# John L. Soileau v. Churchill Downs Louisiana Horseracing Company, L.L.C.,. Churchill Downs Louisiana Video Poker Company, L.L.C. > Louisiana Court of Appeal · December 22, 2021 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11077868 ## Case - **Court:** Louisiana Court of Appeal - **Decided:** December 22, 2021 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Judge Dale N. Atkins - **Judges:** Judge Rosemary Ledet; Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase; Judge Dale N. Atkins - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11077868 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - recognizing the court is not to try the case ## Opinion text CORRECTED OPINION JOHN L. SOILEAU, ET AL. * NO. 2021-CA-0022 VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL CHURCHILL DOWNS * LOUISIANA HORSERACING FOURTH CIRCUIT COMPANY, L.L.C., * CHURCHILL DOWNS STATE OF LOUISIANA LOUISIANA VIDEO POKER ******* COMPANY, L.L.C., ET AL. CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH: JOHN L. SOILEAU, ET AL. NO. 2021-CA-0049 VERSUS CHURCHILL DOWNS LOUISIANA HORSERACING COMPANY, L.L.C., CHURCHILL DOWNS LOUISIANA VIDEO POKER COMPANY, L.L.C., ET AL. CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH: JOHN SOILEAU, ET AL. NO. 2021-CA-0199 VERSUS CHURCHILL DOWNS LOUISIANA HORSERACING COMPANY, L.L.C., CHURCHILL DOWNS LOUISIANA VIDEO POKER COMPANY, L.L.C., ET AL. APPEAL FROM CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2014-03873, DIVISION “G-11” Honorable Robin M. Giarrusso, Judge ****** Judge Dale N. Atkins ****** (Court composed of Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase, Judge Dale N. Atkins) LEDET, J., CONCURS CHASE, J., CONCURS Michael David Singletary SINGLETARY & ASSOCIATES, APLC 604 West 13th Street Austin, TX 78701 Alan N. Magenheim, Pro Hac Vice ATTORNEY AT LAW 3701 Kirby Drive Suite 913 Houston, TX 77098 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS, BERNADINE SOILEAU AS INDEPENDENT EXECUTRIX OF THE SUCCESSION OF JOHN SOILEAU, SR., ALVIN BROSSETTE, JUSTIN DEHART, DONALD WATSON, JOSEPH D. MANUCY AND LUCAS CONSTANTIN Kyle Sherman BRANDT & SHERMAN, LLP 111 Mercury Street Lafayette, LA 70503 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS, JOHN HAMILTON AND DANNY LAVERGNE David F. Waguespack Matthew J. Fantaci CARVER, DARDEN, KORETZKY, TESSIER, FINN, BLOSSMAN & AREAUX, LLC 1100 Poydras Street, Suite 3100 New Orleans, LA 70163 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, CHURCHILL DOWNS LOUISIANA HORSERACING COMPANY, L.L.C. AND CHURCHILL DOWNS LOUISIANA VIDEO POKER COMPANY, L.L.C. John L. Duvieilh Jennifer A. David JONES WALKER LLP 201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 4700 New Orleans, LA 70170 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, LOUISIANA HORSEMEN’S BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION 1993, INC. William L. Townsend, III Keenan K. Kelly KELLY & TOWNSEND, LLC 137 St. Denis Street Post Office Box 756 Natchitoches, LA 71457 J. Chris Guillet Ronald E. Corkern, Jr. CORKERN, CREWS & GUILLET, L.L.C. P.O. Box 1036 Natchitoches, LA 71458-1036 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, CLASS REPRESENTATIVES, JO BAIA FOREMAN AND KENNETH L. ROBERTS AFFIRMED December 22, 2021 DNA These three consolidated appeals arise from a class action dispute between quarter-horse owners, trainers, and jockeys; Churchill Downs Louisiana Horseracing Company, L.L.C, the owner of the Fair Grounds Race Courts & Slots Facility in New Orleans, Louisiana; Churchill Downs Louisiana Video Poker Company, L.L.C.; and the Horsemen’s Benevolent and Protective Association 1993, Inc. These appeals involve the distribution of supplemental purse monies collected in quarter-horse racing at off-track facilities. Quarter-horse owners, trainers, and jockeys bring this appeal. They can be divided into two groups but will hereinafter be referred to collectively as “Appellants.” The first group of Appellants, which is hereinafter referred to as “Soileau Plaintiffs,” is comprised of Bernadine Soileau, as independent executrix of the Succession of John Soileau, Sr.; Alvin Brossette; Justin Dehart; Donald Watson; Joseph Manucy; and Lucas Constantin. The second group of Appellants, which is hereinafter referred to as “Hamilton Plaintiffs,” is comprised of some of the class representatives, namely Danny Lavergne and John Hamilton. 1 Appellees are Jo Baia Foreman1 and Kenneth L. Roberts; Churchill Downs Louisiana Horseracing Company, L.L.C. (hereinafter referred to as “CDLHR”) and Churchill Downs Louisiana Video Poker Company, L.L.C. (hereinafter referred to as “CDLVPC”) (CDLHR and CDLVPC are hereinafter collectively referred to as “Fair Grounds Defendants”); and the Louisiana Horsemen’s Benevolent and Protective Association 1993, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “HBPA”). Appellants appeal the trial court’s November 12, 2020 judgment, which denied Soileau Plaintiffs’ and Hamilton Plaintiffs’ motions to vacate the trial court’s February 18, 2020 order that preliminarily approved a proposed class action settlement agreement (hereinafter referred to as “proposed settlement agreement”), a class,2 class representatives,3 class counsel,4 and deadlines to opt- out, object, and submit a claim form. They also appeal the trial court’s decision not to reset those aforementioned class action deadlines in response to orders issued by 1 In the record before this Court, “Jo Baia Foreman” is also sometimes spelled “Jo Baya Foreman.” For consistency, this opinion will only use the spelling “Jo Baia Foreman.” 2 The February 18, 2020 order certified the class as: All persons and/or entities who are quarter[-]horse owners, quarter[-] horse trainers, and quarter[-]horse jockeys who have won or earned purses at the Fair Grounds Race Course since January 1, 2008, and who claim, claimed, and/or could claim that they are entitled under [] La. R.S. 27:438 to any portion of monies collected from video poker, or which claim, claimed, and/or could claim damages against any Defendant under any theory of recovery of any portion of the monies collected from video poker pursuant to the La. R.S. 27:438. 3 The February 18, 2020 order appointed Mrs. Foreman, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Lavergne as class representatives. 4 The February 18, 2020 order appointed Kelly & Townsend, LLC, and Corkern, Crews, Guillet & Johnson, L.L.C. as class counsel. 2 the Louisiana Governor and the Louisiana Supreme Court regarding the COVID- 19 pandemic. (2021-CA-0022). Further, Appellants appeal the trial court’s February 18, 2020 order granting preliminary approval of the proposed settlement agreement. (2021-CA-0049). Finally, Appellants appeal the trial court’s January 28, 2021 judgment granting final approval of the proposed settlement agreement. (2021-CA-0199). For the following reasons, we affirm. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Because these three consolidated appeals involve multiple Appellants and Appellees, we begin our summary of the factual background and procedural history with a description of the parties.5 APPELLANTS Appellants are Bernadine Soileau, as independent executrix of the Succession of John Soileau, Sr.; Alvin Brossette; Justin Dehart; Donald Watson; Joseph Manucy; Lucas Constantin; Danny Lavergne; and John Hamilton. Appellants are divided into two groups. The first group known as Soileau Plaintiffs is comprised of Bernadine Soileau, as independent executrix of the Succession of John Soileau, Sr.; Mr. Brossette; Mr. Dehart; Mr. Watson; Mr. Manucy; and Mr. Constantin. The second group known as Hamilton Plaintiffs is comprised of Mr. Lavergne and Mr. Hamilton. In a February 18, 2020 order, the trial court, in pertinent part, appointed Hamilton Plaintiffs as two of the four class representatives. They signed the proposed settlement agreement but now oppose it. 5 Due to the complexity of this litigation and the numerous parties, we repeat some of the descriptions of the parties and add more details about the parties in this subsequent section. 3 PLAINTIFFS In the “Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Permanent Injunction, and Damages – Class Action” (hereinafter “Petition”) filed on April 21, 2014, John Soileau, Sr.; Alvin Brossette; Justin Dehart; Donald Watson; Joseph Manucy; Lucas Constantin; Danny Lavergne; John Hamilton; Jo Baia Foreman; and Kenneth L. Roberts are named as plaintiffs (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs”). Therein, Plaintiffs described themselves as members of a class of “Louisiana quarter-horse owners, trainers, and jockeys” who “are ‘horsemen’ entitled to the payment of supplemental purses pursuant to La. R.S. 27:438” and its predecessor statutes due to underpayment of quarter-horse purses won at the Fair Grounds Race Course & Slots since 2008.6 APPELLEES Jo Baia Foreman and Kenneth L. Roberts are named plaintiffs in the Petition, as previously discussed. In the February 18, 2020 order, the trial court named them as the other two class representatives. (Though, as previously mentioned, Mr. Lavergne and Mr. Hamilton are also class representatives, the phrase “Class Representatives” will hereinafter collectively refer to Mrs. Foreman and Mr. Roberts only). They signed the proposed settlement agreement and continue to support it based on their testimony before the trial court. Churchill Downs Louisiana Horseracing Company, L.L.C. (CDLHR), owns the Fair Grounds Race Course & Slots facility in New Orleans, Louisiana. It is a “licensed establishment” under the Video Draw Poker Devices Control Law. La. R.S. 27:401, et seq. Specifically, it qualifies as a licensed establishment because it 6 Louisiana Revised Statutes 27:438 relates to the “[d]istribution of device revenues” in quarter-horse and thoroughbred horse racing. 4 is a “Louisiana state racing commission licensed race track [and] pari-mutuel wagering facility.” La. R.S. 27:402(10). Churchill Downs Louisiana Video Poker Company, L.L.C. (CDLVPC), is a subsidiary or related business interest of CDLHR according to Plaintiffs’ Petition. It is a “device owner” under the Video Draw Poker Devices Control Law. La. R.S. 27:401, et seq. Specifically, it qualifies as a device owner because it “owns and operates . . . video draw poker devices in licensed establishments[,]” including at the CDLHR-owned Fair Grounds Race Course & Slots facility and at off-track waging facilities. La. R.S. 27:402(5). The Louisiana Horsemen’s Benevolent and Protective Association 1993, Inc. (HBPA), is “designated and recognized as an authorized representative that shall represent member and other horsemen racing at licensed race meetings held in the state of Louisiana for the purpose of but not limited to negotiating contracts for such horsemen with all racing associations licensed by the state of Louisiana, relative to purses . . . and all other matters of interest and concern to such horsemen.” La. R.S. 4:179.1. As noted previously, this matter consists of three consolidated appeals that are the result of protracted class action litigation that has come before this Court on multiple occasions. In Soileau v. Churchill Downs Louisiana Horseracing Co., L.L.C., 2017-1003, 2017-1004, pp.1-2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/13/18), 317 So.3d 491, 493-94, writ denied, 2018-1349 (La. 11/14/18), 256 So.3d 283, this Court observed: This lawsuit constitutes complicated and protracted litigation involving a dispute in the horse racing industry between ... [quarter-horsemen] and Churchill Downs Louisiana Horseracing Company, LLC, owner of the Fair Grounds Race 5 Course & Slots facility in New Orleans, and Churchill Downs Louisiana Video Poker Company, LLC. .... Soileau, et al. v. Churchill Downs Louisiana Horse Racing Co., LLC, et al., 17-0264, slip op. at pp. 1-2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/23/2017) (unpub.). The quarter-horsemen, Mr. Soileau, Mr. Brossette, Mr. Dehart, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Lavergne, Mr. Watson, Mr. Munacy, and Mr. Constantin, Mrs. Foreman, and Mr. Roberts (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) instituted the litigation by filing a “Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Permanent Injunction, and Damages - Class Action” on April 21, 2014.7 The Petition averred that Plaintiffs were owners, trainers, and jockeys of quarter-horses racing at the Fair Grounds and were entitled to payment of supplemental purse money pursuant to La. R.S. 27:438.8 Soileau, 7 Note that this Court is utilizing “Plaintiffs” when necessary to refer to all plaintiffs named in the Petition. In the instant appeal, however, Plaintiffs disagree on the proposed settlement at issue herein. That is, at this stage of the proceedings, some named Plaintiffs appear as Appellants, and other named Plaintiffs appear as Appellees. 8 Louisiana Revised Statutes 27:438 is titled “Distribution of device revenues; particular licensed establishments; pari-mutuel wagering facilities.” During the relevant time frame, La. R.S. 27:438 provided in pertinent part: A. The owner of the licensed establishment shall pay twenty percent of the net device revenue derived from the operation of devices at the licensed establishment to be used to supplement purses for horsemen as provided in subsection B of this Section. Such monies shall be made available for use as purses monthly, prior to the twentieth day of the month following the month in which they are earned. B. Revenues earned or purse supplements under subsection A shall be disbursed, accounted for, and used as follows: 1. Monies earned for purse supplements from devices located at a racing facility currently conducting live racing shall be in addition to all other monies currently provided for purses and purse supplements under other provisions of law and shall be used at the current race meeting. 6 2017-1003, p.5, 317 So.3d at 496. Louisiana Revised Statutes 27:438 requires a percentage of video poker net device revenue from off-track facilities to be set aside to supplement the purses issued to the top finishers in horse races. The April 21, 2014 Petition further contended that Fair Grounds Defendants disbursed the video poker revenue in favor of the owners of thoroughbred horses in violation of La. R.S. 27:438. The Petition claimed that Plaintiffs were entitled to the revenue from the end of the thoroughbred racing in March through the last day of quarter-horse racing in September, which constitutes approximately half of the revenue set aside for purses. By law, quarter-horse racing totals ten days in a fifty-two week period. In comparison, thoroughbred racing compromises at least eighty days. See La. R.S. 4:214.1(B). It is undisputed that all of the video poker revenue supplemented the purses of the thoroughbred races. Fair Grounds Defendants did not retain possession of the video poker revenues, rather, they sent the money to HBPA, and HBPA distributed the money to thoroughbred races. See La. R.S. 4:179.1 and 4:185. The parties further agreed the disputed video poker funds totaled $35,820,731.00. By their First Amended Petition filed on August 14, 2014, Plaintiffs added HBPA as a defendant. Therein they described HBPA as “organized, in part, to foster, protect, represent, and promote the welfare and common interest of 2. Monies earned for purse supplements from devices located at a racing facility not currently conducting live racing shall be placed in an interest-bearing account until the first day of the next live race meeting conducted at that facility, at which time the accumulated monies derived from this Paragraph shall be added to all other monies currently provided for purses and purse supplements at that race meeting under other provisions of the law and shall be used at that race meeting. 