# Berman v. Supreme Court of Ohio

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · June 13, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11071463

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** June 13, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11071463

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN BERMAN,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:25-cv-531

v. District Judge Algenon L. Marbley
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO,

Defendant.

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Undersigned on Plaintiff’s Motions for Leave to Proceed in forma
pauperis (Docs. 1, 5); his Motion Requesting Electronic Filing Rights (Doc. 1-5); and the initial
screen of his Complaint (Doc. 1-1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s second Motion for in
forma pauperis status (Doc. 5) is GRANTED, and his first Motion (Doc. 1) is DENIED as moot.
Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting Electronic Filing Rights is also DENIED. (Doc. 1-5).
After screening Plaintiff’s Complaint as required, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that
this action be DISMISSED.
I. STANDARD
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss the Complaint,
or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). Complaints by pro se litigants are to be construed liberally and held to less stringent
standards than those prepared by attorneys. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004).
But this leniency is not boundless, and “it is not within the purview of the district court to conjure
up claims never presented.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 977 (6th Cir. 2012). Nor
is it the Court’s role to “ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of pro se litigants” or
advise “litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.” Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F.
App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (considering the sua sponte dismissal of an amended complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). At bottom, “basic pleading essentials” are still required, regardless

of whether an individual proceeds pro se. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
These essentials are not onerous or overly burdensome. A complaint must contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” see Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2), and provide the defendant with “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation omitted).
In reviewing Plaintiff’s Complaint at this stage, the Court must construe it in his favor, accept all
well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While this standard does not require “detailed factual
allegations, . . . [a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions” is insufficient. Id. at 678 (citation
modified). In the end, the Court must dismiss the Complaint “if it tenders naked assertions devoid
of further factual enhancement.” Id. (citation modified).
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s Complaint is bare bones. He alleges that he has pending cases in an “Ohio Court
of Common Pleas,” as well as an “Ohio appeals court.” (Doc. 1-1 at 2). In late April or early May
2025, he visited the Supreme Court of Ohio’s website to file grievances against Ohio lawyers.
(Id.). But the website, Plaintiff says, “requires a person filing a grievance against an Ohio
lawyer . . . to click the slider button shown that forces him to answer YES to: ‘Do you agree to
maintain the confidentiality of your grievance?’” (Id. (quoting Doc. 1-2)). Simply put, Plaintiff
says he cannot file a grievance unless he agrees to keep it confidential. (Id. at 2–3); see also Ohio
Government of the Bar Rule V, § 8(A)(1) (saying that materials related to consideration of attorney

grievances “shall be kept confidential” prior to a determination of probable cause, with some
exceptions). Plaintiff asserts that this confidentiality requirement “violates [his] right to petition
the Ohio government for redress of grievances, by requiring him to agree to this code of silence.”
(Id. at 3). As a result, he sues the Supreme Court of Ohio under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief. (Id.).
Even construing the Complaint liberally as the Undersigned must do, Plaintiff fails to state
a claim. Under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, “an unconsenting state
is . . . immune from suits filed in federal court by one of its own citizens[.]” Metz v. Sup. Ct. of
Ohio, 46 F. App’x 228, 237 (6th Cir. 2002). Because the state of Ohio has not waived its Eleventh

Amendment immunity in federal court, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against
the Supreme Court of Ohio. See Haller v. Lipps, No. 1:11-cv-291, 2011 WL 7300284, at *6 (S.D.
Ohio Dec. 28, 2011) (saying the state of Ohio has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity,
and Congress did not do so in enacting Section 1983), report and recommendation adopted, No.
1:11-cv-291, 2012 WL 479083 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2012), appeal dismissed, No. 12-4161 (6th
Cir. Nov. 30, 2012); Metz, 46 F. App’x at 237; Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 396–97 (6th
Cir. 1999).
Further, the Supreme Court of Ohio is not a legal entity that can be sued under Section
1983. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that Ohio courts are not sui juris. Williams v. Franklin
Cnty. Mun. Ct., No. 2:10-cv-1155, 2011 WL 13160383, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 22, 2011) (citing
Malone v. Ct. of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga Cnty., 344 N.E.2d 126, 128–29 (Ohio 1976)); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3) (providing the “law of the state where the [federal district] court is
located” determines who has the capacity to be sued in federal court). In other words, “absent

