# Bointy v. State of Oklahoma

> District Court, W.D. Oklahoma · June 23, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11082250

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** June 23, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11082250

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding “no force” to appellant’s argument that previously assigned district judge’s denial of qualified immunity was binding on subsequently assigned judge as law of the case because it was a final appealable order from which the appellee did not immediately appeal

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

JANESSA BOINTY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-23-1002-SLP
)
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel, )
OKLAHOMA STATE DEPARTMENT )
OF EDUCATION, and RYAN WALTERS, )
in his Official Capacity as Superintendent )
of Public Instruction, and in his Individual )
Capacity, )
)
Defendants. )

O R D E R
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment, with Brief in Support, of
Defendant Ryan Walters in his Individual Capacity [Doc. No. 78]. Plaintiff has filed a
Response in Opposition [Doc. No. 110] and Defendant has filed a Reply [Doc. No. 113].1
The matter is fully briefed and ready for determination. For the reasons that follow,
Defendant Walters’ Motion is GRANTED.
I. Background
Plaintiff, Janessa Bointy (Ms. Bointy), is a former employee of the Oklahoma State
Department of Education (OSDE). On March 9, 2023, Ms. Bointy’s employment was
terminated. Ms. Bointy alleges that she was fired by the OSDE in retaliation for exercising

1 Citations to the parties’ briefing submissions reference the Court’s ECF pagination.
her First Amendment rights a few days prior, on March 6, 2023, when she spoke at a school
board meeting for Edmond Public Schools.
Defendant Ryan Walters (Defendant Walters) is the Superintendent of Public

Instruction for the State of Oklahoma (Superintendent). He held that position at the time
of Ms. Bointy’s termination. In this Order, all references to Defendant Walters are made
as to claims against him in his individual capacity.
Ms. Bointy originated this action in the District Court of Oklahoma County, State
of Oklahoma. See Pet. [Doc. No. 1-2]. Defendants then removed the action to federal

court on the basis of federal question subject matter jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal
[Doc. No. 1]. In the course of the parties’ summary judgment briefing, Ms. Bointy clarifies
that the sole claim she brings against Defendant Walters is in his individual capacity
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged violation of her free speech rights under the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Pl’s. Resp. in Opp. To Official

Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. No. 107] at 6-7.
Defendant Walters moves for summary judgment raising the defense of qualified
immunity. He relies on both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis and asserts that: (1)
Ms. Bointy cannot establish that Defendant Walters violated her constitutional rights; and
(2) Ms. Bointy cannot show that his conduct violated clearly established federal law.

Central to the parties’ dispute is whether Defendant Walters can be held liable for
the decision to terminate Ms. Bointy. Although Ms. Bointy agrees that Defendant Walters
did not participate in any manner in her termination, Ms. Bointy claims that, as
Superintendent, Defendant Walters is responsible for the policies that were used as the
basis to terminate her employment. The Court finds Ms. Bointy has failed to establish any
basis upon which to hold Defendant Walters responsible for the termination of her
employment and, accordingly, that Defendant Walters is entitled to qualified immunity.

II. The Law of the Case Doctrine Does not Preclude Defendant Walters from
Asserting Qualified Immunity at the Summary Judgment Stage

Before proceeding to the qualified immunity analysis, the Court addresses Ms.
Bointy’s preliminary argument that the law of the case doctrine precludes Defendant
Walters from raising qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage of proceedings.
See Pl.’s Resp. at 18-19. This case was previously assigned to a different district judge
who addressed qualified immunity in the context of a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant
Walters in his individual capacity. The issue as then raised required the Court to determine
whether Ms. Bointy’s speech was protected by the First Amendment and specifically,
whether her speech was made pursuant to her official duties as an OSDE employee. The
Court addressed both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis and found dismissal on
grounds of qualified immunity was not proper. See Order [Doc. No. 19].
The issue currently pending before the Court is not whether Ms. Bointy’s speech

was protected by the First Amendment, but whether Defendant Walters is subject to
supervisory liability for any alleged violation of Ms. Bointy’s First Amendment rights.2
Because this issue is distinct from the issue previously addressed by the Court, Ms.