7 thoroughbred and quarter[-]horse owners and trainers to improve conditions in the horse racing industry and to improve the relationships between horsemen.” They further explained that “[m]embership in HBPA is open to those persons who are licensed owners and/or trainers of thoroughbred and/or quarter[-]racehorses meeting the minimum requirements established by the bylaws of HBPA and approved for membership by its board of directors.” Additionally, Plaintiffs noted in the First Amended Petition that they have all been members of HBPA since at least 2008 and that, upon information and belief, all members of the class are members of HBPA. Plaintiffs alleged in the First Amended Petition that “[t]o the extent that HBPA represented or purported to represent quarter[-]horsemen in negotiating purses allowing the payment of all La. R.S. 27:438 purse[] supplements to thoroughbred horsemen, then HBPA breached its statutory duty to represent the quarter[-]horsemen in good faith.” HBPA receives the purse funds from the various racetracks in Louisiana and distributes winnings to the owners, trainers, and jockeys. In response to the Petition, Fair Grounds Defendants filed an exception of primary jurisdiction, arguing that the trial court should transfer the matter to the Louisiana Racing Commission (“Commission”). The trial court agreed and transferred the matter to the Commission on December 2, 2014 because the Commission has regulatory and adjudicatory authority over all aspects of horseracing, which is a highly regulated industry. Soileau, unpub., 2017-0264, p.2.9 9 This Court denied Plaintiffs’ application for supervisory writs seeking review of the judgment granting the exception of primary jurisdiction. Soileau v. Churchill Downs Louisiana Horse Racing Co., L.L.C., unpub., 2014-1398, p.1 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/26/15). 8 Thereafter, this matter proceeded before the Commission, with the parties seeking review of several issues in the district court, as well as in this Court. Fair Grounds Defendants and HBPA filed exceptions of no right of action before the Commission. On August 24, 2015, the Commission granted the exceptions. Thereafter, on September 18, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a petition to appeal that administrative ruling of the Commission. The trial court heard the appeal and affirmed the Commission’s ruling. On December 18, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to this Court, and this Court remanded the matter for procedural corrections to the judgment, with which the trial court complied in an amended judgment dated September 15, 2017.10 On October 31, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a motion for devolutive appeal from the amended judgment, which the trial court granted on November 6, 2017. On June 13, 2018, this Court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that they did have a right of action to proceed against Fair Grounds Defendants and HBPA. See Soileau, 2017-1003, p. 9, 317 So.3d at 498. On February 28, 2019, Fair Grounds Defendants formally requested that the Commission set their previously-filed exception of nonjoinder for a hearing. The hearing occurred on June 24, 2019, and the Commission ultimately denied the exception. On July 24, 2019, Fair Grounds Defendants filed an appeal of this ruling. 10 The amended judgment states, in pertinent part: “The Court hereby amends the Judgment dated September 5, 2016 for typographical errors. The Court inadvertently omitted defendant Churchill Downs Louisiana Horseracing Company, LLC. Additionally, the date of the Judgment rendered incorrectly listed the year as 2016.” 9 On or about July 2, 2019, Fair Grounds Defendants advised Plaintiffs that all persons seeking a horse stall for the 2019 Quarter Horse Meet at the Fair Grounds would be required to execute a Stall Agreement that waived their claims in the lawsuit (hereinafter referred to as “2019 Stall Agreement”). On July 3, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a rule to show cause, in which they asked the Commission to set a hearing to enjoin Fair Grounds Defendants from requiring execution of the waiver in the 2019 Stall Agreement. They also asked the Commission to declare the waiver to be unenforceable. On July 22, 2019, the Commission held a hearing on the matter and ordered the waiver language to be stricken from the 2019 Stall Agreement. That same day, Fair Grounds Defendants filed a petition with another division of the trial court to reverse this ruling. They received a temporary restraining order, which temporarily prohibited the enforcement of the Commission’s July 22, 2019 order. On August 2, 2019, Plaintiffs and Fair Grounds Defendants jointly obtained an order from the trial court to stay the pending appeals of the two above-discussed matters, i.e., Fair Grounds Defendants’ appeal of the nonjoinder issue and of the 2019 Stall Agreement issue, pending further settlement discussions. On September 13, 2019, Plaintiffs, Fair Grounds Defendants, and HBPA met to discuss a potential settlement. On October 25, 2019, class counsel met with Plaintiffs to review the terms of the proposed settlement agreement. Soileau Plaintiffs objected to the proposed settlement agreement. Class counsel withdrew from representing Soileau Plaintiffs, and the trial court eventually signed an order enrolling new counsel for Soileau Plaintiffs on February 18, 2020.11 Class counsel 11 On February 18, 2020, the trial court signed an order enrolling Singletary & Associates, APLC, as counsel for Soileau Plaintiffs. 10 continued to represent those Plaintiffs who supported the proposed settlement agreement, namely Mrs. Foreman, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Lavergne, and Mr. Hamilton. The trial court eventually named them as representatives of the class in a February 18, 2020 order, and they ultimately executed the proposed settlement agreement. On January 23, 2020, all enrolled counsel12 filed a “Joint Motion to Set Court Dates for Class Certification and Related Relief,” and the trial court ordered a hearing to be held on February 18, 2020. On February 14, 2020, all enrolled counsel13 filed a “Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Agreement and for Related Relief.” In pertinent part, the proposed settlement agreement provided: 1) Quarter-horse races would receive 12.5% of the video poker purse proceeds at the Fair Grounds, up to a maximum of $1,000,000.00 per year; 2) $1,000,000.00 would be designated for the payment of “past due” claims (from 2008 through the present); the settlement of past due 12 This occurred prior to class counsel, Kelly & Townsend, LLC, and Corkern, Crews & Guillet, L.L.C., withdrawing from their representation of Soileau Plaintiffs and prior to the trial court enrolling new counsel for the Soileau Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Kelly & Townsend, LLC, and Corkern, Crews, and Guillet filed the motion on behalf of Soileau Plaintiffs and Mrs. Foreman, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Lavergne, and Mr. Hamilton. Carver, Darden, Koretzky, Tessier, Finn, Blossman & Areaux LLC filed the motion for Fair Grounds Defendants. Jones Walker, LLP, filed the motion for HBPA. 13 Again, this occurred prior to class counsel, Kelly & Townsend, LLC, and Corkern, Crews & Guillet, L.L.C., withdrawing from their representation of Soileau Plaintiffs and prior to the trial court enrolling new counsel for the Soileau Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Kelly & Townsend, LLC, and Corkern, Crews, and Guillet filed the motion on behalf of Soileau Plaintiffs and Mrs. Foreman, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Lavergne, and Mr. Hamilton. Carver, Darden, Koretzky, Tessier, Finn, Blossman & Areaux LLC filed the motion for Fair Grounds Defendants. Jones Walker, LLP, filed the motion for HBPA. 11 claims would be funded by 25% of the $1,000,000.00 video purse proceeds for the first four years, with the other 75% of video poker purse proceeds going to current races for purse supplements; 3) The Fair Grounds would add five extra race days for quarter-horses; 4) Quarter-horse races would receive 30% of the video poker proceeds at other Louisiana race tracks besides the Fair Grounds; and 5) The Fair Grounds would not enforce waivers contained in the 2019 Stall Agreement or in any other prospective stall agreement. Notably, the proposed settlement agreement contemplated the Louisiana Legislature amending current law to reflect this agreement.14 On February 18, 2020, Soileau Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the “Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Agreement and for Related Relief.” In the opposition, counsel for Soileau Plaintiffs requested additional time to respond to the “Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Agreement and for Related Relief.” Soileau Plaintiffs also filed a motion to substitute counsel. On the same day that Soileau Plaintiffs filed their opposition, February 18, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the “Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Agreement and for Related Relief.” After the hearing, the trial court executed an order granting the “Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Agreement.” The order certified the proposed class of quarter-horse owners, trainers, and jockeys who won purses at the Fair Grounds Race Course from January 1, 2008, and who claimed or could claim 14 By 2020 La. Acts No. 342, §2, the Louisiana Legislature passed the required amendment. Nonetheless, the amendment is contingent on a final judgment being rendered in this case. 12 entitlement to supplement purse funds from video poker revenue. The trial court named Mrs. Foreman, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Lavergne, as representatives of the class. The trial court ordered opt-out forms to be received by the HBPA by April 13, 2020; objection forms to be received by the clerk of court by April 3, 2020; and claim forms to be received by the HBPA by August 1, 2020. The trial court set a fairness hearing for April 27, 2020. According to counsel for Fair Grounds Defendants, all counsel received a copy of the February 18, 2020 order in open court. The notice of judgment for this order is dated November 12, 2020. On April 3, 2020, Soileau Plaintiffs filed a “Motion for Clarification, or in the Alternative, Motion for Continuance.” In their motion, Soileau Plaintiffs noted that Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards issued proclamations and that the Louisiana Supreme Court issued orders that extended certain legal deadlines in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In light of this, Soileau Plaintiffs requested that the trial court clarify all pending deadlines for the class, including those for opting out, objecting, and the submission of claims forms, i.e. to clarify whether those deadlines were affected by the Governor’s proclamations and the Louisiana Supreme Court’s orders. Alternatively, Soileau Plaintiffs requested a continuance of all deadlines “in order to maintain the same notice and evaluation periods between deadlines that were originally contemplated in establishing the Order.” Considering Soileau Plaintiffs’ motion, the trial court ordered the parties to participate in a telephone status conference on June 16, 2020. After the telephone conference, on June 18, 2020, the trial court issued a scheduling order, which provided: 13 1. The hearing on any dispositive motions or exceptions to the Second Amended Petition of Certain Plaintiffs for Damages is set for July 20, 2020 at 9:00 am. Dispositive motions and/or exceptions to be heard on this date must be filed by July 6, 2020 and any objections thereto filed by July 13, 2020. Churchill Downs Louisiana Horseracing Commission [sic] Company, LLC, Churchill Downs Louisiana Video Poker Company, LLC and Horsemen’s Benevolent and Protective Association have agreed to waive service of the Second Amended Petition. 2. The Fairness Hearing that had been scheduled for April 27, 2020 pursuant to this Court’s Order dated February 18, 2020 is reset to October 7-9, 2020 at 9:00 am. Though the scheduling order reset the fairness hearing from April 27, 2020, to October 7-9, 2020, it did not continue the other deadlines, such as the deadline to opt-out, object, or submit a claim. Soileau Plaintiffs did not seek review of the trial court’s failure to clarify the deadlines to opt-out, object, or submit claim forms, nor the trial court’s failure to grant the continuance in the alternative. On May 28, 2020, Soileau Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Petition. In the Second Amended Petition, Soileau Plaintiffs essentially requested that the trial court appoint them as class representatives and allow them to continue litigating the merits. The Second Amended Petition identified an identical class and set forth identical claims and damages. In response to the Second Amended Petition, HBPA and Fair Grounds Defendants separately filed exceptions of lack of procedural capacity, prematurity, and lis pendens, as well as a motion to strike. Soileau Plaintiffs filed an opposition to those exceptions, and Fair Grounds Defendants filed a reply in support of the exceptions. On July 22, 2020, the trial court granted the exceptions and dismissed the Second Amended Petition filed by Soileau Plaintiffs. Soileau Plaintiffs filed an application for supervisory writs regarding the July 22, 2020 judgment that dismissed their Second Amended 14 Petition. On September 16, 2020, this Court denied the writ application “as the trial court did not err.” On September 18, 2020, Soileau Plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate the February 18, 2020 order. On September 22, 2020, Hamilton Plaintiffs also filed a motion to vacate the trial court’s February 18, 2020 order. Though Hamilton Plaintiffs initially agreed to the proposed settlement agreement, signed the proposed settlement agreement, and were named by the trial court as representatives of the class, they eventually objected to the proposed settlement agreement. The trial court held a hearing on the motions to vacate on October 7, 2020, and ultimately denied the motions to vacate on November 12, 2020. Prior to the fairness hearing scheduled for October 