# Cole v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, M.D. Florida · June 17, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11075967

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** June 17, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11075967

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that step two acts as a filter and “allows only claims based on the most trivial impairments to be rejected”
- holding an ALJ’s statements that he considered the whole record are sufficient to demonstrate that he considered all necessary evidence

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
KAREN ALICE COLE,

Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:24-cv-1088-AAS

LELAND DUDEK, Commissioner
of Social Security,1

Defendant.
____________________________________/
ORDER
Plaintiff Karen Alice Cole requests judicial review of a decision by the
Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denying her claim for
disability insurance benefits (DIB) under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
Section 405(g). After reviewing the record, including the transcript of the
proceedings before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the administrative
record, the pleadings, and the memoranda the parties submitted, the
Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ms. Cole applied for DIB on April 22, 2021, and alleged disability

1 Leland Dudek became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 16,
2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Leland Dudek
should be substituted for Martin O’Malley as the defendant in this suit. No further
action need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section
205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
beginning on February 1, 2017. (Tr. 71, 206–10). Ms. Cole’s onset date was
later amended to February 28, 2020. (Tr. 34). Disability examiners denied Ms.

Cole’s applications initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 70–95). At Ms. Cole’s
request, the ALJ held a hearing on September 12, 2023, (Tr. 28–58, 184). The
ALJ issued an unfavorable decision to Ms. Cole on December 28, 2023. (Tr. 7–
27).

On March 5, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Ms. Cole’s request for
review, making the ALJ’s decision final. (Tr. 1–5). Ms. Cole requests judicial
review of the Commissioner’s final decision. (Doc. 1).
II. NATURE OF DISABILITY CLAIM

A. Background
Ms. Cole was 50 years old on her alleged onset date and 53 years old on
her date last insured. (Tr. 19, 209). Mr. Cole obtained a high school equivalency
diploma, completed cosmetology school, and worked as a restaurant manager,

a front desk receptionist, an insurance representative, and a patient
representative. (Tr. 19, 235–36). Ms. Cole alleged disability due to
fibromyalgia, post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, depression, a
back impairment, neuropathy, insomnia, restless leg syndrome, and

migraines. (Tr. 44, 234).
B. Summary of the Decision
The ALJ must follow five steps when evaluating a disability claim.2 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). First, if a claimant is engaged in substantial gainful

activity,3 she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, if a claimant has
no impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limit her
physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities, she has no severe
impairment and is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c); see McDaniel v.

Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1031 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that step two acts as a
filter and “allows only claims based on the most trivial impairments to be
rejected”). Third, if a claimant’s impairments fail to meet or equal an
impairment in the Listings, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).

Fourth, if a claimant’s impairments do not prevent her from doing past
relevant work, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The ALJ
determines the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC) at this fourth
step.4 Id. Fifth, if a claimant’s impairments (considering her RFC, age,

education, and past work) do not prevent her from performing work in the
national economy, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g).

2 If the ALJ determines the claimant is disabled at any step of the sequential analysis,
the analysis ends. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

3 Substantial gainful activity is paid work that requires significant physical or mental
activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572.

4 A claimant’s RFC is the level of physical and mental work she can consistently
perform despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).
The ALJ determined Ms. Cole did engage in substantial gainful activity
through her date last insured. (Tr. 13) The ALJ found Ms. Cole had these

severe impairments: disorder of the skeletal spine, peripheral neuropathy,
anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, depression, and trauma. (Id.).
However, the ALJ found that none of Ms. Cole’s impairments or the
combination of her impairments met or medically equaled the severity of an

impairment in the Listings. (Tr. 13–15).
The ALJ found Ms. Cole had the RFC to perform a reduced range of light
work,5 except:
[Ms. Cole] was limited to frequently climbing ramps and stairs;
occasionally climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequently
balancing; occasionally stooping; frequently kneeling, crouching,
crawling, and reaching overhead; she was able to understand,
carry out and remember simple and complex instructions; she
could perform simple and complex tasks; she could not interact
with the public; she could occasionally interact with coworkers and
supervisors; she could not perform tandem tasks; she required a
low stress job, defined as having only occasional decision-making
and no more than occasional changes in the work setting.

(Tr. 13–15).

