# The Estate of Lord Treyshun Gardner v. Google, Inc.

> District Court, W.D. Kentucky · June 11, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11069634

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Kentucky
- **Decided:** June 11, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11069634

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiff abandoned certain claims by failing to raise them in his brief opposing the government’s motion to dismiss

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
THE ESTATE OF LORD TREYSHUN Plaintiff
GARDNER
v. Civil Action No. 3:25-cv-129-RGJ
GOOGLE, INC. Defendant
* * * * *
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Estate of Lord Treyshun Gardner (“Gardner”)1 originally sued Google Inc.
in state court [DE 1-1]. Summons was served by the Secretary of State on Google Inc. at the
address provided, 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043. [DE 1-1 at 19].
Google, LLC (“Google”) removed this case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1332, 1441, and 1446, on March 4, 2025. [DE 1].2 In its removal, Google asserts that it was
“improperly named in this action as Google, Inc.” [Id. at 1]. Google also asserts it “is a Delaware
limited liability company with its principal place of business at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway,
Mountain View, California 94043. Google LLC’s sole member is XXVI Holdings, Inc., a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway,

1 In Defendant’s removal, it is asserted that “[b]ased on information available, Plaintiff is a living individual,
and not the representative of an estate for a deceased individual.” [DE 1 at 1]. After review of the overall
pleadings and matching the address of the Plaintiff to various public records in Jefferson District Court, it
appears that the Plaintiff is a living individual who ascribes to certain sovereign citizen beliefs and has
chosen to use the estate language to avoid any appearance as a “federal citizen.” See
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_citizen_movement. Specifically, in the Complaint, Plaintiff states,
“Plaintiff Lord Treyshun The Estate Holder & Grantor of Gardner Sir Name,” and refers to himself in all
capital letters, such as “Unjust Enrichments on behalf of the falsified Information and deals made on behalf
without permission of any subject from the natural Person of TREYSHUN GARDNER.” [DE 1-1 at 10].
Moreover, Gardner appears to allege strawman and natural person theories commonly asserted by followers
of the sovereign citizen movement. [Id. at 10-11].
2 Google alleges that Gardner is a citizen of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and it is a citizen of Delaware
and California. [DE 1 at 2-3].
Mountain View, California 94043.” [Id. at 2, ¶9]. Google attaches its Statement of Information
filed with the California Secretary of State. [DE 1-2].
On March 11, 2025, Google timely pleaded, moving for dismissal with prejudice of
Gardner’s claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). [DE 7]. Gardner failed to respond
to Google’s motion and the time for doing so has passed. Over a month after the response deadline,

Gardner moved for “Defaulted Judgement” [sic]. [DE 8]. Google timely responded, [DE 9], and
Gardner did not reply and the time for doing so has passed. These matters are ripe. For the reasons
below, Google’s Motion to Dismiss [DE 7] is GRANTED and Gardner’s Motion for Defaulted
Judgment [DE 8] is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND3
Originally filed in Jefferson Circuit Court on January 17, 2025, Gardner’s complaint is
difficult, at best, to understand. It appears to the Court that Gardner generally asserts that he has
“been Gang Stalked by shareholders looking to Collect my strawman with Illegal Bribery practices
trying to convince TREYSHUN GARDNER to allow my signature for a 3rd Party. Illegal

Malpractices and Misuse of medical information and medication Drugs to sodomize and to also
compromise my wellbeing to not recognize my intelligence.” [DE 1-1 at 10]. In essence, much
of the complaint appears to generally assert misuse or exposure of “Sensitive data.” [DE 1-1 at
12]. In addition, he alleges that Google “Dealing with Pfizer & Other NanoTech to Steal
Intelligence Property From TREYSHUN GARDNER Estate A American Indian” and that Google
has “us[ed] Nanos & Smartdust To Farm Body Heat To Create Currency.” [Id.]. As a result,
Gardner “Demands Full Compensation, Investment, Profit, Interest, Return of Information

