# In re Petition for Reinstatement of Edward Raymond Kohout

> West Virginia Supreme Court · June 10, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11068399

## Case

- **Court:** West Virginia Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 10, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** Bar Discipline/Eligibility
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
FILED
January 2025 Term
_____________ June 10, 2025
released at 3:00 p.m.
C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
No. 21-1033 SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
_____________

IN RE: EDWARD R. KOHOUT PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT

________________________________________________

Lawyer Disciplinary Proceeding

REINSTATEMENT DENIED
________________________________________________

Submitted: March 4, 2025
Filed: June 10, 2025

Edward R. Kohout Rachel L. Fletcher Cipoletti, Esq.
Self-Represented Litigant Chief Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel
Point Marion, Pennsylvania Kristin P. Halkias, Esq.
Petitioner Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel
Office of Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Respondent

JUSTICE BUNN delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. “This Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make

the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of attorneys’

licenses to practice law.” Syllabus point 1, In re Reinstatement of Wheaton, 245 W. Va.

199, 858 S.E.2d 662 (2021) (quoting Syllabus point 3, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Blair,

174 W. Va. 494, 327 S.E.2d 671 (1984)).

2. “A de novo standard applies to a review of the adjudicatory record

made before the [Hearing Panel Subcommittee of the Lawyer Disciplinary Board] as to

questions of law, questions of application of the law to the facts, and questions of

appropriate sanctions; this Court gives respectful consideration to the [Hearing Panel

Subcommittee’s] recommendations while ultimately exercising its own independent

judgment. On the other hand, substantial deference is given to the [Hearing Panel

Subcommittee’s] findings of fact, unless such findings are not supported by reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.” Syllabus point 3, Committee on

Legal Ethics v. McCorkle, 192 W. Va. 286, 452 S.E.2d 377 (1994).

3. “The general rule for reinstatement is that a disbarred attorney in order

to regain admission to the practice of law bears the burden of showing that he presently

i
possesses the integrity, moral character and legal competence to resume the practice of law.

To overcome the adverse effect of the previous disbarment, [the disbarred attorney] must

demonstrate a record of rehabilitation. In addition, the [C]ourt must conclude that such

reinstatement will not have a justifiable and substantial adverse effect on the public

confidence in the administration of justice and in this regard the seriousness of the conduct

leading to disbarment is an important consideration.” Syllabus point 1, In re Brown, 166

W. Va. 226, 273 S.E.2d 567 (1980).

4. A disbarred lawyer petitioning for reinstatement of an annulled

license to practice law must prove the criteria identified in Syllabus point 1 of In re Brown,

166 W. Va. 226, 273 S.E.2d 567 (1980), by clear and convincing evidence.

5. “Rehabilitation is demonstrated by a course of conduct that enables

the [C]ourt to conclude there is little likelihood that[,] after such rehabilitation is completed

and the applicant is readmitted to the practice of law[,] he will engage in unprofessional

conduct.” Syllabus point 4, In re Reinstatement of Wheaton, 245 W. Va. 199, 858 S.E.2d

662 (2021) (quoting Syllabus point 2, In re Brown, 166 W. Va. 226, 273 S.E.2d 567

(1980)).

ii
BUNN, Justice:

Petitioner, Edward R. Kohout, seeks reinstatement of his license to practice

law in West Virginia, which this Court annulled in 2016 based on Mr. Kohout’s serious

misconduct that included converting client funds, submitting a fraudulent invoice, and

establishing a pattern of intentional deceit and dishonesty as evident from his disciplinary

record.1 Because of the nature of his misconduct, Mr. Kohout bears a heavy burden to prove

that he now possesses the integrity, high moral character, and legal competence to justify

reinstating his law license. We find that Mr. Kohout has failed to meet his burden. Due to

the lack of clear and convincing evidence permitting us to conclude that Mr. Kohout’s

reinstatement will not have a substantial adverse effect on the public confidence in the

administration of justice, we deny his petition for reinstatement. Furthermore, before filing

another petition for reinstatement, Mr. Kohout must: (1) fully reimburse the Disciplinary

Board for the cost of the disciplinary proceeding in which he was disbarred; (2) fully

reimburse the Disciplinary Board for the cost of this reinstatement proceeding; and (3)

obtain an affidavit from a licensed attorney agreeing to supervise him upon reinstatement,

which he must include with any future petition for reinstatement he may file.

1
We note that, “disbarment of an attorney and annulment of his license are
two ways of expressing the same form of punishment. The annulment of a license to
practice law constitutes a disbarment. Annulment relates to the license and disbarment
refers to the individual.” Syl. pt. 2, in part, Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Boettner, 188 W. Va.
1, 422 S.E.2d 478 (1992).

1
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Kohout was admitted to the practice of law in West Virginia on

November 4, 1987. On September 23, 2015, the Investigative Panel of the Lawyer

Disciplinary Board (“Disciplinary Board”) issued a four-count statement of charges based

on four separate complaints against Mr. Kohout. The Hearing Panel Subcommittee of the

Disciplinary Board (“Hearing Panel”) held a two-day hearing. Based on the evidence

presented, the Hearing Panel submitted its findings and recommendations to this Court

recommending that we annul Mr. Kohout’s law license, require him to make restitution to

one of the complainants, and require him to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding.

Mr. Kohout objected to the recommended disposition, and the Court scheduled the matter

for briefing and oral argument.

Afterward, the Court agreed with the Hearing Panel’s

recommendation and, on November 15, 2016, issued an opinion disbarring Mr. Kohout.

Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Kohout (“Kohout Disbarment”), 238 W. Va. 668, 798 S.E.2d 192

(2016). We found that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) failed to prove, by clear

and convincing evidence, allegations related to a complaint made by Mr. Kohout’s former

secretary. Id. at 684, 798 S.E.2d at 208. However, the three remaining complaints were

supported by clear and convincing proof that Mr. Kohout committed fifteen different acts

that violated eleven different provisions of the West Virginia Rules of Professional

2
Conduct.2 Id. Notably, in each of the three remaining complaints, the Court found that Mr.

Kohout engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,

which amounted to four separate violations of Rule 8.4(c). Id.; see also W. Va. R. Prof.

Conduct 8.4(c) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . engage in conduct

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]”). Numerous aggravating

circumstances impacted the Court’s disciplinary decision, including:

(1) Mr. Kohout’s list of prior disciplinary offenses, one of
which necessitated suspension of Mr. Kohout’s law license for
two years;[3] (2) his dishonest and/or selfish motive; (3) the
extensive number of Rule violations; (4) a pattern of

2
Several of Mr. Kohout’s actions violated multiple rule provisions. Thus, the
ODC proved a total of twenty-eight violations.
3
Mr. Kohout’s prior lawyer disciplinary offenses relied on by the Court
include several disciplinary proceedings. In 1992, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia suspended his privilege to practice in that court for three years
after finding that Mr. Kohout “engaged in an intentional series of improper acts planned
and directed by [Mr. Kohout] to benefit [his bankruptcy client and the client’s] family and
associates.” Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Kohout, No. 22629, at 5 (W. Va. Apr. 14, 1995)
(unpublished per curiam). This Court suspended Mr. Kohout’s law license for two years in
1995 because he “(1) made a materially false statement” when he applied for admission to
the West Virginia State Bar; “(2) engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or other misrepresentation,” by repeatedly concealing the fact of disciplinary punishment
imposed on Mr. Kohout when he was a law student; and (3) was suspended by the
bankruptcy court. Id. at 6. See also id. at 8 (finding Mr. Kohout “engaged in serious ethical
misconduct and has demonstrated a pattern of conduct involving intentional deception”).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania suspended Mr. Kohout’s Pennsylvania law license for
three years as reciprocal discipline for the suspension of his West Virginia law license. See
In re Kohout, 664 A.2d 1309 (Pa. 1995) (per curiam mem.). In 2013, the Disciplinary Board
admonished Mr. Kohout for misleading a family court about the status of a personal injury
settlement his client received. Kohout, No. 10-01-198 (Investigative Panel, Lawyer
Disciplinary Bd. May 6, 2013) (admonishment and closing order). See also Law.
Disciplinary Bd. v. Kohout (“Kohout Disbarment”), 238 W. Va. 668, 681, 798 S.E.2d 192,
205 (2016) (acknowledging admonishment).

3
misconduct as established by his prior discipline and the
present Rule violations; (5) refusal to acknowledge the
wrongful nature of his conduct or the extent of the harm caused
by his conduct; (6) his substantial experience in the practice of
law; and (7) his indifference to making restitution.

Kohout Disbarment, 238 W. Va. at 686, 798 S.E.2d at 210. An additional aggravating

factor recognized by the Court was a contemporaneous disciplinary action against Mr.

Kohout by the Judicial Investigation Commission. See In re Kohout, No. 15-1190 (W. Va.

October 7, 2016) (unpublished order).4 Finding no mitigating factors, we annulled Mr.

Kohout’s law license and ordered him to “make full restitution to [his client] in the amount

of $2,059.66, and . . . reimburse the [Disciplinary Board] for the costs it incurred in

connection with these proceedings.” Kohout Disbarment, 238 W. Va. at 687, 798 S.E.2d

at 211 (footnote omitted). The Court’s mandate issued on December 15, 2016, reiterating

4
In the Judicial Investigation Commission proceeding, the Court adopted
recommendations by the Judicial Hearing Board and accepted the parties’ joint stipulations
providing that Mr. Kohout violated multiple canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct while
he was a candidate for circuit court judge. In re Kohout, No. 15-1190 (W. Va. October 7,
2016) (unpublished order). We also adopted the parties’ joint recommendations on
discipline. Id. Accordingly, we publicly censured Mr. Kohout, ordered that he be
permanently enjoined from seeking judicial office by election or appointment in West
Virginia, and ordered him to pay the costs of the investigation and prosecution of the
charges. Id. As of January 28, 2016, those costs equaled $3,307.95. Id. We ordered Mr.
Kohout to make $200.00 monthly payments beginning thirty days after the conclusion of
the proceedings. Id. During his reinstatement hearing before the Hearing Panel in the
instant matter, Mr. Kohout claimed that Judicial Disciplinary Counsel forced the stipulation
on him by threatening disbarment, and he admitted that he had made no payments toward
the costs incurred in investigating and prosecuting the Judicial Investigation Commission
proceeding.

4
that Mr. Kohout make full restitution to Ms. Richard and noting that the costs of the

proceedings Mr. Kohout owed the ODC totaled $10,737.77.