2 Although the question of supervisory liability is a component of liability under § 1983 it is also
“incorporate[d] into [the court’s] qualified immunity analysis, where [the court] ask[s] whether a
clearly established constitutional right has been violated.” Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1227
(10th Cir. 2013).
Bointy’s reliance on the law of the case doctrine is misplaced. More fundamentally, the
Court’s prior ruling was an interlocutory ruling, to which the law of the case doctrine does
not apply. See, e.g., Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 647 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir. 2011) (In

the Tenth Circuit, “law of the case doctrine has no bearing on the revisiting of interlocutory
orders, even when a case has been reassigned from one judge to another.”); see also In re
Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 61 F.4th 1126, 1211 (10th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he law of
the case doctrine is fundamentally permissive[.]”).3 Accordingly, the Court addresses the
issue of qualified immunity as now raised by Defendant Walters.

III. Defendant Walters is Entitled to Qualified Immunity as Ms. Bointy Has Not
Shown His Supervisory Liability

A. Governing Standard
The doctrine of qualified immunity “protects public employees from both liability
and from the burdens of litigation arising from their exercise of discretion.” Cummings v.
Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1239 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). “When properly applied, it protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “When a defendant raises a qualified immunity
defense on summary judgment, the onus is on the plaintiff to demonstrate (1) that the

3 The law of the case doctrine does not bar review of issues of qualified immunity even where
such issues are immediately appealable. See Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322, 1329 (10th Cir.
2012) (finding “no force” to appellant’s argument that previously assigned district judge’s denial
of qualified immunity was binding on subsequently assigned judge as law of the case because it
was a final appealable order from which the appellee did not immediately appeal).
official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was “clearly
established” at the time of the challenged conduct.” Johnson v. City of Cheyenne, 99 F.4th
1206, 1217 (10th Cir. 2024) (emphasis in original; internal quotations marks and citations

omitted). The court accepts the plaintiff’s version of the facts, but those facts must find
support in the record. Id.
B. Undisputed Material Facts4
Ms. Bointy was formerly employed by the OSDE as a School Counselor Specialist
for Project AWARE East. She was employed in that capacity from approximately

December 28, 2020 until March 9, 2023.
Defendant Walters has served as Superintendent since approximately January 2023.
Ms. Bointy has never communicated with or even met Defendant Walters.
On March 6, 2023, Ms. Bointy attended a school board meeting for Edmond Public
Schools.5 During the public comments section of the meeting, Ms. Bointy spoke for

approximately two minutes on child and adolescent mental health, including the
importance of providing mental health resources to students, the availability of such
resources, and ideas for implementation.6

4 Included here are those material facts supported by the record and not genuinely disputed in the
manner required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). To the extent either party has made unsubstantiated
allegations, general and conclusory statements, or require “one inference too many to adequately
support the assertion” made, such matters have not been included. See generally Double Eagle
Alloys, Inc. v. Hooper, 134 F.4th 1078, 1087, 1100 n. 21 (10th Cir. 2025).

5 Ms. Bointy has four children enrolled in the Edmond, Oklahoma public schools system.

6 Ms. Bointy has provided a link to a news story that includes the airing of her speech. See Resp.
at 14, n.2, PF 25.
Late that same evening, Ms. Bointy’s direct supervisor, Cheryl McGee, sent an
email to the Chief Human Resources Officer for OSDE, Susan Miller, advising that she
had concerns regarding Ms. Bointy’s statements at the school board meeting and requesting

a meeting. Ms. McGee further advised that she had “repeated documented issues with this
employee throughout [her] tenure with OSDE.” See email [Doc. No. 78-3].
On March 9, 2023, after consultation with Ms. Bointy’s supervisor and the approval
of OSDE legal counsel, HR made the decision to terminate Ms. Bointy’s employment.
Defendant Walters was not involved in the termination of Ms. Bointy and had no

knowledge of the termination prior to its occurrence.
During her employment with OSDE, Ms. Bointy was subject to a Confidentiality
Agreement and a Media Policy. The Confidentiality Agreement states in relevant part:
During their employment at the Oklahoma State Department of Education
(OSDE), employees may have access to confidential, secret or proprietary
information. Any confidential information, whether oral, written or
electronic, should be maintained in a manner that ensures its confidentiality.
Employees should maintain such information in confidence and use such
information only in the interest of OSDE. Employees may use or disclose
information learned or acquired through their employment only for the
performance of their job and as otherwise permitted by law. Confidential
agency information is just for agency use and is not intended for distribution
outside the agency. Distribution of such information requires both a need to
know and a right to know the information requested.