5 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting
or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may
be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or
standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling
of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of
light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If
someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work,
unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability
to sit for long periods of time.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).
Based on these findings, the ALJ determined Ms. Cole could not perform
her past relevant work. (Tr. 19). The ALJ then determined Ms. Cole could

perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
(Tr. 15–19). Specifically, Ms. Cole could work as a collator, a routing clerk, and
a coin machine collector. (Tr. 20). As a result, the ALJ found that Ms. Cole was
not disabled. (Tr. 20–21).

III. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to reviewing whether the ALJ
applied correct legal standards and whether substantial evidence supports her

findings. McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988);
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. Dale v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d
1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In other words, there must be

sufficient evidence for a reasonable person to accept as enough to support the
conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted). The Supreme Court recently explained, “whatever the meaning of
‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is

not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).
A reviewing court must affirm a decision supported by substantial
evidence “even if the proof preponderates against it.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357
F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The court must not
make new factual determinations, reweigh evidence, or substitute its judgment

for the Commissioner’s decision. Id. at 1240 (citation omitted). Instead, the
court must view the whole record, considering evidence favorable and
unfavorable to the Commissioner’s decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; see also
Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted)

(stating that the reviewing court must scrutinize the entire record to determine
the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s factual determinations).
B. Issues on Appeal
Ms. Cole raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the ALJ erred at step

two by finding Ms. Cole’s migraines non-severe, and (2) whether the ALJ’s
alleged failure to properly consider Ms. Cole’s migraines resulted in an
erroneous RFC assessment. (Doc. 14, p. 3, 6).
1. Whether Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Findings in
Step Two of the Sequential Evaluation Process
Ms. Cole argues the ALJ failed to properly consider the severity of her
migraines at the second step of the sequential evaluation process. (Doc. 14, p.
6). In response, the Commissioner contends substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s findings at step two. (Doc. 16, pp. 10–11).
At step two of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must determine
whether the claimant has a severe, medically determinable impairment or a
severe combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Step two serves
as a filter, requiring immediate denial of a claim where no severe impairment

is shown. See Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987). A finding
of any severe impairment, regardless of whether it qualifies as a disability or
results from a single impairment or a combination of impairments, will satisfy
the requirement at step two. Id.; see Packer v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 542

F. App’x 890, 892 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[S]ince the ALJ proceeded beyond step two,
any error in failing to find that Packer suffers from the additional severe
impairments of degenerative joint disease of the right knee or varicose veins
would be rendered harmless.”).

To qualify as severe, a medically determinable impairment must
significantly limit an individual’s physical or mental capacity to perform basic
work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 404.1522(a). In a disability claim, the
plaintiff must establish the severity of an impairment by demonstrating the

effect of the impairment on her ability to work. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224,
1228 (11th Cir. 1999); see McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1547 (11th Cir.
1986) (“[T]he ‘severity’ of a medically determined disability must be measured
in terms of its effect upon ability to work, and not simply in terms of deviation

from purely medical standards of bodily perfection or normality.”). In the
Eleventh Circuit, a mere diagnosis of an impairment is insufficient to prove
severity at step two. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1213 (11th Cir.
2005) (“[T]he mere existence of [Plaintiff’s] impairments does not reveal the
extent to which they limit her ability to work or undermine the ALJ’s

determination in that regard.”); Wind v. Barnhart, 133 F. App’x 684, 690 (11th
Cir. 2005) (“[A] diagnosis or a mere showing of a deviation from purely medical
standards of bodily perfection or normality is insufficient [to prove disability];
instead, the claimant must show the effect of the impairment on her ability to

work.”).
Ms. Cole failed to establish her migraines constitute a severe
impairment. Although the record demonstrates Ms. Cole has a diagnosis and
medical history of migraines predating the period of coverage, Ms. Cole did not

demonstrate any resulting functional loss during the relevant period. The
relevant period for Ms. Cole’s disability claim is from February 28, 2020 (the
amended disability onset date) through June 30, 2022 (the date last insured).
In Ms. Cole’s May 2021 application for disability benefits, she did not allege

her migraine headaches limited her ability to work. (Tr. 234). After the initial
denial of Ms. Cole’s disability claim, Ms. Cole updated her list of medications
to include Sumatriptan, which is used to treat nerve-related migraines. (Tr.
289). However, Ms. Cole did not mention migraines when asked whether she

had developed any new or different mental or physical conditions that affected
her ability to work. (Tr. 283, 306). Although the record includes several medical
evaluations that mention migraines, those records predate the relevant period.
(See Tr. 242, 244, 368–70, 419). In addition, they include no subjective or
clinical reports of functional loss caused by migraines. (Id.).

