# Chaney v. Dallas Sheriff Office

> District Court, N.D. Texas · May 21, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11081464

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** May 21, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11081464

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- quoting, in turn, Rhyne v. Henderson Cnty., 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
LEE ROY CHANEY, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § No. 3:22-cv-2260-E-BN
§
DALLAS SHERIFF OFFICE, ET AL., § Consolidated with:
§ No. 3:24-cv-2478-E-BN
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Lee Roy Chaney, while an inmate at Ellis County jail, filed a pro se
civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. No. 3. United States District Judge
Ada Brown referred Chaney’s lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate
judge for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
The Court granted Chaney leave to proceed in forma pauperis under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See Dkt. No. 7. And a second complaint filed by
Chaney was consolidated. See Dkt. No. 14; see also Chaney v. Ellis Cnty. Sheriff
Office, No. 3:22-cv-2478-E-BN, Dkt. No. 7 (consolidated complaint).
And, after screening his claims, as detailed below, the undersigned now enters
these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should
dismiss this lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Applicable Background
Under the PLRA, where prisoners (whether incarcerated or detained pending
trial) seek relief from a governmental entity or employee, a district court must, on
initial screening, identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion
of the complaint, that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Consistent with this obligation and noting that the defendants named in
Chaney’s complaint were all non-jural entities not subject to suit, the magistrate
judge previously assigned to this case issued a screening questionnaire, providing
Chaney the opportunity to amend to name different defendants. See Dkt. No. 8 at 2.
The questionnaire required Chaney to provide specified information as to each
defendant, including “[a] brief summary of all actions taken by that defendant that

support each of your claims against him,” with “the date (month, day, and year) and
location where each of those actions took place.” Id. at 3. It also asked Chaney to state
what relief he sought. See id. at 4.
Chaney filed a verified response. See Dkt. No. 9. But rather than providing the
specific information requested in the questionnaire, he listed Dallas County, Ellis
County, multiple individuals, including at least two judges, as well as several catch-

all categories like “District Attorneys,” “All Medical Staff,” and “Wayne McCollum
Staff.” See id. at 1-2, 8. Chaney also wrote out several pages of grievances but
generally did not connect those grievances with specific individuals or otherwise
identify actions taken by particular defendants as the order required. See id. at 2, 5-
7. With respect to the question about relief sought, Chaney only answered as to claims
related to his medical care but not the litany of other claims alleged in his
questionnaire. See id. at 4.
So the previously assigned magistrate judge issued a second questionnaire
essentially repeating the first question from the earlier questionnaire but

emphasizing that Chaney needed to provide all information for each defendant with
a particular emphasis on the requirement to provide “[a] brief summary of all
actions taken by that defendant.” See Dkt. No. 10 at 2.
Chaney filed a response specifically naming five defendants – Zackry
Beauchamp of the Waxahachie Police Department, Corbin Philps of the Lancaster
Police Department, District Attorney Grossman, Judge R.H. Magnus, and Dallas
County – and setting out a summary of actions taken by each. See Dkt. No. 12.

Shortly after filing his first case, Chaney filed a second civil rights case. See
Chaney v. Ellis Cnty. Sheriff Office, No. 3:22-cv-2478-E-BN. The magistrate judge
assigned to that case issued a notice of deficiency (“NOD”) informing Chaney that his
complaint was “not in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) and
requiring Chaney to file on the form prisoner civil rights complaint for this Court. See
id., Dkt. No. 6.

And Chaney filed an amended complaint related to his access to the law library
and medical services at the Wayne McCollum Detention Center in Ellis County. See
id., Dkt. No. 7. He named T. Eberhart, G. Flores, and Head Nurse Terry as
defendants. See id. After Chaney filed his amended complaint, the two cases were
consolidated. See Dkt. No. 14.
Chaney was arrested in September 2020, by officers Zachary Beauchamp and
Corbin Phillips in Lancaster, Texas. See Chany v. State, No. 05-22-00168-CR, 2023
WL 2155948, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App.—Dallas Feb. 22, 2023, pet. denied). He was charged,
and subsequently convicted of, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence and

possession of a controlled substance in Dallas County. See id. According to the
judgment of conviction from Dallas County, the judge presiding over Chaney’s trial
was Rick Magnis and the attorney for the state was James Grossman. See State v.
Chaney, Nos. F20-39327-P, F20-39331-P (203rd Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022). Chaney
appealed, and the Texas Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed. See Chany, 2023 WL
2155948, at *3.
The timeline for which jail – Dallas County or Ellis County – had custody of