3 The factual allegations in the Complaint [DE 1-2] are considered true for purposes of this motion. See
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551
F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)).
Property, Intelligence Property, Voice Notes & Music Property. Etc.,” as well as 10 billion in
damages with the “Court” to “receive 10%.” [DE 1-1 at 13]. Google interprets the complaint as
accusing it of “harvesting Plaintiff’s body heat for power and also ‘gang stalking’ him.” [DE 7 at
35].
II. DISCUSSION

Because Gardner’s motion for default [DE 8] addresses the entity which has pled by
moving to dismiss [DE 7], the Court first addresses the motion for default.
1. Motion for Defaulted Judgement [sic] [DE 8]
Gardner asserts that default judgment should be entered because the entity he specifically
sued has not made an appearance. [DE 8 at 46]. As an initial matter, while the Summons served
“Google, Inc,” this motion names the Defendant as “Alphabet INC (Google INC),” but the Court
notes no summons have issued to Alphabet, Inc. (Google’s parent company). [Id.]. Specifically,
Gardner states:
It is stated that “Google LLC” has Appeared In place for “Alphabet Inc” Formerly
Known As “Google Inc” In which “Google LLC” is a different entity than the
corporation I’ve Summoned. The Corporation google changed its name to Alphabet
Inc while Operating in Continuation as Google Inc still holds the same
Responsibilities as its former Corporate Name. It has been Over 80 Days after the
February 10th 2025 Serving of Papers March, 4, 2025 motion to removal from Civil
Court To Federal Court In which Court was Attended on March, 10 2025.
Id. As a result, Gardner requests default judgment and states “I would like to be rewarded 10Billion
and donate 1 billion to Courts for fair Judgment.” [Id.].
Google responded in opposition that the motion was “frivolous,” that “Google timely
responded to the complaint by filing its Motion to Dismiss within 7 days following removal,” and
that “[w]hile Plaintiff seems to argue Google’s parent company, Alphabet, Inc., did not respond,
Plaintiff identified “Google, Inc.” in the Complaint and Summons.” [DE 9 at 49].
A. Standard
Rule 55 governs Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment “[w]hen a party against whom a
judgment of affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend and that failure is
shown by affidavit or otherwise . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 55(a). Where, as here, a case does not
involve a sum certain, Rule 55 sets out a two-step process. First, the Clerk of Court must issue an

entry of default under Rule 55(a). Second, upon entry of default, if the plaintiff’s claim is not for
a sum certain, he or she “must apply to the court for a default judgment” by filing a motion for a
default judgment under Rule 55(b)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1)-(2); I Love Juice Bar Franchising,
LLC v. ILJB Charlotte Juice, LLC, No. 3:19-CV-00981, 2020 WL 4735031, at *3 (M.D. Tenn.
Aug. 14, 2020).
After the Clerk’s entry of default and the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, the Court
considers whether a default judgment is proper. Methe v. Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, 2019 WL
3082329, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 15, 2019). When doing so, the Court takes all factual allegations
in the complaint as true. In re Family Resorts of Am., Inc., 1992 WL 174539, at *4 (6th Cir. July

24, 1992). An entry of default, however, does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a default
judgment. See F.C. Franchising Sys., Inc. v. Schweizer, 2012 WL 1945068, at *3 (S.D. Ohio May
30, 2012). The plaintiff must still show that, when all factual allegations in the complaint are taken
as true, the defendant is liable for the claim(s) asserted. Said v. SBS Elecs., Inc., 2010 WL 1265186,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2010) (It “remains the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that” the
complaint’s factual allegations, taken as true, “establish the defendant’s liability.”), adopted as
modified, 2010 WL 1287080 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010).
When considering whether default judgment is proper, courts:
[T]ake into account: (1) possible prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the
claims; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the amount of money at stake; (5)
possible disputed material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable
neglect; and (7) the preference for decisions on the merits.
Russell v. City of Farmington Hills, 34 F. App’x 196, 198 (6th Cir. 2002).
Additionally, a default is not considered an admission of damages. Vesligaj v. Peterson,
331 F. App’x 351, 355 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Where damages are unliquidated a default admits only
[the defaulting party’s] liability and the amount of damages must be proved.”).
B. Analysis
Several reasons compel denial of a default judgment against Google. First, as a procedural
matter, Gardner has failed to follow the requirements of Rule 55 and seek a clerk’s entry of default.
See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 55(a). As such, the motion must be denied on procedural grounds.
Second, even if a clerk’s entry were properly sought, the clerk could not enter such default
as Google has entered its appearance, noted the improper service on a non-existent entity, and pled
timely by moving to dismiss. In its removal, Google asserts that it was “improperly named in this
action as Google, Inc.” [DE 1 at 1]. Google also asserts it “is a Delaware limited liability company
with its principal place of business at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California
94043.” [Id. at 2, ¶9]. Google attaches its Statement of Information filed with the California
Secretary of State as well as documents of formation. [DE 1-2]. It is clear from the formation
documents and publicly available corporate information that in 2015 Google reorganized its