In addition to the obligations the Court imposed on Mr. Kohout in the

annulment proceeding, West Virginia Rule of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure 3.28

required him to notify his clients of his disbarment. Pursuant to Rule 3.28(c), Mr. Kohout

had a mandatory duty to file an affidavit with this Court no more than twenty days after

the effective date of his disbarment, providing specified information about each client he

notified in accordance with paragraphs (a) and (b) of the rule. Mr. Kohout missed the

twenty-day deadline. He did not file the affidavit until May 18, 2020–nearly three-and-a-

half years after his disbarment. Then, Mr. Kohout waited almost five years after his

disbarment before paying $2,060.00 in restitution to his client as ordered by this Court. See

Kohout Disbarment, 238 W. Va. at 687, 798 S.E.2d at 211 (ordering Mr. Kohout to make

full restitution).5

Pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure 3.33(b),

Mr. Kohout was permitted to petition for reinstatement five years after the annulment of

5
Mr. Kohout paid the ordered restitution on September 21, 2021. This was
nearly eight years after the October 30, 2013, settlement of his client’s personal injury case.

5
his license.6 Toward the end of this five-year period, around December 14, 2021, Mr.

Kohout contacted the ODC about paying the costs of his disciplinary proceeding. By letter

dated and faxed on December 16, 2021, Mr. Kohout advised the ODC that he would “be

filing [his] petition for reinstatement soon and would like to propose a payment plan for

the repayment of the costs of [his] proceeding.” He proposed monthly payments of $300.00

for thirty-six months. That same day, the ODC prepared a payment plan agreement

providing for “monthly installments of $300.00, to be paid the first week of each month,”

and sent it to Mr. Kohout.

6
West Virginia Rule of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure 3.33(b) provides:

After the expiration of five years from the date of
disbarment, a person whose license to practice law has been or
shall be annulled in this State and who shall desire
reinstatement of such license may file a verified petition in the
Supreme Court of Appeals reciting the cause of such
annulment and what the person shall have done in satisfaction
of requirements as to rehabilitation, restitution, conditions or
other acts incident thereto, by reason of which the person
should be reinstated as a member of the state bar and his or her
license to practice law restored. The petitioner shall also file a
completed reinstatement questionnaire provided by the Office
of Disciplinary Counsel. At the time of filing the petition and
questionnaire with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Appeals,
the petitioner shall also file a copy of each with the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, which shall conduct a prompt
investigation thereof and shall file a report with a Hearing
Panel Subcommittee of the Lawyer Disciplinary Board.

6
The next day, December 17, 2021, Mr. Kohout filed his petition seeking

reinstatement along with the reinstatement questionnaire required by Rule 3.33(b).7 The

ODC received copy of Mr. Kohout’s signed payment plan agreement on December 22,

2021. Mr. Kohout’s initial two $300.00 payments were not delivered to the ODC until

February and March of 2022. He then paid only $100 in April 2022, explaining that a

temporary interruption of his Social Security benefits had disrupted his finances.

Thereafter, Mr. Kohout made sporadic $100 payments. As of March 4, 2025, when this

case was submitted after oral arguments, it appears that Mr. Kohout had paid approximately

$1,500.00 of the $10,737.77 cost of the disciplinary proceeding that resulted in his

disbarment.8

Meanwhile, after Mr. Kohout filed his petition for reinstatement, the ODC

requested public comments on Mr. Kohout’s reinstatement. One letter responding to this

request was written in January 2022 by Mr. Nestor Hernandez. He stated that Mr. Kohout

had served four years as the recording secretary for a gun club both men belong to. Mr.

Hernandez explained that he was the treasurer for the club and had known Mr. Kohout for

7
See Id. Mr. Kohout did not fully complete the questionnaire, omitting the
list of the offenses or misconduct that led to his disbarment as well as the related
information and documentation identified in the questionnaire.
8
Documents in the record reflecting Mr. Kohout’s payments are incomplete,
so this amount is an estimate. However, it is undisputed that Mr. Kohout has failed to pay
the full amount owed to the ODC as ordered by this Court.

7
more than five years. Mr. Hernandez credited Mr. Kohout with “guiding and assisting” the

gun club to obtain its non-profit status and helping to improve the club’s by-laws and dues

collection. He wrote that Mr. Kohout “was key in helping the club get back on its feet to

continue [its] existence” after a former treasurer embezzled club funds. Mr. Hernandez

described Mr. Kohout as honest, trustworthy, hardworking, and of good moral character,

further stating that Mr. Kohout ensures “things” are “within the scope of the law.” Lastly,

he stated that Mr. Kohout helps to organize events, keeps “excellent meeting minutes and

records,” and helps other club officers when needed. Mr. Lawrence Mikolajcik, then

president of the insurance sales company for which Mr. Kohout worked as an independent

contractor, also submitted a letter. The letter explained that Mr. Kohout began selling

insurance though the company in late 2016, and he “has conducted himself in a professional

manner under minimal supervision. Overall, he has kept his account in a good financial

position. We have not received any negative feedback from clients and in general would

judge his conduct as satisfactory.”9

9
The information provided by Mr. Hernandez and Mr. Kohout’s employer
occurred after Mr. Kohout’s disbarment. Other letters responding to the ODC’s request for
comments, both in favor of and opposing Mr. Kohout’s reinstatement, are largely related
to his pre-disbarment conduct, or they are general statements to which we give little weight.
See In re Reinstatement of Drake, 242 W. Va. 65, 71 n.20, 829 S.E.2d 267 273 n.20 (2019)
(“General statements and letters from attorneys, friends, and community leaders on behalf
of a petitioner in a reinstatement proceeding are of little evidentiary value.” (quoting Law.
Disciplinary Bd. v. Vieweg, 194 W. Va. 554, 559, 461 S.E.2d 60, 65 (1995))). Therefore,
we do not discuss the contents of those letters.

8
The ODC also conducted an investigation and, on March 26, 2024, filed an

amended report regarding Mr. Kohout’s petition for reinstatement.10 The Hearing Panel

then held a reinstatement hearing in this matter on May 17, 2024.11 At the beginning of the

hearing, the ODC and Mr. Kohout submitted proposed exhibits. The Hearing Panel

admitted all the exhibits into evidence without objection. Seven witnesses testified. Mr.

Kohout offered testimony by Chad Mikolajcik, president of the insurance sales company

employing Mr. Kohout as an independent contractor;12 Linda Cummins, a former client

and insurance customer; and Diane Kohout, his wife. Mr. Kohout also testified on his own

behalf.

Mr. Mikolajcik explained that he is president of Insurance Services, LLC.,

and Mr. Kohout is a licensed insurance agent who has sold life and health insurance through

Mr. Mikolajcik’s company on a commission basis with little supervision, since late 2016.

He described Mr. Kohout as professional and friendly, a person who kept his account in a

10
See W. Va. R. Law. Disciplinary P. 3.33(b) (requiring the ODC to
“conduct a prompt investigation” of the petition for reinstatement and reinstatement
questionnaire and “file a report with a Hearing Panel Subcommittee of the Lawyer
Disciplinary Board,” and quoted supra at note 6).
11
See Id. at 3.33(c) (directing the Hearing Panel to, upon receiving the
ODC’s report, schedule a hearing and promptly prepare a written report with its
recommendation).
12
Chad Mikolajcik apparently replaced his father, Lawrence Mikolajcik, as
president of the insurance sales company.

9
good financial position and generally received no negative feedback. According to Mr.

Mikolajcik, Mr. Kohout has written more than 500 policy applications in the seven-and-a-

half-years they have worked together. Mr. Kohout has annually completed Medicare fraud,

waste, and abuse training to maintain his certification to sell Medicare supplemental plans,

and he won sales awards once or twice.13 Mr. Mikolajcik explained that Mr. Kohout does

not handle client money, and if he received a check from a client, it would be made out to

the insurance company and not to Mr. Kohout. Finally, Mr. Mikolajcik stated that he had

observed nothing to suggest Mr. Kohout was not fit to resume the practice of law, but

qualified his statement by acknowledging that he is unfamiliar with “that regulatory

landscape.”

Linda Cummins explained that Mr. Kohout represented her in a

discrimination/wrongful discharge case against Monongalia General Hospital in 2013. Her

case settled because it was “cut and dried pretty much,” she was “absolutely” satisfied with

the representation Mr. Kohout provided, and she trusted him implicitly. Because of her

trust, she also sought Mr. Kohout’s advice about insurance. Ms. Cummins stated that Mr.

Kohout never said or did anything to make others feel uncomfortable. Although she did

not understand why Mr. Kohout was disbarred, she opined that he should be reinstated

13
In 2018 Mr. Kohout received an “Aetna Medicare Front Runner producer”
certificate and a “Tycoon Club” award from Insurance Services, LLC, for outstanding sales
achievement.

10
immediately.14 When the ODC’s counsel posed a hypothetical describing some of Mr.

Kohout’s professional misconduct, Ms. Cummins declared that she would not believe Mr.

Kohout committed those offenses.

Diane Kohout, Mr. Kohout’s wife, testified by reading a prepared statement,

but she sometimes strayed from it.15 She and Mr. Kohout married in 2013. Ms. Kohout is

14
We have expressed concern when personal opinions about a disbarred
lawyer’s character or legal competence are provided by persons who do not fully
understand the offenses underlying the disbarment. See Drake, 242 W. Va. at 71, 829
S.E.2d at 273 (“We are deeply concerned . . . that none of those who testified had a full
understanding of the underlying offense.”). Because Ms. Cummings did not have a clear
understanding of the offenses that led to Mr. Kohout’s disbarment, we give little weight to
the character testimony she offered on Mr. Kohout’s behalf.
15
The ODC points out that during her testimony, Ms. Kohout commented
that she was “getting a little off script,” and when referring to the written statement said
“[l]et’s see. What else did he say?” and “let’s see what else he put down.” To the extent
that the ODC implies that these comments cast doubt on Ms. Kohout’s credibility, we note
that during the ODC’s cross-examination, counsel asked if Mr. Kohout had prepared the
statement. Ms. Kohout responded “No, ma’am. I—I wrote this.” She then explained that
she wrote the statement and Mr. Kohout typed it for her, then they went through it together
and “tweaked it a little bit.” Furthermore, the Hearing Panel’s findings and
recommendations to this Court contain no finding with respect to Ms. Kohout’s credibility,
and we will not make such a determination on a cold record. See Law. Disciplinary Bd. v.
Cunningham, 195 W. Va. 27, 34, 464 S.E.2d 181, 188 (1995) (acknowledging that the
Hearing Panel “hears the testimony of the witnesses firsthand and, being much closer to
the pulse of the hearing, is much better situated to resolve such issues as credibility”
(quoting Comm. on Legal Ethics v. McCorkle, 192 W. Va. 286, 290, 452 S.E.2d 377, 381
(1994))); Frazier v. Ramadan, 249 W. Va. 170, 181, 895 S.E.2d 25, 36 (2023) (“Our law
is clear that ‘[a] reviewing court cannot assess witness credibility through a record. The
trier of fact is uniquely situated to make such determinations[,] and this Court is not in a
position to, and will not, second guess such determinations.’” (quoting Michael D.C. v.
Wanda L.C., 201 W. Va. 381, 388, 497 S.E.2d 531, 538 (1997))).

