# CLARK CNTY. v. DIST. CT. (EGGLESTON)

> Nevada Supreme Court · June 12, 2025 · 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 31

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11070244

## Case

- **Court:** Nevada Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 12, 2025
- **Citations:** 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 31
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 1 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11070244

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that we may consider writ petitions challenging the denial of a motion for summary judgment when there is no factual dispute and the petition presents a clear question of law

## Opinion text

141 Nev., Advance Opinion ..31

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

CLARK COUNTY; AND GEORGINA No. 87906
STUART,
Petitioners,
vs.
THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE
SUSAN JOHNSON, DISTRICT JUDGE,
Respondents,
and
STEVE EGGLESTON, AN
INDIVIDUAL,
Real Party in Interest.

Original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district
court order denying a motion for summary judgment on immunity grounds
in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and tort action.
Petition granted.

Olson, Cannon, Gormley & Stoberski and Felicia Galati and Stephanie A.
Barker, Las Vegas,
for Petitioners.

Clark Hill PLLC and Paola M. Armeni and William D. Schuller, Las Vegas,
for Real Party in Interest.

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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, HERNDON, C.J.:
In this opinion, we consider whether qualified and
discretionary-act immunity apply to bar suit against a social worker who
allegedly coerced a parent to sign guardianship papers permitting relatives
to temporarily care for his children. Below, real party in interest Steve
Eggleston sued petitioners Clark County and Georgina Stuart, an employee
of the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS), for violations of
his due process rights after he signed temporary guardianship papers in the
midst of an ongoing child abuse/neglect investigation, asserting that Stuart
and the County forced him to do so on threat that his children would
otherwise be forever removed from his care. Stuart and Clark County
moved for summary judgment on the ground that their actions were
protected by qualified immunity and discretionary-act immunity, but the
district court denied their motion. Stuart and Clark County then filed this
petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the order denying summary
judgment. We conclude that our discretionary consideration of the petition
is warranted and, determining that immunity bars the suit, grant the
petition.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Eggleston and his former girlfriend Laura Rodriguez have two
children together: R.E., born in December 2010, and H.E., born in July 2012.
Rodriguez also has adult children from prior relationships, and she has been
the subject of multiple Child Protective Services (CPS) investigations into
abuse and neglect involving those other children. Rodriguez has had

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ongoing problems with substance abuse that, in the years leading up to the
pertinent events, resulted in a DUI conviction, the loss of her job and
cosmetology license, and an overdose. On December 29, 2014, she told one
of her adult daughters that she planned to kill herself. When the daughter
reported this suicide threat to the police, DFS was notified and began
investigating for potential risk to the children, with Stuart assigned to the
case.
Stuart observed that Rodriguez's substance abuse was ongoing
and Eggleston was struggling to make ends meet while providing
supervision for the children. For example, when H.E. developed
appendicitis, Eggleston was rarely able to visit him in the hospital due to
his long work hours and instead left him in the care of Rodriguez, despite
Rodriguez's routine abuse of alcohol and prescription medications at the
time. At one point while under Rodriguez's care, H.E. fell into the family's
pool and nearly drowned. As a result, Stuart worked on developing a plan
to secure in-home services and support for the family by connecting
Eggleston with local organizations and resources, including mental health
support and rent assistance. Because Rodriguez's adult children, along
with Rodriguez's sister Lisa Callahan—who was visiting from out of state—
could provide supervision for the children, the DFS team determined that
the in-home care plan was sufficient. Despite these efforts, however, the
family faced numerous challenges in early January 2015, including
imminent eviction, Rodriguez and Eggleston planning to separate due to
Rodriguez seeking in-patient treatment for her substance abuse, and
Callahan's departure from the home, all of which raised a serious question
as to how Eggleston would provide for R.E. and H.E.

