# Williams v. Warden, Chillicothe Correctional Institution

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · June 9, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11068588

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** June 9, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
:
Christopher-Michael Williams, :
: Case No. 2:23-cv-1042
Plaintiff, :
v. : Judge Graham
:
Warden, Chillicothe Correctional : Magistrate Judge Jolson
Institution, et al., :
:
Defendants. :

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff Christopher-Michael Williams’ (“Williams”)
objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report & Recommendation (“R&R”). Doc. 97; doc. 93. The
R&R determined that Williams’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 77) should be denied and
Defendant Mike Davis’ (“Davis”) cross-motion for summary judgment (doc. 78) should be
granted. For the reasons that follow, the Court OVERRULES Williams’ objections and ADOPTS
the R&R, and therefore GRANTS Davis’ motion for summary judgment and DENIES Williams’
motion for summary judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a party raises timely objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation,
the court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). When no
objections are timely filed, a district court reviews a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation
for clear error. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, advisory committee note (“When no timely objection is filed,
the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to
accept the recommendation.”).
The R&R in this case concerns the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper if the evidentiary materials in
the record show that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Longaberger Co. v. Kolt, 586 F.3d 459,
465 (6th Cir. 2009). The moving party bears the burden of proving the absence of genuine issues

of material fact and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, which may be accomplished by
demonstrating that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its case
on which it would bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-23 (1986); Walton v. Ford Motor Co., 424 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2005).
The “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no
genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)
(emphasis in original); see also Longaberger, 586 F.3d at 465. “Only disputed material facts, those
‘that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,’ will preclude summary

judgment.” Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 702 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248). Accordingly, the nonmoving party must present “significant probative evidence”
to demonstrate that “there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Moore
v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 340 (6th Cir. 1993). The standard of review remains the
same when reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment versus a motion filed by only one
party. Hamilton Cnty. Educ. Ass'n v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 822 F.3d 831, 835 (6th Cir.
2016)
DISCUSSION
The dispute in this matter is straightforward.1 Williams, an inmate at Chillicothe
Correctional Institution (“CCI”), requested that he be provided kosher meals due to his faith as an
adherent of the House of Yahweh. Davis, the religious services administrator for the Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”), denied Williams’ request. Williams filed

this lawsuit.
A motion to dismiss whittled down the claims and defendants. See doc. 32. The cross-
motions presently before the Court seek judgment on Williams’ two remaining claims against
Davis, the sole remaining defendant. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Williams alleges that the denial of
his kosher meal request violated his constitutional rights under the First Amendment. Williams
also alleges that the same denial violated his statutory rights under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (“RLUIPA”). Both claims require the claimant
to show, inter alia, that the state has substantially burdened the claimant’s religious exercise.
In the R&R, as an initial matter, the Magistrate Judge determined that the § 1983 claim can

only proceed against Davis in his individual capacity, and that monetary relief is not available for
an RLUIPA claim. Doc. 93, # 828-29. As for the merits of the RLUIPA claim, the Magistrate
Judge determined that Williams bears the initial burden to show (1) that his exercise is motivated
by a sincerely held religious belief, and (2) that the government is imposing a substantial burden
on that exercise. Id. (citing Ackerman v. Washington, 16 F.4th 170, 179-80 (6th Cir. 2021)). The
Magistrate Judge further determined that while Williams sufficiently established (at the summary
judgment stage) the sincerity of his beliefs, he failed to establish that the denial of kosher meals

1 And the Court is grateful for the efforts of the Magistrate Judge toward making it so.
imposed a substantial burden on his religious exercise, given that he has access to meals which fit
the parameters of his accommodation request.
As to the § 1983 claim, the Magistrate Judge reached the same conclusion, because
“[c]ourts have recognized that, in the prison context, RLUIPA provides greater protections than
the First Amendment.” Fox v. Washington, 949 F.3d 270, 277 (6th Cir. 2020). Lastly, after

surveying the case law, the Magistrate Judge opined on Davis’ qualified immunity defense,
concluding that, “even if [Williams] were able to establish that Davis violated his constitutional
rights, those rights were not so clearly established as to allow monetary liability.” Doc. 93, # 842.
In his objections, Williams takes issue with the conclusion that his religious exercise is not
substantially burdened by the denial of his request for kosher meals. At the root of these objections
is the Magistrate Judge’s decision to “[consider] only the dietary requirements laid out in
[Williams’] requests that Davis had the opportunity to consider.” Id. at # 831. Under those dietary
requirements, the ever-present vegetarian options provided Williams with compliant meals. But
since that time, Williams’ understanding of the dietary requirements of his faith has drastically

expanded, and much of his current argument is based on an understanding of his faith that was not
presented to Davis in the accommodation request.2

2 Williams concedes that he has “added new elements to [his] claim” because he is “still growing,” and has
even “grown beyond the customs of the House of Yahweh.” Doc. 97, # 886. Cf., id. at # 886-87 (“[House
of Yahweh was] like a pair of pants that is too small, but there were no other pants around. Only upon my
release will I find those proverbial pair of pants that are Big Enough to hold the man I have become in the
image of Yahweh.”) (capitalization original).