During the relevant period, Ms. Cole reported a history of migraines at
a neurology visit on March 11, 2022, and noted a prescription for migraine
medication. (Tr. 86, 91, 289). In December 2021 and March 2022, Ms. Cole
stated that, approximately twice a month, she “managed” mild headaches that

sometimes became migraines, but she did not require medication to alleviate
her symptoms. (Tr. 1200, 1264). From April 2021 to February 2022, Ms. Cole
often denied experiencing any headaches. (See Tr. 724, 778, 795, 821, 846, 851,
856, 860, 863–64, 868, 873, 876, 878, 880, 883, 932, 940, 973–75, 977, 981, 984,

991, 1164, 1225, 1228). In September 2023, Ms. Cole alleged the worsening of
her headaches at an administrative hearing. (Tr. 44). This assertion came more
than a year after the expiration of Ms. Cole’s disability insurance and does not
establish how migraines diminished her ability to work. As the Commissioner

noted, this assertion did not bear on the disability claim but demonstrated the
severity of Ms. Cole’s condition after the relevant period lapsed.
Along with the reported mildness and lack of treatment for migraines,
two medical consultants–– Phillip Matar, M.D., and Gary Smith, M.D.–– found

Ms. Cole’s migraines to be non-severe. (Tr. 73, 75–77, 87, 90, 91). These
administrative medical findings, which the ALJ found persuasive, support the
ALJ’s overall determination that Ms. Cole’s migraines were non-severe. The
ALJ attested to a thorough review of the record, the evidence of Ms. Cole’s
impairments, and the relevant listing criteria before determining severity. (Tr.

12, 13, 15). And, the ALJ stated, after considering both severe and non-severe
impairments, he found the non-severe physical impairments to cause “no
greater workplace functional limitations than those found herein.” (Tr. 13).
The ALJ made these assurances several times in his opinion. (Tr. 13–16); see

Tuggerson-Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-14168, 572 F. App’x 949, 951–
52 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“[T]he ALJ stated that he evaluated whether
[plaintiff] had an ‘impairment or combination of impairments’ that met a
listing and that he considered ‘all symptoms’ in determining her RFC. Under

our precedent, those statements are enough to demonstrate that the ALJ
considered all necessary evidence.”).
Based on minimal treatment records about migraines, a lack of
explanation of any functional loss caused by migraines, medical experts’

findings that Ms. Cole’s migraines were non-severe, and Ms. Cole’s indication
that her migraines were manageable, the ALJ reasonably concluded “[t]here is
simply nothing to suggest [Ms. Cole’s migraines] cause more than a minimal
limitation in the ability to perform basic work activities.” (Tr. 13). See Hickman

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:22-cv-2267-PGB-LHP, 2023 WL 9197938, at *4
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2023) (“[W]hile Claimant references numerous medical
records that discuss a diagnosis of headaches, Claimant points to no other
restrictions in her briefing (nor cites to any medical records) as it relates to
functional limitations due to headaches.”). Thus, the court concludes the ALJ’s

determination at step two is supported by substantial evidence.
2. Whether the ALJ Properly Assessed Ms. Cole’s RFC

The second issue raised on appeal challenges the validity of the ALJ’s
RFC analysis. Ms. Cole argues that the ALJ improperly failed to consider all
limitations stemming from her impairments (severe and non-severe) in the
RFC assessment. (Doc. 14, p. 7). In response, the Commissioner contends that
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment. (Doc. 16, pp. 12–19).
A claimant’s RFC is the maximum activity she can do despite limitations

caused by her impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). The RFC is not a
medical opinion, but an administrative assessment of functional capacity made
by an ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c). RFC assessment is based on all
relevant evidence, including medical records, medical source opinions, prior

administrative medical findings, and the individual’s subjective allegations
and descriptions of her limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The ALJ
must consider all severe and non-severe impairments in the RFC assessment.
Schink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245, 1268 (11th Cir. 2019).

