# Keir v. Schoeberl

> District Court, N.D. New York · June 16, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11072144

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** June 16, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11072144

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “[s]o-called sovereign citizens believe that they are not subject to government authority and employ various tactics in an attempt to, among other things, avoid paying taxes, extinguish debts, and derail criminal proceedings”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SUSAN KEIR,

Plaintiff, 1:25-cv-56
(ECC/MJK)
v.

CURT SCHOEBERL, et al.,

Defendants.

Susan Keir, Pro Se Plaintiff
John C. Burns, Esq., for Town and County Defendants
Aimee Cowan, Ass’t Att. General, for State Defendants
Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Susan Keir filed this action against Defendants Curt Schoeberl, Jane
Rascoe, and the Town of Shawangunk (the Town Defendants); Roseann Daw, Tracey Williams,
Christopher Jaros, Jen Metzger, Max Cordella, Bruck Taylor, Clinton Johnson, and the County of
Ulster (the County Defendants); and Michelle Demirian and New York State Attorney General
Letitia James (the State Defendants) (collectively, the Defendants), alleging claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff challenges the Defendants’ assessment and collection of property taxes
that has resulted in the commencement of foreclosure proceedings against her property. See
generally Second Amended Complaint (SAC), Dkt. No. 19. The Defendants have moved to
dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dkt. Nos.
31, 48, 52. The motions are fully briefed. Dkt. Nos. 47, 51, 57, 58, 60, 61, 67, 68. For the
following reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted in part, and the Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint is dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) and 12(b)(6).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed the original Complaint in this action, as well as a

motion for preliminary injunction. Dkt. Nos. 1, 5. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint and
amended motion for preliminary injunction on January 16, 2025. Dkt. Nos. 6, 7. On January 31,
2025, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint and Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.” Dkt. No. 10. On February 7, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion
seeking preliminary injunctive relief.1 Dkt. No. 13. U.S. Magistrate Judge Mitchell J. Katz
subsequently granted Plaintiff’s request to amend, and Plaintiff filed the Second Amended
Complaint on February 14, 2025. Dkt. Nos. 14, 19.
III. FACTS2
Plaintiff owns property located in Wallkill, New York. SAC at 15. 3 On an unspecified
date, “state employees registered the Plaintiff’s private property in their office without disclosing

[that] there is no law” mandating such registration. Id. at 6. Plaintiff was “not provided full
disclosure about registering her private property,” nor was she “informed that registering her
private property would allow the Defendants to extort property taxes.” Id. The registration of
Plaintiff’s property “allowed [it] to be reclassified for the sole purpose of taxation.” Id.

1 Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the February 7, 2025 Memorandum-Decision and Order
was denied. Dkt. Nos. 18, 24.
2 These facts are drawn from the Second Amended Complaint. The Court assumes the truth of,
and draws reasonable inferences from, the well-pleaded factual allegations, see Lynch v. City of
New York, 952 F.3d 67, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2020), but does not accept as true any legal conclusions,
see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
3 Citations to page numbers refer to pagination generated by the ECF system.
Specifically, Plaintiff’s property was “wrongfully re-classified as agricultural, industrial, or
residential.” Id. at 11. The reclassification of Plaintiff’s property was “without permission.” Id.
at 6-7. As a result, Plaintiff was subjected to “unconstitutional direct taxat[ion]” of her property.
Id. at 5, 7-8. Plaintiff was “forced to make unlawful property tax payments for years or risk losing

the property to the state for nonpayment of unlawful taxes.” Id. at 10. Plaintiff’s property is now
the subject of foreclosure proceedings in Ulster County. Id. at 5.
In furtherance of their constitutional violations against Plaintiff, Defendants have
“view[ed] and record[ed] documents containing an all-caps version of [Plaintiff’s] name, and
documents containing [Plaintiff’s] proper name.” SAC at 9. The Defendants have further “stolen
the equity from [Plaintiff’s] private property through use of an electronically reproduced copy of
[Plaintiff’s] deed . . . .” Id. Specifically,
[w]hen the defendants placed the plaintiff’s “document of title” in their records the
attorney created a secret Constructive Quasi “Trust” on the presumption that their
State corporation” has “AN interest in plaintiff’s land, and they now control
plaintiff’s private property rights such as “possession” ect [sic], and plaintiff has
been forced to pay annual fee (tax) in “return” for benefit.