Chaney at any particular time is not clear from the pleadings, but based on online
records of Dallas and Ellis County, it appears that, while on bond in Dallas County,
Chaney was arrested in April 2021 in Ellis County on a charge of possession of a
controlled substance. And he pled guilty to the Ellis County charge in March 2023.
See State v. Chaney, No. 47744CR (443rd Jud. Dist. Ct. Mar. 29, 2023).
Legal Standards

As set out above, the PLRA authorizes the Court to dismiss a complaint where
it “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
Because this language tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the Court should apply the pleading standards as set out in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Under these standards, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not require
that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations, but it does require “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks

for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678.
So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
On the other hand, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; cf. Bryant v. Ditech Fin., L.L.C.,
No. 23-10416, 2024 WL 890122, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) (“[J]ust as plaintiffs
cannot state a claim using speculation, defendants cannot defeat plausible inferences
using speculation.”).
“The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual
matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v.

Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
And, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is “not bound
to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In fact, “the court does not ‘presume true a number of categories of statements,
including,’” in addition to legal conclusions, “‘mere labels; threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement.’” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021)).

So, to avoid dismissal for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted under Section 1915A(b)(1), plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show”
that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely,
and directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby,
Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e));
see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899
(5th Cir. 2019) (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’

is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).
Analysis
Other than the defendants and claims identified in response to the magistrate
judge’s second questionnaire [Dkt. No. 12] or the amended complaint in the
consolidated case [No. 3:22-cv-2478-E-BN, Dkt. No. 7], all defendants identified in

the complaint in the lead case and the magistrate judge’s first questionnaire should
be dismissed because Chaney has not made any attempt to set out the basis for his
claims against those defendants. The undersigned addresses the claims in the second
questionnaire, focusing on Dallas County defendants, and in the amended complaint
in the consolidated case, focusing on Ellis County defendants, separately.
I. Claims Alleged In Second Questionnaire Should Be Dismissed.
A. Claims against Judge Magnis are barred by judicial immunity.
“[A] judge generally has absolute immunity from suits for damages.” Davis v.
Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502

U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991)). “Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just the
ultimate assessment of damages.” Id. (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citing, in turn,
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985))).
There are only two circumstances under which judicial immunity may
be overcome. “First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial
actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity.” Mireles,
502 U.S. at 11 (citations omitted). “Second, a judge is not immune for
actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted). Allegations of bad faith or malice
are not sufficient to overcome judicial immunity. Id.
Id.; see also Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Court [employees] ‘have
absolute immunity from actions for damages arising from acts they are specifically
required to do under court order or at a judge’s discretion.’” (quoting Tarter v. Hury,
646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981))); Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229,
230-31 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he judge’s law clerk, when assisting the judge in carrying
out the former’s judicial functions, is likewise entitled to absolute immunity.”
(citations omitted)).
There is nothing in the complaint to indicate that any of Judge Magnis’s
interactions with Chaney were not in his judicial capacity or that there was an
absence of jurisdiction. So the claims against Judge Magnis should be dismissed
because they are barred by judicial immunity.
B. Claims against Assistant District Attorney Grossman are barred by
prosecutorial immunity.
Similarly, a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity “for actions ‘initiating
a prosecution and … presenting the State’s case’ and those ‘intimately associated with
the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674 (5th Cir.
1997) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)). Absolute immunity
extends to claims of suppression of evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland and

even “[w]ilful or malicious prosecutorial misconduct … in the exercise of their
advocatory function.” Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 635 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430).
Although a prosecutor is entitled only to qualified immunity for certain
administrative activities, see Van de Camp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009),
nothing in the complaint indicates that the allegations address anything other than
the initiation and prosecution of the State’s case against Chaney. So his claims