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In light of these developments, Stuart, her supervisors, and
other DFS employees met to discuss plans for the children's care and
supervision. They ultimately agreed that, without the assistance the
visiting family members had provided, Eggleston and Rodriguez likely
would not be able keep their children safe, and a supervisor recommended
the children's removal from the household and placement in the foster care
system. Stuart proposed that, alternatively, Eggleston and Rodriguez could
voluntarily assign temporary guardianship over R.E. and H.E. to the
Callahans.
On January 7, 2015, Stuart visited the home to discuss the DFS
team's proposed options for R.E. and H.E's care with Eggleston. She was
accompanied by two police officers and Rodriquez's sister, Lisa Callahan.
During the discussion, Stuart presented Eggleston with a choice: Eggleston
could sign the proposed temporary guardianship papers, or DFS would
place the children into protective custody and file an abuse and neglect
petition with the court seeking the removal of the children from the horne.
Eggleston called his attorney and apprised her of the situation. Eggleston's
attorney spoke directly with Stuart about the options available, and then
his attorney advised him to accept the ternporary guardianship. Taking his
attorney's counsel, Eggleston, a formerly practicing attorney himself, signed
the papers, which released the two minor children to the Callahans for up
to six rnonths. The Callahans returned to their home with the children, and
Eggleston asserts that, from the date on which the temporary guardianship
papers were signed, he has seen the children only once, at a legal proceeding
where the Callahans live.
Eggleston subsequently sued Clark County and Stuart,
asserting claims for substantive and procedural due process violations

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED). Following discovery, Stuart and Clark County moved for summary
judgment, arguing that qualified immunity and discretionary-act immunity
foreclosed the § 1983 claims and the IIED claim, respectively. The district
court denied the motion. Clark County and Stuart now petition this court
for mandamus relief.1
DISCUSSION
We elect to entertain the writ petition
Writ relief is extraordinary. Archon Corp. v. Eighth chid. Dist.
Ct., 133 Nev. 816, 822, 407 P.3d 702, 708 (2017). We may issue a writ of
mandamus "in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law." NRS 34.170. "[T]he issuance of a
writ of mandamus . . . is purely discretionary with this court." Srnith v.
Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991). This
court generally will not entertain petitions challenging the denial of
summary judgment but may do so where "the relevant facts are not in
dispute and a clear question of law, dispositive of the suit, is presented."
Bottorff v. O'Donnell, 96 Nev. 606, 608, 614 P.2d 7, 8 (1980). Because we
have not previously addressed whether a writ petition is the appropriate
vehicle for challenging the denial of a summary judgment motion premised
upon defenses of qualified and discretionary-act immunity, we take the
opportunity to do so here.
When forced to face the "burdens of litigation" erroneously,
public officials lose the protections of qualified and discretionary-act

As the parties do not distinguish Clark County and Stuart for
1
purposes of their immunity arguments, we treat them the same for such
purposes as well.
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immunity in their entirety. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985);
see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996) (explaining that
qualified immunity is meant to protect officials from pretrial matters as well
as from standing trial). The denial of such immunity cannot be adequately
remedied via traditional appeal from a final judgment because the
protections constitute an "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense
to liability." Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 526-27. The right to immunity "is
effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial," as the public
official cannot be reimmunized if erroneously required to face the burdens
of litigation. Id. Recognizing this unique characteristic of such immunity,
other states have permitted interlocutory review in similar circumstances
where a question of law is at issue. See, e.g., Tucker u. Resha, 648 So. 2d
1187, 1190 (Fla. 1994); Robinson v. Pack, 679 S.E.2d 660, 665 (W. Va. 2009);
Furlong v. Gardner, 956 P.2d 545, 550-51 (Colo. 1998). So too has the
United States Supreme Court. See Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 530. The same is
true of discretionary-act immunity. See Martinez v. Maruszczak, 123 Nev.
433, 447, 168 P.3d 720, 729 (2007) (indicating that, under NRS 41.032(2),
discretionary-act immunity is "immunity from suit").
Although we have not previously addressed whether a petition
for writ relief is an appropriate avenue to challenge a denial of immunity,
we have observed that questions of immunity must be resolved at the
earliest possible stage of litigation. See Butler ex rel. Biller v. Bayer, 123
Nev. 450, 458, 168 P.3d 1055, 1061 (2007). We recognize that an improper
denial of qualified and discretionary-act immunities subjects Stuart to the
very litigation that those doctrines were adopted to guard against and may
discourage similarly situated public officials from lawfully discharging their
duties out of fear of being sued. See Harlow u. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816

