# Telep v. Stickney

> District Court, D. Maryland · June 12, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11070534

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** June 12, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11070534

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that trespass and disturbing the peace are ”relatively minor” offenses for purposes of a Graham factor analysis

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

MATTHEW A. TELEP, *

Plaintiff, *

v. *
Civil Case No: 1:23-cv-02379-JMC
KARA ANNE STICKNEY as the Personal *
Representative of the Estate of DANIEL J.
STICKNEY, Jr., et al., *

Defendants. *

* * * * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter arises from the arrest of Plaintiff, Matthew A. Telep, after Plaintiff arrived to
pick-up his then seventeen-year-old daughter from a wedding at which multiple fights had broken
out. Telep filed the present lawsuit against Kara Anne Stickney (as personal representative of the
estate of Daniel J. Stickney, Jr.),1 Stephen S. McKinney, Francis D. Peterson, Jr., the Town of
Rising Sun, Maryland (“Town of Rising Sun”), Kyle L. Thomas, Alexander Dowling, and Heather
A. Cotton on August 30, 2023. (ECF No. 1). An Amended Complaint was filed on March 28,
2024, which is the operative complaint. (ECF No. 39). Telep asserts multiple counts against
Defendants for violations of his rights under the United States Constitution and the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, as well as several common law tort claims. Id. Currently pending before the
Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment jointly filed by Defendants Dowling and Thomas. (ECF
No. 69). The motion has been fully briefed, (ECF Nos. 73 and 76), and no hearing is necessary.

1 Plaintiff’s lawsuit originally named Daniel J. Stickney as a Defendant. (ECF No. 1). However, Mr. Stickney passed
away on January 10, 2024, and the Court granted Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to substitute Kara Anne Stickney, as
personal representative of Mr. Stickney’s estate, as a Defendant. (ECF No. 31).
See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants’ motion shall be
DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

a. The Parties
Plaintiff is a retired state trooper currently residing in Rising Sun, Maryland. (ECF No. 39
at 1). At all times relevant to Plaintiff’s claims: Daniel Stickney, Jr., (“Officer Stickney”),2 was a
police officer employed by the Rising Sun Police Department and the Town of Rising Sun;
Defendant Kara Anne Stickney, (“Defendant Stickney”), is the personal representative of the estate
of Officer Stickney following his passing; Defendant McKinney was a police officer also
employed by the Rising Sun Police Department and the Town of Rising Sun; Defendant Peterson
Jr. served as the Chief of Police for the Rising Sun Police Department, and was also employed by
the Town of Rising Sun; Defendant Town of Rising Sun is a municipal corporation located in
Cecil County, Maryland; and Defendants Thomas, Dowling, and Cotton were deputy sheriffs
employed by the Cecil County Sheriff’s Department. Id. at 2-3.
b. Factual Background3
On April 3, 2022, Plaintiff’s then seventeen-year-old daughter, Jordan Telep, attended the
wedding of Curtis and Kyria Miller at the Rising Sun Fire Hall. (ECF No. 73-1 at 29).4 At some
point in the evening multiple fights broke out at the wedding and the police were called. (ECF No.
73-3). Jordan phoned her parents from the Fire Hall, in tears, and told them she had been

2 The Court will refer to Daniel Stickney, Jr. as “Officer Stickney” so as to avoid confusing Officer Stickney with Ms.
Kara Anne Stickney.
3 The following facts are undisputed unless noted otherwise.
4 When the Court cites to a specific page number or range of page numbers, the Court is referring to the page numbers
provided in the electronic filing stamps located at the top of every electronically filed document.
physically attacked by Ms. Miller and several of her female relatives. (ECF No. 73-1 at 32).
Plaintiff and his wife, Jennifer Telep, quickly headed to the venue. Id.

When they arrived at the Fire Hall, Jordan was standing outside the venue beside her car,
“crying and visibly shaking.” Id. at 34-35. The parking lot was filled with other wedding attendees’
cars, and Plaintiff’s wife testified at deposition there were “40 or 50 people standing outside the
venue, screaming back and forth, hollering, [and] going on.” (ECF No. 73-11 at 9). Police from
the Cecil County Sheriff’s Office and the Rising Sun Police Department were already on the scene
and in the process of shutting down the wedding reception. Id. at 34. Plaintiff’s wife went to check
on Jordan, while Plaintiff proceeded to enter the Fire Hall, purportedly for the purpose of obtaining
information from Ms. Miller about the alleged assault on Jordan. (ECF No. 73-1 at 35). Per a
declaration submitted by Defendant Cotton, as Plaintiff entered the Fire Hall, Deputy Odom (who