corporate structure and became a wholly owned subsidiary of Alphabet, Inc. Google Inc. was
converted to a Delaware limited liability company in September 2017 as part of that
reorganization. As Google, Inc. no longer exists in that corporate structure, the existing entity,
Google, LLC, has responded, and no default should issue.
Moreover, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(a)(1) requires a defendant to serve an answer within a
specified time. Under Rule 12(a)(4), if a party serves a Rule 12(b) motion, then the time to serve
an answer is tolled until after the Court resolves the motion. Compton v. City of Harrodsburg, Ky.,
287 F.R.D. 401, 402 (E.D. Ky. 2012); see also, Yao v. Oakland Univ., No. 2:21-CV-10523, 2022
WL 1598619, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 19, 2022); B.H.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:20-

CV-0732, 2020 WL 12630642, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 30, 2020) (“Rule 12(a)(4) plainly tolls the
time within which a defendant must answer during the pendency of a motion to dismiss. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A).”). There is no question that Google has timely filed a 12(b) motion [DE 7]
and that the time to answer is tolled during the pendency of the motion.
For these reasons, the motion for default judgment must be DENIED.
2. Motion to Dismiss [DE 7]
Google asserts that Gardner’s complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) as the
complaint is so devoid of merit it fails to confer subject matter jurisdiction on this Court. [DE 7 at
37]. Google also asserts dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

[Id. at 40].
A. Standard
Rule 12(b)(1) allows dismissal for “lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter” of claims
asserted in the Complaint. Generally, Rule 12(b)(1) motions fall into two categories: facial attacks
and factual attacks. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); United States v. Richie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir.
1994). In a facial attack, the defendant asserts that the allegations in a complaint are insufficient
on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. By contrast, in a factual attack, the defendant
disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal
jurisdiction and the Court is free to weigh the evidence. Id. The plaintiff has the burden of proving
subject matter jurisdiction to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). Madison-Hughes v.
Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121, 1130 (6th Cir. 1996). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable,
fatal defect. Von Dunser v. Aronoff, 915 F.2d 1071, 1074 (6th Cir. 1990).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) instructs that a court must dismiss a complaint if
the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

To state a claim, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When considering a motion to dismiss,
courts must presume all factual allegations in the complaint to be true and make all reasonable
inferences for the non-moving party. Total Benefits Plan. Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “But the district court need not
accept a bare assertion of legal conclusions.” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (citation omitted). “A
pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further
factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim
is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “A complaint will be dismissed . . . if no law supports the claims
made, if the facts alleged are insufficient to state a claim, or if the face of the complaint presents
an insurmountable bar to relief.” Southfield Educ. Ass’n v. Southfield Bd. of Educ., 570 F. App’x
485, 487 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561–64).
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by
attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 519 (1972). Yet “the lenient treatment generally
accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996).
For example, “the less stringent standard for pro se plaintiffs does not compel courts to conjure up
unpleaded facts to support conclusory allegations.” Leisure v. Hogan, 21 F. App’x 277, 278 (6th