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(1982) (qualified immunity prevents the "distraction of officials from their
governmental duties" and the "deterrence of able people from public
service"); Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 526-27 (a denial of qualified immunity is
"effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment" because
immunity is lost if a case erroneously goes to trial); Gregoire u. Biddle, 177
F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950) (holding that
without the protection of qualified immunity, the risks and uncertainty of
litigation could dissuade public servants from doing their duty). These
immunities are meant to insulate law-abiding public servants against the
harm of litigation itself, and therefore the ability to challenge the wrongful
denial of qualified and discretionary-act immunity defenses in an appeal
from the final judgment after trial does not constitute a plain, speedy, or
adequate remedy at law. Thus, we elect to entertain this petition.
Stuart is entitled to qualified immunity from Eggleston's constitutional
claims
Stuart argues that she is entitled to summary judgment on
Eggleston's substantive and procedural due process claims under the
doctrine of qualified immunity. "When reviewing an order granting or
denying summary judgment in the context of a writ petition, we must also
be cognizant of the summary judgment standard," and we review the order
de novo. State, Dep't of Transp. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. 549, 553,
402 P.3d 677, 682 (2017). Summary judgment is proper if, considering the
pleadings and all other evidence in the record, no genuine issue of material
fact exists, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Wood u. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005).
Granting summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is appropriate
where the defendant's conduct did not violate any clearly established
constitutional law. See White u. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78-79 (2017) (quoting
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Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)); see also Butler, 123 Nev. at 458,
168 P.3d at 1061. Whether the defendant violated clearly established law
is a question of law that we review de novo, despite the necessary review of
the factual allegations. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 528-29 & n.9; see also Mabe u.
San Bernardino Cnty., Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th
Cir. 2011) ("Whether specific facts constitute a violat on of established law
is a legal determination reviewed de novo.").
We conduct a two-step analysis based on the Supreme Court's
holding in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), to decide the qualified
immunity question: (1) whether the defendant's conduct violated a
constitutional right, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, and (2) whether, at the time of the defendant's conduct, said
constitutional right was clearly established in the law. Butler, 123 Nev. at
458-59, 168 P.3d at 1061-62 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. 194). We may address
either prong first. Pearson u. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Thus, an
official's conduct loses the protections of qualified immunity when, at the
time of the conduct at issue, the scope of the right is so clearly established
that any reasonable official would recognize a violation. See Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). This is an exacting standard, requiring that
every reasonable official would understand that then-existing precedent
forbids the defendant's conduct in the specific circumstances where it
occurred. See District of Columbia u. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). This
does not require a plaintiff to show that the exact conduct at issue has been
found unlawful in a case that is perfectly on point, but the unlawfulness of
the defendant's conduct must be obvious given the understanding of the law
at the time. See Hope u. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002); see also Hardwick
u. County of Orange, 844 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2017). Courts must be

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careful not to define the law at issue at a high level of generality and should
focus their analysis on whether the specific facts alleged show a violation of
clearly established law. See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12.
Eggleston's § 1983 claim alleges that Stuart violated his
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in parenting his children, without
due process of law. In rejecting Stuart's qualified immunity defense as to
that claim, the district court cited three issues with Stuart's conduct that,
if substantiated by a jury, would constitute a violation of clearly established
law: (1) Stuart concealed aspects of her investigation from Eggleston;
(2) Stuart misrepresented that she had authority to offer Eggleston in-home
support services and rent assistance; and (3) Stuart coerced Eggleston's
consent by misrepresenting that he was only consenting to a temporary
guardianship, whereas now Eggleston has not seen his children for years.
In his opposition to Stuart's motion for summary judgment, Eggleston
proffered each of these contentions as supporting points for his overall
§ 1983 claim that his liberty interest in parenting his children was violated
by the act of removing the children from the home. Eggleston's answer to
the writ petition did not distinguish between these contentions, instead
alleging generally that Stuart's conduct in the removal violated his parental
liberty interest. We nevertheless address the issues under the two-prong
qualified immunity framework.
Stuart's alleged conduct did not violate a clearly established
substantive due process right
A parent's liberty interest in living with and raising their
children is beyond dispute. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753
(1982); see also Hardwick, 844 F.3d at 1116. Indeed, earlier in the
proceedings, we recognized that Eggleston's complaint raised a substantive
due process issue regarding the fundamental right to parent his children.
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See Eggleston v. Stuart, 137 Nev. 506, 511, 495 P.3d 482, 489 (2021)
(Eggleston 1). Eggleston alleges that this right was violated by Stuart's
conduct in obtaining his consent to a temporary guardianship and that he
has not seen his children since the guardianship began. Because we view
the second step of the Saucier test as dispositive in this case, we focus our
analysis on whether, at the time of Stuart's conduct, the law clearly
established that this conduct was a violation of Eggleston's constitutional
rights.2
In general, the appropriate standard for evaluating the alleged
violation of familial rights is whether the conduct at issue "shocks the
conscience." Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008).
However, we are cognizant of the need to define rights at an appropriately
specific level of generality for the purposes of qualified irnrnunity. See
Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12. The conduct at issue here was that Stuart gave
Eggleston two options for the care of the children: he could either consent
to a temporary guardianship with the Callahans, or DFS would place the
children into protective custody and then petition a court to remove the

