# The Estate of Dominique McCoy v. County of San Diego > District Court, S.D. California · June 16, 2025 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11075769 ## Case - **Court:** District Court, S.D. California - **Decided:** June 16, 2025 - **Opinion:** 100trialcourt - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11075769 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that “qualified immunity analysis involves a fact- 9 intensive inquiry that is generally ill-suited for resolution at the pleadings stage” 10 (citation omitted) ## Opinion text 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 22-cv-1724-BTM-SBC THE ESTATE OF DOMINIQUE 12 McCOY by and through its Court ORDER GRANTING IN PART 13 Appointed Administrator AND DENYING IN PART WILLIAM McCOY, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 14 Plaintiff, DISMISS 15 v. [ECF NO. 85] 16 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., 17 Defendants. 18 19 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second 20 Amended Complaint (SAC). (ECF No. 85). For the reasons discussed below, the 21 motion is granted in part and denied in part. 22 BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on November 4, 2022, and Plaintiffs 24 filed an amended complaint on December 15, 2022. (ECF Nos. 1 & 9). According 25 to the amended complaint, Dominique McCoy was waiting to be released from 26 custody when the County placed John Medina, a violent offender, in his cell. (ECF 27 No. 9). Medina was allegedly awaiting arraignment for felony animal abuse, 28 1 assault with a deadly weapon, and violence against a child. (ECF No. 75). Plaintiff 2 claims that Defendants knew Medina had a history of violence, placed him in a cell 3 with McCoy, and then Medina beat McCoy to death. (Id.). Plaintiff claims that 4 Defendants are responsible for knowingly placing a violent offender in McCoy’s 5 cell and thus are responsible for his death. (Id.). 6 On March 22, 2023, the Honorable Marilyn L. Huff granted in part and denied 7 in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss.1 (ECF No. 21). Judge Huff dismissed 8 without prejudice Plaintiffs’ claims for arrest without probable cause, right of 9 association, willful and wanton misconduct, and negligence. (Id.). Defendants 10 filed an answer on April 5, 2023. (ECF No. 22). 11 On June 7, 2023, the parties filed a joint motion to stay the matter pending 12 the resolution of Medina’s criminal trial. (ECF No. 26). On June 23, 2023, the 13 Court granted the parties’ joint motion and stayed the case. (ECF No. 28). On 14 June 17, 2024, the Court held a status hearing and vacated the stay. (ECF No. 15 35). 16 On November 18, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend, to name nine new 17 individual defendants: Deputy Jacob Saelens, Deputy William Renner, Deputy 18 Desan Tyson, Deputy Fernando Mendoza, QMHP Christina Anosike, QMHP 19 Crystal Reeves, Deputy Daniel Cheung, Sergeant Cesar Cardoza, and 20 Commander Richard Williams. (ECF No. 63). The Court granted the motion in 21 part, allowing the amendment for the new defendants. (ECF No. 71). 22 On February 27, 2025, Plaintiff2 filed the SAC. (ECF No. 75). The SAC 23 asserts causes of action (1) under Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 24 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 25 26 1 The case was transferred to the undersigned judge on June 20, 2023. (ECF No. 27). 27 2 The Plaintiffs were originally the Estate of Dominique McCoy and William McCoy, 28 1 Amendments; (2) for deliberate indifference under the Eighth and Fourteenth 2 Amendments; (3) for failing to properly train and supervise; and (4) for wrongful 3 death. (Id.). 4 The County and several employees, William Renner, Jr., Desan Tyson, 5 Daniel Cheung, Jacob Saelens, Christina Anosike, Crystal Reeves, and Richard 6 Williams, now move to dismiss the SAC.3 (ECF No. 85). Defendants argue that 7 (1) the SAC fails to state a claim under Monell; (2) the SAC lacks sufficient 8 allegations against Defendant Tyson; and (3) they are entitled to qualified 9 immunity. (Id.). 10 MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD 11 A complaint must contain facts “stat[ing] a claim to relief that is plausible on 12 its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). “A claim 13 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 14 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 15 alleged.” Id. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must accept the factual 16 allegations, but not the legal conclusions, as true. Id. 17 18 DISCUSSION 19 A. Plaintiff has stated a plausible Monell claim. 20 “A government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless 21 a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind 22 a violation of constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 23 (9th Cir. 2011). A plaintiff can succeed under Monell by showing that a government 24 entity’s policy (1) “amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional 25 26 3 Plaintiff and Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss Defendants Richard Williams, 27 William Renner, Jr. and Christina Anosike, which the Court granted. (ECF Nos. 87 & 90). The Court thus does not discuss the allegations against those defendants in this 28 1 right” and (2) was the “moving force” behind the deprivation of that right. Id. 2 (citation omitted). 3 Here, Plaintiff alleges that the County had a policy of placing violent 4 offenders in cells with nonviolent offenders, and that the policy was the moving 5 force behind the deprivation of McCoy’s constitutional right. Plaintiff alleges that 6 the policy allowing Medina to be placed with McCoy was unconstitutional because 7 McCoy had a constitutional right to be free from violence from other inmates. This 8 claim is plausible. See Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 9 2016) (en banc) (recognizing the “right to be free from violence at the hands of 10 other inmates”). Plaintiff has also plausibly alleged that the policy was a moving 11 force behind the deprivation of McCoy’s constitutional right. 12 For deliberate indifference, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that housing violent 13 offenders with nonviolent offenders created an “obvious” risk of violence to the 14 nonviolent offenders. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) 15 (determining that the deliberate indifference standard for a municipal policy can be 16 satisfied by “obvious” failures of the policy); see also Coleman v. Wetzel, No. 15- 17 CV-00847, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172587, *15 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2015) (“[S]everal 18 federal courts of appeals . . . have determined that cell assignment policies that do 19 not attempt to segregate violent prisoners from non-violent prisoners, particularly 20 when combined with other aggravating factors, may be part of an Eighth 21 Amendment violation.”). 22 Simply put, Plaintiff has stated a plausible Monell claim. 23 B. Plaintiff has plausibly alleged deliberate indifference as to Lieutenant Tyson. 24 25 Defendants next claim that the deliberate indifference allegations as to 26 Lieutenant Tyson are insufficient. The SAC alleges that Lieutenant Tyson placed 27 Medina in the same cell as McCoy and knew or should have known of Medina’s 28 propensity for violence. For purposes of this analysis, the Court will assume based 1 on the SAC that the Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference standard 2 applies here. Under that standard, Plaintiff must show that Lieutenant Tyson “did 3 not take reasonable available measures to abate” conditions placing Plaintiff in a 4 “substantial risk of suffering serious harm,” such that the failure to take those 5 measures was an “obvious” cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. 6 Based on the charges Medina was allegedly facing—felony animal abuse, 7 assault with a deadly weapon, and violence against a child—the Court finds that 8 Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Lieutenant Tyson was deliberately indifferent. 9 See id.; Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 915 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A] deliberate 10 indifference claim may be predicated on custodial officers’ knowledge that a 11 specific individual poses a heightened risk of assault to even a large class of 12 detainees.”); Miller v. Mann, No. 17-cv-01555 (JAM), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13 212195, *7-8 (D. Conn. Dec. 28, 2017) (finding sufficient allegations on deliberate 14 indifference where, among other allegations, plaintiff alleged prison officials placed 15 him “in a cell with an inmate with a history of violence and mental health 16 problems”). 17 C. The individual defendants are not at this time entitled to qualified immunity. 18 19 For qualified immunity, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not identified a 20 clearly established constitutional right. The Court disagrees. “[T]he duty to protect 21 [McCoy] from violence was clearly established at the time of the incident.” See 22 Castro, 833 F.3d at 1067. Moreover, Defendants will not be liable unless their 23 failure to take reasonable precautionary measures created a grave risk to Plaintiff 24 and was an “obvious” cause of his injuries. Id. at 1071; see also Karl v. City of 25 Mountlake Terrace, 678 F.3d 1062, 1073 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Qualified immunity is 26 designed to ensure that before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice 27 their conduct is unlawful.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). A more 28 developed factual record is necessary to determine whether qualified immunity 1 applies, see Singleton v. Kentucky, 843 F.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[I]t is often 2 perilous to resolve a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on qualified immunity grounds given the 3 fact development often needed to decide whether the state official violated clearly 4 established federal law.”); Borja v. Borrayo, No. 21-4148-DDP, 2022 U.S. Dist. 5 LEXIS 237680, *12 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2022) (concluding “that Defendant’s 6 qualified immunity argument would be better addressed with the benefit of a factual 7 record on summary judgment”); Janowski v. City of N. Wildwood, 259 F. Supp. 3d 8 113, 121 (D.N.J. 2017) (explaining that “qualified immunity analysis involves a fact- 9 intensive inquiry that is generally ill-suited for resolution at the pleadings stage” 10 (citation omitted)). Defendant’s qualified immunity claim thus lacks merit at this 11 time. 12 D. Defendants are immune from Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim as to medical care. 13 14 Plaintiff asserts a wrongful death claim against all Defendants. The claim is 15 written broadly, beyond mere medical care. However, the Court will address 16 Defendants’ argument that they are immune as to medical care. 17 California grants immunity to public entities and employees “for injury 18 proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care 19 for a prisoner in his custody,” but the immunity does not apply “if the employee 20 knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical 21 care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care.” Cal. 22 Gov. Code § 845.6. 23 Here, clearly the gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint is that Defendants knew 24 or should have known that Medina was violent and mentally unstable and that 25 placing him in a cell with McCoy was an obvious risk to McCoy’s safety. Plaintiff 26 has not pleaded a plausible claim that Defendants knew or should have known 27 immediate medical care was needed. 28 While the SAC repeatedly states that Medina needed immediate medical 1 ||care, those statements are conclusory because there are no facts in the SAC 2 || plausibly supporting them. In fact, the SAC is essentially inconsistent on this point, 3 times alleging that Medina needed immediate medical care but also at times 4 || stating that he was simply mentally erratic and unstable. Further, the SAC alleges 5 || that Medina had a medical screening, and Section 845.6 precludes claims “relating 6 ||to the manner in which medical care is provided.” Castaneda v. Department of 7 || Corrections & Rehabilitation, 212 Cal. App. 4th 1051, 1074 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 8 In short, the SAC alleges that Defendants knew Medina was mentally 9 ||unstable and should have done more to help him and should not have placed him 10 |/in a cell with McCoy. That is not sufficient to take away Defendants’ immunity 11 ||under Section 845.6. As to medical care, Defendants are immune from Plaintiff's 12 || wrongful death claim. 13 14 CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants are immune from Plaintiff's wrongful death claim as to medical care, but the motion is otherwise denied in full. Defendants’ request for judicial notice is denied as moot. IT IS SO ORDERED. . Dated: June 16, 2025 Til 21 Hono Barry Ted Socks 22 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11075769. Public record. Not legal advice.