was stationed outside, and is not a party to this litigation) radioed the police inside, stating, “you
have a hostile male coming inside.” (ECF No. 69-3 at 2).
As will be discussed, there are differing accounts as to what occurred next. It appears
undisputed that Plaintiff walked past a group of officers on his way to speak with Ms. Miller,
asking, “where’s the bride?” (ECF No. 73-1 at 36-38). Defendant Dowling described Plaintiff as
“visibly enraged” while entering the Fire Hall, writing in a supplemental police report that Plaintiff

approached Ms. Miller “at a fast pace, with clenched fists and growing increasingly louder with
his statements, displaying a physical demeanor that was aggressive and threatening towards the
female.” (ECF No. 73-5 at 2). Defendant Thomas similarly characterizes Plaintiff’s demeanor as
aggressive and threatening, as do Defendant Cotton and Deputy Odom in their respective
affidavits. (ECF No. 69-5; ECF No. 69-3; ECF No. 76-1).5 Plaintiff, however, “denies he was
yelling, denies he was being combative, and denies he clenched his fist.” (ECF No. 73 at 8) (citing
ECF No. 73-1 at 36-37). Plaintiff alleges that he approached Ms. Miller and started to ask her why
she would assault Jordan, and was mid-sentence when he was tackled from behind by Defendants

Dowling and Thomas. (ECF No. 73-1 at 36-38). The Rising Sun officers then joined in the efforts
to detain Plaintiff, and Officer Stickney dry stunned Plaintiff with a taser twice. (ECF No. 73-3).
Plaintiff’s wife testified that she saw the deputies, “throwing elbows, punching [Plaintiff] in the
sides,” and “kneeing and kicking him in the sides” while Plaintiff was saying, “I’m not resisting,
man” and “why are you doing this to me.” (ECF No. 73-11 at 9). Plaintiff was then arrested and
transported to the Rising Sun Police Station for processing. (ECF No. 73-3).
Officer Stickney and Defendant Dowling were recorded on Officer Stickney’s body-worn

camera immediately following Plaintiff’s arrest. (ECF No. 73-7). In the video, the two are seen
laughing together about the arrest, and Deputy Dowling describes “hip tossing” Plaintiff to the
ground. Id. Plaintiff notes in his Opposition that “[a]lthough Officers Stickney and McKinney
activated their body cameras before and after the arrest, neither captured the events leading up to
Telep’s arrest or the actual arrest or, if they were captured, that portion of the recordings has been
deleted.” (ECF No. 73 at 10 n.4). Regardless of the reason why, no body-worn camera footage
capturing the arrest itself has been produced in this litigation.

c. Procedural History

5 Defendants Dowling and Thomas also provide an affidavit signed by Ms. Miller in support of their motion. (ECF
No. 69-6). However, Plaintiff attached text communications to his Opposition between Ms. Miller and Defendants’
counsel, in which Ms. Miller indicates she wishes to withdraw her affidavit because she felt pressured to execute it
and is uncomfortable with “some of the wording.” (ECF No. 73-9). In their Reply brief, Defendants argue that the
affidavit was not withdrawn and provide email communications dated before the affidavit’s execution as evidence
that it was voluntarily signed. (ECF No. 76 at 4). In any case, as will be discussed, because the Court relies on other
evidence in the record to find that genuine disputes of fact preclude summary judgment, the issue of whether Ms.
Miller’s affidavit should be considered withdrawn need not be reached.
Based on the foregoing allegations,6 Plaintiff’s lawsuit alleges that: Defendants Officer
Stickney, McKinney, Thomas, Dowling, and Cotton—in their individual capacities—violated
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizures (Count I); Defendants
Officer Stickney, McKinney, Thomas, Dowling, and Cotton—in their individual capacities—

violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive and unreasonable
force (Count II); Officer Stickney—in his individual capacity—violated Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution (Count III); Officer Stickney—in his
individual capacity—violated Plaintiff’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by intentionally
concealing exculpatory information (Count IV); Chief Peterson and Rising Sun violated Plaintiff’s
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence (Count V); all
Defendants violated Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by unlawfully seizing
Plaintiff (Count VI); all Defendants violated Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by
using excessive and unreasonable force (Count VII); Officer Stickney and Rising Sun violated
Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by maliciously prosecuting Plaintiff

(Count VIII); Officer Stickney, Chief Peterson, and Rising Sun violated Articles 24 and 26 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence (Count IX); Officer
Stickney, McKinney, Thomas, and Dowling battered Plaintiff (Count X); Officer Stickney,
McKinney, Thomas, and Dowling falsely arrested Plaintiff (Count XI); Officer Stickney,
McKinney, Thomas, and Dowling falsely imprisoned Plaintiff (Count XII); Officer Stickney
maliciously prosecuted Plaintiff (Count XIII); and Chief Peterson and Rising Sun negligently hired
and retained Officer Stickney (Count XIV). (ECF No. 39).

