# KING v. LUCUS

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · June 10, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11068891

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** June 10, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11068891

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that § 1983 claims against a district attorney in his official capacity were barred by the Eleventh Amendment
- noting that “the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court”
- explaining that the court is “responsible for deciding whether and for how [long] a defendant may be detained, not the defendant police officers”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ROBERT CHARLES ANTHONY KING, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:24CV761
)
GUY LUCUS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.
This action arises from Plaintiff Robert Charles Anthony
King’s arrest and pre-trial detention in Alamance County, North
Carolina. Before the court are six motions. King has moved for
default against three Defendants: Jaleesa Washington, Guy Lucus,
and Isaac Groves. (Doc. 23 at 2-3.) In the same motion, he also
requests to amend the complaint. (Id. at 3.) Defendants Sean
Boone and Elizabeth Oliver (Doc. 12), Jaleesa Washington (Doc.
35), Justyn Melrose and Hodgin Carrie (Doc. 25), and Christian
Wilson, Dean Culler, Joey England, John P. Paisley, and Terry
Johnson (Doc. 29) have moved to dismiss the complaint. For the
reasons set forth below, King’s motion for default and motion for
leave to amend the complaint will be denied, and the motions to
dismiss will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts alleged in the complaint are accepted as true for
purposes of the motions to dismiss and are viewed in the light
most favorable to King.
King was arrested on August 12, 2019 by the Alamance County

Sheriff’s Office (“ACSO”), detained pre-trial, and then acquitted
by a jury on September 16, 2022. (Doc. 1 at 8.) He has brought
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for “Defamation, Slander,
Liberal [sic], Kidnapping[,] 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th
Amendment[,] Parental Rights[,] False Imprisonment, False arrest,
[and] Malicious Prosecution” against Guy Lucus, Justyn Melrose,
Isaac Groves, Hodgin Carrie, Dale Doe, Melanie Davis, Terry
Johnson, Sean Boone, Elizabeth Oliver, Jaleesa Washington,
Christian Wilson, Dean Culler, Joey England, and John Paisley.
(Id. at 2-5.)
Lucus, Melrose, Groves, Carrie, Doe, and Davis work for news
media companies. Lucus and Melrose are employed by “High Point

Fox 8 News.” (Id. at 7.) Groves is employed at “Burlington Time
News.” (Id.) Carrie is employed by “WXII 12 News.” (Id.) Doe
and Davis are employed by Mebane Enterprise. (Id. at 2.)
The other Defendants are employed by Alamance County. Sheriff
Terry Johnson is the Sheriff of Alamance County, and Washington,
Wilson, Culler, and England are employed by the ACSO. (Id. at 6-
7.) Boone is the District Attorney of Prosecutorial District 17,
and Oliver is an Assistant District Attorney with the same
district. (Id. at 6.) Finally, John Paisley is an Alamance County
Commissioner. (Id. at 4.)
King alleges generally that the ACSO and the Alamance County
District Attorney did not adequately investigate his case to ensure

he was not wrongfully accused. (Id. at 8.) As to the particular
Defendants, he first alleges that Boone and Oliver violated his
“4th[,] 5th[,] 6th[,] 8th[,] and 14th Amendments [sic] [rights],
Defamation, Slander, Liberal [sic], Kidnapping, Parental
Constitution violation, false Imprisonment, false arrest[,]
Malicious Prosecution[,] 42 [U.S.] Code 1983.” (Id. at 8.) He
further alleges that Johnson, Paisley, Wilson, Culler, England,
and Washington “all violated [his] Constitution[al] right[s] as a
parent [d]etaining [King] against his will and falsely
[i]mprison[ing] [him] over three ‘3’ years of confin[e]ment made
defamation, slander and Liberial [sic] against [him],
Kid[]nap[p]ing 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendment, false

arrest, [and] Malicious Prosecuti[on].” (Id.) King alleges he
had proof of his innocence, but these defendants “failed to
c[o]nduct [a] safe investigation nor had any proof of evidence of
time fram[e].” (Id. at 8, 10.) He states he “was in fact in full
legal custody and was award[ed] sole custody by Guilford County
High Point. Alamance never had Jurisdiction over subject matter
nor was [resident] of Alamance county at all.” (Id. at 10.) King
“was not able to get [a] Bail Hearing for three ‘3’ years.” (Id.)
He finally alleges that Lucus, Melrose, Doe, Davis, Groves, and
Carrie “all work at or as a reporter for the News and made a
Defamation Slander Liberal [sic] about the Plaintiff.” (Id. at
9.)

