# Robins v. Wetzel

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · June 12, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11070663

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 12, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JONATHAN ROBINS, :
Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-1474

v. □ (JUDGE MANNION)
SECRETARY JOHN WETZEL, :
et al.,
Defendants

MEMORANDUM
Pending before the court are pro se plaintiff, Jonathan Robins’s,
motions to compel discovery (Docs. 41 and 51) of his presentence
investigative report and psychological assessments. The motions will be
denied as the request seeks documents not relevant to the plaintiff's claim
and to protect the confidentiality of the underlying records.
I. Background
On August 26, 2021, the plaintiff, an inmate confined at the Rockview
State Correctional Institution, (SCl-Rockview), Bellefonte, Pennsylvania,
filed the above-captioned civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.
(Doc. 1). In his original complaint, the plaintiff alleged violations of his rights
to due process, equal protection and the free exercise of his religion. These
alleged violations related to the plaintiffs participation in a sex offender

program at SCl-Rockview. The plaintiff alleged that the sex offender

program, the completion of which is necessary to be considered eligible for
parole, required him to falsely admit that he was guilty of a crime. While the
plaintiff alleged that he was willing to admit that he engaged in the claimed
sexual acts, he stated that he was unwilling to admit that he engaged in any
illegal conduct because the acts occurred with his wife. The plaintiff's wife

was a minor child at the time of the charged offenses. The plaintiff argued
that any requirement that he admit guilt under the sex offender program
violated his constitutional and statutory rights.
By memorandum and order dated December 9, 2021, the undersigned
gave the plaintiffs complaint preliminary consideration under 28 U.S.C.
§§1915A and 1915(c) and dismissed the action as legally frivolous. (Doc.
12). The plaintiff appealed that decision, and by an opinion filed September
28, 2022, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
this court’s decision in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further
proceedings. (Doc. 23). Specifically, the Third Circuit agreed that the
plaintiffs equal protection and due process claims, as well as any claims

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under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments were all properly dismissed.' The
Third Circuit indicated, however, that the plaintiff also alleged that the
admission-of-guilt requirement of the sex offender program violated his
constitutional and statutory rights to the free exercise of religion. In this
regard, the Third Circuit pointed out that the plaintiff alleged that marriage
was a Sacred tenant of his religion and that he could not admit the illegality
of his sexual conduct, which he construed as denouncing his religious marital

vows, without violating his religious beliefs. Although such allegations would
be meritless under the First Amendment, the Third Circuit found that it had
not had occasion to consider an acceptance-of-responsibility component of

a sex offender treatment program in the context of the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-
1, et seq., or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C.
§2000bb-1, et seg. Given the lack of controlling precedent and this court’s
failure to consider the claim, the Third Circuit vacated the sua sponte
dismissal and remanded the case for this court to consider the acceptance-

1 The Third Circuit noted that the plaintiff also raised a claim of age
discrimination which was not considered by this court, but that any age
discrimination claim was also facially meritless.
dh

of-responsibility component of the sex offender treatment program in the

context of RLUIPA and RFRA, allowing for amendment of the complaint as
deemed appropriate. (Doc. 23).
On October 21, 2022, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Doc.
19) which the court ordered stricken from the record (Doc. 22). The plaintiff
was directed to file a second amended complaint limited to the impact of the
plaintiff's acceptance of responsibility in the sex offender treatment program
on his constitutional and statutory rights to the free exercise of religion. On
February 24, 2023, the plaintiff filed his second amended complaint raising
claims under RLUIPA, RFRA and the Pennsylvania Constitution.” (Doc. 24).
In response, on April 28, 2023, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs second amended complaint. (Doc. 34). By way of memorandum
and order, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. (Docs.
55 and 56). The court dismissed all claims brought under RFRA, concluding
that the statute does not apply to state officials, and allowed for the claims
brought under RLUIPA and the Pennsylvania Constitution to proceed. (See
Id.) In that memorandum, the court held in abeyance any decision on the

2 The plaintiff also argued that he had a right to be seen by the parole
board. This issue was previously ruled upon by the court and found properly
dismissed by the Third Circuit.
-A.

plaintiff's instant motions to compel pending the filing of a brief in opposition
by the defendants. (Doc. 55 at 14). Now that the defendants have filed their
brief (Doc. 58) and the plaintiff has replied (Doc. 61), the instant motions are
ripe for disposition.
ll. Standard of Review
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions to
compel discovery. Under Rule 37(a), a party may file a motion to compel
discovery when the opposing party fails to respond or provides incomplete
or evasive answers to properly propounded document request or
interrogatories. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iii—iv). Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(1), a party “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1).
The scope and conduct of discovery are within the sound discretion of
the trial court. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 661-62 (3d Cir.
2003); see also McConnell v. Canadian Pacific Realty Co., 280 F.R.D. 188,
192 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (“Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and
the extent to which discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to
the Court’s discretion and judgment.”).