6 Several of Plaintiff’s claims relate to the events following his arrest and the fact that he faced criminal charges.
These facts are discussed in the Court’s prior opinion denying Officer McKinney’s motion for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 49). Because this background is not pertinent to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Dowling and
Thomas, the Court will not elaborate on them here.
The undersigned denied Defendant McKinney’s Motion for Summary Judgment on May
3, 2024. (ECF No. 49). On May 10, 2024, the undersigned granted in part and denied in part
Defendants’ jointly filed Partial Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, or in the Alternative, Motion
to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery. (ECF No. 53). Counts IV, V, and IX were dismissed in their

entirety. Id. The Court additionally dismissed Count XIV against the Town of Rising Sun,
determined that Counts I-IV could not proceed against the named Defendants in their official
capacities,7 and bifurcated Count XIV to the extent it remained against Defendant Chief Peterson.
Id. On March 26, 2025, this Court approved a stipulation of voluntary dismissal dismissing all
claims against Defendants McKinney and Cotton without prejudice. (ECF No. 67).
Currently pending is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Dowling and
Thomas. (ECF No. 69). They jointly move for summary judgment as to all remaining claims

against them: Counts I, II, VI, VII, and X-XII. Id.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the Court to “grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” A dispute as to a material fact “is genuine if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” J.E. Dunn Const. Co. v.
S.R.P. Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 115 F. Supp. 3d 593, 600 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A nonmoving party “opposing a properly supported motion

for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but

7 Defendants’ motion as to Counts I-IV was actually denied as moot because Plaintiff did not name the Defendants in
their official capacities. (ECF No. 53 at 8).
rather must ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Bouchat v.
Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
The Court is “required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to” the nonmoving party. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Scott

v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007)). However, the Court must also “abide by the ‘affirmative
obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding
to trial.’” Heckman v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 2d 792, 799–800 (D. Md. 2013)
(quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993)). Consequently, a party cannot
create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation of inferences.
See Deans v. CSX Transp., Inc., 152 F.3d 326, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1998).
III. ANALYSIS

a. Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure and excessive force claims: Counts I and
II
i. There are genuine disputes of material fact as to whether the seizure of
Plaintiff was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Defendants Dowling and Thomas aver they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
unlawful seizure claim because they “had ample cause to grab Plaintiff to restrain him and take
him to the ground to disrupt [his] assaultive behavior and prevent the completion of a reasonably
perceived imminent battery.” (ECF No. 69-1 at 9). The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A seizure is unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment if it is not based on probable cause.” Hupp v. Cook, 931 F.3d 307, 318
(4th Cir. 2019) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)). “Thus, ‘[i]f a person is
arrested when no reasonable officer could believe . . . that probable cause exists to arrest that
person, a violation of a clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be arrested only upon
probable cause ensues.’” Id. (quoting Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 290 (4th Cir. 2001)).
“Probable cause is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances approach.” Smith v. Munday,
848 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Two factors are considered: “the suspect’s conduct as known to the

officer, and the contours of the offense thought to be committed by that conduct.” Id. (quoting
Graham v. Gagnon, 831 F.3d 176, 184 (4th Cir. 2016)).
Defendants Dowling and Thomas maintain the seizure of Plaintiff was justified by
Plaintiff’s allegedly threatening demeanor, which they characterize as an assault, and imminent
battery upon Ms. Miller. (ECF No. 69-1 at 8). The probable cause inquiry is informed by the
“contours of the offense” at issue, and the Court will therefore rely on Maryland’s assault statute
in determining whether a reasonable officer could believe Plaintiff’s seizure was permissible. See
Hupp, 931 F.3d at 318-19 (considering West Virginia obstruction statute in finding whether
officers could have reasonably concluded there existed probable cause to arrest plaintiff).
Maryland’s criminal code defines assault as “the crimes of assault, battery, and assault and battery,