express statutory authority,” the Supreme Court of Ohio “can neither sue or be sued in its own
right.” Tingler v. Ohio Gen. Assembly, No. 2:24-cv-468, 2024 WL 1464373, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb.
21, 2024) , report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:24-cv-468, 2024 WL 1172770 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 19, 2024); see also Arbino v. Ohio, No. 1:12-cv-203, 2012 WL 1756856, at *2 (S.D. Ohio
Apr. 2, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:12-cv-203, 2012 WL 1755828 (S.D.
Ohio May 16, 2012); Terry v. Kennedy, No. 2:24-cv-1200, 2025 WL 948919, at *5 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 28, 2025). Consequently, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the Supreme Court of Ohio
must be dismissed.
Even if the Supreme Court of Ohio could be sued in this Court, Plaintiff’s allegations are
too scant to proceed past an initial screen. Plaintiff alleges that the Supreme Court of Ohio’s

confidentiality requirement for attorney grievances violates his rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1-1 at 3; see also Doc. 1-2). More specifically, he says the
requirement violates his right to petition the government. (Doc. 1-1 at 3).
Though the First Amendment guarantees individuals the right to petition the government,
Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999), Plaintiff does not explain how the
confidentiality requirement prevents him from filing his grievance. (Doc. 1-1 at 3 (saying the
requirement forces him to agree to a “code of silence,” but not that he cannot file his grievance));
see, e.g., Tomlin v. City of Eubank, No. 5:22-cv-200, 2023 WL 3391409, at *3 (E.D. Ky. May 11,
2023) (dismissing a First Amendment right-to-petition claim where the plaintiffs did not allege
that the denial of their public records requests prevented them from filing their requests); McCain
v. Hermann Law Off., No. 5:09-cv-165, 2010 WL 3322708, at *5 (D. Vt. July 7, 2010) (dismissing
a similar First Amendment claim based upon a rule requiring materials to be kept confidential
“prior to the filing of formal disciplinary proceeding”); cf. EJS Props., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698

F.3d 845, 863–64 (6th Cir. 2012) (considering whether the defendant’s conduct “chilled” or
meaningfully infringed on the plaintiff’s right to petition the government).
What’s more, Plaintiff does not explain how the Supreme Court of Ohio otherwise violated
his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wyley v. Cuyahoga Cnty., No. 1:25-cv-230, 2025
WL 1581054, at *2–3 (N.D. Ohio June 4, 2025) (finding a complaint did not meet minimum
pleading requirements where it did not say how the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights). At bottom, Plaintiff’s allegations are too thin to provide fair notice of the factual and legal
grounds underlying his claims. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (requiring a complaint “give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” (citation modified));
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (saying a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief”).
In sum, the Supreme Court of Ohio cannot be sued in federal court, and Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, the Undersigned
RECOMMENDS that the Complaint (Doc. 1-1) be DISMISSED.
In light of this recommendation, the Undersigned DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting
Electronic Filing Rights. (Doc. 1-5); see Needham v. Butler Cnty. Jail, No. 1:19-cv-294, 2019 WL
5883643, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 12, 2019) (noting that the “grant of electronic filing privileges is a
privilege granted to pro se litigants in the discretion of this Court”).
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s second Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 5) is GRANTED,
and his first Motion for in forma pauperis status (Doc. 1) is DENIED as moot. The Undersigned
also DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting Electronic Filing Rights. (Doc. 1-5).

After conducting the required initial screen under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Undersigned
RECOMMENDS that the Complaint (Doc. 1-1) be DISMISSED.

Date: June 13, 2025 /s/Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Procedure on Objections
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting
authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence, or may
recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo and operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the
District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985);
United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11071463. Public record. Not legal advice.