King filed his complaint on September 16, 2024. (Doc. 1.)
II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion for Default
King moved for default judgment on January 15, 2025. (Doc.
23.) He argues that Defendants were served “with the Summonses
December 4th, 2024, by Certified mail tracking.” (Id. at 1.)
Therefore, he contends, Defendants were required to respond to the
complaint by December 26, 2024. (Id.) King asserts that while
Defendants Johnson, Wilson, Culler, England, Paisley, Melrose,
Carrie, Oliver, and Boone did timely respond, the other Defendants
did not. (Id. at 2.) He explains that the summonses for Doe and
Davis were returned to him on December 9, 2024, as undeliverable.

(Id.) But he argues that Washington, Lucus, and Groves failed to
respond and moves for default judgment against the three
defendants. (Id. at 2-3.)
Washington is the only Defendant to respond to King’s motion.
She argues that default judgment is not warranted against her
because (1) King did not first obtain entry of default pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), (2) Washington’s motion to
dismiss is sufficient to preclude default judgment, and (3) King’s
complaint is insufficient to state a claim. (Doc. 37 at 3-7.)
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 is the basic procedure to
be followed when there is a default in the course of litigation.”
Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1–800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 246 (2d

Cir. 2004). Rule 55 outlines a “two-step process” for default
proceedings: first, the entry of default pursuant to Rule 55(a),
and second, the entry of a default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b).
VLM Food Trading Int'l, Inc. v. Illinois Trading Co., 811 F.3d
247, 255 (7th Cir. 2016); Canady v. Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH, 307
F. Supp. 2d 2, 8-9 (D.D.C. 2004).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) provides that the “clerk
must enter” a party's default “[w]hen a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or
otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or
otherwise.” Although Rule 55 contemplates that the clerk enter
default as a ministerial act, the district court also enjoys the

inherent power to do so. See City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn
Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir. 2011). Once default is
entered, the party may apply for a default judgment pursuant to
Rule 55(b). If the “claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can
be made certain by computation” and the other party “has been
defaulted for not appearing and [ ] is neither a minor nor an
incompetent person,” the clerk is required to enter a judgment at
the party's request. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). Otherwise, “the
party must apply to the court for a default judgment” under Rule
55(b)(2). See Mystic Retreat Med Spa & Weight Loss Ctr. v.
Ascentium Cap. LLC, No. 1:21-CV-00515, 2021 WL 4993088, at *1
(M.D.N.C. Oct. 27, 2021).

King has not satisfied the procedural requirement of Rule 55
because he has submitted only a motion for default judgment without
a request for an entry of default as required by Rule 55(a).
Furthermore, King has not demonstrated that Washington, Lucus, and
Groves were properly served with process. Before entry of default
or default judgment may be entered, “service of process must be
effective under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” Md. State
Firemen's Ass'n v. Chaves, 166 F.R.D. 353, 354 (D. Md. 1996),
because “[a]bsent waiver or consent, a failure to obtain proper
service on the defendant deprives the court of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant,” Koehler v. Dodwell, 152 F.3d
304, 306 (4th Cir. 1998). Here, King has only asserted that a

summons was mailed to each Defendant. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(c)(1) requires that both a summons and a copy of the
complaint be served on each Defendant. In his Declaration of Proof
of Service filed on December 13, 2024, King stated that “all signed
summons[es]” had been served on Defendants, other than Doe and
Davis, whose summonses were returned to the sender. (Doc. 5.) In
his motion for default, King again asserts that the summonses were
served on Defendants in December 2024 but does not mention copies
of the complaint. (Doc. 23 at 1.) Indeed, Washington argues in
her amended motion to dismiss and in her response to King’s motion
that he only ever attempted to serve her with the summons. (Doc.
36 at 7; Doc. 37 at 5-6.) In a declaration attached to Washington’s

amended motion to dismiss, Annabelle Smith, a paralegal for
Alamance County, explains that she received service of process
that was intended for Washington, and it only included a summons.
(Doc. 35-1 at 1-2.) Failure to serve Defendants with a copy of
the complaint renders King’s attempt at service insufficient.
Washington also has not been entirely unresponsive in this
action. She responded to King’s motion for default and has filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint. It is in the court’s discretion
to grant default judgment “when the ‘adversary process has been
halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.’” Sewell v.
Fid. Nat’l Fin., No. PWG-15-3077, 2016 WL 728012, at *3 (D. Md.
Feb. 24, 2016) (quoting SEC v. Lawbaugh, 359 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421