Id. at 10. This caused Plaintiff’s “control of her private property” to be “stripped away;” requiring
Plaintiff to “request permission to enjoy his/her property.” Id.
Liberally construed, the Second Amended Complaint asserts claims for fraudulent
concealment; “fraudulent misrepresentation, personage, and joinder;” deed fraud and conspiracy
to commit deed fraud; theft of equity; mail fraud; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and
Fourteenth Amendment violations of Plaintiff’s due process rights. See generally SAC. In her
prayer for relief Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief
including an order (1) barring further tax collections against her property; (2) removing the tax
lien currently attached to her property; (3) discharging all debt attached to her property, (4)
removing “anything having to do with” her property from “all local, county, and state files, records
or data bases; and (5) compelling the publication of advertisements in newspapers concerning her
rights over the property. Id. at 15-16.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)
A district court has the inherent power to dismiss a case, sua sponte, if it determines the
court lacks jurisdiction over the matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Notwithstanding the liberal
pleading standard afforded pro se litigants, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may
not preside over cases if they lack subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the
court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action.”) (emphasis supplied); Do No Harm v. Pfizer Inc., 96 F.4th 106, 121 (2d Cir. 2024) (“Once
a federal court determines it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint
in its entirety.”). “A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that it exists.” Searles v. Robert, No. 21-2836, 2023 WL 7271832,

at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 3, 2023) (quoting Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)).
This Court has an “independent obligation to consider the presence or absence of subject matter
jurisdiction sua sponte.” In re Tronox Inc., 855 F.3d 84, 95 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Joseph v.
Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted)).
The Court has no power to address the merits of a claim if it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the claim. Hibbert v. Cap. One Auto Fin., No. 1:23-cv-07538, 2024 WL 3498536,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2024) (citing El Bey v. Hilton, 15-cv-3188, 2017 WL 3842596, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2017) (“Because the Court has no power to address the merits of a case in the
absence of subject matter jurisdiction over it, a challenge to jurisdiction must be resolved before
reaching any other challenge.”)); see also Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478, 481 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“Until we determine whether the District Court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction . . .
, we cannot address the merits . . .”).
B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must provide ‘enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Citigroup, Inc., 709 F.3d
129, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). “Although a
complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it may not rest on mere labels, conclusions,
or a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action, and the factual allegations ‘must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Lawtone-Bowles v. City of New
York, No. 16-cv-4240, 2017 WL 4250513, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555). The Court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See EEOC v. Port Auth., 768 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir.
2014) (citing ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007)).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, her submissions “must be construed liberally and
interpreted ‘to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006).
“Nonetheless, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a pro se plaintiff must support [her]
claims with ‘specific and detailed factual allegations, not stated in wholly conclusory terms.’”
Wightman-Cervantes v. ACLU, No. 06-cv-4708, 2007 WL 1805483, at *1, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June
25, 2007) (quoting Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 85–86 (2d Cir. 2000)).
V. DISCUSSION
A. Constitutional Claims
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s challenges to the assessment

and imposition of local taxes on her property. The Tax Injunction Act (TIA) provides that “[t]he
district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax
under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”
28 U.S.C. § 1341; Campaniello v. New York State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., 737 F. App’x 594, 596
(2d Cir. 2018) (“The TIA is meant to strictly limit federal courts from interfering with local tax
matters . . . . This prohibition is jurisdictional and strips the federal courts of subject matter
jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted); Pan v. City of Niagara Falls, No. 23-7513, 2025 WL 1169057,
at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2025) (“The Tax Injunction Act severely limits the power of federal courts
to interfere with state taxation proceedings.”); Roberts v. NYS Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., No. 1:22-cv-
0208, 2022 WL 1004246, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2022) (“[T]he TIA bars taxpayers from