11
a retired registered nurse and believes herself to be a good judge of character. She described

Mr. Kohout as likable, intelligent, articulate, and truthful, saying they have had a “very,

very happy marriage.” Nevertheless, Mr. Kohout’s disbarment has disrupted their lives and

has made Mr. Kohout unhappy since he is unable to engage in his chosen vocation, and it

has strained their marriage.16 Even though Mr. Kohout works hard as an insurance agent

and makes a good living, they have both begun drawing Social Security benefits and

struggle financially every month. When questioned about Mr. Kohout’s past disciplinary

issues, Ms. Kohout explained that she knew about a couple of Mr. Kohout’s early offenses,

but she knew few details about the 1995 disciplinary action or the 2015 Judicial

Investigation Commission proceeding, and she did not know that a bankruptcy court had

temporarily suspended Mr. Kohout’s privilege to practice in that court in 1995.17 Ms.

Kohout described Mr. Kohout’s clients as “mostly poor people” and “many that didn’t pay

for his services.” However, she indicated that she would like to see Mr. Kohout’s license

reinstated because he is a talented and dedicated lawyer who cares about his clients and is

happiest when he is helping people. Regarding Mr. Kohout’s rehabilitation, Ms. Kohout

16
In his brief to this Court, Mr. Kohout states that Ms. Kohout left him to
return to her home state shortly after the May 17, 2024 hearing.
17
Ms. Kohout was not questioned about her understanding of Mr. Kohout’s
misconduct that led to his disbarment. Because we cannot determine whether Ms. Kohout
had a clear understanding of the offenses that led to Mr. Kohout’s disbarment, and her
knowledge of his disciplinary history was limited, we give little weight to the character
testimony she offered on his behalf. See note 14 supra.

12
stated that, since his disbarment, Mr. Kohout has not sought counseling or taken any classes

on law office management. She believed he could benefit from both.

Mr. Kohout testified at length. His primary theme was that “all this ethics

case is about” is the fact that his “money ran out.” As discussed more thoroughly below,

although he expressed remorse and stated that he accepted full responsibility “for this ethics

[c]ase,” Mr. Kohout repeatedly defended his conduct and refuted this Court’s conclusions

about the misconduct that led to his disbarment. Addressing restitution, Mr. Kohout

explained that he had paid the debts related to some of the offenses for which he was

disbarred, including a $985 medical bill he owed on behalf of a client,18 a $200 filing fee

for an appeal in this Court,19 and $2,060 he owed to a client for settlement funds he

converted to his own use.20 On the topic of rehabilitation, Mr. Kohout relied upon his

seven-and-one-half years of “successfully” selling insurance without complaints. He

asserted there is “little likelihood of reoccurrence” as there are “no prior similar

18
In fact, Mr. Kohout paid this bill before the Court annulled his law license.
See Kohout Disbarment, 238 W. Va. at 679, 798 S.E.2d at 203 (“In October 2015, Mr.
Kohout contacted Dynamic Physical Therapy about paying Ms. Richard’s bill. He paid the
bill in December 2015.”).
19
Mr. Kohout also made this payment prior to the annulment of his law
license. See id. at 673, 798 S.E.2d at 197 (acknowledging that the filing fee was received
in January 2014).
20
Mr. Kohout explained that his son provided the money used to pay this
client.

13
occurrences” and this “is the first time [he has] been accused of conversion or anything

like that.” He has not participated in any counseling since his disbarment and stated that he

had previously done so and did not see the point. Mr. Kohout gave detailed testimony about

clients he represented in the past and how he helped people. During his cross examination

by the ODC, Mr. Kohout became defensive and uncooperative. He did not want to discuss

his disciplinary history, which was the primary focus of the cross-examination.21

Following the hearing, the Hearing Panel filed its “Findings and

Recommendations” regarding Mr. Kohout’s petition for reinstatement, recommending that

this Court deny Mr. Kohout’s petition. Because Mr. Kohout testified that he would “be

back every year” if he must, to get his law license reinstated, the Hearing Panel further

recommends that the Court order Mr. Kohout to pay the entire cost of his underlying

disciplinary proceeding before filing another petition for reinstatement.22 Finally, the

Hearing Panel asks that the Court further direct Mr. Kohout to provide an affidavit from a

licensed attorney agreeing to supervise him upon reinstatement with any future petition for

21
The ODC offered testimony by a panel trustee for the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, and two of Mr. Kohout’s
former employees. These witnesses testified about Mr. Kohout’s pre-disbarment character
and conduct. Because we do not rely on this evidence in reaching our decision on Mr.
Kohout’s reinstatement, we find no need to summarize this testimony.
22
See W. Va. R. Law. Disciplinary P. 3.33(g) (permitting conditions
concerning subsequent petitions for reinstatement).

14
reinstatement he may file. Mr. Kohout requested a hearing pursuant to Rule 3.33(d), and

the Court held oral arguments on March 4, 2025.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“This Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make the

ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of attorneys’

licenses to practice law.” Syl. pt. 1, In re Reinstatement of Wheaton, 245 W. Va. 199, 858

S.E.2d 662 (2021) (quoting Syl. pt. 3, Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Blair, 174 W. Va. 494,

327 S.E.2d 671 (1984)). This standard encompasses our authority to make the ultimate

decision concerning reinstatement. See, e.g., id. (applying standard to reinstatement); In re

Reinstatement of diTrapano, 240 W. Va. 612, 814 S.E.2d 275 (2018) (same). Because we

are the final arbiter of legal ethics issues, we exercise de novo review of disciplinary

matters, including petitions for reinstatement, while giving substantial deference to the

Hearing Panel’s findings of fact that are supported by the record and respectfully

considering its recommendations:

A de novo standard applies to a review of the
adjudicatory record made before the [Hearing Panel
Subcommittee of the Lawyer Disciplinary Board] as to
questions of law, questions of application of the law to the
facts, and questions of appropriate sanctions; this Court
gives respectful consideration to the [Hearing Panel
Subcommittee’s] recommendations while ultimately
exercising its own independent judgment. On the other hand,
substantial deference is given to the [Hearing Panel

15
Subcommittee’s] findings of fact, unless such findings are not
supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on
the whole record.

Syl. pt. 3, Comm. on Legal Ethics v. McCorkle, 192 W. Va. 286, 452 S.E.2d 377 (1994).23

III.

DISCUSSION

We first review the general standards applicable to our consideration of a

disbarred lawyer’s petition for reinstatement, and we clarify that the petitioner’s burden of

proof for reinstatement is met only by clear and convincing evidence. Thereafter, we

evaluate Mr. Kohout’s evidence according to the criteria previously established by this

Court. As explained below, we conclude that Mr. Kohout has not satisfied his burden.

A. Standards for Reinstatement

Mr. Kohout bears the burden of proof in this matter. “In reinstatement

proceedings, the party seeking reinstatement has the burden of showing that he or she

should be permitted to resume the practice of law in West Virginia.” Wheaton, 245 W. Va.

at 204, 858 S.E.2d at 667. This Court has explained that “[i]n reinstatement cases, the

fundamental question which the [C]ourt must address is whether the attorney seeking

23
Because our review is de novo, we need not address Mr. Kohout’s assertion
that the Hearing Panel’s findings and recommendations are “contrary to the correct
standard for assessing rehabilitation.”

16
reinstatement has shown that he presently possesses the integrity, moral character, and

legal competence to assume the practice of law.” Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Hess, 201

W. Va. 192, 194, 495 S.E.2d 563, 565 (1997) (per curiam). See also In re Brown

(“Brown I”), 164 W. Va. 234, 237, 262 S.E.2d 444, 446 (1980) (“The ultimate question is

whether he possesses the integrity, high moral character and legal competence to justify

the reinstatement of his license.”). Thus, we have held that

The general rule for reinstatement is that a disbarred
attorney in order to regain admission to the practice of law
bears the burden of showing that he presently possesses the
integrity, moral character and legal competence to resume the
practice of law. To overcome the adverse effect of the previous
disbarment, [the disbarred attorney] must demonstrate a record
of rehabilitation. In addition, the [C]ourt must conclude that
such reinstatement will not have a justifiable and substantial
adverse effect on the public confidence in the administration of
justice and in this regard the seriousness of the conduct leading
to disbarment is an important consideration.

Syl. pt. 1, In re Brown (“Brown II”), 166 W. Va. 226, 273 S.E.2d 567 (1980).24 Accord

Syl. pt. 3, Wheaton, 245 W. Va. 199, 858 S.E.2d 662.

These cases establish that Mr. Kohout bears the burden of proof regarding

his reinstatement, but they do not explicitly define the standard of proof a disbarred lawyer

seeking reinstatement must meet. The Disciplinary Board proposes a standard that requires

24
Because Mr. Kohout bears the burden of proof in this matter, we decline
to address his argument that the Hearing Panel’s recommendation is not supported by
sufficient evidence.

17
the disbarred lawyer to present clear and convincing evidence, as that is the standard for

lawyer disciplinary cases and for reinstatement following an administrative suspension.25

See W. Va. R. Law. Disciplinary P. 3.7 (“In order to recommend the imposition of

discipline of any lawyer, the allegations of the formal charge must be proved by clear and

convincing evidence.”); W. Va. R. Law. Disciplinary P. 3.24(a) (providing that a petition

for reinstatement of an administratively suspended lawyer pursuant to Rule of Lawyer

Disciplinary Procedure 3.23 “shall be granted by the Court upon a showing by clear and

convincing evidence that the lawyer’s disability has been removed and that the lawyer is

fit to resume the practice of law”).26 Mr. Kohout does not address this issue.