(D. Md. 2005)), aff’d, 668 F. App’x 510 (4th Cir. 2016) (denying
default judgment when defendants had not been unresponsive,
despite their filings being late). That is not the case here at
least as to Washington, and in any case, the court will not grant
default judgment when effective service has not been demonstrated.
Therefore, King’s motion for default judgment will be denied.
B. Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B) provides that a
plaintiff may amend a complaint once as a matter of course within
twenty-one days after the earlier of (1) service of a responsive
pleading or (2) service of a motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b), (e), or (f). After that period, a plaintiff may

amend only with either the opposing party’s written consent or
leave of court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Foman v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (noting that “the grant or denial of an
opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District
Court”). The Fourth Circuit has interpreted Rule 15(a) to provide
that “leave to amend a pleading should be denied only when the
amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has
been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment
would have been futile.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th
Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see Foman, 371 U.S. at 182 (same).
A claim may be futile “if the proposed change advances a claim or
defense that is legally insufficient on its face,” in which case

“the court may deny leave to amend.” Williams v. Little Rock Mun.
Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 225 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Charles A.
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil,
§ 1487, at 637 (1991)) (alterations adopted); see Joyner v. Abbott
Labs, 674 F. Supp. 185, 190 (E.D.N.C. 1987). Thus, “[a] motion to
amend a complaint is futile ‘if the proposed claim would not
survive a motion to dismiss.’” Pugh v. McDonald, 266 F. Supp. 3d
864, 866 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (quoting James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82
F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
In King’s motion for default judgment, he requests to “[add]
injunction [sic] relief to [his] claim.” (Doc. 23 at 1.) This is
not a proper motion, and even if the court were to construe this

request as a motion for leave to amend the complaint, King failed
to attach a proposed amended complaint to his motion in violation
of Local Rule 15.1. His motion is defective on that basis alone.
King seeks injunctive relief requiring all employees of the
ACSO and Alamance County Detention Center to wear body cameras
while on duty, for those entities to install cameras in “cells,
all enclosed rooms, office[s] and control[] rooms,” and for those
camera recordings to be kept at least three years. (Doc. 23 at
3.) King argues that this would “ensure the security, safety and
control[] for All Employees, Pretrial [Detainees], Inmates and
Citizens” and would reduce “Assaults, Misconduct of any person,
Person [sic] being Framed, Accused of any wrongful act as well as

wrongful [sic] charged or conviction.” (Id.) King’s motion was
filed more than twenty-one days after his complaint had been filed.
Therefore, the court considers whether “the amendment would be
prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the
part of the moving party, or the amendment would [be] futile.”
Laber, 438 F.3d at 426.
Even if King’s request to amend the complaint were properly
made, it would plainly be futile. In order to obtain permanent
injunctive relief, “[a] plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that [he]
has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at
law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of the hardships

between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved
by a permanent injunction.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). Any injunction must also be narrowly
tailored to the facts of the case. See PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead
Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 128 (4th Cir. 2011).
King cannot show that he will suffer irreparable harm because
this factor requires a showing that there is concrete threat of
future injury. The Supreme Court has explained that “irreparable
injury” is “a requirement that cannot be met where there is no
showing of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be
wronged again.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111

(1983). King has not provided any facts that even suggest he may
be wronged by Defendants in the future. He has been acquitted of
the (unspecified) crime(s) with which he was charged and is no
longer in custody. Indeed, he does not live in Alamance County or
even North Carolina at this time, but in Florida. The relief
requested also is not narrowly tailored to the facts of this case.
He seeks an injunction that would apply to employees of the
Alamance County Detention Center, but neither this entity nor its
employees is a Defendant in this action. The requested injunctive
relief is also overbroad. For example, it would require every
employee, not just law enforcement officers, of the ACSO and the
Alamance County Detention Center to wear body cameras and for “all

enclosed rooms” to have cameras, even those not being used for
interrogation or detention. King has not demonstrated that such
broad relief is at all related, let alone narrowly tailored, to
remedying the claims arising from his arrest and pre-trial
detention. Therefore, King’s amendment is futile, and his request
to file an amended complaint will be denied.
C. Motions to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a
pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss is meant to “test[] the sufficiency of a
complaint” and not to “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the

merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican
Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). To
survive such a motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must
accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the
complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam), and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the non-
moving party's favor, Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474
(4th Cir. 1997). However, the court “need not accept as true

unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.”
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d
175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000)). Rule 12(b)(6) protects against
meritless litigation by requiring sufficient factual allegations
“to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555, so as to “nudge[] the[] claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible,” id. at 570. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. Thus, mere legal conclusions should not be accepted as
true, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
1. Boone and Oliver