Near the end of his objections, Williams writes “I don’t have the same faith as the House of Yahweh, and
they might even attack my ardent passion for only listening to the words that Yahweh gave to Mosheh, and
not following Yahshua at all.” Id. at # 892; contrast doc. 19-4 (Williams’ second accommodation request,
stating “Hebrews Chapter 12 says that Yahshua the Messiah is the high priest and we need not for mans
approval to worship the way he did when he walked this earth.”)
For example, in his first request for kosher meals, in January 2022, Williams stated his
desire to be “safely in the Levitical eat laws,” specifically citing Leviticus Ch. 11:1-47, Ch. 23,
Ch. 20:25-26, and Deuteronomy Ch. 12:15 and 22, and Ch. 14:11-21. Doc. 77, # 667. He made a
second request, this time citing Leviticus Ch. 2, 3, 11, and 26, and Genesis Ch. 7, supported by a
letter from Gerald Flurry, Pastor General at the Philadelphia Church of God. Doc. 19-4; doc. 3-2.

He later supported his request with a letter from Kohan Anayah Hawkins, overseer for the House
of Yahweh, who stated that members of the faith “do not consume any food containing pork,
shellfish, blood,” again citing to Leviticus Ch. 11. Doc. 19-5, # 275. Across all these materials
submitted in support of Williams’ request for kosher meals, none state that House of Yahweh
adherents must keep kosher, and nothing indicates that a vegetarian or vegan meal option would
violate the stated requirements or otherwise burden Williams’ religious exercise. Accordingly,
Williams’ request was eventually denied, with Davis writing, “[m]enu items are void of pork/pork
products and food is consistent with requirements mentioned in your request,” and that “a meatless
meal option with a vegan entrée is available.” Doc. 77, # 666. Because he could not show that

menu items available to him were inconsistent with the stated requirements of his faith, the
Magistrate Judge concluded that his religious exercise was not substantially burdened by the denial
of his kosher meal request.
In his objections, Williams now argues that his request “in fact said, ‘food in line with the
scriptures.’”3 Doc. 97, # 887. And by “the scriptures,” Williams argues that he is not solely

3 Williams appears to represent this as a direct quotation from his religious accommodation request(s), one
which he repeats numerous times in his objections. See Doc. 97, # 887 (“Once the assertion said in line
with the scriptures it meant every word that the father spoke regarding food”); id. (“I never boxed myself
in with only specific sections of the scriptures but requested ‘In line with the Torah.’”); id. (“There was not
enough space on the forms to place the ‘Every word of Yahweh’ on there so I had to say ‘In line with the
scriptures.’”); id. at # 890 (“my request in religious accommodation filed, under Exhibits 1 & 4 of
complaint, specifically stated that I needed “foods that were in line with the scriptures.”). But his actual
referring to the specific verses cited in his requests, but rather to “every word that the father spoke
regarding food.” Id. Thus, to understand the full breadth of dietary requirements prescribed by his
faith, Williams directs the Court to the nearly 300 pages of text submitted alongside his objections.
See Doc. 98. These pages are not Bible verses nor any other known religious text, but rather are
Williams’ own attempt to write “Every word of Yahweh (as inspired by Yahweh correcting the

errors added through translation and subject to grow upon new revelation).” Doc. 97, # 886. In
other words, Williams now bases his request on scripture—“Yahweh Said”—written by his own
hand.4
Nevertheless, even under “Yahweh Said,” Williams concedes that “Kosher meals are not
sufficient to satisfy my worship to Yahweh.” Id. at # 890. For example, Williams cites to “Yahweh
Said” as prohibiting the consumption of food that has been dead for over 3 days, but fish (labeled
as “kosher”) that Williams purchases from the commissary has been dead “for untold days.” Id.
Cf. doc. 19-2, # 267 (message from Williams to chaplain complaining that kosher meal provided
for Passover is in violation of Exodus Ch. 12). As to the inadequacy of vegetarian meals, Williams

claims that “individuals who do not follow the same words of Yahweh are unclean and everything
they touch, or sit on, becomes scripturally unclean, making the inmates who prepare the vegetarian
meals and the staff unclean.” Doc. 79, # 709. Notably, Williams’ issue with the vegetarian meals
is not because they lack the formal kosher designation. Furthermore, Davis has submitted a
declaration from Michelle Tatman, ODRC Dietary Operations Manager, in which she states:
The personal qualifications of the inmates, Aramark staff, and
Aramark’s suppliers who ship, deliver, unpack, prepare, cook, and
serve the vegetarian/vegan option provided to inmates at CCI are no

accommodation requests, attached to his complaint, contain no such statement, instead listing specific
chapters and verses as the basis for his religious accommodation request. See doc. 19-1; doc. 19-4.