We agree with the Disciplinary Board that the same standard used for

reinstatement after administrative suspension should be applied when addressing a petition

25
This Court will impose an administrative suspension when it concludes
that a lawyer “is disabled from continuing to practice law” due to “mental infirmity or
illness or because of addiction to drugs or alcohol[.]” See W. Va. R. Law. Disciplinary P.
3.23(a).
26
See also Syl. pt. 1, in part, Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 194 W. Va.
788, 461 S.E.2d 850 (1995) (“Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary
Procedure . . . requires the Office of Disciplinary Counsel to prove the allegations of the
formal charge by clear and convincing evidence.”); Off. of Disciplinary Couns. v. Pitts,
208 W. Va. 116, 118, 538 S.E.2d 707, 709 (2000) (per curiam) (stating that an
administratively suspended lawyer “is required, pursuant to Rule 3.24(a) of the Rules of
Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure, to petition this Court for reinstatement of his law license
when he can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that his disability has been
removed and that he is physically fit to resume the practice of law”).

18
for reinstatement following annulment.27 Therefore, we now hold that a disbarred lawyer

petitioning for reinstatement of an annulled license to practice law must prove the criteria

identified in Syllabus point 1 of In re Brown, 166 W. Va. 226, 273 S.E.2d 567 (1980), by

clear and convincing evidence. The Court has identified five factors to inform our decision

of whether a disbarred lawyer seeking reinstatement has adequately proven the criteria in

Syllabus point 1 of Brown II:

(1) the nature of the original offense for which the petitioner
was disbarred, (2) the petitioner’s character, maturity, and
experience at the time of his disbarment, (3) the petitioner’s
occupations and conduct in the time since his disbarment, (4)
the time elapsed since the disbarment, and (5) the petitioner’s
present competence in legal skills.

Brown II, 166 W. Va. at 229, 273 S.E.2d at 568 (quoting Brown I, 164 W. Va. at 237-38,

262 S.E.2d at 446). We consider these factors to evaluate whether Mr. Kohout has met his

burden of showing that he now possesses the integrity, moral character, and legal

27
Other courts also apply a clear and convincing standard of proof. See
Nottingham v. People, 560 P.3d 457, 470 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2024) (“To be readmitted to the
practice of law in Colorado . . . a lawyer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the lawyer has complied with applicable disciplinary orders and rules, is fit to practice law,
and has been rehabilitated.”); In re Kotsogiannis, 230 A.D.3d 1425, 1426 (N.Y. App. Div.
2024) (per curiam) (“It is well settled that ‘every respondent seeking reinstatement from
disbarment must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that he or she has
complied with the order of disbarment and the applicable rules of the Court, (2) that he or
she possesses the requisite character and fitness for the practice of law, and (3) that his or
her reinstatement would be in the public interest’” (quoting In re Castro, 200 A.D.3d 1387,
1389 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021) (per curiam))); In re Reinstatement of Sand, 951 N.W.2d 918,
925 (Minn. 2020) (per curiam) (reinstating disbarred lawyer and holding that he “met his
burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that he satisfied each of the
requirements for reinstatement to the practice of law”).

19
competence to resume the practice of law; demonstrating a record of rehabilitation; and

providing sufficient evidence for this Court to conclude that reinstatement will not have a

substantial adverse effect on the public confidence in the administration of justice. See Syl.

pt. 1, Brown II, 166 W. Va. 226, 273 S.E.2d 567. “We do not apply these factors

mechanically. Rather, they help us determine whether the applicant has made the required

showing.” In re Arrotta, 96 P.3d 213, 216 (Ariz. 2004) (en banc) (applying factors similar

to those identified in Brown II).28

B. Nature of the Offenses that Led to Mr. Kohout’s Disbarment

We have recognized that when “assessing an application for reinstatement,”

we must consider “the nature of the original offense for which the applicant was disbarred.”

Brown II at 234, 273 S.E.2d at 571. This factor is relevant for several reasons. First, the

nature of the underlying misconduct relates to the proof necessary to overcome the previous

finding of unfitness to practice law because “the more serious the nature of the underlying

offense, the more difficult the task becomes to show a basis for reinstatement.” Id. at 234,

28
The Disciplinary Board argues that the seriousness of the underlying
offenses that led to Mr. Kohout’s disbarment precludes his reinstatement. We reject this
argument on the same grounds we expressed in In re Reinstatement of diTrapano, 240
W. Va. 612, 814 S.E.2d 275 (2018). A rule barring reinstatement for certain conduct
“would run counter to the fact-intensive reinstatement inquiry mandated by Syllabus Point
1 of [Brown II], which demands analysis of current attributes (integrity, moral character,
and legal competence), the record of rehabilitation, and the impact reinstatement would
have on our profession.” diTrapano at 617, 814 S.E.2d at 280. “Moreover, it would unduly
constrain the ‘independent judgment’ that this Court must exercise as the final arbiter of
lawyer disciplinary matters.” Id.

20
273 S.E.2d at 571. Furthermore, understanding the nature of the underlying offenses allows

us to appraise the disbarred lawyer’s recognition of his or her misconduct. See Law.

Disciplinary Bd. v. Moore, 214 W. Va. 780, 788, 591 S.E.2d 338, 346 (2003) (per curiam)

(acknowledging that a factor for consideration when a person applies for reinstatement is

“the applicant’s recognition of his wrongdoing” (emphasis added) (quoting Lester v.

Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 532 S.W.2d 435, 436 (Ky. 1975) (per curiam))). The applicant’s

recognition of his or her misconduct is important since “rehabilitation and reformation

demand that the individual perceive and reject the wrongfulness of his conduct and show

in some positive way that he now has a correct sense of professional responsibility.” Id.

(emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Peterson, 274 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Minn.1979) (per

curiam)). In the same manner, the nature of the misconduct underlying disbarment provides

a useful guide to measure the disbarred lawyer’s efforts at rehabilitation, permitting the

Court to assess how a disbarred lawyer has focused his or her efforts on addressing the

issues that led to disbarment. See Wheaton, 245 W. Va. at 205, 858 S.E.2d at 668

(observing that “to evaluate a petitioner’s rehabilitation . . . we must consider: (1) the

nature of the original offense for which the petitioner was disbarred . . .”); Arrotta, 96 P.3d

at 217 (“To show rehabilitation, an applicant must first establish by clear and convincing

evidence that he has identified just what weaknesses caused the misconduct and then

demonstrate that he has overcome those weaknesses.”).

21
Mr. Kohout contends that the nature of his underlying offenses weighs in his

favor because they all “stemmed from the one fact that [he] ran out of money in the Fall

[sic] of 2013.” He states that, by contrast, his case is not as serious as, “million dollar bank

fraud, or overcharging the Public Defender Services, or converting trust funds,[29] or having

sex with clients, or election fraud.” Finally Mr. Kohout asserts that the Hearing Panel failed

to consider “the glaring exculpatory and laudable fact that [his] solo practice in

Morgantown was devoted to serving poor and low-income clients, which led to the shortfall

of cash and this ethics case.”30 The Disciplinary Board summarizes the nature of Mr.

Kohout’s misconduct by observing that it

29
Notably, the Court found Mr. Kohout converted client funds, including
funds from his client trust account that were designated to pay a client’s medical bill. See
Kohout Disbarment, 238 W. Va. at 685, 798 S.E.2d at 209 (discussing Mr. Kohout’s
conversion of settlement funds, in part, by moving “funds intended for Dynamic Physical
Therapy from his client trust account to his operating account, comingling the funds of a
third person with his own”).
30
Providing some types of legal services to low income clients may be
commendable when done responsibly and in compliance with the Rules of Professional
Conduct. However, we emphatically reject Mr. Kohout’s assertion that the economic status
of his clients excuses his misconduct. A lawyer’s duties to clients apply to all clients.
Misconduct such as conversion and fraudulent billing is no less serious when the victim
has little wealth. Whether clients are impoverished or wealthy, misappropriating their funds
is a most egregious breach of trust. See Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Pence, 216 S.E.2d 236,
239 (W. Va. 1975) (“The proper handling of funds belonging to a client is one of the most
important and exacting obligations of an attorney.”); Syl. pt. 5, in part, Law. Disciplinary
Couns. v. Jordan, 204 W. Va. 495, 513 S.E.2d 722 (1998) (“This Court, like most courts,
proceeds from the general rule that, absent compelling extenuating circumstances,
misappropriation or conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to his/her care warrants
disbarment.”). There were no extenuating circumstances in Mr. Kohout’s underlying
discipline.

22
arose directly out of his practice of law[,] . . . violated his duty
as an officer of the Court, undermined the foundations of the
administration of justice, and was clearly inconsistent with the
character expected of an attorney. [Mr. Kohout’s] underlying
offenses pertaining to misappropriation of client funds . . . is
infected with deceit and dishonesty. Such conduct reflects
adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness to
practice law.[31]

Mr. Kohout’s misconduct was extensive. He committed fifteen acts that

affected three separate clients and violated eleven different provisions of the Rules of

Professional Conduct. Four of Mr. Kohout’s offenses involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit,

or misrepresentation, which is the type of misconduct that most negatively impacts the

public’s confidence in the legal profession. Indeed, “no single transgression reflects more

negatively on the legal profession than a lie. . . . Respect for our profession is diminished

with every deceitful act of a lawyer.” Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Curnutte, 243 W. Va. 617,

31
The Hearing Panel found that Mr. Kohout’s conduct involved “moral
turpitude.” However, this Court abandoned the concept of “moral turpitude” in lawyer
disciplinary matters when it initially adopted the West Virginia Rules of Professional
Conduct, which became effective on January 1, 1989. See Comm. on Legal Ethics v.
Boettner, 183 W. Va. 136, 139, 394 S.E.2d 735, 738 (1990) (discussing the American Bar
Association’s elimination of “moral turpitude” in its model rules and acknowledging that
“‘moral turpitude’ is an elusive concept incapable of precise definition” (quoting
Committee on Legal Ethics v. Six, 181 W. Va. 52, 54, 380 S.E.2d 219, 221 (1989))). See
also Committee on Legal Ethics v. Scherr, 149 W. Va. 721, 726, 143 S.E.2d 141, 145
(1965) (“‘[M]oral turpitude’ . . . has never been clearly defined because of the nature of the
term.”).

