# T. Robinson v. Philadelphia Int'l. Airport ~ Appeal of: City of Philadelphia

> Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · June 9, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11067613

## Case

- **Court:** Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 9, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Fizzano Cannon
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tasha Robinson :
:
v. :
:
Philadelphia International Airport, :
City of Philadelphia, Menzies Aviation, :
John Menzies, PLC, Menzies Aviation :
Group (USA), Inc., Aircraft Service :
International, Inc., PSA Airlines, :
and American Airlines Terminal F :
: No. 263 C.D. 2022
Appeal of: City of Philadelphia : Argued: March 4, 2025

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: June 9, 2025

The City of Philadelphia (City) appeals from the January 6, 2022, order
of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court). The trial court’s
order granted the motion in limine of American Airlines (American) and held that
the City remains a party in the underlying tort litigation for purposes of the trial and
verdict sheet. The City asserts that the trial court’s order violated coordinate
jurisdiction principles because a prior trial court order dated December 22, 2020,
granted the City’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice all
claims and crossclaims asserted against the City, including a crossclaim by
American. Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s January 6, 2022, order and
remand for further proceedings.
I. Factual & Procedural Background
In March 2019, Tasha Robinson (Robinson) filed a complaint against,
among others, the City and American. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 52a-64a.
Robinson averred that on March 31, 2017, she was on her way to her job as a gate
agent at the Philadelphia International Airport when she fell in a slippery area on the
tarmac outside Terminal F and sustained various injuries. Id. at 60a-62a. She
asserted claims sounding in negligence against all named defendants. Id. at 62a-64a.
American filed an answer with new matter asserting various defenses
against Robinson’s allegations, as well as crossclaims against the City and other
defendants. R.R. at 67a-77a. American’s crossclaim against the City alleged that if
Robinson’s claims were viable, the City was either solely or jointly liable to
Robinson on the basis of negligence and should be subject to indemnity and
contribution based on the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act, 42 Pa.C.S.
§§ 8321-8327. Id. at 74a-76a. Notably, American’s crossclaim against the City did
not assert contractual claims against the City based on the lease between the City
and American. Id. at 76a-77a.
The City similarly filed an answer with new matter and crossclaims.
Id. at 81a-94a. The City asserted various defenses against Robinson’s allegations,
including governmental immunity pursuant to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims
Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8542 (Tort Claims Act), lack of control of the area where
Robinson fell, lack of notice of the condition of the area where Robinson fell
(“common law notice”), and lack of written notice from Robinson advising of her
claims against the City as a governmental unit, as required by Section 5522 of the

2
Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5522 (“statutory notice”);1 the City crossclaimed against
American and other defendants for common law indemnity and contribution. Id. at
81a-88a. The City also crossclaimed against American alone for contractual
indemnity, including attorney’s fees, based on a lease provision stating that
American bore responsibility for the premises where Robinson’s injury occurred.
Id. at 90a-94a.
In October 2020, the City filed a motion for summary judgment with
regard to Robinson’s claims. R.R. at 222a. The City reiterated its assertion of
governmental immunity, claiming that because the incident occurred on an “inner
service road” at the airport, the only applicable exception to immunity was the
“public streets” exception.2 Id. at 222a-25a. However, the City averred that based

1
Section 5522(a)(1) states that within six months of an incident, the plaintiff must provide
a government entity with a written statement setting forth:

(i) The name and residence address of the person to whom the cause of action has
accrued.
(ii) The name and residence address of the person injured.
(iii) The date and hour of the accident.
(iv) The approximate location where the accident occurred.
(v) The name and residence or office address of any attending physician.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5522(a)(1). Section 5522 (a)(2) states that in the absence of this notice, the plaintiff’s
case may be barred with prejudice. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5522(a)(2).

2
The “streets” exception states that a governmental unit may be liable if an injury occurs
due to:

A dangerous condition of streets owned by the local agency, except
that the claimant to recover must establish that the dangerous
condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury
which was incurred and that the local agency had actual notice or
could reasonably be charged with notice under the circumstances of

3
on the evidence, the area where Robinson fell was not defective in and of itself but
had an “oily substance” on it that was not within the City’s control, and the City’s
immunity remained viable. Id.
The City added that the evidence did not show that it had common law
notice of the dangerous condition, which is part of the “streets” exception to
immunity as well as an independent duty of care owed by a landowner to business
invitees. R.R. at 225a-27a (citing Section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(Am. L. Inst. 1965)).3 This was because the evidence did not show that the condition
had existed long enough prior to the accident for the City to have actual or
constructive notice of it. Id. at 226a-27a. The City separately re-asserted that
Robinson failed to provide it with written statutory notice of her claim within six

the dangerous condition at a sufficient time prior to the event to have
taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.

42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(6)(i).