which retain their judicially determined meanings.” Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-201(b).
Maryland’s courts have clarified that “second-degree assault encompasses three modalities: (1)
intent to frighten, (2) attempted battery, and (3) battery.” Snyder v. State, 63 A.3d 128, 135 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2013). Defendants Dowling and Thomas appear to rely exclusively upon the intent
to frighten theory of assault in support of their motion, (ECF No. 69-1 at 9), an offence which is
comprised of three elements: “(1) the defendant committed an act with the intent to place the victim
in fear of immediate physical harm; (2) the defendant had the apparent ability at the time of the act
to bring about the threatened physical harm; and (3) the victim was aware of the threat[.]” Garcia
v. Montgomery Cnty., 145 F. Supp. 3d 492, 521 (D. Md. 2015) (citing Jones v. State, 103 A.3d
586, 589 (Md. 2014)).
Considering these principles in conjunction with the record in this matter, the Court
determines that disputes of fact preclude finding that a reasonable officer in the positions of

Defendants Dowling and Thomas could have concluded there was probable cause to seize Plaintiff.
Critically, the parties dispute whether Plaintiff approached Ms. Miller in an aggressive manner.
They dispute the speed at which Plaintiff walked towards her, whether he yelled at her, and if his
fist was clenched. Compare ECF No. 75-4 (Defendant Dowling’s report describing Plaintiff
entering the Fire Hall “visibly enraged, making loud, verbal statements regarding his daughter
being assaulted” and “stepp[ing] even closer to [Ms. Miller], at a fast pace, with clenched fists”)
and ECF No. 73-2 at (Plaintiff’s affidavit attesting “I walked into the Fire Hall at a normal
pace[.]”); see also ECF No. 73-1 at 38-41 (Plaintiff’s testimony that he did not approach Ms. Miller
with a closed fist and could not speak very loudly because he was “getting over bronchitis”). There
is also a dispute as to whether the deputies commanded Plaintiff to stop as he approached Ms.

Miller. (ECF No. 69-4 at 2). Further, because Defendants have produced no body-worn camera
footage of the incident, the Court can only rely on the parties’ conflicting accounts of what
occurred.
The manner in which Plaintiff approached Ms. Miller is material as to whether a reasonable
officer in Defendants Dowling and Thomas’ position could have concluded that Plaintiff acted
with the intent to place Ms. Miller in fear of physical harm, or that he had the present ability to
bring about the threatened harm, such that there existed probable cause to seize him. See Garcia,
145 F. Supp. 3d at 521 (finding no reasonable basis for probable cause based on intent to frighten
second-degree assault where arrestee allegedly cursed and pointed at another person and police
were standing only a few feet away). Because there are genuine disputes of fact as to Plaintiff’s
conduct leading up to his seizure and arrest, summary judgment as to Count I shall be denied.
ii. There are genuine disputes of material fact as to whether the force used
to detain Plaintiff was objectively reasonable.
Defendants Dowling and Thomas next contend their use of force was objectively
reasonable because “[t]he severity of a potential battery of a pregnant bride is obviously significant
and Plaintiff’s behavior posed an immediate threat to her safety.” (ECF No. 69-1 at 10). “A claim
that a police officer used excessive force in making an arrest, investigatory stop, or seizure of a
person is ‘properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.”
Dorsey v. Sokoloff, 381 F. Supp. 3d 521, 531 (D. Md. 2019) (quoting Armstrong v. Vill. of
Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, 899 (4th Cir. 2016)); see Fernandes v. Montgomery Cnty., No. AW-10-

cv-752, 2012 WL 1664086, at *3 (D. Md. May 10, 2012) (“[An excessive force] claim is analyzed
under objective standards of reasonableness, meaning an officer’s actions are not excessive if they
are ‘objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [the officer].’”)
(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 397 (1989)). “Courts examine three factors [under Graham]
to determine if an officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable: (1) the severity of the crime
at issue, (2) the extent to which a suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and (3) the extent to which a suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest
by flight.” Dorsey, 381 F. Supp. 3d at 531 (internal quotations omitted). “The determination is to
be made from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene . . . based upon the information
the officers had when the conduct occurred.” McCullough v. Anne Arundel Cnty., No. CV CCB-

19-926, 2022 WL 959516, at *8 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2022) (cleaned up).
The genuine disputes of fact identified above likewise make summary judgment
inappropriate on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. See supra Sec. III(a)(i). The first Graham factor
favors Plaintiff because he was ultimately arrested for various misdemeanors, relatively non-
serious crimes. See, e.g., Est. of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 409, 417 (D. Md.
2014) (noting that trespass and disturbing the peace are ”relatively minor” offenses for purposes
of a Graham factor analysis); Santana v. State, No. 1146, 2024 WL 226590, at *9 (Md. App. Ct.