4 To be clear, “sincerity is distinct from reasonableness,” and the Court does not doubt the sincerity of
Williams’ faith. New Doe Child #1 v. Cong. of United States, 891 F.3d 578, 586 (6th Cir. 2018).
different from the personal qualifications of those who ship, deliver,
unpack, prepare, cook, and serve the kosher meals to provided
inmates at CCI.

In preparing both the vegetarian/vegan meals and kosher meals
served at CCI, it is necessary for the food service workers,
themselves, to personally touch the refrigerator, the freezer, the
dishwasher, the food wrappings, the fruit and vegetables, the pots,
the pans, the cooking utensils, the containers, the microwaves, the
ovens, and the trays.

Doc. 87-2, # 784. Based on Tatman’s representations, Williams’ requirement that “scripturally
clean” foods must be prepared by those who follow “the same words of Yahweh,” is no more
accommodated by kosher meals than by vegetarian or vegan meals.5 Williams does not dispute
these facts regarding meal preparation at CCI.6
Williams’ belief that the preparation of the kosher meals is “closer” to what his faith
requires does not create a genuine dispute of material fact. Even if Williams’ proved as much at
trial, the fact would remain (per Williams’ own admission, as well as the cosmically distant
goalposts set by “Yahweh Said”) that the kosher meals do not suffice. Therefore, because

5 Though Williams characterizes kosher meals as the “closest” accommodation of his religious exercise,
elsewhere he suggests (and his materials support) that whether something is “scripturally unclean” is not a
matter of degree—i.e., there is nothing to support the notion that Williams’ religious exercise would be
accommodated by swapping “unclean” vegetarian/vegan meal options with kosher meals which are
somehow less “unclean.” Cf. doc. 79, # 714 (“my accommodation plainly stated that I need food in line
with the Torah, not slightly in line but in line.”); but see supra, n.3 (explaining that his accommodation
requests did not state such a need, plainly or otherwise); see also doc. 53, # 458 (“Anything that an unclean
person touches becomes unclean, and anyone who touches the unclean becomes unclean.”) (quoting
Numbers 19:22). Regardless, even if the Court could determine a quantum of uncleanliness that would
substantially burden Williams’ religious exercise, the difference of degree would be entirely speculative,
given the unknowability of the extent to which anybody who handles his food follows the every word of
“Yahweh Said.”

6 Williams sometimes characterizes his request as for “Kosher Meals that are untouched by staff and sealed
up.” Doc. 97, # 892. This does not solve Williams’ problem, as he cannot show that the preparation and
sealing of such a meal would be done by “scripturally clean” individuals, a reality which Williams’ appears
to acknowledge with his concession that kosher meals “are not sufficient,” and his belief that his only means
of scripturally clean eating requires him to “sacrifice [his] own food, and grow his own vegetation, and
allow the land to keep the sabbatical year.” Doc. 97, # 889.
providing a kosher meal would not accommodate Williams’ religious exercise, denial of a kosher
meal does not substantially burden his religious exercise. Williams’ objections, and his submission
of “Yahweh Said,” do not change this conclusion.
Because Williams cannot, as a matter of law, show that the denial of his kosher meal
request substantially burdened his religious exercise, he cannot prevail on his RLUIPA claim. And

because RLUIPA provides greater protection—i.e., is the lower hurdle to clear—his First
Amendment free exercise claim must fail as well.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court OVERRULES Williams’ objections (doc. 94) and
ADOPTS the Report and Recommendations (doc. 93). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Davis’
motion for summary judgment (doc. 78) and DENIES Williams’ motion for summary judgment
(doc. 77). Furthermore, the Court GRANTS Williams’ second motion to amend his objections
(doc. 97), as the Court considered his amended objections filed therewith. The Court DENIES
Williams’ first motion to amend (doc. 95) as moot.

Accordingly, Williams’ other pending objections (doc. 53 and doc. 66) are OVERRULED
as moot. The Court ADOPTS the R&R (doc. 45) regarding Williams’ motion for injunctive relief
(doc. 41) and therefore DENIES said motion as moot. The Court further ADOPTS the R&R (doc.
65) regarding Williams’ motion for joinder (doc. 57) and therefore DENIES said motion as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James L. Graham
JAMES L. GRAHAM
United States District Judge

DATE: June 9, 2025

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11068588. Public record. Not legal advice.