23
626, 849 S.E.2d 617, 626 (2020) (quoting Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Munoz, 240 W. Va. 42,

51, 807 S.E.2d 290, 299 (2017) (additional quotations and citations omitted)).32

The most serious offense involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or

misrepresentation was Mr. Kohout’s wrongful misappropriation and conversion33 of a

client’s settlement funds and funds he owed to a third party for payment of the client’s

medical debt. See Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Hess, 186 W. Va. 514, 517, 413 S.E.2d 169,

172 (1991) (“Misappropriation of funds by an attorney . . . is an act infected with deceit

and dishonesty and will result in disbarment in the absence of compelling extenuating

circumstances justifying a lesser sanction.” (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Ezrin, 312

Md. 603, 608-09, 541 A.2d 966, 969 (1988)).

32
We have further recognized that

The honor of practicing law “does not come without the
concomitant responsibilities of truth, candor[,] and
honesty[.] . . . [I]t can be said that the presence of these virtues
in members of the bar comprises a large portion of the fulcrum
upon which the scales of justice rest.” Jones’ Case, 137 N.H.
351, 628 A.2d 254, 259 (1993) (quotation omitted).

Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Curnutte, 243 W. Va. 617, 626, 849 S.E.2d 617, 626 (2020)
(quoting Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Munoz, 240 W. Va. 42, 51, 807 S.E.2d 290, 299 (2017)).
33
“Misappropriation or conversion of money is ‘the unauthorized use of
entrusted funds for the lawyer’s own purpose. It includes temporary use. It also includes
use that does not result in personal gain or benefit to the lawyer.’” Off. of Disciplinary
Couns. v. Morgan, 242 W. Va. 667, 677-78, 839 S.E.2d 145, 155-56 (2020) (quoting Law.
Disciplinary Bd. v. Kupec, 202 W. Va. 556, 568, 505 S.E.2d 619, 631 (1998)).

24
Further misconduct of this type involved Mr. Kohout submitting a fraudulent

invoice with his notice of an attorney’s charging lien, thereby seeking compensation from

a client for legal services he did not perform,34 failing to notify a client that he was filing

an appeal, and tendering a worthless check to the Clerk of this Court as payment for a filing

fee. During the disciplinary proceedings, Mr. Kohout exacerbated his misconduct

involving the worthless check by repeatedly insisting that “his account contained sufficient

funds” when he wrote the check, “despite the fact that his bank records clearly reflect[ed]

otherwise.” Kohout Disbarment, 238 W. Va. at 683, 798 S.E.2d at 207. The Court found

this response demonstrated “a dishonest motive.” Id. Mr. Kohout further exhibited

dishonesty by knowingly making a false statement when responding to the ODC about one

of the underlying complaints.

In addition to the specific offenses involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or

misrepresentation that led to Mr. Kohout’s disbarment, we must also acknowledge that Mr.

Kohout has demonstrated a pattern of engaging in this type of conduct. In an earlier

disciplinary action that resulted in Mr. Kohout’s law license being suspended, the Court

found he had “engaged in serious ethical misconduct and has demonstrated a pattern of

34
The Court has recognized that “[b]oth the statutory and common law of
this State have long recognized an attorney’s right to recover his/her unpaid fees by way
of a charging lien.” Trickett v. Laurita, 223 W. Va. 357, 364, 674 S.E.2d 218, 225 (2009).
“Correspondingly, ‘[a]n attorney has no lien upon a fund which he is not instrumental in
creating, and which never came to his hands.’” Id. at 365, 674 S.E.2d at 226 (quoting Syl.
pt. 4, Schmertz & Co. v. Hammond, 51 W. Va. 408, 41 S.E. 184 (1902)).

25
conduct involving intentional deception.” Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Kohout, No. 22629, at

8 (W. Va. Apr. 14, 1995) (per curiam). Based on his history and the misconduct underlying

his disbarment, the Court once again found that Mr. Kohout “established a pattern of

harmful conduct that this Court cannot minimize.” Kohout Disbarment, 238 W. Va. at 687,

798 S.E.2d at 211.

Mr. Kohout’s remaining misconduct that led to his disbarment related to the

client-lawyer relationship, primarily his failure to keep client funds separate from his own

and his failure to properly account for client funds. He charged one client an unreasonable

fee and did not promptly pay a medical bill from settlement proceeds. Also included in this

class of misconduct was Mr. Kohout’s repeated lack of proper communication with clients

by failing to obtain client permission for certain actions, keep clients properly informed,

and respond to a client’s reasonable requests for information. The Court described the

nature these offenses when it annulled Mr. Kohout’s law license, explaining that he

“violated duties owed to a number of his clients . . . and to a third party”; “acted

intentionally, knowingly, and with a dishonest motive”; and caused a “great” amount of

injury to his clients.” Id. at 685, 798 S.E.2d at 209.

The offenses underlying Mr. Kohout’s disbarment are serious, extensive, and

include intentional acts of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation. When

considered along with his lengthy disciplinary record, Mr. Kohout’s actions establish a

26
long-standing pattern of ethical misconduct involving intentional deception that reflects a

lack of integrity and moral character. For this reason, Mr. Kohout bears a heavy burden to

establish that he has perceived and rejected the wrongfulness of his misconduct, and to

show that he has fostered a correct sense of professional responsibility. To meet this

burden, Mr. Kohout must provide clear and convincing evidence that he has identified the

issues that led to his disbarment and has taken steps to address them. Mr. Kohout’s failure

to meet his burden is highlighted by our discussion of the evidence in addressing the

remaining Brown II factors.

C. Mr. Kohout’s Character, Maturity, and Experience When Disbarred

In considering a disbarred lawyer’s character, maturity, and experience when

disbarred, we differentiate between the conduct of younger, less experienced attorneys and

that of attorneys with more experience and sophistication. See Brown II, 166 W. Va. at

235, 273 S.E.2d at 572 (commenting that considering “the maturity and experience of the

practitioner at the time of his disbarment” in relation to reinstatement is “a recognition that

a youthful and inexperienced attorney may have blundered as a result of inexperience rather

than as a result of deliberate calculation”); In re Smith, 214 W. Va. 83, 88, 585 S.E.2d 602,

607 (1980) (“The criteria of character, maturity, and experience are basically designed to

permit forgiveness of a young man who has been stupid in his youth and can demonstrate

that over the course of years he has become wiser and stronger.”). Mr. Kohout asserts that

27
the best evidence of his character is the lack of complaints about his character from judges,

lawyers, and clients. The Disciplinary Board does not comment on this factor.35

Regarding Mr. Kohout’s character, the opinion annulling Mr. Kohout’s law

license reflects that, at that time, Mr. Kohout “violated duties owed to a number of his

clients . . . and to a third party,” and did so “intentionally, knowingly, and with a dishonest

motive,” a “selfish motive,” or both. Kohout Disbarment, 238 W. Va. at 685-86, 798 S.E.2d

at 209-10. Furthermore, Mr. Kohout refused to “acknowledge the wrongful nature of his

conduct or the extent of the harm” he caused,36 was indifferent about making restitution,

and showed no remorse. Id. at 686-87, 798 S.E.2d at 210-11. The Court observed that Mr.

Kohout’s disclosures to the ODC during the disciplinary proceedings “were less than ‘full

and free,’” and he made “multiple false statements to the ODC and ultimately this Court.”

35
During his reinstatement hearing, Mr. Kohout expressed frustration that
the ODC continues to raise his prior misconduct in these proceedings, including conduct
that occurred while he was in law school in the late 1970s, forcing him to continually
answer for his youthful poor judgment. While the depth of the ODC’s review of Mr.
Kohout’s disciplinary history could have been more tempered, given that his history is a
matter of record, Mr. Kohout must understand that as long as he continues to perpetuate
his well-established pattern of intentionally deceitful and dishonest behavior, his past
misdeeds, which are entangled with his prior misconduct as a lawyer, will continue to be
relevant considerations in disciplinary proceedings.
36
The Court found that “[t]he amount of actual injury in this case is great,”
acknowledging that, at that time, “Mr. Kohout still retain[ed] thousands of dollars that [he]
should have . . . disbursed to Ms. Richard over three years ago. By failing to pay the
Dynamic Physical Therapy bill when due, Mr. Kohout also put Ms. Richard’s credit at
risk.” Kohout Disbarment, 238 W. Va. at 685, 798 S.E.2d at 209.

28
Id. at 687, 798 S.E.2d at 211. Finally, the Court concluded that Mr. Kohout’s entire record

of disciplinary offenses “established a pattern of harmful conduct,” and a “general

disregard for personal integrity and the honor of the legal profession.” Id.37

Mr. Kohout was admitted to the West Virginia Bar in 1987, and at the time

of his 2016 disbarment he had practiced law in West Virginia for nearly eighteen

nonconsecutive years. Following his admission, Mr. Kohout worked several years at two

law firms, but he has spent most of his legal career as a solo practitioner. His license was

suspended in 1995, after he had practiced for about seven-and-one-half years. Then, after

his license was reinstated in 2005, he practiced around ten more years before his license

was annulled. Mr. Kohout’s years of experience, most of which he spent operating his own

law firm, are substantial.

Mr. Kohout’s dishonest and deceitful character described above, which

developed into a long-standing pattern of intentional misconduct, combined with his failure

to accept responsibility for his actions and lack of remorse, provide no basis for attributing

the misconduct underlying his disbarment to inexperience or mistake. Rather, given his

37
See supra note 3 for Mr. Kohout’s prior lawyer disciplinary actions. See
also W. Va. R. Prof. Conduct 3.30 (requiring that a person’s prior and subsequent conduct
be considered in determining “good moral character and fitness”); Brown II, 166 W. Va.
at 239, 273 S.E.2d at 574 (“[W]e do not view the inquiry on reinstatement as limited to the
single issue of the precise offense that triggered disbarment. Most courts have concluded
that applicant’s prior and present record of infractions can be considered.”).

29
lengthy disciplinary record and years of practice, Mr. Kohout should, by now, have a

thorough understanding of the high moral standards and integrity required of those who

are granted the privilege to practice law. Therefore, this factor weighs against reinstating

Mr. Kohout’s law license.

D. Mr. Kohout’s Occupations and Conduct Since Disbarment

A disbarred lawyer’s occupations and conduct after disbarment give insight

into the person’s efforts toward rehabilitation and objective information pertinent to the

level of success produced by those efforts. See Brown II, 166 W. Va. at 235, 273 S.E.2d at

572 (stating that “the applicant’s activity and conduct since the date of his disbarment,” is

an “important area of inquiry . . . since it is upon this objective record that good character

must be judged”). This factor is vital because “the original disbarment stands as a finding

that the attorney has committed a serious breach of professional obligations . . . and this

fact continues to demonstrate a lack of fitness to practice law.” Id. at 233-34, 273 S.E.2d

at 571 (stating further that, “[a]s a consequence, there is a burden on [the person] who seeks

reinstatement to overcome this finding of lack of fitness”); see also Moore, 214 W. Va. at

788, 591 S.E.2d at 346 (“The judgment of disbarment continues to be evidence against the

applicant and [the disbarred lawyer] may overcome it only by most persuasive proof.”