7-9, 2020, Fair Grounds Defendants filed a brief in support of final approval of the proposed settlement agreement on September 21, 2020. Fair Grounds Defendants attached numerous exhibits to their brief and asserted that the factors outlined in La. C.C.P. art. 591 were met for class certification. Further, Fair Grounds Defendants contended the proposed settlement agreement was fair, reasonable, and adequate according to Reed v. General Motors Corporation, 703 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1983). Also on September 21, 2020, Soileau Plaintiffs and Hamilton Plaintiffs filed an “Objection to Fairness Hearing and Subject to that Objection Opposition to the Entry of Final Judgment on the Proposed Settlement.” They objected to the trial court holding a fairness hearing by asserting that the Governor’s Proclamations and the Supreme Court’s orders issued as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic required the trial court to issue new deadlines to opt-out, object, or submit a claim form. They also objected to the court holding a fairness hearing by claiming that the February 18, 2020 order was null due to a lack of service and contended that the 15 class notice was defective. Alternatively, Soileau Plaintiffs and Hamilton Plaintiffs argued the proposed settlement agreement was not fair, reasonable, or adequate. On September 22, 2020, class counsel filed a memorandum in support of the proposed settlement agreement on behalf of Class Representatives. Class counsel provided a background of the litigation and the numerous issues presented to the Commission, the trial court, and this Court. In support of the fairness of the proposed settlement agreement, class counsel indicated the parties fought numerous exceptions before the Commission, the trial court, and this Court and agreed to stay two issues while engaging in settlement negotiations, namely the issues of nonjoinder and the enforceability of the Fair Grounds’ 2019 Stall Agreement waivers. Further, class counsel noted the outcome of those two issues could affect the litigation. Class counsel outlined why they believed the proposed settlement agreement was fair, reasonable, and adequate. On September 22, 2020, HBPA filed a memorandum in support of the proposed settlement agreement by adopting the memorandum filed by class counsel. Fair Grounds Defendants filed a reply to Soileau Plaintiffs’ objection to the fairness hearing and opposition to the proposed settlement agreement. Fair Grounds Defendants submitted that if Soileau Plaintiffs truly believed in their claim, they would have opted out of the settlement and continued the litigation. Fair Grounds Defendants noted that, instead, Soileau Plaintiffs objected to the proposed settlement agreement. 16 FAIRNESS HEARING ON OCTOBER 7, 2020, AND NOVEMBER 17, 2020 The trial court conducted a fairness hearing on October 7, 2020, and November 17, 2020. During the fairness hearing, the trial court received both documentary and testimonial evidence. APPELLEES’ CASE IN CHIEF Documentary Evidence Presented by Appellees At the fairness hearing, Appellees introduced numerous exhibits into evidence. The exhibits numbered one through thirty-three and numbered forty-one through sixty-one included, in pertinent part, both completed and incomplete opt-in forms (also referred to as claim forms); both completed and incomplete opt-out forms; completed objection forms; and claim value calculations.15 15 The exhibits introduced into evidence include: 1. Exhibit #1: Completed Opt-In Forms (also referred to as claim forms) 2. Exhibit #2: Incomplete Opt-In Forms 3. Exhibit #3: Completed Objection Forms 4. Exhibit #4: Completed Opt-Out Forms 5. Exhibit #5: Incomplete Opt-Out Forms 6. Exhibit #6: Objector Claim Value Calculation, Brossette, Alvin, Owner 7. Exhibit #7: Objector Claim Value Calculation, Brossette, Alvin, Trainer 8. Exhibit #8: Objector Claim Value Calculation, Dehart, Justin, Owner 9. Exhibit #9: Objector Claim Value Calculation, Dehart, Justin, Trainer 17 10. Exhibit #10: Objector Claim Value Calculation, Connie Nobles and Guillory Bros., LLC (Lyle and Carl Guillory), Owner 11. Exhibit #11: Objector Claim Value Calculation, JLS Speed Horse Ranch Inc. (John Soileau), Owner 12. Exhibit #12: Objector Claim Value Calculation, M&D Racing Stables (Norris Davis & Levi Mays), Owner 13. Exhibit #13: Objector Claim Value Calculation, Manucy, Carly C., Owner 14. Exhibit #14: Objector Claim Value Calculation, Manucy, Joseph D., Trainer 15. Exhibit #15: Objector Claim Value Calculation, N V Racing (Norris Davis), Owner 16. Exhibit #16: Objector Claim Value Calculation, Watson, Donald R., Jockey 17. Exhibit #17: Objector Claim Value Calculation, Williams, Darrell, Owner 18. Exhibit #18: Incomplete Opt-Out Claim Value, Carter, III, James C., Owner 19. Exhibit #19: Incomplete Opt-Out Claim Value, Dugas, Carl, Owner 20. Exhibit #20: Completed Opt-Out Claim Value, Demouchet, Ricky Joseph, Trainer 21. Exhibit #21: Completed Opt-In Claim Value (Total for class) 22. Exhibit #22: No Form Objector Claim Value Calculation, Hamilton, John E., Jockey 18 23. Exhibit #23: No Form Objector Claim Value Calculation, Lavergne, Danny, Jockey 24. Exhibit #24: February 18, 2020 Mailing: Notice of Class Settlement 25. Exhibit #25: February and September 2020: Claimant Members Mailing List 26. Exhibit #26: February 27, 2020 Mailing Transaction Receipt 27. Exhibit #27: February 28, 2020 Mele Printing Invoice 28. Exhibit #28: Non-deliverable Returned Mail Envelopes (3) 29. Exhibit #29: August 2020 Mailing: Class Action Notice Regarding Date Change of #Fairness Hearing from April 27, 2020, to October 7, 2020 30. Exhibit #30: September 4, 2020 Mailing Transaction Receipt 31. Exhibit #31: September 4, 2020 Mele Printing Invoice 32. Exhibit #32: September 28, 2020 Administrator’s (HBPA’s) Report by Edwin J. Fenasci 33. Exhibit #33: Administrator’s (HBPA’s) Master Return Mail Log (Please note that the subsequent exhibits numbered 34 through 40 are not included in this list because they were proffered but not admitted.) 41. Exhibit #41: Fair Grounds 2019 Stall Application 42. Exhibit #42: 2015 Condition Book Exemplar 43. Exhibit #43: February 18, 2020 Order, which preliminarily approved a class settlement, a class, class representatives, class counsel, and deadlines to opt-out, object, and submit a claim form 19 44. Exhibit #44: February 14, 2020 Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 45. Exhibit #45: Spreadsheets: Reports of 20% of Video Poker Net Device Revenue for 2008 - 2019 (in globo) 46. Exhibit #46: July 2, 2014 Letter to Louisiana Racing Commission from Counsel for Fair Grounds and Excerpts of Commission’s October 21, 2014 Meeting (in globo) 47. Exhibit #47: August 13, 2018 Letter to Louisiana Racing Commission from Counsel for Fair Grounds and Excerpts of Commission’s August 28, 2018 Meeting (in globo) 48. Exhibit #48: May 23, 2019 Letter to Louisiana Racing Commission from Counsel for Fair Grounds and Excerpts of Commission’s June 19, 2019 Meeting (in globo) 49. Exhibit #49: August 20, 2020 Letter to Louisiana Racing Commission from Counsel for Fair Grounds 50. Exhibit #50: February 21, 2020 Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Louisiana Quarter Horse Breeders Association (LQHBA) 51. Exhibit #51: March 1, 2020 LQHBA Memorandum to Members 52. Exhibit #52: August 12, 2013 LQHBA Letter to Jeff Traylor, Audit Director, Louisiana State Police, Gaming Audit Section 53. Exhibit #53: November 26, 2013 LQHBA Letter to Tim Bryant, President, Fair Grounds 54. Exhibit #54: January 9, 2014 LQHBA letter to Stanley Seelig, HBPA 20 Testimonial Evidence Presented by Appellees Testimony of Ryan Robicheaux Ryan Robicheaux testified he is the current President of LQHBA and the owner of a quarter-horse breeding farm, including quarter-horses that race. Mr. Robicheaux testified he had been in the quarter-horse business for thirty-one years. He indicated he accepted the purse amount listed in the condition book prior to racing horses at the Fair Grounds between 2008 and 2019. Additionally, Mr. 55. Exhibit #55: October 12, 2018 LQHBA letter to Charles Gardiner, III, Executive Director, Commission 56. Exhibit #56: CDLHR Responses to Request for Admissions 57. Exhibit #57: CDLHR Responses to Interrogatories and Request for Production 58. Exhibit #58: CDLVPC Responses to Request for Admissions, Interrogatories, and Request for Production 59. Exhibit #59: HBPA Responses to Request for Admissions, Interrogatories, and Request for Production 60. Exhibit #60: Affidavit of Mr. Guillet (one of the attorneys who serves as class counsel). As of November 17, 2020, Mr. Guillet worked 1,020 hours providing legal services in this matter and paid approximately $11,597.78 for costs. 61. Exhibit #61: Affidavit of Mr. Townsend (one of the attorneys who serves as class counsel). As of November 17, 2020, Mr. Townsend worked 653 hours providing legal services in this matter and paid approximately $22,070.62 for costs. 21 Robicheaux testified that he understood the terms of the proposed settlement agreement and supported the proposed settlement agreement. Mr. Robicheaux claimed the addition of the supplemental 12.5% of video poker purse money would be very beneficial to quarter-horse breeding and racing in Louisiana. Further, he asserted the quarter horse-purses would increase by forty to fifty percent. During cross-examination, Mr. Robicheaux admitted he did not file a claim or opt-in to the proposed settlement agreement. Mr. Robicheaux noted he was aware that the disputed video poker funds totaled thirty-five million dollars. Testimony of Edwin Joseph Fenasci Edwin Joseph Fenasci, the current executive director of the HBPA, testified he worked in the racing industry for a total of thirty-eight years. He indicated HBPA is the appointed administrator in this case. Mr. Fenasci testified that the Louisiana Legislature tasked HBPA with handling the payout of purses from the four racetracks to the winners of all races (owners typically receive 80% of the purse, trainers 10%, and jockeys 10%). Further, he explained HBPA issues checks to the owners, trainers, and jockeys and thus maintains addresses. Mr. Fenasci identified Exhibit #25, a list of owners, trainers, and jockeys, along with their addresses, who won races at the Fair Grounds between 2008 and 2019. He noted that 3,567 notices of the proposed settlement agreement were mailed to the class on February 27, 2020, utilizing the information from Exhibit #25. Mr. Fenasci indicated that the United States Postal Service (hereinafter referred to as “USPS”) returned four notices as undeliverable16; that HBPA received 179 completed claim 16 Note that Mr. Fenasci testified that USPS returned four notices as undeliverable; but in the record before this Court, Exhibit #28 contains only three notices returned as undeliverable. 22 or opt-in forms; that HBPA received thirty-three incomplete claim or opt-in forms; and that HBPA received one complete opt-out form and two incomplete opt-out forms. Additionally, Mr. Fenasci noted the clerk of court received ten completed objection forms. As requested, Mr. Fenasci testified he performed various calculations. He calculated the value of the claim of the member who completed an opt-out form totaled $12,968.49. He further determined the value of the claims of the members submitting incomplete opt-out forms totaled $2,931.36. Mr. Fenasci also calculated the value of the claims of the members who submitted completed claim or opt-in forms totaled $4,610,062.00. Mr. Fenasci determined the total value of the claims of the ten members objecting to the proposed settlement agreement as follows:17 a) Mr. Brossette: $43,730.91.18 b) Mr. Dehart: $29,804.93.19 c) Lyle Guillory: $92,875.00.20 d) JLS Speed Horses (Mr. Soileau): $58,698.52.21 17 The total value of the claims of the ten members objecting to the proposed settlement agreement is $518,544.96. 18 Per Exhibit #6 (claim value for Mr. Brossette as an owner, $6,965.83) and Exhibit #7 (claim value for Mr. Brossette as a trainer, $36,765.08). 19 Per Exhibit #8 (claim value for Mr. Dehart as an owner, $2,840.64) and Exhibit #9 (claim value for Mr. Dehart as a trainer, $26,964.29). 20 Per Exhibit #10 (claim for Lyle and Carl Guillory, Guillory Bros., $0; claim for Dwayne J. Saucier and Lyle Guillory, $807.41; claim for Lyle Guillory, $66,562.97; claim for Lyle Guillory and Teddy Abrams, $22,922.22; claim for Lyle Guillory and John Soileau, $0; and Lyle Guillory, Teddy Abrams, Lou Phillips, and Darryl Williams, $2,582.40). 21 Per Exhibit #11 (Objector Claim Value Calculation, JLS Speed Horse Ranch Inc. (John Soileau), Owner). 23 e) M&D Racing Stables: $66,370.48.22 f) Carly Munacy: $0.00.23 g) Joseph Munacy: $34,916.03.24 h) NV Racing: $16,697.52.25 i) Donald R. Watson: $124,912.63.26 j) Darryl Williams: $51,538.94.27 Mr. Fenasci noted Mr. Hamilton, one of the class representatives who initially supported and signed the proposed settlement agreement, did not submit an objection form. Mr. Fenasci indicated that he was asked to calculate the value of Mr. Hamilton’s claim and determined the value was $363,414.46. Additionally, Mr. Fenasci explained that Mr. Lavergne, one of the other class representatives who initially supported and signed the proposed settlement agreement, did not submit an objection form. Mr. Fenasci explained that he was asked to calculate the value of Mr. Lavergne’s claim, which he determined to be $113,377.56. Mr. Fenasci identified the condition book for 2015, which the trial court admitted as Exhibit #42. Mr. Fenasci testified a condition book provides a road map for trainers so they know the requirements of the race, such as the age and/or 22 Per Exhibit #12 (Objector Claim Value Calculation, M&D Racing Stables (Norris Davis & Levi Mays), Owner). 23 Per Exhibit #13 (Objector Claim Value Calculation, Manucy, Carly C., Owner). 24 Per Exhibit #14 (Objector Claim Value Calculation, Manucy, Joseph D., Trainer). 25 Per Exhibit #15 (Objector Claim Value Calculation, N V Racing (Norris Davis), Owner). 26 Per Exhibit #16 (Objector Claim Value Calculation, Watson, Donald R., Jockey). 27 Per Exhibit #17 (Objector Claim Value Calculation, Williams, Darrell, Owner). 