against Assistant District Attorney Grossman are barred by prosecutorial immunity.
C. Claims against Officers Beauchamp and Phillips are conclusory or, in
the alternative, are barred by Heck.
The claims set out in response to the magistrate judge’s second questionnaire
against Officers Beauchamp and Phillips amount to a laundry list of labels and
conclusory statements without any factual support and should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim. See Dkt. No. 12 at 2-3. But, to the extent that any of the
claims against the officers could plausibly state a claim, they are barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).1
A Section 1983 claim that “falls under the rule in Heck is legally frivolous
unless the conviction or sentence at issue has been reversed, expunged, invalidated,

or otherwise called into question.” Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1996)
(citation omitted).
As to whether a particular civil claim is subject to the rule in Heck,
[i]t is well settled under Heck that a plaintiff who has been convicted of
a crime cannot recover damages for an alleged violation of his
constitutional rights if that “violation arose from the same facts
attendant to the charge for which he was convicted, unless he proves
‘that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.’”
Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d
391, 396 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting, in turn, Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87)); accord Magee v.
Reed, 912 F.3d 820, 822 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“In Heck, the Supreme Court
held that if a plaintiff’s civil rights claim for damages challenges the validity of his
criminal conviction or sentence, and the plaintiff cannot show that such conviction or
sentence has been reversed, invalidated, or otherwise set aside, the claim is not
cognizable under § 1983.” (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87)).
Though it is not clear what relief Chaney seeks as to his claims attacking his
Dallas County convictions, while Heck generally applies to claims for damages, it
1 These arguments would also apply to the claims against Judge Magnis and Assistant
District Attorney Grossman to the extent that they are not entitled to immunity as to any
of the claims. See Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994) (Absolute immunity is
“threshold matter” that “is appropriate for the district courts to resolve before reaching the
Heck analysis when feasible.”).
applies equally where a suit seeks injunctive relief. See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Harpstead,
No. 21-cv-0177 (ECT/TNL), 2021 WL 1200671, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 26, 2021)
(“[A]lthough Heck discusses only claims brought for monetary damages, the

principles of that case apply to all claims brought in civil litigation that necessarily
imply the invalidity of detention, including claims for injunctive relief.” (citing Jones-
El v. Joyce, No. 4:09-CV-1972, 2009 WL 5217006, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 30, 2009)
(collecting cases))), rec. accepted, 2021 WL 1195863 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2021).
“That is because ‘civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging
the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.’” Ray, 2022 WL 16945898, at *2
(quoting Colvin v. LeBlanc, 2 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting, in turn, Heck,

512 U.S. at 486)).
Put differently, “Heck does not allow a civil rights lawsuit to be an alternative
vehicle to a criminal case for challenging law enforcement decisions that resulted in
arrest or prosecution unless the criminal case was resolved ‘in favor of the accused.’”
Morris v. Mekdessie, 768 F. App’x 299, 301 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up; quoting Heck,
512 U.S. at 484).

Other than conclusory assertions of medical neglect, the allegations set out in
response to the second questionnaire focus on the validity of Chaney’s Dallas County
conviction. See Dkt. No. 12. But Chaney does not show that conviction has been
reversed, invalidated, set aside, or otherwise resolved in his favor. In fact, the
conviction was affirmed on appeal. See Chany, 2023 WL 2155948, at *3. So claims
against Officers Beauchamp and Phillips are barred by Heck and not cognizable.
D. Claims against Dallas County should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim for municipal liability under Monell.
A county “cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless ‘execution of a
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.’”
Martinez v. Nueces Cnty., 71 F.4th 385, 389 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). A plaintiff may proceed on a