Boone and Oliver move to dismiss King’s complaint pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). (Doc. 12.)
They argue that the claims against Boone in his official capacity
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment (Doc. 13 at 6), and that the
claims against both Defendants in their individual capacities are
barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity (id. at 4). Boone and
Oliver also argue that King’s complaint fails to state a claim.
(Id. at 7.)
King responds that the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 precludes
prosecutorial immunity because it refers to “every person.” (Doc.
24 at 3.) He also makes a policy argument that absolute immunity

should only extend to an “honest” prosecutor and not to prosecutors
that “abuse their power.” (Id.)
King brings a number of claims in this action, specifically
claims pursuant to § 1983 and the “4th, 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th
Amendment[s],” and what the court presumes to be state law claims
for “Defamation, Slander, Liberal [sic], Kidnapping, . . .
Parental Rights[,] False Imprisonment, False arrest, [and]
Malicious Prosecution.” (Doc. 1 at 5.) He does not specify which
of these claims are being brought against which Defendants, which
is a fatal pleading error. Nevertheless, the court thus assumes
that all of these claims are being brought against Boone and
Oliver.
a. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

As Boone argues, King’s claims against him in his official
capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh
Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Although by its terms the
Eleventh Amendment applies to suits brought against a State by
“Citizens of another State,” it is well established that “an
unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts
by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.”

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). It is also well
understood that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against States
and any State instrumentality properly characterized as an “arm of
the State.” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425,
429–30 (1997). And “a suit against a state official in his or her
official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is
a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different
from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dept. of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citations omitted). Eleventh
Amendment immunity has only limited exceptions: (1) a State may
waive its immunity; (2) Congress may abrogate a State's immunity;
and (3) a plaintiff may sue for prospective injunctive relief

against State officials acting in violation of federal law pursuant
to the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See Frew
ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004) (citing Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. at 123); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999).
None of the exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity applies
to the § 1983 and intentional tort claims brought in this case.
See, e.g., Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (“[N]either a State nor its
officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under
§ 1983.”); Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 249 (4th Cir. 2006)
(holding that § 1983 claims against a district attorney in his
official capacity were barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Gunter

v. S. Health Partners, Inc., No. 1:16CV262, 2017 WL 1194227, at *5
(M.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2017) (“Although the [North Carolina] Tort
Claims act authorizes recovery for negligent torts, intentional
torts committed by agents and officers of the State are not
compensable under the Tort Claims Act.” (citation omitted))
(holding that claim for false imprisonment was barred by sovereign
immunity). Thus, the court will dismiss King’s claims against
Boone in his official capacity pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See
South Carolina v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 3d 684, 692 (D.S.C.
Oct. 31, 2016) (“Assertions of governmental immunity are properly
addressed under Rule 12(b)(1).” (citing Smith v. Wash. Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 290 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir. 2002))).
b. Failure to State a Claim

The only allegations in the complaint regarding Boone and
Oliver are that they are employed as the District Attorney and
Assistant District Attorney, respectively, in Alamance County and
that they violated King’s “4th[,] 5th[,] 6th[,] 8th[,] and 14th
Amendments [sic] [rights], Defamation, Slander, Liberal [sic],
Kidnapping, Parental Constitution violation, false Imprisonment,
false arrest[,] Malicious Prosecution[,] 42 [U.S.] Code 1983.”
(Doc. 1 at 8.) King further alleges that the Alamance County
District Attorney’s Office generally did not adequately
investigate his case. (Id.)
The nature of King’s “4th[,] 5th[,] 6th[,] 8th[,] and 14th