See Confidentiality Agreement [Doc. No. 78-5] at 1. Ms. Bointy acknowledges that the
Confidentiality Agreement was not intended to deprive OSDE employees of their right to
free speech and she has no criticisms of the Confidentiality Agreement itself. Indeed, she
agrees that the OSDE had legitimate reasons for requiring the Confidentiality Agreement,
to include the protection of student data and school district data. But Ms. Bointy contends
the Confidentiality Agreement was erroneously applied to her.
The Media Policy, included as part of the Employment Handbook, provides:

It is the policy of OSDE to respond to news media inquiries in a timely
manner. All media inquiries, whether verbal or written, are to be directed to
the Communications Division or Cabinet head. Any media contact not made
initially through the Communications Division should be quickly reported to
Communications Division.

As the Communications Division is responsible for officially responding to
all media inquiries, it is not appropriate for any other OSDE employee to
contact or respond to the media on behalf of the agency. Any unauthorized
individual who makes public comments or addresses the media as an
apparent representative of the OSDE may be subject to discipline, up to and
including termination.

See Media Policy [Doc. No. 78-6] at 8.
Ms. Bointy has no criticisms of the Media Policy itself and she does not contend
that the Media Policy was intended to deprive OSDE employees of their First Amendment
rights. Ms. Bointy agrees that the OSDE had legitimate reasons to adopt the Media Policy.
However, as with the Confidentiality Agreement, Ms. Bointy contends the Media Policy
was erroneously applied to her.
Defendant Walters did not create the Confidentiality Agreement or the Media
Policy. The Agreement and Policy were existing at the time he became Superintendent
and something he “inherited” when he took office.
C. Analysis
Defendant Walters argues, under the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis,
that he did not cause a violation of Ms. Bointy’s constitutional rights. He moves for
summary judgment on grounds that: (1) he did not participate in the termination decision;
(2) he cannot be held individually liable for the conduct of his subordinates under theories
of respondeat superior or vicarious liability; and (3) he is not liable in his supervisory

capacity as a policymaker.
Ms. Bointy purports to “dispute” the first ground but acknowledges as “correct”
Defendant’s statement that “Ms. Bointy can point to no evidence that Mr. Walters, himself,
made the decision to terminate her employment.” Resp. at 27. Ms. Bointy argues that it is
nonetheless appropriate to submit the matter for determination by a jury because Defendant

Walters impermissibly relies on “self-serving testimony of interested parties” that the Court
must disregard. Id. at 27-28. Notably, she does not identify the self-serving testimony.
And as authority in support of her argument, Ms. Bointy cites Sonnenthiel v. Christian
Moerlein Brewing Co., 172 U.S. 401 (1899). But this extremely old precedent is contrary
to current law.7 As the Tenth Circuit has very recently made abundantly clear, at the

summary judgment stage “a district court may consider interested witness evidence from
the movant . . . so long as a jury would be required to believe such evidence because it is
uncontradicted and unimpeached.” Mauldin v. Driscoll, 136 F.4th 984, 995 (10th Cir.
2025). Ms. Bointy fails to show that the evidence relied upon by Defendant Walters is

7 Judges in this judicial district have so noted for over twenty years now. See Cox v. Council for
Developmental Disabilities, Inc., No. CIV-12-0183-HE, 2013 WL 647390 at *1, n. 2 (W.D. Okla.
Feb. 21, 2013) (“Plaintiff’s brief repeatedly relies on Sonnentheil” for the proposition that self-
serving testimony must be disregarded for summary judgment purposes but “[w]hatever may have
been the standard for summary judgment in the 19th Century . . . is plainly not the standard now.”
(emphasis in original)).
contradicted or subject to impeachment. Indeed, as noted, she does not even identify the
“self-serving testimony.”8
As discussed below, the second ground upon which Defendant Walters moves for

summary judgment is a well-established principle under § 1983. Defendant Walters does
not argue any facts in support, but simply sets forth this settled principle. And Ms. Bointy
acknowledges this settled principle. Therefore, the Court’s focus is on the third ground
which is central to the parties’ dispute – whether Defendant Walters can be held liable in
his supervisory capacity as a policy maker for OSDE.