challenging the payment of state taxes in a federal district court.”). The TIA “has been interpreted
to cover local taxes[.]” Luessenhop v. Clinton Cnty., New York, 466 F.3d 259, 266 (2d Cir. 2006).
“The principal purpose of the Tax Injunction Act [is] ‘to limit drastically federal district court
jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes.’” California
v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408-09 (1982) (quoting Rosewell v. LaSalle National
Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 522 (1981)); see also Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 107 (2004) (“In sum, this
Court has interpreted and applied the TIA only in cases Congress wrote the Act to address, i.e.,
cases in which state taxpayers seek federal-court orders enabling them to avoid paying state
taxes.”).
“Two conditions must be satisfied to invoke the protection of the TIA: first, the surcharges
must constitute ‘taxes,’ and second, the state remedies available to plaintiffs must be ‘plain, speedy
and efficient.’” Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. James, 974 F.3d 216, 221 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 713 (2d Cir. 1993) (footnote omitted), rev’d on other

grounds, 514 U.S. 645 (1995)). “The Supreme Court has previously determined in other litigation
related to the TIA that New York does provide ‘plain, speedy and efficient’ forums for individuals
to bring constitutional challenges to its tax laws.” Abuzaid v. Mattox, 726 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir.
2013) (quoting Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1976)); Glob. Leadership Found. v. City
of New York, No. 21-cv-10942, 2022 WL 2788398, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2022) (same).
Under the related doctrine of comity, federal courts are restrained “‘from entertaining
claims for relief that risk disrupting state tax administration,’ including claims for damages” if
state court remedies are plain, adequate, and complete. Glob. Leadership Found. v. City of New
York, No. 22-2095, 2023 WL 3144043, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2023) (quoting Levin v. Com.
Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 417 (2010)). “While the TIA bars injunctive and declaratory relief, ‘it

is the principle of comity that prevents a taxpayer from seeking damages.’” DeMartino v. New
York State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., No. 22-720, 2023 WL 2563967, at *4 (2d Cir. Mar. 20, 2023)
(quoting Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 97 (2d Cir. 2021)); see also Casciani v. Town of
Webster, 501 F. App’x 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Actions under § 1983 seeking damages related to
the collection of state taxes are barred by the principle of comity so long as there is a procedurally
adequate state alternative procedure for challenging the assessment.”). The comity doctrine is more
expansive than the Tax Injunction Act. Levin, 560 U.S. at 417.
Here, Plaintiff requests that the court “bar any future tax collection” and “remove any tax
liens from” her property are “precisely the type of suit the [TIA] was designed to limit.” Staten v.
Vill. of Monticello, No. 14-cv-4766, 2015 WL 6473041, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2015) (quoting
Bernard v. Village of Spring Valley, 30 F.3d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1994)). Likewise, the principles of
comity warrant dismissal of Plaintiff’s parallel claims for compensatory damages due to lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s invocation of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights do

not render the TIA or the comity doctrine inapplicable. Specifically, the Second Amended
Complaint asserts a violation of Plaintiff’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
relative to state-court foreclosure proceedings initiated against her property. SAC at 11.
Conceivably, the Court might exercise jurisdiction over a Fourteenth Amendment due process
claim challenging some conduct by the Defendants preceding a state-court foreclosure. Here,
however, Plaintiff’s claim is grounded in her challenge to the particular taxes assessed against her
property that resulted in the initiation of foreclosure proceedings:
This illegal property tax process is a violation of the constitution and plaintiff’s due
process, as there has been no court hearing, no judgment, no adjudication of all
facts, and no consideration given for the actual laws regarding the tax in the first
place.