Amendment[]” claims is unclear. (Id.) He provides no detail about
the kinds of claims he seeks to bring pursuant to these
constitutional amendments, beyond those described by his more
specific claims of “Defamation, Slander, Liberal [sic],
Kidnapping, Parental Constitution violation, false Imprisonment,
false arrest[,] [and] Malicious Prosecution.” (Id.) The court
presumes these more specific claims are brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and under state law.
Defamation is not actionable under § 1983. Garrett v. Aube,
No. 8:18-1449, 2018 WL 3628848, at *2 (D.S.C. May 31, 2018) (citing
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-710 & nn.3-4 (1976)). Defamation,
under North Carolina law, requires the plaintiff to allege that

“the defendant made false, defamatory statements of or concerning
the plaintiff, which were published to a third person, causing
injury to the plaintiff’s reputation.” Cannon v. Peck, 36 F.4th
547, 559 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Griffin v. Holden, 636 S.E.2d
298, 302 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006)). Libel and slander are the two
forms of defamation; “libel is written while slander is oral.”
Id. (quoting Tallent v. Blake, 291 S.E.2d 336, 338 (N.C. Ct. App.
1982)).
A § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution is one “founded on
a Fourth Amendment seizure that incorporates elements of the
analogous common law tort of malicious prosecution.” Smith v.
Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 252-53 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Lambert v.

Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 2000)). To demonstrate such
a claim, the plaintiff must show “that (1) the defendant ha[s]
seized plaintiff pursuant to legal process that was not supported
by probable cause and (2) that the criminal proceedings have
terminated in plaintiff’s favor.” Id. at 253 (quoting Massey v.
Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 356 (4th Cir. 2014) (alterations in
original)). Under North Carolina law, to state a common law tort
claim for malicious prosecution, King would similarly need to show
that “the defendant (1) instituted, procured or participated in
the criminal proceeding against the plaintiff; (2) without
probable cause; (3) with malice; and (4) the prior proceeding
terminated in favor of the plaintiff.” Wall v. Gulledge, No. 1:22-

cv-31, 2024 WL 4503823, at *13 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 16, 2024) (quoting
Braswell v. Medina, 805 S.E.2d 498, 506 (2017)).
To establish a § 1983 claim for false arrest or false
imprisonment, the plaintiff “must show that he was seized by [the
defendant] without probable cause.” English v. Clarke, 90 F.4th
636, 646 (4th Cir. 2024). Under North Carolina law, “a cause of
action in tort will lie for false imprisonment, based upon the
‘illegal restraint of one’s person against his will.’ A false
arrest, i.e., one without proper legal authority, is one means of
committing false imprisonment.” Caraway v. City of Pineville, 639
F. Supp. 3d 560, 588 (W.D.N.C. 2022) (quoting Myrick v. Cooley,
371 S.E.2d 492, 494 (1988)).

As for King’s claim that his parental rights under the
Constitution were violated, there is indeed a “fundamental liberty
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management
of their child” that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). In order to show
that his procedural due process rights have been violated, King
must show that (1) he had a protected life, liberty, or property
interest (2) of which the defendant deprived him (3) without due
process of law. See Rockville Cars, LLC v. City of Rockville, 891
F.3d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 2018); Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724
F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2013). On the other hand, “a plaintiff
asserting a § 1983 substantive due process claim must allege both

the deprivation of his life, liberty or property interest by a
state actor, and that the deprivation of this interest was
‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’” Callahan v. N.C. Dep’t
of Pub. Safety, 18 F.4th 142, 145 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Collins
v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). North
Carolina has not recognized a claim for tortious interference with
parental rights. See Bossian v. Chica, 910 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2024). However, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700
states that “an action may be maintained by the parent who is
entitled to the custody of a minor child against one who by force
abducts the child from its home, or one who induces the child to
leave its home with knowledge that the parent has not consented.”

Finally, kidnapping is not cognizable as a tort under North
Carolina law or as a § 1983 claim.
King’s allegations are conclusory and do not offer any facts
about the actions of Boone and Oliver as they relate to King’s
claims. He provides no statement made by Defendants that could
have been defamatory or any facts to suggest the charges brought
against him were not supported by probable cause. Indeed, King
does not even state the offense for which he was prosecuted. He
also does not provide any facts whatsoever about how his parental
rights were violated. In fact, his complaint does not allege that
he has children.
The Supreme Court stated in Iqbal that “[t]hreadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a claim. 556 U.S.
at 678. Here, King falls short of even reciting the elements of
the many claims he brings against these defendants and alleges no
facts to plausibly state those claims. Thus, King’s claims against
Boone and Oliver in their individual capacities will be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Rodgers v. NVR Inc.-Ryan
Homes, No. 3:23-CV-179, 2023 WL 5493602, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 24,
2023) (dismissing a complaint that “fail[ed] to identify specific
conduct by each Defendant that violate[d] [the plaintiff’s]
rights” and did not indicate “which allegations match[ed] up with
which claimed violation”); Holt v. Stroman, No. 3:12-CV-03539,