Jan. 22, 2024); Britton v. State, 30 A.3d 236, 242-43 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (explaining that
second-degree assault under § 3-203(a) of Maryland’s criminal code is a misdemeanor).
Moreover, per Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, he was committing no crime when Defendants
Thomas and Dowling tackled him, and was merely attempting to speak with Ms. Miller to inquire
about the details of the alleged assault on his daughter. (ECF No. 73-1 at 38). If Plaintiff’s account
is credited, this factor weighs even more heavily Plaintiff’s favor. See Dorsey, 381 F. Supp. 3d at
531 (“When the subject of a seizure has not committed any crime, this factor weighs heavily in
[the subject’s] favor.”) (internal quotation omitted).
There are also genuine disputes of fact regarding the second and third Graham factors.
With respect to the second factor, according to Plaintiff’s disputed version of events, he merely

approached Ms. Miller at a “normal pace” and started to ask her a question at an ordinary speaking
volume before being tackled from behind. (ECF No. 73-1 at 38-41). Viewing the factual
allegations and disputed facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that Plaintiff did not pose an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others. As
for the third Graham factor, Defendants Dowling and Thomas contend that Plaintiff resisted being
handcuffed after he was tackled, requiring Officer Stickney to tase him so that he could be cuffed.
(ECF No. 69-4 at 2; ECF No. 69-5 at) (“Mr. Telep was told several times to stop resisting and
allow himself to be handcuffed and he refused and continued to resist.”). Plaintiff, however,
maintains he did not resist, but could not comply with the officers demands to “give [them his]
hands” because his body tensed after being tased. (ECF No. 73-1 at 46).
Additionally, while the deputies’ arguments for summary judgment on Count II are
predicated solely on their use of force in seizing Plaintiff, Plaintiff alleges that after he was tackled

and tased the deputies and Rising Sun officers proceeded to punch and kick him. (ECF No. 73-1
at 46). Plaintiff’s account is corroborated by his wife’s deposition testimony. (ECF No. 73-11 at
33) (“I see them throwing elbows, punching him in the sides. I see them kicking and kneeing him
in the sides.”). In their Reply brief, Defendants Dowling and Thomas dispute that they punched or
kicked Plaintiff, and no account of hitting or kicking Plaintiff is included in their supplemental
police reports or referenced in their affidavits. (ECF No. 76 at 2-3).8 The Fourth Circuit has “made
clear that the justification for using protective force expires at the very moment a threat is
neutralized.” Dean v. Jones, 984 F.3d 295, 305 (4th Cir. 2021). Thus, once Plaintiff was subdued
the deputies “no longer had reason to fear for officer or public safety” and the “use of force became
unnecessary and unjustified.” Id.; see also Harris v. Pittman, 927 F.3d 266, 274 (4th Cir. 2019)

(“[T]he reasonableness of force employed can turn on a change of circumstances during an
encounter lasting only a few seconds.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If
Plaintiff’s version of events were credited by a factfinder, the second and third Graham factors
would undoubtedly weigh in his favor. Thus, because there are genuine disputes of fact material
to the extent to which Plaintiff posed a threat to the safety of others and the extent to which he

8 Defendants argue allegations of kicking and punching Plaintiff are unreliable and uncorroborated. (ECF No. 76 at
2). Credibility determinations of this kind are inappropriate at the summary judgment stage. Jennings v. Frostburg
State Univ., 679 F. Supp. 3d 240, 264 (D. Md. 2023) (“[I]n considering a summary judgment motion, the court may
not make credibility determinations.”). Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s account is corroborated by his
wife’s deposition testimony. (ECF No. 73-11 at 9).
resisted arrest, the Court is unable to conclude that Plaintiff’s seizure was objectively reasonable
as a matter of law.
In sum, the parties’ conflicting accounts do not warrant entering summary judgment on
this issue, particularly considering that the first Graham factor undoubtedly weighs in Plaintiff’s