2 0ur holding in Eggleston /—that Eggleston had sufficiently alleged
a violation of his constitutional due process rights—was strictly under the
motion to dismiss standard, where the allegations of the complaint are
taken as true. See Eggleston I, 137 Nev. at 512, 495 P.3d at 489-90 ("Taking
Eggleston's allegations as true, as we must in the context of a motion to
dismiss, the state's actions 'shock the conscience .. . ." (emphasis added)).
Today, we evaluate Eggleston's claims with the benefit of the evidence
produced in discovery under the stricter surnrnary judgrnent standard. See
Wood, 121 Nev. at 729, 121 P.3d at 1029. Additionally, in Eggleston I, we
addressed whether Eggleston was required to exhaust his administrative
rernedies before bringing his claims and whether he had alleged procedural
or substantive due process injuries, not the immunity defenses we now
consider. See Eggleston I, 137 Nev. at 507, 510-13, 515, 495 P.3d at 486,
488-90, 491-92.
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children from the home and place them in foster care. Eggleston consented
to the temporary guardianship option, but he now argues that his consent
was coerced. Thus, defined according to the specific circumstances in which
these events occurred, the liberty interest at issue is Eggleston's right to
determine his children's care, and the alleged violation is coercion of his
consent.
We note at the outset that courts have generally found that
placing children in temporary guardianships does not implicate a
substantive due process violation. See Mammaro u. N.J. Diu. of Child Prot.
& Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 170 (3d Cir. 2016) ("[T]he [Supreme] Court
has never found a substantive due process violation when state agencies
temporarily remove a child, whatever the circumstances of the removal.").
The Second Circuit has drawn a distinction between temporary measures
like a temporary guardianship and more severe measures like termination
of parental rights, holding that the former do not implicate a "serious
constitutional question" due to their temporary nature. See Nicholson u.
Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 172 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that temporary 'ex
parte removal" to keep children safe during an investigation did not violate
substantive due process rights because there was no permanent
termination of parental rights).
We have not squarely addressed the scope of parental due
process rights in the context of consenting to a temporary guardianship
offered by social services where coercion is alleged. But we have previously
held that there is no substantive due process violation of parental rights
where a district court awarded a temporary guardianship for a hospital to
provide treatment to a child that the parents had refused to consent to. See
In re Guardianship of L.S. & H.S., 120 Nev. 157, 167, 87 P.3d 521, 527

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interests of children when enacting statutes governing petitions for removal
from parental custody); In re Parental Rights as to D.R.H., 120 Nev. 422,
427, 92 P.3d 1230, 1233-34 (2004) (discussing the state's compelling interest
in protecting the best interests of children in parental rights termination
proceedings). Stuart's actions in investigating Eggleston and in obtaining
his consent to a temporary guardianship clearly implicate Nevada's policy
of supporting the best interests of children, and allowing the claims against
her to proceed could negatively impact how that policy is carried out in the
future.
Lastly, immunizing Stuart from suit promotes Nevada's
"compelling interest in assuring that abused and neglected children achieve
safe, stable and permanent home environments within which to be reared."
Id. at 427, 92 P.3d at 1233. The determination that it is in children's best
interests to separate them from their parents will always be in fundamental
tension with parental rights. Discretionary-act immunity is necessary for
social workers to do the painstaking work of navigating that tension
competently and lawfully. Here, Stuart acted to protect the children from
Eggleston's failure to adequately supervise and care for them in the face of
Rodriguez's struggles with addiction and mental health. Accordingly, we
hold that Stuart is entitled to discretionary-act immunity on Eggleston's
IIED claim.
CONCLUSION
Qualified and discretionary-act immunities protect government
employees from suit when performing their jobs unless they do so in a way
that violates a clearly established right or is conducted in bad faith. These
immunities present special legal issues that must be decided before trial,
lest they be lost forever. Stuart's actions did not violate any of Eggleston's
clearly established rights but rather reflected her lawful exercise of
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discretion as a public servant. Accordingly, we grant the petition and direct
the clerk of this court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the district court
to vacate the challenged order denying summary judgment and enter an
order granting summary judgment on the 1983 claims and the IIED claims
in favor of Stuart and Clark County. In light of this opinion, we lift the stay
of proceedings imposed by our March 18, 2024, order.