2015 WL 1061990, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2015) (dismissing a
complaint that included only “conclusory statements, outline[d]
the relevant law with only vague allusions to the alleged facts,
[and] mentioned a few facts that still [fell] far short of showing
how [the defendant’s] actions [met] the elements of the causes of
action alleged”).
2. Jaleesa Washington
Washington initially moved to dismiss King’s complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 20.) Twenty-one days later, she
filed an amended motion seeking to dismiss the complaint pursuant
to Rules 12(b)(2), 12(b)(4), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6). (Doc. 35.)
Washington argues that her amended motion to dismiss was filed as

of right because it fell within the twenty-one-day window under
Rule 15(a). (Doc. 36 at 2.) Rule 15 applies to pleadings, not
motions to dismiss, but the court in its discretion will consider
Washington’s amended motion to dismiss. In support of her amended
motion, Washington argues that dismissal is appropriate pursuant
to (1) Rule 12(b)(2) because she was never properly served and the
court thus lacks personal jurisdiction over her, (2) Rule 12(b)(4)
because she was not served with a copy of the complaint and was
nevertheless improperly named in it, (3) Rule 12(b)(5) because
service of process, attempted by mailing the summons to
Washington’s former employer, was insufficient, and (4) Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Id. at 5-9.) King did

not respond to either motion.
The court has already determined that service of process was
insufficient as to Washington. When a defendant raises a defense
pursuant to Rules 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5), the plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing compliance. Ballard v. PNC Fin. Servs.
Group, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 733, 735 (S.D.W. Va. 2009)). And
while King is proceeding pro se and is entitled to a certain
liberal construction of his complaint, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 106 (1976), the court need not ignore clear defects, Bustos v.
Chamberlain, No. 3:09-1760, 2009 WL 2782238, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug.
27, 2009). Even pro se litigants must follow the proper procedural
rules of the court. And it is not the court's role to become an

advocate for the pro se litigant. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). Here, King has failed to carry
his burden. He has not demonstrated that he properly served
Washington; in fact, he has not responded to her motion to dismiss
or amended motion to dismiss.
Alternatively, Washington is also correct that King’s
complaint fails to state a claim against her. The complaint
alleges that she is employed by the ACSO as a detective and that
she “violated [his] Constitution[al] right[s] as a parent
[d]etaining [King] against his will and falsely [i]mprison[ing]
[him] over three ‘3’ years of confin[e]ment made defamation,
slander and Liberial [sic] against [him], Kid[]nap[p]ing 4th, 5th,

6th, 8th, and 14th Amendment, false arrest, [and] Malicious
Prosecuti[on].” (Doc. 1 at 3, 8.) King brings all of the same
claims he brought against Boone and Oliver against Washington. As
with those allegations, this vague and conclusory statement,
bereft of factual support, is insufficient to state a claim
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). King does not provide any facts about
Washington’s conduct and certainly does not describe how her
conduct would make any of the myriad claims he brings against her
plausible. See, e.g., Rodgers v. NVR Inc.-Ryan Homes, No. 3:23-
CV-179, 2023 WL 5493602, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 24, 2023); Holt v.
Stroman, No. 3:12-CV-03539, 2015 WL 1061990, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar.
11, 2015).

As for King’s allegation that he was detained pre-trial for
three years, it is not clear whether he seeks to bring a separate
claim challenging the length of his pre-trial detention or whether
this claim is one and the same with his false imprisonment claim.
If King does seek to bring a separate claim, Washington had no
control over the length of King’s detention and thus could not be
held liable under this theory. See Wilson v. City of New York,
480 F. App’x 592, 594 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that the court is
“responsible for deciding whether and for how [long] a defendant
may be detained, not the defendant police officers”). Therefore,
King’s complaint against Washington will be dismissed for
insufficiency of process and service of process and, in the

alternative, for failure to state a claim.
3. Melrose and Carrie
Melrose and Carrie move to dismiss the complaint against them
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Doc.
25.) King did not respond. The complaint states that Melrose
works for “High Point Fox 8 News” and Carrie works for “WXII 12.”
(Doc. 1 at 2.) It then alleges that they “made a Defamation[,]
Slander[,] Liberal [sic] about the Plaintiff.” (Id. at 9.) These
conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. King
does not identify any defamatory statements concerning him made by
Melrose and Carrie and does not explain how any such statements
injured his reputation. Just as with King’s claims against Boone,

