motion, it would
not change the fact that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
consider them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3),
2255(h). And although Ragland later attempted to frame those
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23-12278 Opinion of the Court 21

claims as objections to his PSI at resentencing, that again does not
change the fact that those claims were not authorized.
Therefore, the District Court properly dismissed Ragland’s
motion to amend his second or successive § 2255 motion for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction because he was required to ask this
Court for permission to raise claims for Counts Three, Five, Ten,
Twelve, Eighteen, Twenty, and Twenty-Two in his successive
§ 2255 motion. Similarly, the District Court properly declined to
address the merits of Ragland’s claims under United States v. Taylor
and Wooden v. United States because he did not ask this Court for
permission to raise claims under Taylor or Wooden in his successive
§ 2255 application, and thus, the District Court lacked subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction over those claims.
IV.
Finally, we review the substantive reasonableness of a sen-
tence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard considering
the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at
597. In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we will not sub-
stitute our own judgment for that of the district court and will “af-
firm a sentence so long as the court’s decision was in the ballpark
of permissible outcomes.” United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355
(11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). The party challenging
the sentence bears the burden of proving that it is unreasonable.
United States v. Boone, 97 F.4th 1331, 1338–39 (11th Cir. 2024).
A court imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence
“when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that
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22 Opinion of the Court 23-12278

were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an im-
proper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment
in considering the proper factors.” Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355 (quota-
tion marks omitted). Although the district court is required to con-
sider all relevant § 3553(a) factors, “the weight given to each factor
is committed to the sound discretion of the district court,” and the
court may attach great weight to one factor over the others. Id.
We have held that “[p]lacing substantial weight on a defend-
ant’s criminal record is entirely consistent with § 3553(a) because
five of the factors it requires a court to consider are related to crim-
inal history.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1263
(11th Cir. 2015). Moreover, the court’s failure to discuss mitigating
evidence does not indicate that the court “erroneously ‘ignored’ or
failed to consider this evidence.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d
823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007).
We ordinarily expect sentences within a defendant’s Guide-
lines range to be reasonable. United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191,
1220 (11th Cir. 2009). Another sign of reasonableness is that the
sentence is well below the statutory maximum. United States v. Ri-
ley, 995 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2021).
Here, Ragland argues that his 2,072-month sentence was
substantively unreasonable largely on the basis that the District
Court failed to properly apply the § 3553(a) factors. But nothing in
the record suggests that the District Court shirked its duties at re-
sentencing. To the contrary, the Court specifically cited “the [§]
3553(a) factors” and “the history and characteristics of the
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23-12278 Opinion of the Court 23

Defendant,” including Ragland’s prior violent acts, when it im-
posed the new sentence.
Given the District Court’s broad discretion, we cannot say
that the sentence was unreasonable. The 2,072-month total sen-
tence was within the Guidelines range and below the statutory
maximum sentence,7 both indicators of reasonableness. Even if
Ragland prevailed on his challenge to his criminal history score, his
sentence would still have been within the proposed Guidelines
range. 8 The District Court reached this sentence after considering
the parties’ arguments, Ragland’s history and characteristics, the
updated presentence investigation report, the sentencing memo-
randum, and the § 3553(a) factors.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.

7 The District Court imposed mandatory minimum sentences as to Counts

Three, Five, Ten, Twelve, Eighteen, Twenty, and Twenty-Two. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1). And it imposed concurrent 188-month sentences as to the Hobbs
Act convictions, for which the statutory maximum sentence would have been
twenty years. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
8 See supra note 6. Ragland’s proposed Guidelines range would be 168 to 210

months, based on a criminal history category of II and a total offense level of
34. The District Court sentenced him to 188 months as to Counts One, Two,
Four, Eight, Nine, Eleven, Fifteen, Seventeen, Nineteen, and Twenty-One, to
be served concurrently. Therefore, the imposed 188-month sentence re-
mained within Ragland’s proposed Guidelines range.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11082863. Public record. Not legal advice.