(quoting Lester, 532 S.W.2d at 436)).

30
We have explained that “[r]ehabilitation is demonstrated by a course of

conduct that enables the [C]ourt to conclude there is little likelihood that[,] after such

rehabilitation is completed and the applicant is readmitted to the practice of law[,] he will

engage in unprofessional conduct.” Syl. pt. 4, Wheaton, 245 W. Va. 199, 858 S.E.2d 662

(quoting Syl. pt. 2, Brown II, 166 W. Va. 226, 273 S.E.2d 567). See also Syl. pt. 1, in part,

In re Smith, 214 W. Va. 83, 585 S.E.2d 602 (explaining that, in the context of our

consideration of a petition to reinstate an annulled law license “the word ‘rehabilitation’

means a course of conduct since disbarment which leads the Court to conclude that the

public is adequately protected.”); see also Arrotta, 96 P.3d at 216 (“the bottom line must

always be whether the applicant has ‘affirmatively shown that he has overcome those

weaknesses that produced his earlier misconduct,’ i.e., whether he has been rehabilitated.”

(emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Robbins, 836 P.2d 965, 966 (1992))).

When evaluating a disbarred lawyer’s rehabilitation we use a flexible

approach. Rather than framing rehabilitation “around a set of specific principles,” our

analysis “will vary depending on the particular facts of a given case.” Brown II at 234, 273

S.E.2d at 571. Addressing the type of proof required, an Arizona court has observed that

When a disbarred lawyer seeks readmission to the bar,
particularly when disbarment resulted from [egregious]
conduct . . . he must demonstrate more than that he has led a
blameless and law-abiding life while disbarred. “Merely
showing that [an individual] is now living and doing those
things he . . . should have done throughout life, although
necessary to prove rehabilitation,” is not sufficient to meet the

31
applicant’s burden. . . . In addition, he must bring forth clear
and convincing evidence showing the positive actions he has
taken to overcome the weaknesses that led to his disbarment.

Arrotta, 96 P.3d at 219 (quoting In re J.J.T., 761 So. 2d 1094, 1096 (Fla. 2000) (per

curiam)). As we concluded above, Mr. Kohout’s burden of proving his rehabilitation is a

heavy one because of his long-standing pattern of ethical misconduct involving intentional

deception that reflects a lack of integrity and moral character.

Mr. Kohout asserts that his conduct since disbarment “is unassailable.” To

support this declaration, he relies only on his current employment, pointing out that he “has

been successfully selling insurance to the public under [a] state license,” handling over 500

cases “without complaint,” and has been “tested annually by Medicare.” He does not

explain how this employment has aided him in resolving the various issues that led to his

disbarment. The Disciplinary Board contends that since his disbarment, Mr. Kohout has

“publicly displayed hatred, disrespect[,] and disregard for the ODC and the [Judicial

Investigation Commission],” which “demonstrates a lack of judgment, moral character[,]

and integrity.” The Disciplinary Board suggests that Mr. Kohout’s demonstrated animosity

toward the disciplinary process “raises a serious concern as to whether . . . he would

adhere” to the Rules of Professional Conduct if reinstated.

While we agree that the letter and testimony from Mr. Kohout’s employer is

positive in describing him generally as a good insurance sales agent, that evidence falls far

32
short of proving his rehabilitation, particularly as it relates to money management. At his

reinstatement hearing, Mr. Kohout testified that there is “no functional difference between

selling insurance and practicing law in terms of dealing with the public” and stated that he

had “handled money” and “people’s checks.” Yet, other testimony established, to the

contrary, that Mr. Kohout’s duties did not provide him with access to customer funds.

Similarly, the letter from Mr. Hernandez describing Mr. Kohout’s service as the secretary

for a gun club is laudable.38 However, even taken together with the information about Mr.

Kohout’s employment, this evidence is insufficient to show that Mr. Kohout is now able

to handle client funds or that he has overcome the problems that led to his disbarment.

We turn now to more direct evidence of Mr. Kohout’s post-disbarment

conduct. Initially, Mr. Kohout failed to timely comply with his mandatory obligation to,

within twenty days after disbarment, file an affidavit with this Court providing information

about each client he was required to notify about his disbarment. See W. Va. R. Law.

Disciplinary P. 3.28(c).39 He did not file the required affidavit until May 18, 2020–nearly

38
We note that this letter does not indicate whether Mr. Hernandez knew the
details of Mr. Kohout’s disciplinary problems. See Drake, 242 W. Va. at 71, 829 S.E.2d at
273 (expressing concern over personal opinions about a disbarred lawyer’s character or
legal competence that are provided by persons who do not fully understand the offenses
underlying the disbarment).
39
Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure Rule 3.28(c) provides, in relevant part,
that,

33
three-and-a-half years later. Notably, noncompliance with Rule 3.28(c) is a serious offense

that may warrant annulment of a suspended law license. See Syl. pt. 7, Law. Disciplinary

Bd. v. Hart, 241 W. Va. 69, 818 S.E.2d 895 (2018) (“A suspended attorney who fails to

comply with the provisions of [Rule 3.28 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure]

may have his [or her] license to practice law annulled upon proof by the [Office of

Disciplinary Counsel] of the West Virginia State Bar by [clear and convincing] evidence

that the suspended attorney failed to comply with the provisions.” (quoting Syl. pt. 3,

Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Keenan, 192 W. Va. 90, 450 S.E.2d 787 (1994))).

It also appears that Mr. Kohout gave little thought to complying with this

Court’s directions accompanying his disbarment until the time approached when he could

petition for reinstatement. Mr. Kohout’s license was annulled in December 2016, and he

Within twenty days after the effective date of the disbarment
or suspension order, the lawyer shall file under seal with the
Supreme Court of Appeals an affidavit showing (1) the names
of each client being represented in pending matters who were
notified pursuant to subsections (a) and (b); (2) a copy of each
letter of notification which was sent; (3) a list of fees and
expenses paid by each client and whether escrowed funds have
been or need to be reimbursed; and (4) an accounting of all
trust money held by the lawyer on the date the disbarment or
suspension order was issued. Such affidavit shall also set forth
the residence or other address of the disbarred or suspended
lawyer where communications may thereafter be directed and
a list of all other courts and jurisdictions in which the disbarred
or suspended lawyer is admitted to practice. A copy of this
report shall also be filed with the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel.

34
was ordered to make full restitution to Ms. Richard and to pay the costs of the disciplinary

proceedings.40 Yet he did not pay Ms. Richard until September 2021, less than two months

before he filed his petition for reinstatement. He first contacted the ODC about paying the

costs of his disciplinary proceeding in mid-December 2021, mere days before filing his

petition for reinstatement, and did not make his first payment for several more weeks. He

executed a repayment plan with the ODC, but he quickly defaulted on that plan and then

made only sporadic payments.

However, as the date for oral arguments in this proceeding neared, Mr.

Kohout began making more regular payments—an apparent effort to generate evidence

that he was finally complying with the Court’s order to pay those costs so we might

reinstate with a requirement for continued payments. See, e.g., Wheaton, 245 W. Va. 199,

858 S.E.2d 662 (reinstating annulled license where petitioner executed payment plans for

outstanding bankruptcy judgment and costs owed to Disciplinary Board and began making

payments according to the plans, all while his request for reinstatement was pending);41

40
Mr. Kohout also has not paid any of the costs of his judicial disciplinary
proceeding. The Court’s order resolving that matter directed Mr. Kohout to begin making
payments thirty days from the date of the Court’s order, which was October 7, 2016. See
In re Kohout, No. 15-1190 (W. Va. October 7, 2016) (unpublished order).
41
Wheaton is distinguishable from this case. Once Mr. Wheaton executed a
payment plant to reimburse the Disciplinary Board, he made payments in accordance with
that plan. In re Reinstatement of Wheaton, 245 W. Va. 199, 208, 858 S.E.2d 662, 671
(2021). Mr. Kohout quickly defaulted on his payment plan, and thereafter made irregular
payments of a lesser amount than he had agreed to.

35
Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Vieweg, 194 W. Va. 554, 461 S.E.2d 60 (1995) (reinstating

disbarred lawyer while he was in the process of repaying substantial debts).42 We find Mr.

Kohout’s circumstances are more like those reflected in In re Reinstatement of Drake, 242

W. Va. 65, 829 S.E.2d 267 (2019). Mr. Drake failed to make restitution during the seven

years prior to his petition for reinstatement and did not even seek information about where

to send those payments until a few weeks before oral argument on his petition for

reinstatement. The Court concluded that “Mr. Drake did not prioritize restitution and did

not exercise reasonable and diligent efforts to fulfill these obligations until he came before

this Court seeking reinstatement of his law license.” Id. at 71, 829 S.E.2d at 273. Like Mr.

Kohout, Mr. Drake also tried to justify and downplay his misconduct.

In addition to delaying his compliance with Rule 3.28 and the Court’s

directions, Mr. Kohout has shown no initiative to critically examine his actions to identify

the root cause for his misconduct so that he could work toward a remedy. See Moore, 214

W. Va. at 788, 591 S.E.2d at 346 (“[R]ehabilitation and reformation demand that the

individual . . . show in some positive way that he now has a correct sense of professional

42
The Vieweg opinion does not give details about Mr. Vieweg’s repayment
efforts, but the Court did take note that Mr. Vieweg was forthright in admitting his
misconduct and had discussed it with some of his victims. He also presented testimony
from law firm and state agency employers who commented favorably about his integrity,
legal competence, and rehabilitation from alcoholism, indicating that petitioner’s
rehabilitation would inspire others. Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Vieweg, 194 W. Va. 554, 461
S.E.2d 60 (1995).

36
responsibility.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Peterson, 274 N.W.2d at 926)); Arrotta, 96

P.3d at 217 (“To show rehabilitation, an applicant must first establish by clear and

convincing evidence that he has identified just what weaknesses caused the misconduct

and then demonstrate that he has overcome those weaknesses.”). Mr. Kohout did not even

attempt to remedy the one excuse he has offered.43 Even though Mr. Kohout has maintained

throughout these proceedings that this case is only about the fact that “the money ran out,”

he has not produced evidence of any effort to improve his money management skills. In

fact, not only has Mr. Kohout failed to fully satisfy the payments ordered by this Court in

his disbarment proceeding and in the judicial discipline proceeding, but his testimony about

his household finances reveals that properly managing his money continues to be a

challenge.