Oliver, and Washington, he again fails to describe any conduct
that would make any of the claims he brings against Melrose and
Carrie plausible. Therefore, his claims against Melrose and Carrie
will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
4. Johnson, Wilson, Culler, England, and Paisley
Johnson, Wilson, Culler, England, and Paisley (“County
Defendants”) move to dismiss the complaint against them pursuant
to Rules 12(b)(2), (5) and (6). (Doc. 29.) They first argue that
the summonses and complaint were not properly served on them and,
therefore, that the complaint should be dismissed for
insufficiency of service of process pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2) and
(5). (Doc. 30 at 7.) County Defendants contend that they were

only served with the summonses and not with copies of the complaint
in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 and North
Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 4. (Id. at 7-8.)
County Defendants next argue that any state law claims brought
against Defendants Johnson and Paisley in their official
capacities in this action are barred by governmental immunity.
(Id. at 10-11.) They explain that King has not alleged waiver of
this immunity by either the purchase of liability insurance or
bond. (Id. at 11.) They finally point out that even if King had
alleged waiver of immunity by purchase of a bond, the surety would
need to be joined as a party to this action, and it is not. (Id.)
As for all claims brought against County Defendants in their

individual capacities, they contend that any § 1983 claims are
barred by qualified immunity and any state law claims by public
official immunity. (Id. at 12-13.) County Defendants assert that
qualified immunity bars § 1983 claims against government officials
sued in their individual capacities unless the plaintiff alleges
a violation of clearly established law. (Id. at 12.) They contend
that King “failed to allege any specific violation of law, much
less any specific violation of clearly established law.” (Id.)
County Defendants further argue that public official immunity bars
any state law claims brought against them in their individual
capacities because any challenged conduct occurred while
performing governmental duties involving judgment and discretion,

and no exceptions to this immunity, such as acting outside their
scope of authority, with malice, or corruptly, were alleged in the
complaint. (Id. at 13.)
County Defendants also argue that all claims against them
should be dismissed for failure to plead sufficient facts. They
contend that King’s “allegations are unsupported, incomplete,
incoherent, or altogether non-existent.” (Id. at 15.)
Finally, County Defendants move for dismissal of King’s
defamation, libel, and slander claims because they are not
actionable under § 1983 and are time-barred under state law. (Id.
at 19, 21.) Under North Carolina law, they argue, defamation is
subject to a one-year state of limitations period, and King has

not alleged the publication of a defamatory statement in or after
September 2023, one year prior to the filing of his complaint.
(Id. at 21.) In fact, County Defendants contend that King has not
identified any defamatory statement made or alleged its
publication in the complaint. (Id.)
King has not responded to County Defendants’ motion to
dismiss.
a. Service of Process
As County Defendants point out, it is King’s burden to prove
that service of process was effective. (Id. at 7.); see Ballard
v. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 733, 735 (S.D.W.
Va. 2009)). King himself has asserted that Defendants were only

served with summonses and has not otherwise made a showing of
proper service of process. County Defendants, on the other hand,
have submitted three declarations demonstrating that copies of the
complaint were not served on them. (Doc. 30-1 (Declaration of
Terry Johnson); Doc. 30-2 (Declaration of Annabelle Smith); Doc.
30-3 (Declaration of Tory Frink).) Therefore, all claims against
County Defendants will be dismissed for insufficient service of
process pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5).
b. Official Capacity Claims Against Johnson and
Paisley

Alternatively, King’s state law claims against Johnson and
Paisley in their official capacities are also barred by
governmental immunity.1 Johnson is the sheriff of Alamance County,
and Paisley is a county commissioner. By suing these Defendants
in their official capacities, King has in effect sued the office
of the sheriff and the county itself. See, e.g., Hunter v.
McFadden, No. 3:21-CV-63, 2021 WL 1030239, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Mar.
16, 2021); Welton v. Durham County, No. 17-CV-258, 2017 WL 3726991,