Cir. 2001). Additionally, the Court cannot “create a claim which [the plaintiff] has not spelled out
in his pleading.” Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). The
Court cannot supply missing facts or un-pled allegations, create a claim for the pro se plaintiff, or
otherwise act as an advocate for them. Brown v. Cracker Barrel Rest., 22 F. App’x 577, 578 (6th
Cir. 2001); Bond v. Verdecia, 2023 WL 5807026, *2 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 7, 2023). A pro se
complainant must still contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material
elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. See Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy
Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). Ultimately, “[t]he Court’s duty to construe a pro
se complaint liberally does not absolve a plaintiff of the duty to comply with the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure by providing each defendant with fair notice of the basis of the claim.” Jones v.
Cabinet for Families & Child., No. 3:07-cv-11-S, 2007 WL 2462184, at *4 (W.D. Ky, Aug. 29,
2007) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).
B. Analysis
i. Failure to respond.
As an initial matter Local Rule 7.1 provides that “[f]ailure to timely respond to a motion
may be grounds for granting the motion.” LR 7.1(c). Moreover, a party may to waive opposition
to a motion to dismiss by “virtue of his failure to oppose [it].” Humphrey v. U.S. Att’y Gen.’s Off.,
279 F. App’x 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Williams v. PBI Bank, No. 3:13-cv-1166-DJH-
CHL, 2017 WL 6940699, at *1, (W.D. Ky. Feb. 28, 2017) (“Failure to respond to a dispositive
motion will be grounds for granting the motion.”) (citations omitted). It is well settled law that a
plaintiff waives a claim by failing to respond to or refute arguments made by the defendant in a
motion to dismiss and “the Court assumes he concedes this point and abandons the claim.” Mekani
v. Homecomings Fin., LLC, 752 F. Supp. 2d 785, 797 (E.D. Mich. 2010); see also Notredan, LLC

v. Old Republic Exch. Facilitator Co., 531 F. App’x. 567 (6th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that the
plaintiff had waived claim by failing to respond to or refute arguments made by the defendants in
the district court); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Global Med. Billing, Inc., 520 F. App’x. 409, 412 (6th
Cir.2013) (same); Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1007–08 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district
court’s conclusion that the plaintiff abandoned certain claims by failing to raise them in his brief
opposing the government’s motion to dismiss); Degolia v. Kenton Cty., 381 F. Supp. 3d 740, 759–
60 (E.D. Ky. 2019) (“[I]t is well understood . . . that when a plaintiff files an opposition to a
dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat
those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.” (quoting Rouse v. Caruso, No. 6-

cv-10961-DT, 2011 WL 918327, at *18 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 18, 2011)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); ARJN #3 v. Cooper, 517 F. Supp. 3d 732, 750 (M.D. Tenn. 2021); PNC Bank, Nat. Ass'n
v. Goyette Mech. Co., Inc., 88 F. Supp. 3d 775, 785 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (dismissing claims that the
plaintiffs failed to respond to in opposition to motion to dismiss, noting that “[a] plaintiff abandons
undefended claims.”).
Here, Gardner has failed to file a response to Google’s motion. Gardner’s own default
motion acknowledges that Google has appeared in the case, [DE 8 at 46], yet he has not filed a
response to the motion to dismiss. Moreover, in Google’s response to Gardner’s motion for
default, Google asserted Gardner’s failure to respond to its’ motion to dismiss as grounds for
granting its’ motion. [DE 9 at 48 (“The deadline for Plaintiff to respond to the Motion to Dismiss
was more than a month ago, April 1, 2025. Plaintiff’s failure to respond is grounds to grant
Google’s Motion to Dismiss.” (citing Rule 7.1(c))]. Gardner did not reply in opposition to this
assertion or attempt to file a response to the motion to dismiss. As a result, the Court may consider
any opposition to the motion to dismiss waived and grant Google’s motion to dismiss.

ii. Frivolous and patently insubstantial or conclusory claims.
Even if Gardner had responded, dismissal here is warranted. A district court has authority
to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) “when the allegations of a complaint are totally
implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.”
Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.1999) (per curiam). “[M]ost complaints will not be so
clearly insufficient as to warrant dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), but instead should be handled
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Id. at 480. “When a district court is faced with a complaint that
appears to be frivolous or unsubstantial in nature, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) (as opposed to