Monell claim only by
identify[ing] “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker
can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a
constitutional violation whose moving force is that policy (or custom).”
Pineda v. City of Hous., 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up).
Municipalities are not liable “on the theory of respondeat superior” and
are “almost never liable for an isolated unconstitutional act on the part
of an employee.” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th
Cir. 2009).
Hutcheson v. Dall. Cnty., 994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2021); see also Brown v. Tarrant
Cnty., 985 F.3d 489, 497 & n.11 (5th Cir. 2021) (noting that where a plaintiff’s claim
fails as to one prong, a court “need not consider whether [his] claim also fails the other
two Monell prongs” (citing Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 168-69 (5th
Cir. 2010))).
Chaney’s claim against Dallas County asserts that he was injured, required to
work while injured, and was not taken to the hospital. See Dkt. No. 12 at 5. But no
official policy or custom is identified. Chaney’s claims instead attempt to state a claim
against Dallas County based on the actions of its employees under respondeat
superior, which is not sufficient to state a claim. So the claims against Dallas County
should be dismissed.
II. Claims Alleged In Consolidated Amended Complaint Should Be
Dismissed.
The amended complaint in the consolidated case alleges claims against three
individuals related to law library access and medical care. See No. 3:22-cv-2478-E-
BN, Dkt. No. 7 at 3-4. The defendants named are T. Eberhart who Chaney asserts is
“over Wayne McCollum Det[e]ntion Center,” G. Flores who is alleged to be a corporal
presumably at Wayne McCollum Detention Center, and Terry who is alleged to the

be head nurse at Wellpath. See id. at 4.
A. Claim for denial of access to law library should be dismissed.
Chaney asserts that he was not permitted to go to the law library when he
asked and that, as a pretrial detainee, he “should have access to up to date law
library” so he could fight his criminal case in Ellis County. Id. at 3. But the docket for
his Ellis County criminal case reflects that Chaney was represented by counsel. See
State v. Chaney, No. 47744CR (443rd Jud. Dist. Ct.).

“[P]rison law libraries and legal assistance programs are not ends in
themselves, but only the means for assuring ‘a reasonably adequate opportunity to
present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.’” Lewis
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825
(1977)). So a prisoner claiming denial of access to a law library or legal assistance
program must “demonstrate an actual injury.” Mendoza v. Strickland, 414 Fed. App’x

616, 618 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also Hopkins v. Ogg, 783 F. App’x 350, 354
(5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“A prisoner’s right of access to the courts is limited to
‘the ability of an inmate to prepare and transmit a necessary legal document to a
court.’” (citing Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1328 (5th Cir. 1996); Terry v. Hubert,
609 F.3d 757, 761-62 (5th Cir. 2010)).
Chaney cannot demonstrate such an injury “because he was represented by

counsel and, therefore, his right to access the courts had not been infringed.” Id.; see
also Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir.1981) (“As long as a criminal
defendant is represented by counsel, he will be able to present matters for decision to
the court through motions filed by his attorney.”).
And, even if that were not the case, Chaney did not “show that ‘his position as
a litigant was prejudiced by his denial of access to the courts.’” Hopkins, 783 F. App’x
at 354 (quoting Eason, 73 F.3d at 1328). Specifically, “he does not explain how he

would have proceeded with access to a law library, what claims he would have raised,
or how those claims would have been meritorious.” Id.
So Chaney fails to plausibly allege a constitutional violation related to access
to a law library, and those claims should be dismissed.
B. Claim for medical neglect should be dismissed.
As to the claim related to medical neglect, Chaney alleges that he “came in

with a broken ankle and a bone comeing [sic] out the side of [his] leg the first 2 month
I was refused medical.” No. 3:22-cv-2478-E-BN, Dkt. No. 7 at 3. There is little
additional detail in the consolidated amended complaint to assist in screening.
But, while they are not linked to any particular defendant, allegations in other
filings provide additional information about Chaney’s injury and medical treatment.
In the complaint in the lead case, Chaney alleges that, as of October 2022, a bone had
been “pruseing out the side of [his] leg … for over 2 yrs.” Dkt. No. 3 at 8. The original
injury was allegedly either caused by harassment by Lancaster police or working in
an oil field and then was allegedly “rebroken on the floor at Cook Chill where they

made me go to work.” Id.
The Cook Chill injury took place while Chaney was incarcerated in Dallas
County jail, and he alleges that he was not taken to the hospital at the time. See Dkt.
No. 12 at 5. He alleges that he was waiting for an operation when he was bonded and
had to start again with his blood flow checks. See Dkt. No. 3 at 8. Chaney asserts that
the injury did not heal properly due to “unproper medical attention.” See Dkt. No. 9
at 4.