1 King brings claims against Johnson in only his official capacity but
does not specify whether the claims against Paisley are brought against
him in his individual or official capacity. The court thus addresses
any possible claims against Paisley in both his individual and official
capacities.
at *6 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 28, 2017). Pursuant to North Carolina law,
“[a] county, as a governmental agency, exercises the police power
of the State and is thus exempt from liability under the common

law rule of governmental immunity.” Baucom’s Nursery Co. v.
Mecklenburg County, 366 S.E.2d 558, 560 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); see
also Simmons v. Corizon Health, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 3d. 255, 268
(M.D.N.C. 2015) (“[S]heriffs are immune from suit absent a waiver
of immunity.”). A county can waive governmental immunity “by
consenting to suit, purchasing liability insurance, or purchasing
a bond.” Safford v. Barnes, 191 F. Supp. 3d 504, 506 (M.D.N.C.
2016) (citing Sellers v. Rodriguez, 561 S.E.2d 336, 339 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2002)). King has not alleged that any of these waivers of
immunity are present. Therefore, any state law claims against
Johnson and Paisley in their official capacities are dismissed on
the alternative ground of governmental immunity.
c. Specific Claims

Defamation is not actionable under § 1983. Garrett v. Aube,
No.8:18-1449, 2018 WL 3628848, at *2 (D.S.C. May 31, 2018) (citing
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-710 & nn.3-4 (1976)). And King’s
state law claims for defamation, slander, and libel are indeed
time-barred. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-54(3) (2020) (providing one-year
statute of limitations for defamation claims). King alleges he
was acquitted in September 2022 and does not allege any conduct
that occurred after that time. The statute of limitations for any
statement published in 2022, though notably one is not actually
alleged in the complaint, would have expired in 2023, and King’s
complaint was filed in September 2024. Because the statute of

limitations bar can be determined on the face of the complaint,
the court finds them time-barred. Dickinson v. Univ. of N.C., 91
F. Supp. 3d 755, 763 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (“To succeed on a statute-
of-limitations defense at [the motion to dismiss] stage, all facts
necessary to show the time bar must clearly appear ‘on the face of
the complaint.’ ” (quoting Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458,
464 (4th Cir. 2007))). Thus, King’s defamation claims against
County Defendants will be dismissed, in the alternative, as time-
barred.
The complaint alleges that Wilson, Culler and England are
employed by the ACSO, that Johnson is the sheriff of Alamance
County, and that Paisley is an Alamance County Commissioner. (Doc.

1 at 3-4, 6-7.) King asserts that these Defendants “violated [his]
Constitution[al] right[s] as a parent [d]etaining [King] against
his will and falsely [i]mprison[ing] [him] over three ‘3’ years of
confin[e]ment made defamation, slander and Liberial [sic] against
[him], Kid[]nap[p]ing 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendment, false
arrest, [and] Malicious Prosecuti[on].” (Id. at 8.) He further
alleges that the ACSO “did not investigate or Interview everyone
to ensure that Plaintiff is not wrongful[l]y accus[]ed.” (Id.)
King states that County Defendants “failed to c[o]nduct safe
investigation nor had any proof of evidence of time fram[e].” (Id.
at 10.)
King’s allegations are insufficient to state any of the many

claims he brings against County Defendants and are entirely
conclusory. He does not provide sufficient facts to demonstrate
that his arrest was without probable cause, and he does not
identify a defamatory statement made by any of the County
Defendants. Nor does King explain how his “Constitution[al]
right[s] as a parent” were violated. (Id. at 8.) Regarding his
claim that he was detained pre-trial for three years, County
Defendants, like Defendant Washington, did not determine or
control the length of King’s detention and thus cannot be held
liable for it. See Wilson, 480 F. App’x at 594. All of the claims
brought against County Defendants, therefore, fail to state a claim
against them.
III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated,
IT IS ORDERED that Boone and Oliver’s motion to dismiss (Doc.
12), Washington’s amended motion to dismiss (Doc. 35), Melrose and
Carrie’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 25), and County Defendants’ motion
to dismiss (Doc. 29) are GRANTED, and the claims against these
Defendants are DISMISSED as follows:
1. All claims against Boone, Johnson, and Paisley in their
official capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2. King’s defamation, slander, and libel claims against
County Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
3. All other claims against Boone, Oliver, Washington,

Melrose, Carrie, and the County Defendants (Johnson,
Wilson, Culler, England, and Paisley) are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that King’s motion for default (Doc.
23) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that King’s motion for leave to amend
the complaint (Doc. 23) is DENIED.

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge

June 10, 2025

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11068891. Public record. Not legal advice.