=F

This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, at
the outset, it is clear that Rule 26’s broad definition of that which can be
obtained through discovery reaches only “non-privileged matter that is
relevant to any party's claim or defense.” Therefore, valid claims of relevance
and privilege restrict the court’s discretion in ruling on discovery issues.
Furthermore, the scope of discovery permitted by Rule 26 embraces all
“relevant information,” a concept which is defined in the following terms:
“Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”
With these principles in mind, the court turns to consider the various
discovery requests set forth in Mr. Robins' motions to compel.
lil. Discussion
Despite repeated assertions that his presentence report and
psychological assessments bear on his religious freedom claim, the plaintiff
fails to articulate any argument that renders them relevant.
“Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment. . .
including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.”
O’Lone v. Est. of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). However, a regulation
limiting prisoners’ religious exercise is constitutional if the record shows that

it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 50 (3d Cir. 2000).
RLUIPA offers broader protection than the First Amendment. See Holt

v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361 (2015). The statute forbids the government from
imposing “a substantial burden” on a prisoner's religious exercise unless the
government “demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person (1)
is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). A substantial burden under RLUIPA exists where: (1)
a follower is forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion
and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates versus
abandoning one of the precepts of his religion to receive a benefit; or (2) the
government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify
his behavior to violate his beliefs. Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280
(3d Cir. 2007). Both the First Amendment and RLUIPA require that the
beliefs in question are “sincerely held” and religious in nature. See Holt, 574
U.S. at 360-61.
Here, the plaintiff alleges that the acceptance-of-responsibility
component to the sex-offender treatment program offered by the

af

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (the “DOC”) violates his
constitutional and statutory rights to the free exercise of religion because the

program requires him to admit guilt, which he perceives as denigrating his
marriage—a sacred tenet of his religion. The plaintiff holds that he could not
admit to the illegality of his sexual conduct, which he construed as
denouncing his religious marital vows, without violating his religious beliefs.
In essence, the acceptance-of-responsibility component to the program
imposes “a substantial burden” on his religious exercise.
Paradoxically, however, the plaintiffs arguments in support of the
discovery requests appear to bear no direct relevance to the program at
issue, his sincerely held religious beliefs, the tenets of his faith, or other
pertinent matters. Rather, they primarily concern his attempt to establish that
the defendants were either misinformed about, or unaware of, his marital
status, and to preemptively contest the government’s anticipated justification
that the challenged policy serves a compelling governmental interest. But the
defendants’ knowledge or misinformation regarding the plaintiffs marital
status has no bearing on whether the plaintiff was actually married, does not
advance the plaintiffs claim that his religious rights were substantially
burdened, and has no connection on whether the government can meet its

burden of showing that its policy serves a compelling governmental interest.

However fervently the plaintiff presses for disclosure, the arguments lack

relevance to the matters in dispute and are unlikely to produce information
of probative value.
Furthermore, the defendants correctly point out that the confidential
and sensitive nature of the information contained in the plaintiff's
presentence report and his psychological assessments requires their
disclosure to be limited. See Bracey v. Price, 2012 WL 849865, at *2—3 (W.D.
Pa. Mar. 13, 2012). However, that does not mean such information is beyond
discovery, where relevant. (/d.)
A presentence investigation report is comprised of: a summary of the
circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the history of
delinquency or criminality, physical and mental condition, family situation and
background, economic status, education, occupation and personal habits of
the defendant, any history of drug or alcohol abuse or addiction and any
other matters that the person preparing the report deems relevant or that the
court directs to be included. 42 Pa. C.S. §9732. In addition, the presentence
report includes “a victim impact statement as provided by law.” Pa. R. Crim.
P. 702(A)(4). If confidentiality of the report is breached, the government's

access to information would be severely compromised; and disclosure of

reports to public may stifle or discourage vital transmission of information.
United States v. Preate, 927 F. Supp. 163, 167 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
With respect to the psychological assessments of plaintiff conducted
by Department of Corrections counselors, the reliability and utility of such
evaluations depend upon the candidness of the DOC professionals.
Disclosure of these assessments to the inmate would likely inhibit such
candor, as DOC personnel may be reluctant to provide honest opinions and
evaluations. Moreover, such disclosure creates a risk that the inmate could
manipulate the information, thereby undermining the integrity of classification
decisions—both of which are undesirable outcomes.
In sum, the court concurs that the contents of the presentence report
and psychological assessments must remain confidential, as disclosure
would impair the government's ability to effectively gather and safeguard the
sensitive information contained therein. The court further observes that this
is not the plaintiff's first attempt to obtain these materials; he has previously
sought access through another proceeding. See Robins v. P.A. Dep't of
Corr., 2015 WL 179074 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2015). The same confidentiality
concerns that informed the prior ruling are present in this matter. /d. at □□□□□

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Accordingly, following in line with the prior ruling, Mr. Robins’s current
motions to compel discovery will yield the same result and be therefore
denied.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs motions to compel (Docs. 41
and 51) will be denied. An appropriate order will follow.

United States District Judge
Date: & [alas
21-1474-03

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11070663. Public record. Not legal advice.