Both parties recognize and rely upon Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185 (10th
Cir. 2010), as setting forth the applicable law governing supervisory liability under § 1983.9
As the Tenth Circuit explained in Dodds, a supervisor may not be held liable under § 1983
under a theory of respondeat superior, i.e., without fault on his part. Id. at 1195. Instead,
a supervisor is liable only when he himself has “breached a duty to plaintiff which was the

proximate cause of the injury.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It is
insufficient to show merely that a “defendant was in charge of other state actors who
actually committed the violation. Instead . . . the plaintiff must establish a deliberate,

8 Although Mauldin is a very recent Tenth Circuit decision, it was decided prior to the filing of
Ms. Bointy’s Response and, therefore, should have been addressed by her.

9 In Dodds, the Tenth Circuit discussed the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009) – which addressed supervisory liability under Bivens – and the effect of that
decision on supervisory liability under § 1983. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Tenth Circuit acknowledged there were “important
questions about the continuing vitality of supervisory liability” after Iqbal, but concluded that
§ 1983 liability survived against a “defendant-supervisor” under the parameters set forth in its
decision. Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1194, 1199.
intentional act by the supervisor to violate constitutional rights.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
But Ҥ 1983 allows a plaintiff to impose liability upon a defendant-supervisor who

creates, promulgates, implements, or in some other way possesses responsibility for the
continued operation of a policy the enforcement (by the defendant-supervisor or h[is]
subordinates) of which subjects, or causes to be subjected that plaintiff to the deprivation
of any rights secured by the Constitution.” Id. at 1199 (cleaned up). Thus, an official with
policy-making authority who “creates, actively endorses, or implements a policy which is

constitutionally infirm . . . may face personal liability for the violations which result from
the policy’s application.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To establish
liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) the defendant promulgated, created,
implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2)
caused the complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required

to establish the alleged constitutional violation.” Id.
In a concurring opinion in Dodds, United States Tenth Circuit Judge Tymkovich
observed:
In sum, our precedent has established, with varying levels of clarity, that a
supervisor is only liable for violations that he caused, and that causation
requires at least some degree of fault on the supervisor’s part. Exactly how
this causation can be shown varies depending on the type of violation and the
facts of the case. . . . First, a supervisor may directly order a subordinate to
violate the plaintiff’s rights. . . . Next, some cases say a supervisor may cause
violations when he or she has actual knowledge of past constitutional
violations being carried out by a subordinate, and does nothing to stop future
occurrences. . . . Finally, a series of cases requires a standard of deliberate
indifference. Those types of cases include the failure to train, the failure to
supervise, and potentially other supervisory shortcomings. . . . In those cases,
we may find that a supervisor has somehow caused the violation to occur by
an egregious failure to act. . . . In sum, our decisions hold that supervisors
are liable for constitutional violations they cause. The exact contours of
causation – especially regarding an official’s state of mind sufficient for
liability – are uncertain in light of Iqbal. But for purposes of this case, Dodds
alleges the sheriff deliberately implemented an unconstitutional bail policy
that violated his clearly established rights as a pretrial detainee and thereby
caused him injury. As the majority ably demonstrates, his allegations are
enough to survive summary judgment.

Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1211-13 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
Here, Ms. Bointy argues that Defendant Walter’s “exercise of control, statutory
authority, and continued implementation and utilization of the policy which led to Ms.
Bointy’s termination is more than sufficient to meet the involvement requirement.” Resp.
at 28. Ms. Bointy does not identify whether she is referring to the Confidentiality
Agreement or the Media Policy in making this argument, nor does she cite the factual
record. Because no other policy is identified by either party, the Court’s analysis is
confined to the Confidentiality Agreement and Media Policy.10
1. Defendant Walters Possessed Responsibility for the Continued
Operation of the Policies

Ms. Bointy argues that Defendant Walters is the final policymaker at the OSDE.
See Pl.’s Resp. at 28 (“[B]y Oklahoma statute, Defendant Walters has ultimate authority
and exclusive control over the policies and procedures of the Oklahoma State Department
of Education, as well as control over the OSDE’s personnel.”). In support, Ms. Bointy
cites Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 3-107.1. The statute provides in relevant part that “[t]he State