At no point in the various allegations does Chaney clarify the timeline of when
the injury occurred, when he was transferred to McCollum Detention Center in Ellis
County, or specifically how Nurse Terry or any other personnel at Ellis County
contributed to his injury beyond not providing the operation that Chaney contends is
necessary to fix his leg. And his allegations indicate that there was a period of time
between his injury and his incarceration at McCollum when Chaney was out on bond

and did not obtain the medical care that he claims should have been provided to him
in prison.
“In the context of medical care, a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment
when he acts with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.”
Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)).
“‘Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet’ but can be
satisfied by a ‘wanton disregard for [an inmate’s] serious medical needs.’” Cope v.
Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 207 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Domino, 239 F.3d at 756).

Put another way, “[d]eliberate indifference is a degree of culpability beyond
mere negligence or even gross negligence; it must amount to an intentional choice,
not merely an unintentionally negligent oversight.” Alvarez v. City of Brownsville,
904 F.3d 382, 391 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (quoting James v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d
612, 617-18 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting, in turn, Rhyne v. Henderson Cnty., 973 F.2d 386,
392 (5th Cir. 1992))); see also Kelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411, 417 (5th Cir. 2021)
(“[D]eliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely from a negligent or even a

grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm. Rather, the plaintiff
must show that the officials refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,
intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would
clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” (cleaned up)).
Alone, a disagreement with medical treatment or a failure to provide
additional medical treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference. See Domino,

239 F.3d at 756; Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Smith
v. Allen, 288 F. App’x 938, 939 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (determination that a
prisoner was not a candidate for further surgery after two prior surgeries were not
successful “is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation” (citations omitted)).
Chaney alleges claims for medical neglect against two defendants in the
consolidated amended complaint. The first is Corporal Flores, but there are no
allegations to explain how he acted with deliberate indifference beyond an assertion
of “neglect to medical needs.” As to the second defendant, Nurse Terry, Chaney
alleges that she is the head nurse for Wellpath, but “[u]nder section 1983, supervisory

officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious
liability.” Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir.1987). So to the extent that
Chaney seeks to hold her responsible for the actions of all medical personnel at
McCollum, he has not sufficiently pled a claim. And the limited allegations about
Nurse Terry specifically within the context of all the allegations about his injury and
treatment also do not state a claim. Failure to provide the surgical treatment Chaney
sought for an old injury does not meet the extremely high standard for deliberate

indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs.
So Chaney fails to plausibly allege a constitutional violation related to his
assertions of medical neglect, and those claims should be dismissed.
Leave to Amend
Chaney has been given multiple opportunities in the consolidated cases to
amend or to provide additional details through responding to questionnaires but still

has not been able to plausibly allege a coherent claim. That said, if Chaney believes
that he has not yet stated his best case as to any claim discussed above – which
means, after considering the notice provided above, Chaney believes he knows of more
facts that he can assert to allege a plausible claim – the time to file objections (further
explained below) allows him an opportunity to explain how he would cure the
deficiencies identified above and thus show the Court that his case should not be
dismissed with prejudice at this time and that the Court should instead grant him
leave to amend his claims. See Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209
(5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“A court should freely give leave to amend when justice

so requires, FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2)), but a movant must give the court at least some
notice of what his or her amendments would be and how those amendments would
cure the initial complaint’s defects.”). But if Chaney cannot show that leave should
be granted, the Court should dismiss this case with prejudice other than the claims
against Judge Magnis and District Attorney Grossman which should be dismissed as
barred by absolute immunity.
Recommendation

The Court should dismiss claims against Judge Magnis and District Attorney
Grossman as barred by judicial and prosecutorial immunity respectively and should
dismiss the remainder of the claims in the consolidated cases with prejudice under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: May 21, 2025

DAVIDL.HORAN }©— □
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11081464. Public record. Not legal advice.