, C.J.
Herndon

We concur:

J.

Parraguirre

J.
Stiglich
.t (

ofiet/ J.
Cadish

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BELL, J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent for two reasons. First, granting Stuart's
petition contradicts our decision in Eggleston v. Stuart, 137 Nev. 506, 495
P.3d 482 (2021) (hereinafter Eggleston 1). Second, I disagree with the
majority's conclusion that Stuart was simply acting pursuant to her
authority under NRS Chapter 432B. Evidence could support a conclusion
that Stuart circumvented the carefully structured statutory process to
protect neglected children by coercing Eggleston into signing a
guardianship, thereby disposing of the need to have any further
involvement with the Eggleston children. If Stuart used coercion or threats
to achieve her aims, she would not be entitled to qualified or discretionary
act immunity.
Granting Stuart immunity conflicts with our decision in Eggleston I
This case last came before us after the district court granted in
part Stuart's motion to dismiss. Id. at 506-07, 495 P.3d at 486. Two pieces
of our analysis are relevant here. First, we concluded Eggleston was not
required to exhaust administrative remedies because he asserted a
substantive, rather than a procedural, due process claim. Id. at 513, 495
P.3d at 490. We took Eggleston's allegations as true "that Clark County
and Stuart arbitrarily and capriciously . . . forced him under duress to sign
temporary guardianship papers leading to the unwarranted removal of his
children from his care." Id. at 511-12, 495 P.3d at 489. We concluded this
was enough to "shock the conscience," giving rise to a substantive due
process claim. Id. at 512, 495 P.3d at 489-90. Discovery has not eliminated
factual disputes about whether Stuart's threat was arbitrary and
capricious. Stuart's coercive tactics still "shock the conscience," and conduct
shocking to the conscience is not protected by qualified immunity. See

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Tobias v. Arteaga, 996 F.3d 571, 575 (9th Cir. 2021); Hernandez ex rel.
Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 478-79 (7th Cir. 2011).
Second, we concluded the district court erred in Eggleston I by
disallowing punitive damages. Eggleston I, 137 Nev. at 514, 495 P.3d at
491. We stated punitive damages were allowed because the allegations in
the complaint indicated Stuart was acting in an individual capacity, outside
the scope of her official authority. Id. Specifically, we stated that Eggleston
sufficiently alleged Stuart acted beyond the scope of her authority when she
arrived at his home with two police officers and forced him to sign
temporary guardianship papers under the threat that he would otherwise
never see his children again." Id. Discovery has borne out Eggleston's
allegations, and I see no reason we should reverse course and now declare
that Stuart's actions were within the scope of her authority. Because Stuart
was acting in her individual capacity, she should not be entitled to qualified
or discretionary act immunity.
Stuart's threat circumvented the statutory procedures for removal
Stuart's coercive tactics also sidestepped important procedural
protections, both for Eggleston and the children. Absent Stuart's on-the-
spot ultimatum, Eggleston could have made an informed choice to work
toward getting his children back through a normal protective custody
proceeding, affording him a panoply of procedural protections. See NRS
432B.470(1) (providing notice and a hearing within 72 hours of removal to
determine whether protective custody is required); NRS 432B.540(2)
(requiring DFS to submit a plan for placement of the children during an
investigation); NRS 432B.540(2)(b) (requiring DFS to submit a plan to
reunite the parents and children); NRS 432B.393(1) (requiring DFS to
make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family of a child").

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By coercing Eggleston into agreeing to the temporary
guardianship, Stuart avoided her responsibilities to appropriately place the
children, ensure the children's continuing welfare, and make efforts to
reunify Eggleston with his children. Meanwhile, Eggleston lost access to
resources that would assist him with reunification and the opportunity to
contest any of DFS's actions in court. Using a threat to circumvent
important protections for children and parents violated Eggleston's clearly
established right to custody and control of his children. Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (explaining that "[t]he fundamental liberty interest
of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does
not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents"). This
holds especially true if Stuart could not actually have taken the children on
the spot, and Eggleston has offered evidence the children were not in
immediate danger when Stuart made her threat. Thus, I believe there is a
triable question of fact as to whether Stuart violated Eggleston's clearly
established due process rights. Social workers are responsible for some of
the most vulnerable people in our society, but that does not entitle Stuart
to use threats or coercion to achieve those nds, and I dissent.

J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11070244. Public record. Not legal advice.