24 weight requirement for a horse to be eligible for participation, as well as the amount of the purse for that race and the source of the funds for the purse. He stated HBPA reviews the condition books before the track issues it and works with each track to insure they offer the races indicated therein. Further, Mr. Fenasci indicated that the Commission approves the condition book prior to issuance. Mr. Fenasci testified he attends Commission meetings in his capacity as executive director of HBPA. Mr. Fenasci stated he attended meetings wherein the Commission instructed the Fair Grounds to place the disputed video poker funds into the thoroughbred races. Mr. Fenasci testified that Exhibit #1 comprises all of the properly completed and timely submitted opt-in forms (also referred to as claim forms). He recalled classifying the claim form from Mrs. Foreman, one of the class representatives who approved the proposed settlement agreement, as timely. Mr. Fenasci indicated he checked every claim form carefully as they arrived and as the deadline to submit a claim neared, he checked the postmark to determine if a claim arrived timely. Mrs. Foreman’s claim form indicates she signed it on August 1, 2020, and HBPA received it on August 7, 2020. HBPA designated several claim forms received after August 1, 2020, as timely. The notice advised the class “THE CLAIM FORM MUST BE SUBMITTED (MAILED/POSTMARKED) NO LATER THAN AUGUST 1, 2020.” (Emphasis in original). In reviewing exhibit one, this Court notes Mrs. Foreman’s claim form indicates she signed it on August 1, 2020, and the HBPA received it on August 7, 2020. Mr. Fenasci designated her claim form filed timely. Exhibit #1 reveals HBPA designated several claim forms received after August 1, 2020, as timely. For instance, Anthony Arey submitted a claim form signed on 25 July 30, 2020, and it was received by HBPA on August 6, 2020. Frank Cavazos submitted a claim form signed June 6, 2020, and it was received by HBPA on August 7, 2020. Andrea G. Lematta submitted a claim form signed July 28, 2020, and it was received by HBPA on August 6, 2020. Daisy Sanchez submitted a claim form signed August 1, 2020, and it was received by HBPA on August 5, 2020. Noe R. Sanchez submitted a claim form signed August 1, 2020, and it was received by HBPA on August 5, 2020. HBPA designated the claim forms timely. Mr. Fenasci noted Mr. Roberts, one of the class representatives who approved the proposed settlement agreement, did not submit an individual claim form. However, Mr. Fenasci indicated Mr. Roberts is a partner/owner with other entities and that HBPA received claim forms on behalf of Mr. Roberts and Jumonville Farms, as well as JD&C Jumonville and Mr. Roberts. On cross-examination, Mr. Fenasci noted Mr. Jumonville signed the claim forms, not Mr. Roberts. On re-direct, Mr. Fenasci indicated HBPA received several claim forms for multi-owner accounts signed by a single owner. Also on cross-examination, Mr. Fenasci agreed Evangeline Downs distributes video poker proceeds to both quarter-horse and thoroughbred races, but noted the other tracks do not have poker machines. Mr. Fenasci testified he believed Evangeline Downs had quarter horse races in 1991 when the Louisiana Legislature passed the video poker statute, La. R.S. 27:438. He noted the Fair Grounds did not have set quarter horse races in 1991 except for Champion’s Day, when there might be a few quarter horse races on that particular day. Testimony of Bruce Salaid Bruce Salaid, the executive director of LQHBA, testified he had an understanding of the proposed settlement agreement and was present when 26 LQHBA passed a resolution supporting the proposed settlement agreement. He noted that on March 1, 2020, LQHBA issued a detailed letter to their members urging their 1,700 plus members to support the settlement. At the beginning and the end of the March 1, 2020 letter, LQHBA urged its members “*****PLEASE DO NOT OPT OUT OF SETTLEMENT*****.” In addition to the capitalization and red ink, LQHBA enlarged the font to distinguish the plea from the rest of the memorandum. Mr. Salaid indicated LQHBA raised the issue of video poker purse supplements beginning in 2013 and was very aware of the situation. Beginning in 2013, LQHBA sent letters to the State Police, the President of the Fair Grounds, HBPA, and the Commission claiming quarter-horsemen were entitled to a portion of the video poker proceeds from Fair Grounds Defendants. Mr. Salaid affirmed that LQHBA’s vote in support of the proposed settlement agreement was not a knee jerk reaction. Mr. Salaid indicated he has owned and raced quarter-horses since 1980- 1981. He stated that he personally looked forward to the additional purse money and additional race days, believing both were significant, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic. During cross-examination, Mr. Salaid acknowledged LQHBA knew the amount of the disputed purse funds totaled thirty-five million dollars. Mr. Salaid indicated LQHBA possessed a general idea of the attorneys’ fees included with the proposed settlement agreement. Further, Mr. Salaid noted LQHBA knew the proposed settlement agreement allowed the Fair Grounds to seek to move the quarter-horse races to another track, but noted the proposed settlement agreement provided the video poker supplemental purse money would transfer from the Fair Grounds to the receiving track. 27 Mr. Salaid acknowledged he was eligible to file a claim as an owner but that he had not filed a claim. Testimony of Kenneth Roberts Kenneth Roberts, who is a class representative, testified he is an owner and trainer of quarter-horses. Mr. Roberts indicated he understood the terms of the proposed settlement agreement. Further, Mr. Roberts stated he discussed the multi- owner claim with Mr. Jumonville and knew Mr. Jumonville was filing it. Mr. Roberts noted he intended to submit an individual claim form, though he was not sure if he did so. He acknowledged he would not participate in the million dollars for past claims in an individual capacity. Mr. Roberts indicated he still supported the proposed settlement agreement because it was not about him but about helping all horsemen. Mr. Roberts acknowledged it was alleged that thirty-five million dollars was owed for past claims, but he expressed a desire to move forward and believed the proposed settlement agreement was in the best interest of the quarter- horse racing industry. Finally, Mr. Roberts indicated he attended proceedings before the Commission and the district court and was aware Plaintiffs won some battles and lost some battles. Testimony of Jo Baia Foreman Jo Baia Foreman, a class representative, testified she owns quarter-horses. Mrs. Foreman expressed she understood the terms of the proposed settlement agreement. She indicated that she believed the proposed settlement agreement was the best solution for horsemen because she wants horseracing to continue in Louisiana. The trial court questioned Mrs. Foreman about her enthusiasm for the additional five days of racing at the Fair Grounds. Mrs. Foreman indicated that she has to pay a trainer to take her horse(s) to a track. Mrs. Foreman explained with 28 additional race days over several weeks, a horse could run twice, making it easier to justify the costs of getting the horse to the track. Mrs. Foreman indicated she attended many of the Commission meetings and was aware Plaintiffs won some battles and lost some battles during the litigation. She acknowledged the disputed past due claims are alleged to total just over thirty-five million dollars. However, Mrs. Foreman testified she supported the proposed settlement agreement because it provides certainty for the quarter-horse industry. Mrs. Foreman noted she executed a claim form on August 1, 2020, at the office of class counsel. She watched class counsel leave with her claim form in an envelope to deposit it in the mail. Mrs. Foreman stated that if HBPA denied her claim, she would still support the proposed settlement agreement because it was in the best interest of Louisiana horsemen. During cross-examination, Mrs. Foreman explained she lost her claim form and went to the office of class counsel to obtain another one. Mrs. Foreman indicated she never believed the class would receive the thirty-five million dollars and thought, instead, that they were fighting for the future of quarter-horse racing at the Fair Grounds. Testimony of Jason Boulet Jason Boulet indicated he is the senior director of racing at the Fair Grounds. Mr. Boulet testified that during the first one hundred and seventeen years of racing at the Fair Grounds, only thoroughbred horses raced there. Mr. Boulet indicated that, in 2008, the Louisiana Legislature added five quarter-horse race days and later increased the number of quarter-horse race days to ten. He noted the minimum number of thoroughbred race days is eighty. Mr. Boulet explained the 29 sources of purse funds are slots, video poker, and pari-mutuel wagering, or funds from individuals betting on the race. Mr. Boulet acknowledged that he attends Commission meetings and possessed personal knowledge of the Commission ordering the Fair Grounds to place disputed video poker funds into thoroughbred races. Further, he confirmed that the Fair Grounds paid purses pursuant to the Commission’s directive. Mr. Boulet acknowledged that the Fair Grounds sought the Commission’s direction in 2014 when Plaintiffs raised the issue because the video poker statute differs from the slot machine law. He noted the slot machine law specifically mandates seventy percent of revenue be paid to thoroughbred races and thirty percent of revenue be paid to quarter-horse races. Mr. Boulet explained that a condition book informs trainers and owners of the type of race and purse offered by the Fair Grounds. Mr. Boulet noted the first five horses to finish a race are entitled to purse funds. He explained that he never received a complaint about the purses paid to any quarter-horse owner, trainer, or jockey prior to the filing of suit. Mr. Boulet read the following waiver from the 2019 Fair Grounds Stall Agreement: Applicant does not have any claims against Fair Grounds and to the extent Applicant has any such claims, Applicant knowingly and voluntarily releases any such claims, including but not limited to any and all claims set forth in that certain suit John L. Soileau et al v. Churchill Downs Louisiana Horseracing Company, L.L.C. et al, filed as case no. 14-3873, Div. G, in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, and now pending with the Louisiana Racing Commission. Mr. Boulet testified approximately 550 - 600 horses were stabled in 2019 during quarter horse racing days at the Fair Grounds. He stated that all trainers and/or 30 owners of the 550 - 600 horses executed the 2019 Stall Agreement containing the waiver. Mr. Boulet explained that Fair Grounds Defendants intended to utilize the stall application containing the waiver in the future. On cross-examination, Mr. Boulet asserted his belief that applying La. R.S. 27:438 as suggested by Appellants would devastate the thoroughbred industry. He indicated such an application would result in the quarter-horse races receiving five and a half months of video poker purse supplemental funds for ten days of racing, doubling the purses of quarter-horse races, and removing significant funds from thoroughbred races. Further, Mr. Boulet contended the public interest in quarter- horse races is not at the same level as that of thoroughbred races. He testified that for every $100.00 placed in bets on races, less than $1.00 is placed on a quarter- horse race. Mr. Boulet asserted there is no real fan base because owners and their guests are the individuals attending quarter-horse races. Testimony of Arthur Morrell Arthur Morrell, who is Clerk of Criminal District Court for Orleans Parish, testified he previously served in the Louisiana Legislature. Mr. Morrell indicated he served in the Louisiana Legislature from 1984 through 2006 and authored, or co-authored, 99% of the horse bills passed during his tenure. He acknowledged he was a member of the Louisiana Legislature at the time of the passage of the bill regarding video poker purse supplements. In particular, Mr. Morrell indicated the bill came about after he purchased a horse farm and was approached by other horsemen who asked how the horse industry could be protected. Mr. Morrell testified that he “devised a couple of bills”, including the video poker purse supplement bill to keep the thoroughbred industry in existence by not allowing video poker machines at a racetrack unless some of the proceeds supplemented the 31 purses. Mr. Morrell noted the Fair Grounds did not conduct quarter-horse races at the time of the bill’s passage. Mr. Morrell indicated the intent of La. R.S. 27:438, which is titled “Distribution of device revenues; particular licensed establishments; pari-mutuel wagering facilities”, was to increase purses for thoroughbred races. Mr. Morrell explained that the video poker money generated by the enactment of the bill was for the meets in existence at the time of the creation of the bill. He noted that at the time of the passage of the bill the Fair Grounds only conducted thoroughbred horse races. Mr. Morrell noted a portion of the funds did go to the quarter-horse breeders’ award and that race received video poker funds, but quarter-horse races did not receive video poker funds. APPELLANTS’ CASE IN CHIEF Testimonial Evidence Presented by Appellants Testimony of Danny Lavergne Appellants called Danny Lavergne, who was a jockey from 1976 through 2016 when he retired. Mr. Lavergne testified that he won approximately 100 races at the Fair Grounds. He explained that he raced at the Fair Grounds between 2008 and 2016. Mr. Lavergne indicated some of the jockeys and trainers learned that the Fair Grounds Defendants withheld money that should have gone to quarter- horse races and placed the money into thoroughbred races. He recalled meeting once with a lawyer at the racetrack, but believed he had not spoken to a lawyer since. Mr. Lavergne did not know the names of the attorneys representing him previously and testified that he did not know he was a class representative. When asked about the proposed settlement agreement, Mr. Lavergne noted he got something in the mail and that Mr. Roberts suggested Mr. Lavergne should sign it, so he did. Further, Mr. Lavergne explained that he used to ride for Mr. Roberts and 32 believed Mr. Roberts had his best interests at heart. Mr. Lavergne admitted he did not read all of the proposed settlement agreement or ask a lawyer to review it, though he should have. He explained that he was now opposed to the proposed settlement agreement because he learned that the amount alleged to be owed was thirty-five million dollars. Additionally, Mr. Lavergne stated he spoke with Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Watson about the amount alleged to be owed and learned it was thirty-five million dollars. Mr. Lavergne indicated “[a]ll I want is what they said that they were supposed to do and so, what’s owed to me.” During cross-examination, Mr. Lavergne noted his signature appeared on the proposed settlement agreement. He agreed he did not opt-out of the settlement and did not file an objection to the proposed settlement agreement. Mr. Lavergne stated his problem with the proposed settlement agreement is that he would only get $250.00, according to his lawyer, Mr. Brandt, who represented him as of the day of the hearing. Mr. Lavergne did not know the value of his claim totaled $113,377.56. He recalled one or two meetings with Mr. Townsend (one of the attorneys who serves as class counsel) talking to a group that included Mr. Lavergne, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Watson. However, Mr. Lavergne did not recall participating in a telephone meeting to discuss the terms