3
This section, titled “Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by Possessor,”
states:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to business visitors
by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he

(a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover, the condition
which, if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them,
and
(b) has no reason to believe that they will discover the condition or realize the risk
involved therein, and
(c) invites or permits them to enter or remain upon the land without exercising
reasonable care
(i) to make the condition reasonably safe, or
(ii) to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm without
relinquishing any of the services which they are entitled to receive, if the possessor
is a public utility.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (Am. L. Inst. 1965).

4
months of the incident pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5522(a)(2) (requiring notice to
government unit of possible injury action within six months of incident). Id. at 227a.
The City also filed a motion for summary judgment with regard to
American’s crossclaim. R.R. at 386a-92a. The City asserted that based on the lease
between the City and American, American was responsible for the area where
Robinson fell and must indemnify the City against Robinson’s claims. Id. The City
added that American breached its lease agreement by failing to secure insurance
coverage for the City as provided in the agreement. Id.
American, too, filed a motion for summary judgment concerning
Robinson’s claims. R.R. at 407a-19a. American asserted, inter alia, that the
evidence showed Robinson’s injury did not occur in an area of the airport under
American’s control. Id. Further, the evidence failed to show that American knew
about, should have known about, or caused the condition that led to the injury. Id.
American also filed a motion for summary judgment with regard to the
City’s crossclaim, arguing that Robinson’s injury occurred on premises controlled
by the City, not American, and that the City was not immune. R.R. at 610a-20a.
American denied the City’s crossclaim averments regarding insurance coverage. Id.
The City and American filed responses to each other’s motions for
summary judgment on their crossclaims, and Robinson filed responses to the City’s
and American’s motions for summary judgment. R.R. at 807a-1436a. Relevant to
this appeal, American did not file a response in opposition to the City’s motion for
summary judgment concerning Robinson’s claims. See id. at 32a-33a (Trial Ct.
Docket). Robinson’s response to the City’s motion for summary judgment asserted
that the area where she fell was within the City’s control, that it was defectively
designed and constructed, and that the City knew or should have known of the defect.

5
Id. at 1065a-80a. Therefore, Robinson asserted, the condition met the “real
property” or real estate exception to governmental immunity, and the City should
remain a defendant.4 Id.
On December 22, 2020, Judge Kennedy of the trial court issued an
order granting the City’s motion for summary judgment concerning Robinson’s
claims, holding that “[a]ll claims and cross[-]claims asserted against [the City] in the
above-captioned matter are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.” R.R. at 1437a. In
his subsequent opinion, Judge Kennedy acknowledged the City’s assertion of
immunity on the basis that the evidence did not support the “public streets”
exception of the Tort Claims Act, as well as Robinson’s assertion that the “real
property” exception applied to defeat immunity. Trial Ct. Op., Sept. 16, 2024, at 4-
5. However, Judge Kennedy concluded that the difference was not dispositive,
because both exceptions pertain to “government controlled land,” where the relevant
analysis focuses on whether there is an “actual defect of the land itself” that causes
the injury. Id. at 5 (quoting Bullard v. Lehigh-Northampton Airport Auth., 668 A.2d
223, 225 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (emphasis added).
Judge Kennedy concluded that the evidence, including Robinson’s
testimony, did not show that her fall “was the result of a defect in the property or in
its construction, maintenance, repair, or design.” Trial Ct. Op., Sept. 16, 2024, at 6-

4
The “real property” exception states that a governmental unit may be liable if an injury
occurs due to:

The care, custody or control of real property in the possession of the
local agency, except that the local agency shall not be liable for
damages on account of any injury sustained by a person
intentionally trespassing on real property in the possession of the
local agency. . . .

42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(3).

6
8 (stating that the evidence showed only that the oily substance was “on the tarmac”
and not “of the tarmac” within the City’s control). As such, Judge Kennedy
concluded that the evidence supported the City’s immunity based on the evidentiary
failure of the real property exception. Id. at 7-8.
Judge Kennedy further concluded on the City’s common law notice
assertions that the evidence did not show that the City knew or should have known
of the oily substance on the tarmac such that it owed Robinson a duty of care that
had been breached, as very little time had passed between the onset of the wet oily
condition and Robinson’s accident. Id. at 8-10. Lastly, Judge Kennedy stated that
once the incident occurred, the City had sufficient constructive notice of Robinson’s
potential suit to defeat its statutory notice assertions based on 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 5522(a)(2).5 Id. at 11 n.2.
Relevant to this appeal, Judge Kennedy did not find that the City did
not control the area where Robinson fell. Rather, he determined that, even
presuming control by the City, it was immune because the evidence did not show
that the defect was “of” the area or that the City had common law notice of the defect.
In light of Judge Kennedy’s December 2020 order dismissing all claims and
crossclaims against the City, the City was subsequently removed from the docket.
See City’s Reply Br. at 4 (citing American’s Br. at 20).
On the same date, Judge Kennedy issued an order denying American’s
motion for summary judgment concerning Robinson’s claims. R.R. at 1438a. On
January 7, 2021, Judge Kennedy issued orders denying the City’s motion for

5
This issue is not relevant to this appeal and, further, is now moot in light of our holding,
which restores Judge Kennedy’s December 2020 order dismissing the City from this litigation
entirely and with prejudice.