SAC at 7 (emphasis added). Thus, even liberally construed, the Court lacks jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. See Marvin v. Allen, No. 23-CV-5947, 2024
WL 4290722, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2024) (“[W]here a plaintiff “object[s] to [his] own tax
situation,” federal courts routinely dismiss constitutional claims, including claims sounding in due
process.”); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 597 (2013) (“It is beyond
dispute that “[t]axes . . . are not ‘takings[.]’” (quoting Brown v. Legal Foundation of Wash., 538
U.S. 216, 243, n. 2 (2003)).
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims premised on challenges to her local taxes
are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Neary v. Driscoll, No. 2:24-cv-00736,
2024 WL 1704715, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2024) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims challenging town
and county’s “billing and tax collection practices” for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
to the TIA and related principles of comity); Sandstrom v. Wendell, No. 1:23-cv-00405, 2024 WL
1242415, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2024), appeal dismissed, No. 24-956, 2024 WL 5516312 (2d
Cir. Oct. 23, 2024) (granting motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where

plaintiff attempted to enjoin county defendants from assessing taxes); Stankovic v. Frankel, No.
12-cv-3215, 2012 WL 2700648, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2012) (dismissing claims challenging
“local tax matters” for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
2. Merits
Generally, in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court does not reach the merits
arguments contained in a motion to dismiss, and the claims lacking jurisdiction in this case would
be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Humphrey v. Syracuse Police
Dep’t, 758 F. App’x 205, 206-07 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining, where a court dismisses a complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court does “not have the power to reach the merits and
dismiss the claims against the defendants for failure to state a claim . . . .”) (citing Carter v.

HealthPort Technologies, LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2016)).
Here, to the extent any of Plaintiff’s claims are not jurisdictionally barred by the TIA or
doctrine of comity, they are nevertheless subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). At the outset,
Plaintiff’s claims are grounded in “Redemptionist” and “Sovereign Citizen” theories that have
been consistently recognized as frivolous by the courts. Redemptionists claim, among other
things, that when “[a] person’s name is spelled . . . with initial capital letters and small letters, [it]
represents the real person . . . . Whenever a person’s name is written in total capitals, however, . .
. only the strawman is referenced, and the flesh and blood person is not involved.” McLaughlin v.
CitiMortgage, Inc., 726 F.Supp.2d 201, 210 (D. Conn. 2010) (citations and punctuation omitted).
Likewise, Sovereign Citizens are “a loosely affiliated group who follow their own set of laws and,
accordingly, do not recognize federal, state, or local laws, policies or regulations as legitimate.”
United States v. DiMartino, 949 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). “Theories presented by redemptionist and sovereign citizen adherents have not only

been rejected by the courts, but also recognized as frivolous and a waste of court resources.”
Muhammad v. Smith, No. 3:13–cv–760 (MAD/DEP), 2014 WL 3670609, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 23,
2014) (collecting cases).
Plaintiff’s challenge in this case is grounded in her position that, as a general matter, the
local and state “tax collection system[s]” stands in violation of the federal Constitution to the extent
they impose direct taxes; that the state courts have no jurisdiction over foreclosure proceedings
against her property and are “fictitious entities;” and that documents containing “all-caps” versions
of her name, including her deed, constitute “fraudulent misrepresentation[s].” Even when read
with the “special solicitude” required for pro se pleadings, these allegations do not invoke viable
legal theories on which Plaintiff can rely in her constitutional challenges. See Bendeck v. U.S.

Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 17-cv-0180, 2017 WL 2726692, at *6 (D. Haw. June 23, 2017) (collecting
cases that have rightly have rejected the argument that “differences in capitalization of a person’s
name create separate legal entities”); Gravatt v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 279, 282 (Fed. Cl.
2011) (noting that “[s]o-called sovereign citizens believe that they are not subject to government
authority and employ various tactics in an attempt to, among other things, avoid paying taxes,
extinguish debts, and derail criminal proceedings”).
Moreover, as the Defendants argue in their motion papers, the Second Amended Complaint
suffers from a variety of pleading deficiencies. A plaintiff seeking relief under § 1983 must allege
facts showing the defendants’ personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See
Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“‘It is well settled in
this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a
prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.’” (quoting Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873
(2d Cir. 1995))). As a corollary of the personal involvement requirement, complaints that rely on