of the proposed settlement agreement. Testimony of Donald Watson Donald Watson, a jockey, testified he won quite a few races at the Fair Grounds. He testified when he won races at Evangeline Downs, Louisiana Downs, or Delta Downs, they would pay from video poker and slot machine revenue. Later, Mr. Watson indicated he did not know whether Louisiana Downs and Delta Downs included video poker revenue with their purse funds. Mr. Watson testified 33 that for what it cost him to come to New Orleans to race, it was not fair to be cheated out of his money. He noted that he missed weddings, funerals, and vacations being a jockey. Mr. Watson stated he wanted to continue the litigation. On cross-examination, Mr. Watson acknowledged additional racing days would be beneficial. Mr. Watson admitted he attended a meeting with an attorney at Evangeline Downs, another in Baton Rouge, and one Shreveport. Mr. Watson declared his objection to the proposed settlement agreement was that it was not fair to keep the money he worked for and that was supposed to be distributed by the Fair Grounds. He agreed the value of his claim totaled $124,912.63. Mr. Watson testified he was not told had he submitted a claim he would have received approximately $25,000.00. Testimony of Joseph Munacy Joseph Munacy, a horse trainer, testified he trained horses that ran at the Fair Grounds. He testified he did not like the million dollar settlement because he believed they should receive the money owed to them. Accordingly, Mr. Munacy expressed a desire to continue the litigation. During cross-examination, Mr. Munacy acknowledged he participated in several group meetings and that he had the opportunity throughout the litigation to discuss the case. Mr. Munacy testified he did not like the cap portion of the proposed settlement agreement. He noted he always believed the Fair Grounds should have more days of quarter-horse races. Further, Mr. Munacy stated that when he raced at the Fair Grounds between 2008 and 2014, he did not complain about the amount of the purses. Mr. Munacy indicated he reviewed the condition book for the purse amount and would see the source of the purse funds. He acknowledged his claim totaled $34,916.03. When informed that people were 34 receiving approximately twenty cents on the dollar if they submitted a claim form, Mr. Munacy testified more money should be in the settlement and “I think I should be entitled to what’s mine.” Testimony of Alvin Brossette Alvin Brossette, who was a jockey for thirty-eight years, testified he owned and trained quarter-horses for the last seven or eight years. He indicated by the time the Fair Grounds held quarter-horse meets in 2008, he trained horses that ran. Mr. Brossette noted after learning the Fair Grounds did not pay video poker proceeds to the quarter-horse industry, he instituted suit on behalf of the quarter- horse industry. Mr. Brossette testified he did not like the proposed settlement agreement because one million dollars for past claims was not enough when, according to his interpretation, the amount due was thirty-five million dollars. He advised he did not like the yearly amount being capped at one million dollars. Further, Mr. Brossette insisted he was not worried about what he might get individually but was fighting for the whole industry. During cross-examination, Mr. Brossette acknowledged receiving a condition book prior to a race that revealed the purse and the sources of funds for the purse. Mr. Brossette agreed he decided whether or not to enter a horse in a race based on the condition book and did not complain about the purse amount until 2014. On re-direct examination, he testified he learned of the terms of the proposed settlement agreement prior to October 2019 and participated in several settlement meetings. Mr. Brossette stated he knew the amount in dispute totaled thirty-five million dollars. Additionally, he indicated he had the opportunity to discuss the proposed settlement agreement with others. Mr. Brosette noted after the terms of 35 the proposed settlement agreement were revealed, some were in favor of the proposed settlement agreement and some were against it. REBUTTAL BY APPELLEES Jo Baia Foreman Rebuttal Testimony Appellees recalled Mrs. Foreman. Mrs. Foreman testified she participated in several meetings pertaining to the proposed settlement agreement. She indicated that in October 2019, she, Mr. Roberts, and Mr. Brossette attended a meeting in person with class counsel while Mr. Lavergne, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Munacy participated by telephone. Mrs. Foreman noted after the meeting, some were in favor of the proposed settlement agreement and some were against it. She also indicated she knew the amount in dispute potentially totaled thirty-five million dollars. Mrs. Foreman acknowledged that all Plaintiffs discussed the proposed settlement agreement amongst themselves to determine whether they supported it or not. POST-FAIRNESS HEARING BRIEFS The trial court granted the parties until December 18, 2020, to submit post- trial briefs. On December 18, 2020, Soileau Plaintiffs and Hamilton Plaintiffs submitted a “Post Hearing Brief in Support of Opposition to the Entry of Final Judgment on the Proposed Settlement [Agreement].” Also on December 18, 2020, Fair Grounds Defendants filed a “Post Trial Memorandum in Support of Final Approval of Class Action Settlement.” Mrs. Foreman and Mr. Roberts, as class representatives, submitted a “Post-Hearing Memorandum in Support of Settlement” on December 18, 2020. Pursuant to the trial court’s request, Mrs. Foreman and Mr. Roberts, in their capacity as Class Representatives, also filed a document titled “Proposed Findings of Fact and Relevant Procedural History.” 36 HBPA filed a “Motion and Incorporated Memorandum in Support to Join and Adopt the Post-Hearing Memorandum in Support of Settlement and Proposed Findings of Fact and Law,” i.e., to adopt the Post-Hearing Memorandum and Proposed Findings of Fact filed by Class Representatives, Mrs. Foreman and Mr. Roberts. Thereafter, on December 28, 2020, Soileau Plaintiffs and Hamilton Plaintiffs filed an objection to the “Motion for Final Approval of the Settlement Agreement,” which was filed by Class Representatives, Mrs. Foreman and Mr. Roberts; Fairgrounds Defendants; and HBPA. TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT AND REASONS FOR JUDGMENT On January 28, 2021, the trial court issued a final judgment, which granted final approval to the proposed settlement agreement, the class, the class representatives, the amount of the settlement, the payout procedure, and $787,500.00 as reasonable attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of expenses for class counsel. In the trial court’s written reasons for judgment, the trial court acknowledged the proposed settlement agreement was not perfect because no settlement is perfect. The trial court believed the proposed settlement agreement was in the best interests of all. The trial court indicated the need to add the thoroughbred defendants would lead to additional, years-long litigation at a considerable expense to all. Further, the trial court indicated it was not impressed with the testimony of the objectors. Appellants now seek review of the January 28, 2021 judgment, as well as the trial court’s November 12, 2020 denial of the Soileau Plaintiffs’ and Hamilton Plaintiffs’ motions to vacate; failure to reset deadlines in light of the Governor’s Proclamations and the Supreme Court’s Orders in response to the COVID-19 37 pandemic; and February 18, 2020 grant of the joint motion for preliminary approval of the proposed settlement agreement. For purposes of this Opinion, we will consider each consolidated appeal separately. DISCUSSION 2021-CA-0022: Appeal of the Trial Court’s Denial of the Motions to Vacate In this appeal, Appellants seek review of the trial court’s denial of their motions to vacate.28 The appellants assign three errors: [1]. The Trial Court erred in denying the [] Motion[s] to Vacate. [2]. The Trial Court erred in not resetting the deadlines as required by the Governor’s Proclamations and Supreme Court’s Orders in response to COVID-19. 3. The Class Notice is Defective.[29] Each of these assignments of error is discussed in turn. Jurisdiction of Moot Issue Prior to addressing the merits, we note that in this consolidated appeal Appellants seek review of the judgment, which denied their motions to vacate the judgment granting preliminary approval to the proposed settlement agreement and the judgment granting final approval of the proposed settlement agreement. In 28 Note that in their first assignment of error, Appellants state that “[t]he Trial Court erred in denying the Soileau Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate.” Soileau Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Vacate on September 18, 2020, and Hamilton Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Vacate on September 22, 2020. Though the assignment of error references only Soileau Plaintiffs’ motion, we consider the trial court’s denial of both motions in this section. 29 Appellants did not assign as error the argument regarding the class notice being defective. Appellants’ brief to this Court includes it as a major heading and designated the argument as number three. Appellees likewise designated their response as number three. For consistency, the Court will utilize the numbering of the parties. 38 2021-CA-0199, Fair Grounds Defendants contend that any objection to the judgment granting preliminary approval is moot because the trial court held a fairness hearing on the merits of the proposed settlement agreement and thereafter granted final approval to the proposed settlement agreement. In Edward v. Badie, in discussing whether an issue was moot, this Court indicated: The Louisiana Supreme Court provided that “[t]he jurisprudence of this Court is well settled that courts will not decide abstract, hypothetical or moot controversies, or render advisory opinions with respect to such controversies.” Cat’s Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans Through Dep’t of Fin., 98-0601, p.8 (La. 10/20/98), 720 So. 2d 1186, 1193. Further, an issue is “moot” when a judgment or decree on that issue has been “deprived of practical significance” or “made abstract or purely academic.” Perschall v. State, 96-0322 (La. 7/1/97), 697 So.2d 240; Louisiana Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc.[v. State Through Div. of Admin., Office of State Purchasing], 669 So.2d [1185] at 1193 [ (1996) ]; American Waste & Pollution Control Co. [v. St. Martin Parish Police Jury], 627 So.2d [158] at 162 [ (1993) ]. A case is “moot” when a rendered judgment or decree can serve no useful purpose and give no practical relief or effect. Robin [v. Concerned Citizens for Better Ed. in St. Bernard, Inc.], 384 So.2d [405] at 405 [(1980)]. If the case is moot, then “‘there is no subject matter on which the judgment of the court can operate.’” St. Charles Parish Sch. Bd. [v. GAF Corp.], 512 So.2d [1165] at 1171 [ (1987) ] (citing Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 20 S.Ct. 673, 44 L.Ed. 813 (1900)). That is, jurisdiction, once established, may abate if the case becomes moot. Id. 2019-0332, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/28/19), 282 So.3d 269, 270-71. In the case sub judice, an argument exists that any claim pertaining to the judgment granting preliminary approval is moot because the trial court issued a final judgment approving the settlement. Similarly, any objection to the order granting preliminary approval to the class and the proposed settlement agreement 39 ceased to exist upon rendition of the final judgment. The joint motion for preliminary approval served as a procedural vehicle to obtain court approval of the notice to be disseminated to the class. The notice issued to the class informed the class of the terms of the proposed settlement agreement; their opportunity to opt- out, object, or opt-in; and the date of the fairness hearing. The final judgment approving the class and the proposed settlement agreement occurred after the issuance of the notice and the opportunity to present testimony and evidence at the fairness hearing. A decision by this Court pertaining to the order granting preliminary approval would be deprived of practical significance because there is a final judgment granting approval of the class and the proposed settlement agreement. We note the appeals appeared in a unique procedural posture because appellate courts typically review an objection to an order granting preliminary approval prior to the fairness hearing. See, e.g., Pollard v. Alpha Tech., 2010- 0788, p. 53 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/12/11), 102 So.3d 71, 106 (wherein this Court reversed the trial court’s judgment granting preliminary approval of a class settlement prior to the trial court holding a fairness hearing). Herein, Appellants sought review of the order granting preliminary approval in such close proximity to the request to review the final judgment that this Court consolidated the appeals. Nonetheless, appeals are favored by law. Alexander v. La. State Bd. of Private Investigator Exam’rs, 2019-0778, p. 20 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/1/20), 293 So.3d 1243, 1256, writ denied, 2020-01072 (La. 11/10/20), 303 So.3d 1039. Further, an appellant is entitled to seek review of all adverse interlocutory rulings prejudicial to him when taking an unrestricted appeal from a final judgment. Elysian, Inc. v. Neal Auction Co., 2020-0674, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/21/21), 325 So.3d. 1075, 40 1083. Thus, we consider the assignments of error pertaining to the preliminary order and do not deem them moot. Jurisdiction to Consider the November 12, 2020 Judgment Prior to addressing the merits of Appellants’ argument, the Court notes that Fair Grounds Defendants and Class Representatives assert the November 12, 2020 judgment denying the motions to vacate is interlocutory and not appealable. “A judgment that does not determine the merits but only preliminary matters in the course of the action is an interlocutory judgment. A judgment that determines the merits in whole or in part is a final judgment.” La. C.C.P. art. 1841. Notably, “an interlocutory judgment is appealable only when expressly provided by law.” La. C.C.P. art. 2083(C). In this instance, the November 12, 2020 judgment denying the motions to vacate determined preliminary matters and not the merits. Further, there is no law that expressly provides the right to appeal the denial of a motion to vacate. Thus, the proper procedural vehicle to seek review of an interlocutory judgment is by the filing of an application for supervisory writs. Sullivan v. Malta Park, 2016-0875, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/31/17), 215 So.3d 705, 708; see also Narcise v. Jo Ellen Smith Hosp., 98-2417, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/10/99), 729 So.2d 748, 751 (wherein this Court noted the plaintiffs filed an application for supervisory writs asking this Court to consider the merits of the trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate). Nonetheless, while an interlocutory judgment may not itself be immediately appealable, it is nevertheless subject to review by an appellate court when an appealable judgment is rendered in the case. Elysian, Inc., 2020-0674, p. 9, 325 So.3d. at 1083 (citing People of the Living God v. Chantilly Corp., 251 La. 943, 947-48, 207 So.2d 752, 753 (1968)). “When an unrestricted appeal is taken from a 41 final judgment, the appellant is entitled to seek review of all adverse interlocutory rulings prejudicial to him, in addition to the review of the final judgment.” Id. (quoting Wimsatt v. City of New Orleans, 2019-0461, p. 7, n. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/20/19), 286 So.3d 1217, 1223). Appellants were not entitled to appellate review of the November 12, 2020 judgment denying the motions to vacate at the time of the lodging of the appeal in this Court on January 15, 2021, because the judgment was interlocutory. On January 28, 2021, the trial court rendered a final judgment in this matter. Appellants sought an unrestricted appeal of the final judgment, and this Court ordered consolidation of the appeals.30 Thus, this Court will review the interlocutory judgment, which denied the motions to vacate, as part of the unrestricted appeal of the final judgment rendered on January 28, 2021. STANDARD OF REVIEW Appellate courts review the denial of a motion to vacate under an abuse of discretion standard. Narcise, 98-2417, p.9, 729 So.2d at 753. Assignment of Error No. 1 – Denial of the Motions to Vacate The motions to vacate requested that the trial court vacate the February 18, 2020 order granting preliminary approval of the settlement agreement. Appellants set forth several arguments to support the assertion that the trial court erred in denying the motions to vacate. 30 The Court consolidated the cases after the parties filed separate briefs in 2021- CA-0022 and 2021-CA-0049. The parties thereafter filed separate briefs in 2021- CA-0199. There is some overlap in the assignments of error and/or arguments in support thereof. The Court will address the issues raised in the various appeals separately while omitting detailed discussion of the similar assignments and/or arguments. 42 Applicability of La. C.C.P. art. 2002 Appellants first contend the preliminary order is null pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 2002(A)(2). That provision states: A final judgment shall be annulled if it is rendered against a defendant who has not been served with process as required by law and who has not waived objection to jurisdiction, or against whom a valid final default judgment has not been taken. Appellants aver that Appellees failed to serve them with a copy of the “Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Agreement and for Related Relief.” Thus, Appellants contend the February 18, 2020 preliminary order is null. In their Appellee brief, Fair Grounds Defendants first contend the specific articles governing class actions do not require a contradictory hearing to approve a preliminary settlement. Fair Grounds Defendants aver La. C.C.P. art. 594, which pertains to “[d]ismissal or compromise” of a class action, requires the court to hold a fairness hearing after notice of the proposed settlement has been provided to the class. In support, Fair Grounds Defendants cite Pollard. Therein, this Court acknowledged that pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 594(B), a formal hearing is not required until after preliminary approval and notice of the compromise has been provided to the class. Pollard, 2010-0788, p. 5, 102 So.3d at 76. Fair Grounds Defendants further cite Kent A. Lambert, Class Action Settlements in Louisiana, 61 LA. L. REV. 89, 125 (2000) (noting preliminary approval of a settlement is often granted with no formal hearing, even at the federal level). Fair Grounds Defendants also aver La. C.C.P. art. 2002 is not applicable. They note that the February 18, 2020 order granting preliminary approval of the settlement is not a final judgment. 43 Similarly, Class Representatives note that Appellants received notice of the February 18, 2020 hearing in a letter dated January 29, 2020, and sent via Federal Express. Class Representatives aver that Appellants obtained new counsel; new counsel appeared at the February 18, 2020 hearing; new counsel argued against granting preliminary approval of the settlement; and new counsel did not object to a lack of service during the February 18, 2020 hearing. We agree the February 18, 2020 order determined preliminary matters and not the merits. Hence, the February 18, 2020 order is interlocutory. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2002 applies to final judgments. Thus, Appellants’ contention that La. C.C.P. art. 2002 applies is misplaced. Additionally, La. C.C.P. art. 2002 provides that a final judgment shall be annulled if rendered “[a]gainst a defendant who has not been served with process as required by law and who has not waived objection to jurisdiction.” La. C.C.P. art. 2002(A)(2). In Washington v. Landry’s Seafood House New Orleans, Inc., the plaintiff claimed the defendant did not properly serve him with a motion. 2014- 0128, p. 4, n. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/19/14), 154 So.3d 677, 680. This Court determined that the objection to service was voluntarily waived because the plaintiff made a general appearance and argued the merits of the motion. Id. Two Appellants, Mr. Watson and Mr. Brossette, appeared at the February 18, 2020 hearing with counsel. Counsel for Appellants argued the merits of the motion. At no point did counsel for Appellants object due to a lack of service. Rather, counsel for Appellants first requested additional time to prepare for the fairness hearing. Next, counsel for Appellants indicated that he would require two days to present evidence at the fairness hearing. Appellants voluntarily waived the right to object to a lack of service when they made a general appearance, argued 44 the merits, and did not object to a lack of service. See Washington, 2014-0128, p. 4, n. 4, 154 So.3d at 680. This argument lacks merit. Applicability of La. C.C.P. art. 1312 Appellants next cite La. C.C.P. art. 1312, which states that “every pleading subsequent to the original petition shall be served on the adverse party as provided by [La. C.C.P. arts.] 1313 or 1314.” Appellants aver that class counsel, Fair Grounds Defendants, and HBPA filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of class settlement. Appellants submit that Appellees did not request service on Appellants, an adverse party. Appellants contend that Appellees failed to comply with La. C.C.P. art. 1312. In their briefs, Appellees again note counsel for Appellants appeared on February 18, 2020, and argued the merits of the motion. Appellees contend that counsel for Appellants did not object due to a lack of service. Thus, Appellees conclude that Appellants waived the right to object to a lack of service. As indicated above, Appellants and their counsel appeared at the February 18, 2020 hearing and did not object to a lack of service. Rather, counsel for Appellants argued the merits and participated fully in the hearing. Thus, Appellants voluntarily waived the right to object to a lack of service when they made a general appearance, argued the merits, and did not object to a lack of service. See Washington, 2014-0128, p. 4, n. 4, 154 So.3d at 680. This argument lacks merit. Applicability of La. C.C.P. art. 963 Appellants further cite La. C.C.P. art. 963, which is titled “Ex parte and contradictory motions; rule to show cause.” Louisiana code of Civil Procedure Article 963 provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]f the order applied for by written 45 motion is one to which the mover is not clearly entitled, or which requires supporting proof, the motion shall be served on and tried contradictorily with the adverse party.” Appellants suggest that Appellees, as the movers, were not clearly entitled to the relief sought in the joint motion. Appellants contend that Appellees were required to serve the adverse parties and try the motion contradictorily. Appellants aver that they were not served with the joint motion and that the trial court should have thus vacated the February 18, 2020 order. In their briefs, Appellees again note counsel for Appellants appeared on February 18, 2020, and argued the merits of the motion. Appellees contend counsel for Appellants did not object due to a lack of service. Thus, Appellees conclude that Appellants waived the right to object to a lack of service. This Court has acknowledged that a formal hearing is not required until after preliminary approval and notice of the settlement has been sent to the class. In Pollard, this Court quoted from the trial court’s reasons for judgment as follows: The two-step approach for approval of a settlement class is laid out in Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 248 F.R.D. 434, 438-439 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Armstrong v. B. Of School Dirs., 616 F.2d 305, 314 (7th Cir. 1980), overruled on other grounds by Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998); In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 564 F.Supp. 1379, 1384 (D.Md. 1983); Horton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 855 F.Supp. 825, 827 (E.D. N.C. 1994). First, the Court issues a preliminary approval of the settlement, where the court reviews the proposed settlement for obvious deficiencies, schedules a fairness hearing, and provides the class with notice of the proposed settlement and hearing. Second, the court considers the final approval of the proposed settlement at a formal fairness hearing during which arguments and evidence are presented in support of and in opposition to the proposed settlement. On a motion for preliminary approval the Court need only ascertain whether there is “probable cause” to notify the class members of the proposed settlement and to proceed with a fairness hearing. Mid-Atlantic Toyota, 564 F.Supp. at 1384. When making the preliminary determination of fairness of the settlement, the standard is 46 not whether the settlement was the best of all possible deals, but rather, “whether it is fair, adequate, and free from collusion.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 (96 Cir, 1988) [(9 Cir.1998)]. When a proposed settlement appears to fall within the range of possible approval, it is appropriate to issue preliminary approval and direct notice to members of the settlement class. Horton, 855 F.Supp. [825] at 827. Pollard, 2010-0788, pp. 4-5, 102 So.3d at 75-76. In this instance, the trial court complied with the two-step approach. The trial court reviewed the proposed settlement agreement, granted preliminary approval of the settlement class, and ordered notice of the proposed settlement agreement be provided to the class. The trial court ordered the notice inform the class of the deadline to opt-out, object, and submit a claim form, as well as the date of the fairness hearing. The trial court held a formal fairness hearing on October 7, 2020, and November 17, 2020, during which the parties presented testimony and evidence in support of, and in opposition to, the proposed settlement agreement. The Pollard Court further noted that Louisiana courts refer to cases interpreting the federal class action statute because the Louisiana class action statute is largely derived from the federal class action statute, which is codified at Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 2010-0788, p. 11, 102 So.3d at 79-80. Federal courts often grant preliminary approval of a class settlement with no formal hearing, much less notice to any named plaintiff who objected to the settlement. See Kent A. Lambert, Class Action Settlements in Louisiana, 61 LA. L. REV. 89, 125 (2000). Appellants’ argument that La. C.C.P. art. 963 applied, thereby requiring service of the joint motion and a contradictory hearing, is misplaced. Significantly, to the extent that La. C.C.P. art. 963 applied, class counsel and the trial court complied. Class counsel informed the named plaintiffs of the terms 47 of the proposed settlement agreement in October 2019. Class counsel provided notice of the hearing date to the named plaintiffs objecting to the proposed settlement agreement. Counsel for Soileau Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the joint motion; appeared at the February 18, 2020 hearing; and argued against the granting of the joint motion for preliminary approval at the hearing. Additionally, counsel for Soileau Plaintiffs requested a thirty-day extension to file an opposition to the joint motion. Counsel for Soileau Plaintiffs also did not object to a lack of service. Counsel for Soileau Plaintiffs noted that Fair Grounds Defendants and HBPA had not filed an answer. Further, Counsel for Soileau Plaintiffs provided he would require two days to present evidence at the fairness hearing. Class counsel and counsel for Fair Grounds Defendants set forth reasons to move forward with setting dates to opt-out, object, and submit a claim form. The trial court clearly held a contradictory hearing as contemplated by La. C.C.P. art. 963. This argument lacks support. Applicability of White v. White Appellants cite this Court’s decision in White v. White, 398 So.2d 1257 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1981). Therein, this Court declared a judgment of contempt, which imposed both a fine and a jail term, to be absolutely null because the record reflected no service and no evidence the appellant received notice of the proceeding. White, 398 So.2d at 1259. Appellants contend the February 18, 2020 order is likewise an absolute nullity. In their briefs, Appellees again note that counsel for Appellants appeared on February 18, 2020, and argued the merits of the motion. Appellees contend that counsel for Appellants did not object due to a lack of service. Thus, Appellees conclude that Appellants waived the right to object to a lack of service. 