favor and in light of the Court’s obligation to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to Plaintiff. Iko, 535 F.3d at 230 (citation omitted). Summary judgment on
Count II shall be denied.
iii. Defendants Dowling and Thomas are not entitled to qualified
immunity.
Defendants Dowling and Thomas argue they are entitled to qualified immunity and should
therefore be granted summary judgment on Counts I and II as a matter of law. (ECF No. 69-1 a
11). “Qualified immunity protects all governmental officials except those who violate a ‘statutory
or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.’” Smith
v. Murphy, 634 F. App’x 914, 916 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Carroll v. Carman, 574 U.S. 13, 16
(2014)). “A right is clearly established only if its contours are sufficiently clear that ‘a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Carroll, 574 U.S. at 16
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “Courts apply a two-step test in
determining whether a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity, inquiring, first, whether the
facts alleged or shown, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establish that the officer’s
conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional right, and second, if the first prong is satisfied,
whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the officer’s conduct.” Dorsey, 381

F. Supp. 3d at 530 (internal quotations omitted). “[I]n reviewing a motion for summary judgment
on the basis of qualified immunity, the court generally adopts ‘the plaintiff’s version of the facts.’”
Id. (quoting Witt v. W. Va. State Police, Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272, 276 (4th Cir. 2011)). “Only one of
the questions has to be resolved in favor of the defendant” for qualified immunity to apply. Moore
v. Peitzmeier, No. CV TDC-18-2151, 2020 WL 94467, at *10 (D. Md. Jan. 7, 2020).
“Accordingly, even when the facts in the record establish that the officer’s conduct violated a
plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the officer still is entitled to immunity from suit ‘if a reasonable

person in the [officer’s] position could have failed to appreciate that his conduct would violate
those rights.’” Wilson v. Prince George’s Cnty., 893 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1991)); see also Swagler v. Sheridan, 837 F.
Supp. 2d 509, 534–35 (D. Md. 2011).
The Court has already explained that there are genuine disputes of material fact as to
whether Defendants Dowling and Thomas violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free
from unlawful seizure and/or excessive force, and that, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
Plaintiff’s version could establish such violations if proven. The Court will therefore turn to the
second prong of the qualified immunity analysis.9 “A right is clearly established if it would be
clear to a reasonable officer that the alleged conduct is unlawful.” Dorsey, 381 F. Supp. 3d at 533.

“To determine whether a right is clearly established, we assess whether the law has been
authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court, the appropriate United States Court of Appeals, or
the highest court of the state.” Id. Although a “case directly on point for a right to be clearly
established” is not necessary to deny an officer qualified immunity, “existing precedent must have
placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100,
104 (2018). The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed courts “not to define clearly established
law at a high level of generality.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Specificity is especially

9 The undersigned previously held Officer McKinney was not entitled to qualified immunity in deciding McKinney’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, which necessarily included a determination that the Constitutional rights Plaintiff
alleges were violated were clearly established law. (ECF No. 49). This opinion incorporates much of the same
authority and analysis.
important in the Fourth Amendment context, where the [Supreme] Court has recognized that it is
sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive
force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.” Id.; see also Schultz, 290 F. Supp.
2d at 648 (“Thus, qualified immunity protects law enforcement officers from bad guesses in gray

areas and ensures that they are liable only for transgressing bright lines.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
Defendants Dowling and Thomas emphasize these principles of specificity in their motion
and contend there is “no precedent in the Fourth Circuit that would have instructed the deputies
that it would be an unreasonable and excessive use of force to grab and take to the ground an
individual engaged in [] threatening assaultive behavior toward a pregnant bride.” (ECF No. 69-1
at 14). This is far too narrow an interpretation of what is required to demonstrate clearly established
law. Dean for and on behalf of Harkness v. McKinney, 976 F.3d 407, 417 (4th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he
absence of controlling authority holding identical conduct unlawful does not guarantee qualified
immunity.”). The Court may determine that a right is clearly established absent case law with

identical facts, and such a finding in this matter certainly does not require precedent specifically
involving an assault on a pregnant bride. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (“Although
earlier cases involving ‘fundamentally similar’ facts can provide strong support for a conclusion
that the law is clearly established, they are not necessary to such a finding.”).
Regarding Plaintiff’s testimony that he was tackled by Deputies Dowling and Thomas
when approaching Ms. Miller in a non-aggressive manner, Fourth Circuit precedent clearly

establishes “that a police officer’s tackling to the ground a non-threatening, nonresisting,
misdemeanor suspect violates the Fourth Amendment.” Higginbotham v. Brauer, No. DKC 18-
1067, 2020 WL 4569520, at * (D. Md. Aug. 7, 2020) (citing Kane v. Hargis, 987 F.2d 1005, 1008
(4th Cir. 1993)); see also Barfield v. Kershaw Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 638 F. App’x 196, 203 (4th Cir.
2016) (“Although there is not a case directly on all fours with the facts of this case, the law at the
time of [the officer’s] conduct makes clear that in November 2011, a police officer’s unprovoked
tackling of a nonthreatening, nonresisting misdemeanor suspect to effect his arrest violates the