At step two of the evaluation, the ALJ found Ms. Cole’s diagnosed, non-
severe impairments to cause no additional functional limitations. See Brady v.
Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding non-severe impairments to
have such minimal effects that they are unlikely to interfere with one’s ability
to work); Sprague v. Colvin, No. 8:13-CV-576-T-TGW, 2014 WL 2579629, at *6

(M.D. Fla. June 9, 2014) (noting that a non-severe impairment often will not
result in functional limitation). The ALJ “considered all symptoms and the
extent to which these symptoms [could] reasonably be accepted as consistent
with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” (Tr. 15); See

Tuggerson-Brown, 572 F. App’x at 951 (holding an ALJ’s statements that he
considered the whole record are sufficient to demonstrate that he considered
all necessary evidence). The ALJ then determined Ms. Cole had the residual
functional capacity to perform light work with various restrictions. (Id.).

The ALJ demonstrated his careful consideration of the entire record,
including all severe and non-severe impairments, in his narrative summary of
the RFC assessment. (Tr. 13, 15). The ALJ acknowledged Ms. Cole’s reported
symptoms, summarizing her physical and cognitive difficulties with lifting,

squatting, bending, standing, reaching, walking, sitting, kneeling, climbing
stairs, remembering things, using her hands, completing tasks,
understanding, following instructions, and getting along with others. (Tr. 15–
16). Then, the ALJ evaluated the extent to which objective medical evidence

supported Ms. Cole’s statements about the “intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects” of her symptoms. (Tr. 16).
Medical evidence and treatment records revealed normal
musculoskeletal, neurological, extremity, and psychological findings. (Tr. 17–
18). The ALJ noted Ms. Cole’s independence in routine activities (e.g., personal

care, meal preparation, transportation to doctor’s appointments) and her
endorsement of the efficacy of medications in managing her symptoms. (Tr. 14,
16–18). The ALJ determined “objective and clinical evidence of record fail[ed]
to support the severity of functional limitation alleged by the claimant . . . .”

(Tr. 18). The ALJ properly considered the limiting effects of Ms. Cole’s
symptoms insofar as the record substantiated her assertions. See 20 C.F.R.
404.1520c.
The ALJ’s RFC determination is further supported by medical opinions

and administrative medical findings, which he duly considered. (Tr. 18–19).
First, the ALJ summarized several unpersuasive medical opinions and
articulated why he would not adopt their findings into the analysis. For
example, the ALJ disregarded physical findings from consultative examiner

Jose Diaz, M.D., and psychological findings from Donna Donati-Waddell,
Psy.D. (Tr. 18). In his reasoning, the ALJ noted the physical findings
(suggesting Ms. Cole was limited to seated work only) were vague and
unsupported by objective findings, specific limitations, or other medical

evidence. (Tr. 18). The ALJ concluded the psychological findings (suggesting
Ms. Cole’s psychological difficulties significantly impaired her ability to work)
were inconsistent with mostly regular psych evaluations of record and Ms.
Cole’s account of the efficacy of medication in managing her symptoms. (Tr.
18).

Second, the ALJ described the persuasive medical findings in the record.
(Tr. 18). Two agency psychologists, Catherine Nunez, Ph.D., and Janice Miller,
Ph.D., determined Ms. Cole could perform a range of unskilled work. (Tr. 77–
78, 91–93). On initial review, agency consultant Phillip Matar, M.D.,

determined Ms. Cole could perform light, unskilled work with additional
postural and physical limitations. (Tr. 75–77). On reconsideration, agency
consultant Gary Smith, M.D., affirmed Dr. Matar’s findings. (Tr. 90–91). These
administrative medical findings were consistent with the totality of evidence

in the record and supported the ALJ’s RFC assessment. (Tr. 18).
Objective medical evidence did not reveal additional functional
limitations; Ms. Cole endorsed her ability to perform routine tasks and manage
her symptoms; and the ALJ’s findings were consistent with prior

administrative findings. For these reasons, the court concludes the ALJ offered
an adequate explanation, supported by substantial evidence, for not adding
additional functional limitations to his RFC assessment.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED, and
the Clerk is directed to enter judgment for the Commissioner.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on June 17, 2025.
Aranda. □□□ Sasone_
AMANDA ARNOLD SANSONE
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11075967. Public record. Not legal advice.