Rule 12(b)(6)) is appropriate in only the rarest of circumstances where . . . the complaint is deemed
totally implausible.” Faller v. Att’y Gen. of Kentucky, No. CIV A 1:08-CV-86-R, 2009 WL
530646, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 3, 2009) (citing Apple, 183 F.3d at 480).
Frivolous or patently insubstantial complaints are subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Watkins v. F.B.I., No. 3:14-CV-656-CRS, 2015 WL 339584,
at *1 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 23, 2015) (citing Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 n. 6 (1989) and
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974) (federal courts lack power to entertain claims that
are “so attenuated and insubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.”)). Examples of clearly
baseless factual contentions include “claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios . . .”
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328. As stated in White v. State of Michigan Ctr. for Forensic Psychiatry, 66
Fed. App’x 626, 627, 2003 WL 21397866 (6th Cir. 2003), “[a] totally unsubstantiated complaint
such as the one in this case fails to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the district court.” Citing
Hagans, 415 U.S. at 536–37. Garner’s complaint lacks credible allegations. It contains bizarre,
fantastic, delusional, and disjointed thoughts which the Court strains to interpret or decipher. As

such, the action must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) as patently insubstantial and frivolous such
that it conveys no subject matter jurisdiction to this Court.
Further, to survive a motion to dismiss grounded on a failure to state a claim, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, taken as true to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Not only
are Gardner’s allegations bizarre and incredible, but they fail to allege any claim. As stated in
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions, or a

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Here the complaint lacks plausible legal
claims and any well-pled facts. Moreover, any well potentially decipherable allegations are
speculative and conclusory such that they cannot survive a motion to dismiss. For this reason, the
action must also be dismissed for Gardner’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, under Rule 12(b)(6).
iii. Sovereign citizen claims.
Although Google does not directly address this matter, the Court notes that Gardner’s
complaint appears to raise a number of so-called “sovereign citizen” beliefs or arguments or, at a
minimum uses language associated with these theories. Noles v. United States Internal Revenue
Serv., No. 3:23-CV-150-TAV-JEM, 2024 WL 4899990, at *1–2 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 26, 2024)
(citing United States v. Cook, No. 3:18-cr-19, 2019 WL 2721305, at *1–2 (E.D. Tenn. June 28,
2019)). As described by other courts in this Circuit, sovereign citizen pleadings are “dense,
complex, and virtually unreadable,” and a branch of sovereign citizen case law has grown to
address the voluminous and often frivolous workload. See Francis X. Sullivan, The “Usurping

Octopus of Jurisdictional/Authority”: The Legal Theories of the Sovereign Citizen Movement, 199
Wis. L. Rev. 85, 796 (1999) (“Faced with mountains of paperwork, courts must choose between
spending hours deciphering Sovereign Citizen arguments or dismissing them out of hand”). Thus,
“Courts have repeatedly rejected, as frivolous, arguments based on the theory of sovereign
citizenship” recognizing that such arguments are “a waste of court resources.” Powell v. Michigan,
No. 22-10816, 2023 WL 2154954, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 24, 2023) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
As a result, courts in this district and others frequently sua sponte dismiss sovereign citizen
complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or dismiss sovereign citizen complaints on this

ground without extended argument. Primero v. Barum, No. 3:24-cv-200, 2024 WL 1543782, at *2
(W.D. Ky. Apr. 9, 2024) (dismissing sovereign citizen complaint, at screening stage, for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because “the legal theories espoused in this action are frivolous”);
Adkins v. Kentucky, No. 3:18-mc-26, 2018 WL 6528462, at *1–2 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 12, 2018) (sua
sponte dismissing sovereign citizen complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction without
further discussion); Maddox El v. Scharf, No. 23-10990, 2023 WL 3587538, at *1–2 (E.D. Mich.
May 22, 2023) (dismissing sovereign citizen complaint at screening stage for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction without further discussion). To the extent certain of Gardner’s claims assert these
theories, the Court finds it appropriate to follow this course of action here.
I. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT
IS ORDERED as follows:
1. Google’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) [DE 7] is
GRANTED;
2. Gardner’s motion for default judgment [DE 8] is DENIED;
3. A separate judgment will be entered accordingly.

United States District Court
June 10, 2025
CC: Plaintiff, pro se

13

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11069634. Public record. Not legal advice.