10 Ms. Bointy testified that the Confidentiality Agreement and Media Policy were the only policies
or customs of the OSDE that she blamed for her termination. See Bointy Dep. [Doc. No. 78-2] at
140.
Superintendent of Public Instruction shall have the control of and direct the State
Department of Education” and “shall [a]dopt policies and make rules for the organization,
operation and administration of the State Department of Education.” Id., § 3-107.1(2). The

statute further provides that the State Superintendent of Public Instruction “shall . . . [h]ave
general supervision of all employees of the Department.” Id., § 3-107.1(4).
In reply, Defendant Walters wholly fails to address § 3-107.1. Instead, he argues
that the Confidentiality Agreement and Media Policy were in place prior to him becoming
Superintendent. The Court finds this fact is without consequence. Pursuant to § 3-107.1,

Defendant Walters, as Superintendent, is responsible for the Confidentiality Agreement
and Media Policy. In any event, the fact that he held responsibility for their continued
operation does not, without more, establish his liability. As discussed below, Ms. Bointy’s
claim fails on the causation and state of mind requirements.11
2. Neither the Confidentiality Agreement nor the Media Policy
Caused the Complained of Constitutional Harm

Ms. Bointy’s claim fails on the causation element. To succeed on this element, Ms.
Bointy must show that Defendant Walters’ “alleged actions caused the constitutional
violation by setting in motion a series of events that the defendant knew or reasonably
should have known would cause others to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights.”

11 As Defendant Walters points out, however, he had only been Superintendent for approximately
two months prior to Ms. Bointy’s termination and would have had “a very short time to learn about
the [P]olicies and any alleged issues with them.” Mot. at 24. The Court finds, in the context of
this case, that this fact speaks to the causation and/or state-of-mind requirements of supervisory
liability and further supports the finding, discussed infra, that the record is void of evidence that
Defendant Walters is subject to supervisory liability.
Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 997 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Here, Ms. Bointy’s claim is that HR erroneously applied the Confidentiality

Agreement and/or the Media Policy to her and this erroneous application led to the alleged
violation of her constitutional rights. The policies themselves do not serve as the basis for
her claim. Necessarily therefore, any implementation of the policies per se does not give
rise to the imposition of liability on Defendant Walters. Cf. Goudeau v. E. Baton Rouge
Par. Sch. Bd., 540 F. App’x 429, 437 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that

school superintendent could be held liable based on constructive or actual knowledge of a
grade-changing policy where “the potential constitutional violation alleged by [the
plaintiff] [was] not the implementation of the grading policy per se, but the infringement
on her First Amendment rights in the form of employment retaliation for the exercise of
those rights”).

By contrast, in Dodd, supervisory liability was imposed upon a county sheriff
because he acquiesced in a policy that prevented arrestees from posting preset bail. The
policy itself prevented arrestees from posting preset bail and it was the inability to post
such bail that resulted in the deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The
defendant sheriff acquiesced in these policies in deliberate indifference to the constitutional

rights of the arrestees and therefore, could be subject to supervisory liability. Dodd, 614
F.3d at 1204 (finding facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff showed that
the sheriff “played more than a passive role in the alleged constitutional violation – he may
have deliberately enforced or actively maintained the policies in question at the jail” and
by the sheriff’s own admission, “the policies’ enforcement caused the constitutional
violation”).
Here, the record is devoid of any evidence that the Confidentiality Agreement or the

Media Policy caused the constitutional violation. Notably, Ms. Bointy does not bring any
claim challenging the constitutionality of these policies. Instead, as she testified, her claim
is based on the erroneous application of the policies to her.
3. Defendant Walters Did Not Act with the Requisite State of Mind
Finally, there is no evidence that Defendant Walters acted with any culpable state

of mind.12 As the Court has addressed, the undisputed factual record establishes that
Defendant Walters had no knowledge of Ms. Bointy’s termination until this lawsuit was
filed. And Ms. Bointy has not shown, nor has she even alleged in her Petition or any other
filings, that either the Confidentiality Agreement or the Media Policy itself violates federal
law such that the mere existence of these policies would suffice to establish culpability.

See Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1199 n. 8 (addressing circumstances were the unconstitutional
nature of the policy itself is sufficient to establish the requisite culpability). In fact, Ms.
Bointy testified that she has no reason to believe that Defendant Walters intended to violate
her right to free speech. See Bointy Dep. [Doc. No. 78-2] at 113.