Fourth Amendment.”). As for Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants Dowling and Thomas kicked
and punched after he was subdued, “there is controlling precedent holding that assaulting an
unarmed, subdued suspect or arrestee violates the Fourth Amendment.” Moore, 2020 WL 94467,
at *11. As the Court explained in its May 5, 2024 Memorandum Opinion and Order denying
Defendant McKinney’s Motion for Summary Judgment:
[T]he Fourth Circuit concluded in Kane v. Hargis that a police officer’s decision to
exert additional physical force on an already secured, unarmed citizen that no
longer posed any potential threat violated that citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights.
987 F.2d 1005, 1008 (4th Cir. 1993). The Fourth Circuit likewise explained in Jones
v. Buchanan how police officers violated an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights
when they used unnecessary additional force against an already subdued individual
“who posed no threat to the officer or others and had neither committed, nor was
suspected of committing, any crime.” 325 F.3d 520, 534 (4th Cir. 2003). To be
clear, the alleged excessive force in both cases was more severe than what Plaintiff
faults Defendant McKinney for. However, both cases nevertheless make clear that
an officer’s additional use of unnecessary force against an already subdued,
unarmed individual constitutes a clear Fourth Amendment violation. The Fourth
Circuit in Jones also provided several citations to cases in other Circuits in which
officers were denied qualified immunity for exerting unnecessary, additional force
against an already neutralized individual, even where the individual suffered no
serious or permanent injury. See id. at 533–34 (collecting cases); Smith, 634 F.
App’x at 617–18 (explaining in the context of whether an officer is entitled to
qualified immunity for alleged Fourth Amendment excessive force violations that
there is no support for the proposition that “suffering only de minimis injuries bars
one from asserting a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim”).

(ECF No. 49 at 17). Keeping these principles in mind and adopting Plaintiff’s version of events,
the undersigned concludes that the rights at issue were clearly established at the time of the relevant
conduct. Accordingly, the Court cannot hold as a matter of law that Defendants Dowling and
Thomas are entitled to qualified immunity as to Counts I and II.

b. State Constitutional Claims: Article 26 unlawful seizure and excessive force
claims (Counts VI and VIII)
The parties correctly identify that “state constitutional claims under Articles 24 and 26 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights are construed in pari materia to … Fourth Amendment
claim[s]. Miller v. Prince George’s Cnty., 475 F.3d 621, 631 n.5 (4th Cir. 2007); Smith v. Bortner,
998 A.2d 369, 380 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010). Thus, the Court declines to grant summary judgment
on Counts VI and VIII given that there exist genuine disputes of material fact as to whether
Defendants Dowling and Thomas violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Rights. See supra Sec.
III(a).
c. Common law claims: Battery (Count X), false arrest (Count XI), and false
imprisonment (Count XII)
Defendants Dowling and Thomas maintain Plaintiff’s battery claim fails as a matter of law
because their use of force against Plaintiff was reasonable under the circumstances. (ECF No. 69-
1 at 16). As explained in the Court’s prior summary judgment opinion, “the principle of
reasonableness announced in Graham is the appropriate one to apply to excessive force claims
brought under Article 26 and for common law claims of battery in an excessive force suit.”
Randall v. Peaco, 175 Md. App. 320, 332 (2007); (ECF No. 49). The Court’s conclusion that
genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding the merits of Plaintiff’s unlawful seizure and
excessive force claims therefore also preclude summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s

battery claim.
Finally, the deputies contend they should be granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s false
arrest and false imprisonment claims because their seizure of Plaintiff was legally justified. (ECF
No. 69-1 at 16). “Under Maryland common law, false arrest and false imprisonment are intentional
torts.” Dett v. State, 161 Md. App. 429, 441 (2005). “The torts are separate causes of action that
share the same elements . . . 1) the deprivation of the liberty of another; 2) without [his] consent;
and 3) without legal justification.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “[A] police officer carrying