Thus, we perceive little evidence that Mr. Kohout has recognized the

wrongfulness of his prior conduct. See Moore, 214 W. Va. at 788, 591 S.E.2d at 346

(recognizing that an “applicant’s recognition of his wrongdoing” is a consideration for

reinstatement (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lester, 532 S.W.2d at 436)). Rather, he

continues to deny or minimize his misconduct, revealing that he has neither rejected the

conduct nor developed a correct sense of his professional responsibility. Id. Although Mr.

43
Mr. Kohout demonstrated his resistance to rehabilitation during his
reinstatement hearing, when he stated “look, I’m not going to act like a lawyer when I’m
not permitted to practice law. That’s absurd. That’s that’s [sic] Kafkaesque.”

37
Kohout professes to have accepted responsibility for his transgressions and claims remorse,

his testimony during the Hearing Panel’s reinstatement hearing and his brief to this Court

in support of his reinstatement demonstrate otherwise. During his lengthy testimony before

the Hearing Panel, Mr. Kohout attempted to minimize his wrongdoing by repeatedly

characterizing this case as being only about a loss of money. He made comments such as:

“I ran out of money. That’s it, and that’s where all these ethics cases came from,” and “[i]n

this ethics [c]ase, all of these complaints and statement of charges stemmed from losing

money, losing the finances and lose—the money ran out. The money ran out. That’s all

there was to it.” He repeats this refrain in his brief. Mr. Kohout’s characterization of his

misconduct as being solely due to running out of money demonstrates his profound

misunderstanding or willful denial of the conduct that led to his disbarment.

Mr. Kohout continues to deny committing multiple acts of misconduct,

arguing that this Court’s conclusions were wrong and attempting to discredit witnesses,

despite this Court’s final resolution of these matters in Mr. Kohout’s prior disciplinary

proceeding.44 These responses not only show Mr. Kohout’s disregard for the proceedings

that led to the annulment of his license, but also that Mr. Kohout has not accepted

44
Cf. Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Macia, 246 W. Va. 317, 324, 873 S.E.2d 848,
855 (2022) (“[T]he general rule is that when a question has been definitively determined
by this Court its decision is conclusive on parties, privies and courts, including this Court,
upon a second appeal and it is regarded as the law of the case.” (quoting Syl. pt. 1, Mullins
v. Green, 145 W. Va. 469, 115 S.E.2d 320 (1960))).

38
responsibility for his misdeeds and lacks remorse for them. For example, Mr. Kohout

denied using a worthless check to pay the filing fee for an appeal, testifying “[w]hen I

wrote that check, it was good. They held on [sic] it for six weeks. They held onto that check

for six weeks. For six weeks.” When cross-examined, he stated the following:

Q. Right. Okay. Well, here’s what the Supreme
Court found. . . . So the check—so the [C]ourt found that the
check written to the court was—was worthless when written.

A. That’s not true.

Q. That’s—that’s what the [C]ourt found.

A. Well, they’re wrong.

He likewise rejected the conclusion that, by retaining client settlement funds and using

them to pay his firm’s expenses, he committed conversion:

Now—now, this really galls me that that—that the ODC
or the Hearing Panel or the Supreme Court would say that this
was a conversion [c]ase. Okay, the facts are what they are, and
I admit to them. But if you look at my disbursements for all of
my cases, you will see my clients always got more money than
I did. Always.

Mr. Kohout justified this misconduct by explaining “[i]f I had paid [the client] the extra

$2,000 and if I had paid the $985 medical bill, that’s another $3,000 that doesn’t go into

paying [employee salaries] and we would have been broke, and I would have closed the

office[.]”45

45
Mr. Kohout’s apparent belief that keeping settlement funds that belonged
to his client is neither unethical nor a conversion of client funds so long as the client

39
When questioned about failing to obtain a client’s permission before filing

an appeal, Mr. Kohout denied this conduct too:

[Q] They [the Supreme Court of Appeals] found that
you had not received your client’s permission to file the appeal
to the [C]ourt in the Big Bear Camplands [matter].

A. That’s not true either.

And, in his brief to this Court, Mr. Kohout denies submitting a fraudulent invoice with his

notice of attorney’s charging lien against his client and former employee Mr. Ronald “Ron”

Kramer, II, declaring “[t]here was NO ‘fraudulent charging lien’ filed in Kramer’s car

case,” and incorrectly stating that “[t]he only evidence of a ‘fraudulent charging lien’

presented at the original ethics hearing in January 2016 was Kramer’s own false

assertion.”46 Thus, even though this Court has conclusively determined that Mr. Kohout

filed a fraudulent charging lien, he continues to attack Mr. Kramer’s credibility. Mr.

Kohout similarly accused another former employee of lying when she testified before the

received more of the settlement than he did, or he needed the funds to meet his expenses,
demonstrates that he still does not comprehend the rules related to fees and client funds, or
the negative impact ignoring these rules has on the public’s perception of the legal
profession.
46
See Kohout Disbarment, 238 W. Va. at 684, 798 S.E.2d at 208 (“Despite
Mr. Kohout’s testimony to the contrary, email correspondence included in the record shows
that he acknowledged receipt of a discovery document drafted by Mr. Kramer and his
assertion that it would be filed exactly as it was written. We find that based on the evidence
in the record, there is clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Kohout submitted a lien
asserting he was owed money for work that he did not perform.”).

40
Hearing Panel, claiming “[s]he’s still angry with me. I did insult her there, which, you

know, I’m just so upset with these people.”47

During the time since his disbarment, Mr. Kohout has engaged in conduct

that demonstrates a grim lack of integrity and moral character. An egregious example of

this type of conduct occurred after Mr. Kohout’s reinstatement hearing before the Hearing

Panel. The ODC subpoenaed Mr. Kramer to testify at the hearing. Subsequently, Mr.

Kramer notified the ODC that Mr. Kohout left the following message on Mr. Kramer’s law

firm website at 3:14 am on May 18, 2024, the morning after Mr. Kramer testified before

the Hearing Panel:

[Y]ou’re a disposable person Ron. You’re a liar and vindictive,
deceitful and conniving. And a fraud. You didn’t accomplish a
thing yesterday. I just still cannot understand why you and KT
[another former employee] continue to stalk me and try to hurt
me. It’s been ten years! When will your hate ever end? You’re
no Marine! You may have served in the Corps, but you are
without honor. I would love to see your service record. Varner
was so glad you left. Your day will come.

Before the Hearing Panel’s hearing, Mr. Kramer had not seen or spoken to Mr. Kohout

since his disciplinary hearing in 2016.

47
The insult Mr. Kohout references is likely his comment “[l]ooks like
you’ve gained some weight since we spoke last time; is that true?” which he made
immediately after greeting the witness at the beginning of his cross examination.

41
Mr. Kohout has also publicly portrayed the ODC as stupid, incompetent,

corrupt, and malevolent. Examples of this publicly expressed contempt for the ODC and

the lawyer disciplinary process include a July 2017 narrative titled “My Story: Practicing

Law in West Virginia,” that he published online. In this writing, Mr. Kohout contradicted

conclusions related to his rule violations, which this Court found to be proven by clear and

convincing evidence, and accused the ODC of exaggerating the case, misstating the facts,

and pursuing “a vendetta.” He further claimed that the Hearing Panel “made no

independent finding[s],” the Court’s opinion “was like a virtual rubber stamp,” and West

Virginia’s legal system “is broken and corrupt.” On another occasion, in April 2018, Mr.

Kohout commented on Facebook post by the West Virginia Record reporting on Dante

diTrapano’s petition for reinstatement. Mr. Kohout wrote, in part:

The people have no idea how corrupt and stupid and unfair the
lawyer disciplinary process is. . . . First of all, the women (and
it’s all women) running the ODC are stupid, incompetent,
corrupt and lazy. And they play favorites. They go after
Lawyers they don’t like. They go after lawyers whom they’re
told to go after. They couldn’t find their fat a**** with both
hands. They are pure evil. They are puppets of the [Supreme
Court of Appeals] and the big law firms. They are not doing
their job properly and they don’t care one bit about the “public”
whom they claim to be protecting. Someone needs to be
protecting the public and the Bar from these stupid evil
b*****!

Although Mr. Kohout attributes these comments to the past “when [he] was very angry one

time, and during a terrible period in [his] . . . life when [he] was in the depths of [his]

despair,” he continued to disparage the disciplinary process during this reinstatement

42
proceeding. For example, before the Hearing Panel, he alleged that in disciplinary

proceedings, “the ODC does all the talking,” and the “investigative panel doesn’t

investigate anything. They’re like magistrates that rubber stamp complaints brought in by

police officers. They don’t investigate anything.” Likewise, he asserted that “it’s always

the ODC’s version of everything” and implied that neither the Hearing Panel nor this Court

made independent findings in disciplinary actions.48 He made similar, though tempered

comments in his briefing to this Court, averring that the “false idea” that he is unfit to

48
Mr. Kohout defends his comments by asserting that lawyers have a public
duty to criticize the legal system and citing In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 631, 79 S. Ct. 1376,
1380, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1473 (1959), which states that “lawyers are free to criticize the state of
the law.” In Sawyer the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii found Ms. Sawyer, a
lawyer serving as one of the defense counsel in a federal Smith Act case, was guilty of
violating Canons 1 (duty of the lawyer to the courts) and 22 (candor and fairness) of the
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, by engaging in speech that reflected adversely upon
the trial judge’s “impartiality and fairness in the conduct of the Smith Act trial and
impugned his judicial integrity.” Id. at 624-25, 79 S. Ct. at 1377, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1473. The
Hawaii court suspended Ms. Sawyer’s license for one year and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed. It characterized Ms. Sawyer’s comments
as “voicing strong criticism of Smith Act cases and the Government’s manner of proving
them,” and said they were “not a reflection in any wise upon [the trial judge] personally or
his conduct of the trial.” Id. at 628, 79 S Ct. at 1379, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1473. Notably, the Court
specifically found that Ms. Sawyer’s speech could not “be equated with an attack on the
motivation or the integrity or the competence of the judges.” Id. at 632, 79 S. Ct. at 1381,
3 L. Ed. 2d 1473. Mr. Kohout’s reliance on Sawyer is misplaced. The issue in Sawyer,
addressing a lawyer’s alleged violation of ethical cannons by impugning a judge’s integrity,
is entirely different from the question currently before this Court, i.e., whether Mr. Kohout
presently possesses the integrity and moral character to overcome his disbarment and be
restored to the practice law. Moreover, Mr. Kohout’s criticisms were an attack on the
ODC’s motivation and competence, and on the integrity of the ODC and the entire
disciplinary process, thus it is not the type of protected speech the Sawyer Court addressed.