48 We find the facts in White are distinct from those found herein. In White, the wife filed a rule for contempt and requested service on the husband via the long-arm statute. White, 398 So.2d at 1258. At the hearing, the wife and her counsel appeared, but the husband did not. Id. The trial court granted the rule for contempt, imposed a fine on the husband, and sentenced him to a jail term. Id. This Court determined: [A] judgment rendered against a defendant who has not been served with process and who has not entered a general appearance is an absolute nullity. C.C.P. 2594, 2002(2), Thompson v. Courville, 372 So.2d 579 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1979). Since the record reflects no service whatsoever in this matter, and since there is no evidence of appellant being given notice of the summary proceedings set for October 12, 1979, then the judgment based on this hearing and rendered on October 17, 1979 is an absolute nullity. Id., 398 So.2d at 1259. Unlike White, the record herein reflects service of the hearing date. Also, unlike White, the judgment herein is not an appealable judgment.31 Additionally, unlike White, Appellants voluntarily waived an objection regarding service by making a general appearance and arguing the merits of the joint motion without objection. Thus, Appellants’ reliance upon White is misplaced. Applicability of Louisiana District Court Rule 9.8 Appellants lastly contend the hearing on the joint motion violated Rule 9.8 of the Louisiana District Court Rules. The pertinent part of La. Dist. Ct. Rule 9.8 states: In cases other than juvenile and family law proceedings, no hearing on an exception or motion will be scheduled until at least fifteen calendar days after filing. A party seeking to have an exception or motion heard less than fifteen days after filing shall show 31 A judgment imposing sanction for contempt is a final judgment subject to appeal pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(A)(6). 49 good cause and shall state in the exception or motion the reasons why an expedited hearing is necessary. Rule 9.8(c), La. Dist. Ct. Rules. Appellants assert the trial court erred in holding a hearing on February 18, 2020, because the parties filed the joint motion on February 14, 2020, which was fewer than fifteen days before the hearing. Appellants contend this violates procedural due process. Appellants did not cite to any law or jurisprudence in support of the assertion of procedural due process. In their briefs, Appellees again note counsel for Appellants appeared on February 18, 2020, and argued the merits of the motion. Appellees also contend counsel for Appellants did not object due to an alleged violation of La. Dist. Ct. Rule 9.8. Thus, Appellees conclude that Appellants waived the right to object. As we previously noted, Class Representatives and Fair Grounds Defendants filed the joint motion to set hearing dates for class certification and related relief on January 23, 2020. The trial court set a hearing for February 18, 2020. On January 29, 2020, class counsel notified Appellants of the February 18, 2020 hearing date by letter sent via Federal Express. Appellants filed an opposition to the joint motion for preliminary approval of class settlement, appeared at the hearing, participated in the hearing, and did not object to a violation of La. Dist. Ct. Rule 9.8. Admittedly, the parties filed the joint motion for preliminary approval on February 14, 2020, which was four days before the February 18, 2020 hearing. However, Appellants suffered no prejudice due to the alleged violation of La. Dist. Ct. Rule 9.8. See In re Succession of Benoit, 2014-0546, p. 4, n. 1 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/25/14),165 So.3d 1017, 1018 (wherein the appellant asserted a lack of sufficient 50 notice to defend against a summary judgment and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal determined the appellant was not prejudiced because she filed an opposition to the motion, including three supporting affidavits). As noted, counsel for Soileau Plaintiffs filed an opposition, appeared at the hearing, and participated in the hearing. While counsel for Soileau Plaintiffs requested additional time to prepare for the fairness hearing, counsel then indicated he would require two days to present evidence at the fairness hearing. Appellants failed to demonstrate any prejudice due to the alleged violation of La. Dist. Ct. Rule 9.8. This argument lacks support. Assignment of Error No. 2 – The Trial Court Erred in Not Resetting Deadlines Due to COVID-19. Pursuant to the crisis imposed by COVID-19, Governor Edwards issued a public health emergency declaration on March 11, 2020. 25 JBE 2020. In connection therewith, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued an order dated March 20, 2020, continuing all civil trial, hearings, and court appearances set between the date of the order and April 13, 2020. Appellants contend the Governor’s Proclamations and the Supreme Court’s orders required the rescheduling of the deadlines (to opt-out or object to the proposed settlement agreement) contained in the February 18, 2020 preliminary order. Appellants aver the time between the receipt of the notice and the time to respond was impacted because the deadlines occurred during the declared state of emergency. Appellants contend any resulting hearing or order violated the due process rights of the entire class. However, Appellants did not cite to any law or jurisprudence in support of the assertion of a violation of due process rights. 51 In their brief, Fair Grounds Defendants explain that Appellants filed a motion for clarification concerning the deadlines, and, in response, the trial court set a telephone status conference. During the telephone status conference, the trial court accommodated the request of Appellants to reschedule the fairness hearing to October 7 - 9, 2020. Fair Grounds Defendants contend that counsel for Appellants did not raise the deadlines to opt-out, object, or submit a claim form due to COVID-19, or otherwise, during the telephone status conference. Further, Fair Grounds Defendants aver that the plain language of the Governor’s Proclamations and the Supreme Court orders did not supersede or vacate any deadline. Rather, Fair Grounds Defendants contend the Governor’s Proclamations and the Supreme Court’s orders extended certain legal deadlines. Fair Grounds Defendants note that during the 2020 legislative session, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Louisiana Act 162, which extended all legal deadlines impacted by the Governor’s Proclamations to July 6, 2020. 32 Fair Grounds Defendants submit the Supreme Court’s orders did not vacate the deadlines to opt-out or object. The Supreme Court’s March 20, 2020 order addressed “civil trials, hearings and court appearances.” The Supreme Court’s April 6, 2020 order continued jury trials and non-emergency in person-proceedings scheduled prior to May 4, 2020, to a date to be reset by trial court order. Fair Grounds Defendants note the only trial, hearing, or court appearance contained in the February 18, 2020 order was the fairness hearing, which was originally scheduled for April 27, 2020, but reset for October 7 - 9, 2020 (and ultimately held on October 7, 2020, and November 17, 2020). 32 2020 La. Acts 162 was codified as La. R.S. 9:5828 - 5830. 52 Lastly, Fair Grounds Defendants contend that Appellants lack standing to raise lack of due process as to this issue. Fair Grounds Defendants note that new counsel represented Appellants and filed objections to the proposed settlement agreement. Appellants did not opt-out of the proposed settlement agreement. Fair Grounds Defendants avow the Governor’s Proclamations and/or the Supreme Court’s orders did not confuse Appellants because they timely filed objections to the proposed settlement agreement. Further, Appellants fully participated in the full trial on the fairness of the proposed settlement agreement. Fair Grounds Defendants aver that Appellants may not now claim confusion to an order after fully complying with the order. Likewise, Class Representatives argue that Appellants misconstrue the Governor’s Proclamations and the Supreme Court’s orders pertaining to COVID- 19. Class Representatives aver that the Governor’s Proclamations and the Supreme Court’s orders extended deadlines, not vacated deadlines. This Court first notes that the February 18, 2020 order required class members to opt-out by April 13, 2020, and to object by April 3, 2020. The individual Appellants filed their objections to the proposed settlement agreement timely and failed to present evidence that a single member of the class suffered confusion about the deadlines due to the Governor’s Proclamations or the Supreme Court’s orders. Turning to the language contained in the Governor’s Proclamation itself, the Proclamation notably declared that legal deadlines were “suspended.”33 The Supreme Court ordered that all civil trials, hearings, and court appearances were 33 See 30 JBE 2020; 84 JBE 2020. 53 continued and would be re-set.34 Further, the Louisiana Legislature codified the Governor’s Proclamations and proclaimed: All prescriptions, including liberative, acquisitive, and the prescription of nonuse, abandonment periods, and all peremptive periods shall be subject to a limited suspension or extension during the time period of March 17, 2020, through July 5, 2020; however, the suspension or extension of these periods shall be limited and shall apply only if these periods would have otherwise expired during the time period of March 17, 2020, through July 5, 2020. The right to file a pleading or motion to enforce any right, claim, or action which would have expired during the time period of March 17, 2020, through July 5, 2020, shall expire on July 6, 2020. La. R.S. 9:5829(A). This Court discussed La. R.S. 9:5829(A) in American Global Insurance Co., v. 4503 Prytania Street, L.L.C., 2020-0438 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/4/21), __ So.3d __, 2021 WL 1399742. Therein, this Court determined that “the statutory language [of La. R.S. 9:5829(A)] is clear and unambiguous. All deadlines were subject to a ‘limited suspension or extension until July 6, 2020.’ Thus, any deadline that would have expired between March 17, 2020 and July 5, 2020, expired July 6, 2020.” American Global Ins. Co., 2020-0438, p. 3, 2021 WL 1399742 at *2. The Governor’s Proclamations and La. R.S. 9:5829(A) did not vacate any deadlines. Pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language contained in La. R.S. 9:5829(A) and American Global, the deadlines to opt-out or object contained in the February 18, 2020 order, which are deadlines that would have expired between March 17, 2020, and July 5, 2020, expired July 6, 2020. 35 Further, the deadlines to submit opt-out or objection forms did not contemplate a court hearing, trial, or the like. Thus, the Supreme Court’s orders did not affect the deadlines contained in 34 See La. Sup. Ct. Orders dated March 16, 2020, and March 20, 2020. 35 The Governor’s Proclamations and La. R.S. 9:5829(A) did not impact the August 1, 2020 deadline to mail a claim form. 54 the February 18, 2020 order. The Supreme Court’s orders affected the date of the fairness hearing. The trial court properly reset the fairness hearing by order. The Court is cognizant that USPS continued mail service throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. The February 18, 2020 order set the deadline to file an objection for April 3, 2020. On April 2, 2020, Appellants all filed objections timely. Appellants failed to present evidence that any class member encountered difficulties in receiving or sending mail. Appellants did not cite any authority for the assertion of a violation of the due process rights of the members of the class. Considering the importance of the due process right guaranteed by both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions, we will briefly address the issue. This Court discussed due process in the context of a class action and noted: “Adequate notice is one of the most elementary requirements of procedural due process.” Vincent v. Vincent, 2011-1822, p.13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/30/12), 95 So.3d 1152, 1161. “Adequate notice given must be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and to afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, “procedural due process requires an opportunity to be heard.” Miller v. Crescent City Health Care Ctr., 2011-0403, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/9/11), 78 So.3d 219, 221 (citation omitted). Claborne v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 2014-1050, pp. 25-26 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/15/15), 165 So.3d 268, 288. As indicated earlier, the racing industry is highly regulated by the Commission. In accordance with laws, regulations, and rules, Fair Grounds Defendants provide money to HBPA and HBPA pays the owners, trainers, and jockeys who win quarter-horse and thoroughbred races. HBPA keeps records of this information and easily compiled the names and addresses of the winners of quarter-horse races beginning January 1, 2008, through the time of the settlement. 55 HBPA mailed approximately 3,567 notices. USPS returned three or four notices36 as undeliverable. One claimant opted out. Ten class members filed objections. Approximately 179 class members submitted claim forms. In Etter v. Hibernia Corp., objectors to a class settlement complained the notice sent to class members was deficient. 2006-0646, p.12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/14/07), 952 So.2d 782, 791. This Court first noted that La. C.C.P. art. 594(A)(2) requires notice of a settlement to be given in the manner that the court directs. Etter, 2006-0646, p.12, 952 So.2d at 791. The trial court issued a scheduling order requiring a notice to be sent to the class members no less than thirty days prior to the fairness hearing. The parties mailed the notice more than thirty days prior to the fairness hearing. This Court noted the objectors themselves received notice. Further, this Court indicated not a single class member sought to extend the time to object or claimed deprivation of the right to object. This Court determined the objectors’ complaint about the deficient notice to be without merit. Id. Likewise, the class members in this case received notice of the proposed settlement agreement and the date of the fairness hearing. Significantly, no member of the class requested an extension or otherwise claimed deprivation of the right to object based on the COVID-19 pandemic or otherwise. Indeed, Appellants themselves received the notice, complied with the notice by submitting objections timely, and fully participated in the fairness hearing. There is no evidence that the failure to set new deadlines and send a new notice violated the due process rights of any class member. This argument is without merit. 36 As noted previously, Mr. Boulet testified that USPS returned four notices; but in the record before this Court, Exhibit #28 contains only three notices returned as undeliverable. 