12 In Dodds, the Tenth Circuit held a defendant-supervisor must have “acted with the state of mind
required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id., 614 F.3d at 1199. Defendant
Walters argues that “[t]he required retaliatory intent in a free speech retaliation case is a parallel
to the “discriminatory purpose” required in an invidious discrimination case.” Mot. at 22. The
Court need not decide the state-of-mind required to support the constitutional violation at issue.
Here, there is no evidence of any degree of Defendant Walters having acted with a culpable state
of mind with respect to Ms. Bointy’s alleged retaliatory termination.
Additionally, there is no evidence in the record to establish a custom or practice of
applying the Confidentiality Agreement or Media Policy in a manner that resulted in
violations of First Amendment rights of OSDE employees. As the Tenth Circuit has

explained, “[t]he custom or practice giving rise to liability must be so well settled and
widespread that policymaking officials . . . can be said to have either actual or constructive
knowledge of it yet did nothing to end the practice.” Burke, 935 F.3d at 998 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) (recognizing that the elements of supervisory and
municipal liability are the same where liability is predicated on maintaining a policy or

custom that resulted in the underlying violation).
In Burke, the Tenth Circuit found a reasonable jury could find the sheriff acted with
the requisite state of mind based on deficiencies at the county jail in medical care that had
been unaddressed for several years. Id. (noting that “[b]etween 2007 and Mr. Williams’s
death in 2011, outside auditors and consultants informed Sheriff Glanz, the official

responsible for the jail’s medical care, of understaffing, inadequate training, or poor follow-
up” and that “Sheriff Glanz repeatedly told auditors he planned to improve the quality of
the jail’s medical care, but . . . could not point to any changes that were made”). By
contrast, here, Defendant Walters had been Superintendent for a very few months before
Ms. Bointy’s termination and there is no evidence that he had any knowledge that the

Confidentiality Agreement or Media Policy were causing the denial of First Amendment
rights.
Ms. Bointy includes a termination letter dated May 25, 2023 addressed to Cheryl
McGee and stating as the basis for termination “a breach of confidentiality by leaking
internal agency emails to the media.” See McGee Termination Letter [Doc. No. 110-1].
Even if the Court were to assume that this termination implicated Ms. McGee’s First
Amendment rights, her termination post-dates Ms. Bointy’s termination. Moreover,

regardless of its timing, Ms. Bointy cites no other evidence of any terminations alleged to
be in violation of any OSDE employees’ First Amendment rights. Such a singular
incidence is insufficient to demonstrate any well-settled and widespread custom.
Nor is there any evidence of any obvious risk that the Confidentiality Agreement or
Media Policy would result in a violation of Ms. Bointy’s First Amendment rights. Again,

Ms. Bointy’s own testimony was that she did not think there was anything about either the
Confidentiality Agreement or the Media Policy that was designed or intended to deprive
OSDE employees of their right to free speech. See Bointy Dep. [Doc. No. 78-2] at 129,
136.
In sum, the Court finds the factual record does not support imposition of supervisory

liability on Defendant Walters as to Ms. Bointy’s § 1983 claim. There is no evidence that
Defendant Walters: (1) “directly order[ed] a subordinate to violate [Ms. Bointy’s] rights”;
(2) “ha[d] actual knowledge of past constitutional violations being carried out by a
subordinate, and d[id] nothing to stop future occurrences”; or (3) that “other supervisory
shortcomings” by Defendant Walters “somehow caused the violation to occur by an

egregious failure to act”. Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1211-13 (Tymkovich, J., concurring). As
discussed, there is no evidence to support a finding that Defendant Walters caused the
constitutional violation or acted with any requisite mental state. Accordingly, Defendant
Walters is entitled to qualified immunity as Ms. Bointy has not demonstrated the violation
of her First Amendment rights by Defendant Walters."?
IV. Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment, with Brief
in Support, of Defendant Ryan Walters in his Individual Capacity [Doc. No. 78] is
GRANTED. Defendant Walters is entitled to qualified immunity as Plaintiff has failed to
establish that he violated her constitutional rights.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 23rd day of June, 2025.
whe tZ_
SCOTT L. PALK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

'3 Because the Court finds Defendant Walters is entitled to qualified immunity under the first
prong, the Court need not further decide Defendant Walters’ additional argument under the second
prong of the qualified immunity analysis — whether the scope of supervisory liability, in the context
of the facts and circumstances of this case, was clearly established at the time of the alleged
constitutional violation. See Valdez v. Macdonald, 66 F.4th 796, 831 (10th Cir. 2023) (‘A
“defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff fails to satisfy either prong.”); Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (the court has discretion regarding “which of the two prongs
of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first”).
17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11082250. Public record. Not legal advice.