43
practice law “is emanating solely from the bruised and vindictive ego of the ODC,” and is

a “phantom charge . . . born entirely from the ego of the ODC.”

Mr. Kohout has failed to present sufficient evidence that his occupations and

conduct since disbarment demonstrate a level of rehabilitation, integrity, and moral

character to warrant reinstating his license to practice law. His burden to establish

rehabilitation is a heavy one because his prior misconduct was serious, and he has a long-

established pattern of intentional deceit and dishonesty to courts and his clients. To meet

this burden, Mr. Kohout relied on his work as an insurance agent; however, this work

history does not provide evidence demonstrating that Mr. Kohout has developed skills that

diminish the risk that he will engage unethical behavior if reinstated to the practice of law.

Furthermore, Mr. Kohout’s evidence of accepting responsibility and being remorseful for

his misconduct is limited to his own self-serving statements, and these statements are

contradicted by his continued declarations of innocence. Finally, Mr. Kohout’s repeated

attacks on the veracity, motivations, and competence of complainants, witnesses, the ODC,

and the entire lawyer disciplinary process reveal that he has not achieved the integrity and

moral character required to practice law.49 Accordingly, Mr. Kohout’s occupation and

49
Mr. Kohout argues that to be fair and consistent, we must compare his case
with Wheaton, 245 W. Va. 199, 858 S.E.2d 662, and diTrapano, 240 W. Va. 612, 814
S.E.2d 275. He contends that this case does not involve criminal behavior or felony
convictions, and implies that his law license should be reinstated as Mr. Wheaton’s and
Mr. diTrapano’s were. In both Wheaton and diTrapano the disbarred lawyers’ first

44
conduct since disbarment do little to satisfy his burden to show that the Court should

reinstate his license to practice law.

E. Time Elapsed since Mr. Kohout’s Disbarment

The Court has made clear that, “the mere passage of time alone is insufficient

to warrant reinstatement.” Brown II, 166 W. Va. at 235, 273 S.E.2d at 572. However,

“[m]any reasons can be seen for considering . . . the passage of time in evaluating a petition

for reinstatement from disbarment.” Moore, 214 W. Va. at 793, 591 S.E.2d at 351. For

instance, “[t]ime may bring greater maturity than at the time of the misconduct,” and “may

give an opportunity for a person to recognize, address, and overcome the circumstances

and conditions that led to the misconduct[.]” Id. Additionally, “time may reduce the

perception of the misconduct’s gravity, perhaps because of changing mores or by placing

the conduct in a historical perspective.” Id. See also Brown II, 166 W. Va. at 235, 273

S.E.2d at 572 (stating “[t]ime provides the applicant [for reinstatement] an opportunity to

build a record of good character and integrity”). Mr. Kohout submits that he has endured

eight years of disbarment and his “suffering during those eight years has been substantial”

petitions for reinstatement were denied. In making his argument, Mr. Kohout fails to
recognize that in connection with their second, successful petitions for reinstatement, Mr.
Wheaton and Mr. diTrapano did not minimize and deny their wrongdoing in the face of
this Court’s conclusive findings of such misconduct, they did not attempt to discredit or
verbally attack witnesses or complainants, and they did not demonstrate contempt for
disciplinary officials and proceedings. Therefore, comparing this case with Wheaton and
diTrapano does not persuade us to reinstate Mr. Kohout’s license.

45
in that he has “lost his home, his credit, his income, his ability to land a decent job, his

reputation,” and his marriage. The Disciplinary Board does not address this issue.

Mr. Kohout’s focus on the consequences he has purportedly suffered because

of his unethical behavior is misplaced. While eight years is an ample amount of time to

demonstrate some level of rehabilitation and progress toward developing the level of

character and integrity required in the practice of law, the record Mr. Kohout has produced

reveals his ineffective use of those eight years. Mr. Kohout made no attempt during that

time to identify and address the circumstances and conditions that led to his misconduct or

“to build a record of good character and integrity.” Brown II, 166 W. Va. at 235, 273 S.E.2d

at 572. Rather, Mr. Kohout stated “from December of ‘16 until December of ‘21, I’ve been

waiting. I’ve been waiting.” He did not engage in any form of counseling during this time

due to the cost and because he had participated in counseling when his law license was

suspended in an earlier disciplinary proceeding. According to Mr. Kohout, he thought the

counseling “was a bunch of nonsense,” and the counselor “couldn’t find anything wrong

with [him].” Neither did Mr. Kohout pursue any form of training or engage in any civic or

volunteer activities that might have fostered personal growth. Although Mr. Kohout

declares his strong desire to help others, he has engaged in no voluntary activities that

would allow him to fulfill this desire without personal gain. Finally, during this time he

failed to prioritize repaying the costs of the disciplinary proceedings or making restitution

to his client as ordered by this Court, addressing these debts only when the date he could

46
first petition for reinstatement was near. For these reasons, the amount of time since Mr.

Kohout’s disbarment does not weigh in his favor.

F. Present Competence and Legal Skills

Mr. Kohout contends that the ODC has not questioned his competence and

legal skill, “they just do not like him.” The Disciplinary Board does not address this issue.

Nevertheless, Mr. Kohout has tendered no evidence to indicate that, during the eight years

since his disbarment, he has made an effort to remain abreast of the law. He only recently

began to participate in continuing legal education courses. Mr. Kohout supplemented the

record for this case with a copy of his CLE transcript covering the 2024-2026 reporting

period. The transcript shows that he received credit for twelve hours of CLE, including ten

hours of legal ethics, by completing fourteen hours of pre-recorded CLE courses all in the

same day—January 27, 2025. He received credit for only twelve hours because that is the

credit limit for pre-recorded presentations. We give little rehabilitative value to completing

fourteen hours of pre-recorded CLE in a single day. Other evidence of Mr. Kohout’s

competence and legal skills is comprised mostly of letters that were either written before

his disbarment, some as long ago as 1995, or that discuss his pre-disbarment competence.

Because of the absence of evidence reflecting Mr. Kohout’s present competence and legal

skill, this factor does not weigh in Mr. Kohout’s favor.

47
G. Public Confidence in the Administration of Justice

Engaging in the practice of law is a privilege. In exchange for this privilege

lawyers owe certain duties to the public, the courts, and the legal profession:

A lawyer owes an ethical duty to clients including the duty of
candor, loyalty, diligence, and competence. Lawyers also owe
duties to the public who rely on lawyers to protect their
interests. The general public deserves lawyers with the highest
standards of honesty and integrity. As officers of the court,
lawyers owe duties to the legal system whereby they must
conduct themselves within the bounds of the law and abide by
the rules of substance and procedure which afford the
administration of justice. As to the legal profession, lawyers
owe an ethical duty to maintain the integrity of the profession.

Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Blyler, 237 W. Va. 325, 341, 787 S.E.2d 596, 612 (2016). When

a lawyer engages in misconduct, the harm extends beyond the affected clients and impacts

public confidence in the administration of justice. See Smith, 214 W. Va. at 93, 585 S.E.2d

at 612 (Miller, J., dissenting) (“It is a lawyer’s obligation to participate in upholding the

integrity, dignity, and purity of the courts. He owes a definite responsibility to the public

in the proper administration of justice. It is of utmost importance that the honor and

integrity of the legal profession should be preserved and that the lives of its members be

without reproach.” (quoting In re Stump, 114 S.W.2d 1094, 1097 (Ky. 1938)). Therefore,

protecting the public and the legal profession are essential elements of lawyer disciplinary

proceedings. See Syl. pt. 2, In re Daniel, 153 W. Va. 839, 173 S.E.2d 153 (1970)

(“Disbarment of an attorney to practice law is not used solely to punish the attorney but is

for the protection of the public and the profession.”).

48
Our discussion of the five factors used to evaluate a petition for reinstatement

demonstrate that Mr. Kohout has failed to carry his heavy burden of proving, by clear and

convincing evidence, that he possesses the integrity, moral character, and legal competence

necessary to resume the practice of law. This lack of evidence prevents us from reaching

the mandatory conclusion that his reinstatement will not have a substantial adverse effect

on the public confidence in the administration of justice, and we must deny Mr. Kohout’s

petition for reinstatement.

When we deny a petition for reinstatement, Rule 3.33(g) of the Rules of

Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure authorizes us to impose conditions concerning subsequent

petitions.50 Because Mr. Kohout did not exercise reasonable diligence in reimbursing the

Disciplinary Board for the costs of his underlying disciplinary proceeding, we impose the

condition that Mr. Kohout may not further petition for reinstatement of his license to

practice law before he has reimbursed the Disciplinary Board, in full, for the costs incurred

in the proceeding that resulted in Mr. Kohout’s disbarment as well as the costs incurred in

50
Rule of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure 3.33(g) provides:

If the petition is withdrawn or is denied, the Court may
enter an order of judgment requiring the petitioner to reimburse
the Office of Disciplinary Counsel for the ordinary and
necessary costs expended in connection with the petition for
reinstatement. The Court may include in any order denying
reinstatement any terms and conditions concerning subsequent
petitions, including time restrictions concerning filing, as the
Court may deem just.

49
this reinstatement proceeding. In addition, any future application for reinstatement Mr.

Kohout submits must include an affidavit from a licensed attorney agreeing to supervise

him upon reinstatement.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained in this opinion, we adopt the Hearing Panel’s

recommendation and deny Mr. Kohout’s petition for reinstatement. Additionally, before

he files any further petitions for reinstatement, we direct Mr. Kohout to: (1) fully reimburse

the Disciplinary Board for the cost of the disciplinary proceeding in which he was

disbarred; (2) fully reimburse the Disciplinary Board for the cost of this reinstatement

proceeding; and (3) obtain an affidavit from a licensed attorney agreeing to supervise him

upon reinstatement, which he must include with any future petition for reinstatement he

may file.

Petition Denied.

50

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11068399. Public record. Not legal advice.