“group pleading” and “fail to differentiate as to which defendant was involved in the alleged
unlawful conduct are insufficient to state a claim.” Adamou v. Cty. of Spotsylvania, Va., No. 12-
cv-7789, 2016 WL 1064608, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2016) (citing Atuahene v. City of Hartford,
10 F. App’x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001) (observing that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 “requires, at
a minimum, that a complaint give each defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the
ground upon which it rests,” and that a complaint fails to meet that minimum where it “lump[s] all
the defendants together in each claim and provide[s] no factual basis to distinguish their
conduct”)).
Here, the Second Amended Complaint repeatedly refers to actions taken by “the
defendants,” and contains only a very general description of each named defendant’s purportedly

unconstitutional job duties. It fails, however, to address in what way each defendant participated
in the allegedly unconstitutional acts giving rise to the violations against Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s
general references to the Defendants fail to satisfy the requirement that litigants plead “precisely
who did what and how such behavior is actionable under the law.” Demuth v. New York State
Police, No. 3:18-cv-0796, 2018 WL 5924605, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018).
Accordingly, to the extent any of Plaintiff’s claims are not properly dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3), they are dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim.
B. State Law Claims
Plaintiff’s remaining claims sound in state law. Since there is no diversity of citizenship
between the parties, the only basis for this Court’s continuing jurisdiction over those claims is
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (providing that “in

any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to the claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
the United States Constitution.”). The Court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction .
. . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3). “Courts must consider ‘the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity’ when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.” Kroshnyi v. U.S. Pack
Courier Servs., 771 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484
U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before
trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point

toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).
Here, judicial economy weighs in favor of dismissing the state law claims. This case is in
its early stages; discovery has not occurred; and Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are best addressed by
a state court. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those
claims.
VI. LEAVE TO AMEND
Generally, the Court will afford a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend “unless the court
can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would
succeed in stating a claim.” Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted). However, leave to amend pleadings is properly denied where amendment would
be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Ruffolo v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Where it appears that granting leave to

amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.”);
Myers v. Sperazza, 11-cv-292, 2012 WL 6690303, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2012) (dismissing
pro se complaint without leave to amend because “there is no indication a valid claim can be stated
and the court has determined that leave to amend the complaint would be futile”).
Here, the deficiencies with Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, including most
significantly this Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the frivolous legal theories on
which Plaintiff mounts her challenge, cannot be cured with better pleadings. Thus, although the
Court is cognizant of Plaintiff’s pro se status, allowing Plaintiff an opportunity to further amend
would be an exercise in futility. See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Wendell, No. 1:23-cv-00405, 2024 WL
1242415, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2024), appeal dismissed, No. 24-956, 2024 WL 5516312 (2d

Cir. Oct. 23, 2024) (declining to grant leave to amend where Court lacked jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s challenges to assessment of local taxes); see also Dieujuste v. Sin, 731 F. Supp. 3d 440,
454 (E.D.N.Y.), reconsideration denied, 734 F. Supp. 3d 232 (E.D.N.Y. 2024), and aff’d, 125
F.4th 397 (2d Cir. 2025) (declining to grant leave to amend where plaintiff was “an adherent to
the ‘sovereign citizen’ movement” and sought “to assert legally frivolous claims,” noting that court
“has the inherent power to dismiss without leave to amend or replead ‘where the substance of the
claim pleaded is frivolous on its face[.]’”) (quotation omitted).
VII. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 19, is sua sponte
DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3), to the extent it challenges the
assessment and payment of local taxes against her property, and it is further
ORDERED that, to the extent any of the federal claims raised in Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint are not subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
Defendants’ motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Dkt. Nos. 31, 48, 52, are GRANTED, and
these claims are DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim,
and it is further
ORDERED that the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's
state-law claims, and those claims are DISMISSED without prejudice, and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close
this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 16, 2025
(ie
Elizabeth C. Coombe
U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11072144. Public record. Not legal advice.