7
summary judgment concerning American’s crossclaim against the City and denying
American’s motion for summary judgment concerning the City’s crossclaim against
American. Id. at 1439a-40a. Judge Kennedy did not explain the bases for those
orders. As discussed further below, Judge Kennedy’s January 2021 denial of the
City’s motion for summary judgment against American was inconsistent with his
December 2020 order dismissing all claims and crossclaims against the City,
including American’s crossclaim pleading solely negligence-based allegations that
the City was a fellow tortfeasor. However, neither Robinson nor American sought
permission to appeal the December 2020 and January 2021 orders.6 At that point,
American was the sole remaining defendant for Robinson to pursue at trial; however,
the City’s contract-based crossclaims against American remained formally pending
even though it was no longer a party to the litigation. See id. at 1461a. The City
subsequently asserted that because it had been dismissed from the litigation, it did
not intend to pursue its remaining contract based crossclaims against American. Id.
at 1516a.7 The City’s claims, however, have not been formally withdrawn.
In July 2021, American filed a motion for reconsideration of Judge
Kennedy’s December 2020 order granting the City’s motion for summary judgment
concerning Robinson’s claims. R.R. at 1443a-49a. American asserted that Judge
Kennedy erred in granting the City’s motion because Robinson’s testimony

6
See K.H. v. J.R., 826 A.2d 863, 869 (Pa. 2003) (stating that “in an action involving
multiple defendants, and in the absence of an express determination [of finality] by the trial court
under [Pa.R.A.P.] 341(c), an order granting summary judgment as to one party is treated as
appealable as of right only after the disposition of the claims involving the remaining parties”).
Here, where Judge Kennedy did not express that his order granting summary judgment to the City
was a final order, Robinson and American would have had to seek Judge Kennedy’s permission
to appeal his order prior to trial. See Pa.R.A.P. 312.

7
The City’s counsel confirmed this position at oral argument before this Court.

8
established that her injury occurred outside the area within American’s control
pursuant to its lease agreement with the City. Id. at 1446a-48a. Judge Kennedy
denied American’s motion for reconsideration. Id. at 1458a.
In August 2021, American filed a motion in limine seeking to present
evidence against the City at trial and have the City included on the jury verdict sheet.
R.R. at 1459a. American maintained that Judge Kennedy’s December 2020 order
constituted clear error because the evidence showed that the area where Robinson
fell was outside of American’s leasehold and within the City’s control. Id. at 1461.
American maintained that the coordinate jurisdiction rule8 did not prevent the trial
court from granting American’s motion in limine because that motion differed in
kind from the City’s prior motion for summary judgment even though the underlying
legal issue of the City’s liability was the same. Id. at 1467a. As such, American
asked that it be permitted to present evidence at trial in support of its own affirmative
defenses to Robinson’s complaint and its “previously dismissed cross[-]claims
against the City.” Id. at 1469a. Robinson similarly filed a motion in limine seeking
to present evidence against the City at trial. Id. at 1482a-85a.
The City responded that the coordinate jurisdiction rule precluded the
relief sought by American and Robinson and that their motions in limine were thinly
veiled attempts to “get a second bite at the apple” and circumvent Judge Kennedy’s
prior dismissal of the City from the litigation. Id. at 1514a-21a & 1533a-40a.
On January 6, 2022, Judge Carpenter of the trial court issued an order
stating:

8
The coordinate jurisdiction rule, which is discussed further below, states that “judges of
coordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same case should not overrule each other’s decisions.” Ivy
Hill Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 310 A.3d 742, 754 (Pa. 2024).