56 Assignment of Error No. 3 - The Class Notice was Defective Lastly, in support of the argument the trial court should have vacated the February 18, 2020 order, Appellants contend the class notice was defective. They aver that the class notice failed to provide any information concerning the opposition by a majority of the Plaintiffs; the amount of the disputed purses; the amount of attorneys’ fees; the fact the court had not ruled on the merits; or the position of the parties. In support, Appellants reference State v. Sprint Commc’n Co., L.P., 2003-1264 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/29/04), 897 So.2d 85, on reh’g (April 6, 2005), writ denied, 2005-1180 (La. 12/9/05), 916 So.2d 1056 and writ denied, 2005-1190 (La. 12/9/05), 916 So.2d 1057 (“Sprint”). However, Appellants cite to no particular portion of the Sprint opinion. In response, Fair Grounds Defendants assert the class notice was not defective. Fair Grounds Defendants note the Sprint court differentiated between information that must be included and information a trial court should consider for inclusion in a class notice. Fair Grounds Defendants aver the class notice sent out in this case was very detailed and included all information required by La. C.C.P. art. 594. Fair Grounds Defendants note that Appellants consistently assert that a majority of the Plaintiffs objected to the proposed settlement agreement. Fair Grounds Defendants aver that Plaintiffs’ approval to the proposed settlement agreement is not necessary. Fair Grounds Defendants cite several federal cases in support of this point. In Charron v. Wiener, 731 F.3d 241, 254 (2d Cir. 2013), the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, determined: Finally, to the extent that appellants argue that the rejection of the settlement by all five remaining named class representatives requires its rejection by the Court, we cannot agree. As our sister 57 circuits have noted, the assent of class representatives is not essential to the settlement, as long as the Rule 23 requirements are met. See Elliott v. Sperry Rand Corp., 680 F.2d 1225, 1226, 1228 (8th Cir.1982); Kincade v. Gen.Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 508 (5th Cir.1981) (“[T]he assent of named plaintiffs is not a prerequisite to the approval of a settlement.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Laskey v. Int'l Union, 638 F.2d 954, 957 (6th Cir.1981) ( “Accepting a settlement over the objections of the named representatives is not necessarily an abuse of discretion.”); Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1174 n. 19 (4th Cir.1975). “Class counsel is supposed to represent the class, not the named parties: that the named parties objected does not prove the settlement was unfair or that the class counsel acted improperly.” Laskey, 638 F.2d at 956. We believe those cases correctly state the law. 731 F.3d 241, 254 (2d Cir. 2013). Thus, Fair Grounds Defendants aver that the approval of Plaintiffs, whether a majority or otherwise, was not necessary for the trial court to grant preliminarily approval of the class settlement. Likewise, Class Representatives contend that the notice contained all of the information required by law. The notice defined the class; described the terms of the proposed settlement agreement; described the payout procedure for past due claims; informed members of the right to opt-out or object; informed them of the process to submit a claim; and notified them of the time and place of the fairness hearing. The notice did not mention attorneys’ fees. Class Representatives note that Appellees are paying the fees separately from the amount of the settlement. Further, Class Representatives aver the law does not require that information to be included. In Louisiana, class action proceedings are governed by La. C.C.P. art. 591, et seq. Once a class is certified, the best practicable notice must be provided to the members of the class. La. C.C.P. art. 592(B)(1). The notice shall include: (a) A general description of the action, including the relief sought, and the names and addresses of the representative parties or, where 58 appropriate, the identity and location of the source from which the names and addresses of the representative parties can be obtained. (b) A statement of the right of the person to be excluded from the action by submitting an election form, including the manner and time for exercising the election. (c) A statement that the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion. (d) A statement that any member who does not request exclusion may, if the member desires, enter an appearance through counsel at that member’s expense. (e) A statement advising the class member that the member may be required to take further action as the court deems necessary, such as submitting a proof of claim in order to participate in any recovery had by the class. (f) A general description of any counterclaim brought against the class. (g) The address of counsel to whom inquiries may be directed. (h) Any other information that the court deems appropriate. La. C.C.P. art. 592(B)(2). As this matter involves a proposed settlement or compromise of a class action, La. C.C.P. art. 594 is implicated. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 594(A) mandates notice of the proposed settlement or compromise be provided to all members of the class in the manner directed by the trial court. After the class receives notice, then the trial court “shall order a hearing to determine whether the proposed compromise is fair, reasonable, and adequate for the class. At such hearing, all parties to the action, including members of the class, shall be permitted an opportunity to be heard.” La. C.C.P. art. 594(B). The first requirement is that the notice contain a general description of the action, including the relief sought and the names and addresses of the representative parties, or, where appropriate, the identity and location of the source 59 from which the names and addresses of the representative parties can be obtained. The notice herein provided the title of the action, including the trial court’s docket number. The notice indicated the Petition claimed Fair Grounds Defendants failed to pay supplemental purse money from video poker revenue to quarter-horse races as required by La. R.S. 27:438. The notice averred the Petition claimed HBPA allowed this to happen. The notice set forth the defenses of Fair Grounds Defendants: La. R.S. 27:438 does not apply to quarter-horse races, and the revenues were distributed in accordance to the terms set forth in the condition books, orders of the Commission, and other Louisiana law, such that the claims were barred by estoppel. The notice indicated Fair Grounds Defendants disputed liability. The notice provided the names of the Class Representatives and that the addresses of the Class Representatives were located in the record. The second requirement mandates that the notice inform the class members that they had the right to exclude themselves from the action. The notice herein included the approved opt-out form and instructed the class members desiring to exclude themselves that they must complete the opt-out form and return it to HBPA. The notice included the address for HBPA and provided the deadline to opt-out. The third requirement mandates inclusion of a statement that informs the class they will be bound by the judgment, favorable or not, if they do not opt-out. The notice herein informed class members if they did not opt-out, the judgment would be binding on them. The fourth requirement is inclusion of a statement that a member who does not opt-out may enter an appearance through counsel. The notice provided that a member could file an objection through counsel who enrolled in the lawsuit. 60 The fifth requirement is inclusion of a statement advising the member that they may be required to submit a claim form. The notice herein advised members who wished to participate in the settlement to return the attached claim form. Specifically, the notice advised the class members to return the completed form to HBPA, provided HBPA’s address, and set forth the deadline to submit the claim form. The sixth requirement mandates inclusion of any counterclaim brought against the class. In this instance, Fair Grounds Defendants and HBPA did not file any counterclaims. Notably, Fair Grounds Defendants had the owners execute the 2019 Stall Agreement that contained a waiver of claims against Fair Grounds Defendants. The notice therein warned those desiring to opt-out that Fair Grounds Defendants intended to raise the waiver as a defense in any litigation. While the warning is a defense and not a counterclaim, the inclusion of the warning speaks to the thoroughness of the notice. The seventh requirement is inclusion of the address of counsel to whom the class member may direct inquiries. The notice herein informed class members they could direct inquiries to class counsel and provided the addresses and telephone numbers of class counsel. The last requirement is inclusion of any other information the court deems appropriate. In this instance, no one requested the inclusion of other information. The court did not deem the inclusion of any other information appropriate. Appellants claimed certain information was required to be included in the notice pursuant to Sprint. In Sprint, the First Circuit Court of Appeal determined: Notice required to be sent in a class action must provide the class members with information sufficient to consider the terms of the proposed settlement and determine whether there is a basis for 61 challenging the proposed settlement. See In re Shell Oil Refinery, 155 F.R.D. 552, 558 (E.D.La.1993). Further, notice in a class action should: describe succinctly and simply the substance of the action and the positions of the parties; identify the opposing parties, class representatives, and counsel; indicate the relief sought; explain any special risks of class members, such as being bound by the judgment, while emphasizing that the court has not ruled on the merits of any claims or defenses; and, describe clearly the procedures and deadlines for opting out. Robert H. Klonoff and Edward K.M. Bilich, Class Actions and Other Multi-Party Litigation, p. 393 (West 2000), citing Manual for Complex Litigation (Third), § 30.21 (1995). 2003-1264, pp. 10-11, 897 So.2d at 93 (emphasis added). Herein, the notice outlined the terms of the proposed settlement agreement. It informed the members they were eligible for a cash payment for past claims from the settlement amount of $1,000,000.00. In addition to a cash payment for past claims, the proposed settlement agreement included guaranteed funds for future purse supplements. Not only did the parties agree to the purse supplements for the future, the parties requested the Louisiana Legislature amend existing legislation adopting the terms of the proposed settlement agreement. As amended, La. R.S. 27:438 specifies “[t]welve and one-half percent of the monies earned for such purse supplements shall be used to supplement purses for quarter[-]horse races at that licensed eligible facility, or as authorized by R.S. 4:147.1,[37] up to a maximum of one million dollars per state fiscal year.” La. R.S. 27:438(B)(2)(a). Additionally, Fair Grounds Defendants agreed to increase the number of quarter- horse racing days from ten to fifteen. The notice informed the class that Fair Grounds Defendants disputed all liability in the case and set forth numerous defenses asserted by Fair Grounds Defendants, including: 1) La. R.S. 27:438 does not allocate funds to quarter-horsemen thus the class should not have received the 37 Louisiana Revised Statutes 4:147.1 is titled “Commission; purse supplements; additional or substitute races and race days; force majeure.” 62 purse supplements described therein; 2) the funds were disbursed to horsemen in accordance with approved condition books; 3) the funds were disbursed to horsemen by orders of the Commission; 4) the funds were disbursed to horsemen in accordance with Louisiana law; and 5) Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by estoppel. The class members possessed sufficient information regarding the terms of the proposed settlement agreement and the defenses asserted by Fair Grounds Defendants to make an informed decision to opt-out, object, submit a claim form, or do nothing. Further, the notice herein described the substance of the action and the positions of the parties; identified the opposing parties, class representatives, and counsel; indicated the relief sought; explained any special risks of class members, such as being bound by the judgment; and described clearly the procedures and deadlines for opting out and objecting. In this instance, the notice did not specify whether the court had ruled on the merits of the claims or defenses. However, whether the court ruled on the merits or defenses is not information required by the class action statutes. Notably, in Sprint, the First Circuit Court of Appeal indicated that information should be included, not that it must be included in the notice. 2003-1264, pp. 10-11, 897 So.2d at 93. There is no requirement that the notice include the amount in controversy, reveal that some named plaintiffs oppose the settlement, specify the number of members in the class, or provide the amount of attorneys’ fees. Additionally, the public record of this proceeding identified the disputed amount of video poker purse funds; revealed that the trial court had not ruled on the merits; demonstrated that some named plaintiffs opposed the settlement; listed the number of members in the class; and provided the amount of attorneys’ fees, as well as the fact that the attorneys’ fees are in addition to the 63 settlement amount, i.e., the fees will not reduce the $1,000,000.00 settlement amount for past due claims. The notice herein complied with the statutory requirements. HBPA mailed the notice well in advance of the fairness hearing, which gave every member the opportunity to consult outside counsel, ask questions of the class counsel, opt-out, or object. The trial court properly approved the notice of the proposed settlement agreement. As the trial court did not abuse its discretion, the November 12, 2020 judgment denying the motions to vacate is affirmed. 2021-CA-0049: Appeal of the Trial Court’s Preliminary Approval of the Proposed Settlement Agreement In this appeal, Appellants seek review of the trial court’s February 18, 2020 order, which granted preliminary approval of the settlement agreement. Appellants assign five errors: [1]. The Trial Court erred in granting the “Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement Agreement. [2]. The Trial Court erred in not resetting the deadlines as required by the Governor’s Proclamations and Supreme Court’s Orders in response to COVID-19. 3. The class notice is defective.[38] 4. [Appellees] have failed to dispute the allegations of the petition(s) and therefore the Court is without any evidence from [Appellees] to determine whether there is probable cause to notify the class of the proposed settlement. 5. Issues Raised by Soileau Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Petition Have Never Been Admitted or Denied by [Appellees] as Required by Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Articles 1001-1006; and Therefore, Have Not Been Addressed by the Court. 38 Appellants did not assign the last three contentions as error or include them as an issue presented for review, but they did include them as major headings in the argument and designated them as numbers three, four, and five. Likewise, Appellees responded to the arguments with cor [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11077868. Public record. Not legal advice.