out either an arrest under warrant or a warrantless arrest is not liable for false imprisonment in
connection with that arrest if the officer had legal authority to arrest under the circumstances.”
Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 721 (1995). The critical inquiry, just as it was for
Plaintiff’s unlawful seizure claims, is whether Defendants Dowling and Thomas acted without
legal justification. The Court has already determined that genuine disputes of material fact
preclude summary judgment on this issue. Defendants’ motion as to Counts X, XI, and XII will
therefore be denied.
d. Defendants Dowling and Thomas are not entitled to immunity under the
Maryland Tort Claims Act.
Defendants Dowling and Thomas next maintain they are entitled to statutory immunity
under the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”). “[G]enerally[,] under common law, the State
enjoys sovereign immunity and is thus protected from suit for both ordinary torts and State
constitutional torts. The State, however, has partially waived this immunity by statute.” Cooper v.
Rodriguez, 118 A.3d 829, 844-45 (Md. 2015) (quoting Ford v. Balt. City Sheriff’s Off., 814 A.2d
127, 133 (2002)). Pertinent here, the MTCA provides: “State personnel shall have immunity from
liability described under § 5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.” Md. Code
Ann., State Gov’t § 12-105. Under § 5-522(b), state personnel are immune “from liability in tort

for a tortious act or omission that is within the scope of the public duties of the State personnel and
is made without malice or gross negligence[.]” Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(b).
Defendants Dowling and Thomas argue there are no facts suggesting they acted with malice or
gross negligence because the detention of Plaintiff and accompanying force was reasonable under
the circumstances, and they are accordingly immune under the MTCA as a matter of law. The
Court does not agree.

For purposes of the MTCA, Maryland courts apply a standard of “actual malice,” which
“normally refers ‘to conduct characterized by evil or wrongful motive, intent to injure, knowing
and deliberate wrongdoing, ill-will or fraud…” Lee v. Cline, 863 A.2d 297, 311 (Md. 2004)
(quoting Shoemaker v. Smith, 725 A.2d 549, 559 (Md. 1999)); see also Barbe v. Pope, 935 A.2d
699, 714 (Md. 2007) (“In cases involving allegations of malice we have said that well-pled facts
showing ‘ill-will’ or ‘evil or wrongful motive’ are sufficient to take a claim outside the immunity
and non-liability provisions of the MTCA.”) (citations omitted). Gross negligence is viewed “as
something more than simple negligence, and likely more akin to reckless conduct,” and has been

described as:
[A]n intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the
consequences as affecting the life or property of another, and also implies a
thoughtless disregard of the consequences without the exertion of any effort to
avoid them. Stated conversely, a wrongdoer is guilty of gross negligence or acts
wantonly and willfully only when he inflicts injury intentionally or is so utterly
indifferent to the rights of others that he acts as if such rights did not exist.

Barbre, 863 A.2d at 717 (first quoting Taylor v. Harford Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 862 A.2d
1026, 1035 (Md. 2004) (emphasis in original); and then quoting Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co.,
495 A.2d 838, 846 (Md. 1985)). Gross negligence is evaluated on the facts and circumstances of
each case, and is generally a question reserved for the factfinder unless reasonable people “could
not differ as to the rational conclusion to be reached.” Cooper, 118 A.3d at 846 (quoting Romanesk
v. Rose, 237 A.2d 12, 14 (1968)). Thus, “[u]nless the facts are so clear as a matter of law, it is for
the trier of fact to determine whether a defendant’s negligent conduct amounts to gross
negligence.” Id. (quoting Taylor, 862 A.2d at 1034).

As has been discussed extensively, there are genuine disputes of material fact regarding
whether Defendants Dowling and Thomas had a reasonable basis to tackle Plaintiff, as well as
whether they kicked and punched him once he was subdued and on the ground. If a factfinder
credited Plaintiff’s account of events, it could reasonably be inferred that the deputies were
motivated by an intent to injure Plaintiff, or at least that they acted with indifference to his rights.
See Okwa v. Harper, 757 A.2d 118, 127-29 (Md. 2000) (holding a reasonable factfinder could
determine officers acted with malice, where it was disputed whether nonresisting Plaintiff was
“forcibly put to the ground” and struck “in the head and neck” by arresting officers); Lee, 863 A.2d
at 310 (“Wrestling another to the ground, pulling his hair, and hitting him on the case, again

without cause or provocation, is certainly malicious conduct.”). On this record, the Court cannot
conclude that Defendants Dowling and Thomas are immune under the MTCA as a matter of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Dowling
and Thomas (ECF No. 69) is DENIED.

Date: June 12, 2025 /s/
J.Mark Coulson
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11070534. Public record. Not legal advice.