9
[The City] remains a party in this action by virtue of this
Court’s finding that the Orders of December 22, 2020, and
January 7, 2021 did not properly extinguish [American’s]
cross[-]claims against the City. Further, this Court finds
that the City is not immune from [American’s] cross[-]claims
and the City may remain on the verdict sheet for purposes
of the Fair Share Act.[9]

R.R. at 48a-49a (Trial Ct. Docket). Relevant to this appeal, Judge Carpenter’s order
did not specifically address the City’s distinct common law notice assertion in its
motion for summary judgment, which Judge Kennedy upheld, that even if the City
was not immune and had control of the area where Robinson fell, the City did not
have actual or constructive notice of the slippery condition in that area. See id.
The City sought reconsideration of Judge Carpenter’s January 2022
order, asserting that American waived its right to pursue its crossclaims against the
City at trial because American did not oppose the City’s prior motion for summary
judgment concerning Robinson’s claims or seek to appeal Judge Kennedy’s
December 2020 order granting that motion and dismissing all pending claims and
crossclaims against the City. R.R. at 1554a-60a. The City added that American’s
crossclaims against it were predicated on its purported status as a joint tortfeasor
liable to Robinson and that Judge Kennedy’s December 2020 order correctly
dismissed it from Robinson’s claims and, by extension, American’s crossclaims. Id.
at 1561a-65a.
Judge Carpenter denied the City’s motion for reconsideration of her
January 2022 order granting American’s motion in limine, and in July 2022, this

9
The Fair Share Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102, “abolished joint and several liability in most
negligence cases. [It] requires that damages be apportioned in negligence cases based upon the
relative causal negligence of the parties.” Adams v. Rising Sun Md. Ctr., 257 A.3d 26, 42 (Pa.
Super. 2020). Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court but may be cited as
persuasive where they address analogous issues. Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 180
A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

10
Court granted the City’s request to appeal that order. R.R. at 50a. Judge Carpenter
stayed the trial of the underlying matter pending this appeal and issued an opinion
in support of her January 2022 order. Original Record (O.R.) # 109 & #110. Judge
Carpenter explained that in deciding the motions in limine regarding which parties
were necessary for appearance at trial and potentially on the verdict sheet, she was
not bound by Judge Kennedy’s prior dismissal of the City on summary judgment.
O.R. #10 at 3. Judge Carpenter added that American’s crossclaim against the City
remained viable because American had presented sufficient evidence to submit to
the jury that based on the lease between the City and American, the area where
Robinson fell was controlled by the City, not American, and the “real estate”
exception to immunity applied. Id. at 2-4. As noted above, however, American’s
crossclaim against the City had not asserted contractual claims based on its lease
with the City. Judge Carpenter did not address the City’s assertions based on
common law notice as an independent basis for its denial of liability, which Judge
Kennedy had upheld as explained in his opinion. See Trial Ct. Op., Sept. 16, 2024,
at 9-10.

II. Issues Presented
The City argues that American waived its right to try to return the City
to this litigation via motion in limine because it previously failed to either oppose
the City’s motion for summary judgment concerning Robinson’s underlying claims
or seek to appeal Judge Kennedy’s December 22, 2020, order granting that motion
and dismissing all of Robinson’s claims against the City. City’s Br. at 13. The City
also argues that Judge Carpenter’s January 2022 order returning the City to the
litigation violated coordinate jurisdiction principles. City’s Br. at 14.

11
III. Discussion
A. Inclusion of the City at Trial and on the Verdict Sheet
The Fair Share Act states:
(a.1) Recovery against joint defendant; contribution--

Where recovery is allowed against more than one person,
including actions for strict liability, and where liability is
attributed to more than one defendant, each defendant
shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount
awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of that
defendant’s liability to the amount of liability attributed to
all defendants and other persons to whom liability is
apportioned under subsection (a.2).

(a.2) Apportionment of responsibility among certain
nonparties and effect--

For purposes of apportioning liability only, the question of
liability of any defendant or other person who has entered
into a release with the plaintiff with respect to the action
and who is not a party shall be transmitted to the trier of
fact upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party[.]

42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a.1), (a.2).
Our Supreme Court set forth the basic principles of contribution in
McLaughlin v. Nahata, 298 A.3d 384 (Pa. 2023), an opinion pertaining to vicarious
liability. Considering the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act, the Court
noted the Act’s definition of joint tortfeasors as “two or more persons jointly or
severally liable in tort for the same injury to persons or property, whether or not
judgment has been recovered against all or some of them.” Id. at 395 (quoting 42
Pa.C.S. § 8322). Contribution “is available whenever two or more persons are
jointly or severally liable in tort, irrespective of the theory by which tort liability is
imposed.” Id. at 396 (quoting Straw v. Fair, 187 A.3d 966, 1002) (emphasis added

12
by McLaughlin). Accordingly, here, as the City has been found to be without fault,
and therefore not a tortfeasor, it cannot be subject to contribution. In that regard,
Judge Kennedy’s opinion in support of his order stated that the evidence did not
show that the City knew or should have known of the slippery condition where and
when Robinson fell, such that it owed her a duty of care that had been breached.
Neither Robinson nor American sought to appeal that order, which became the law
of the case.
Regarding indemnity in the negligence context, this Court stated in City
of Wilkes-Barre v. Kaminski Brothers, 804 A.2d 89 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002), that it is “a
common law equitable remedy that shifts the entire responsibility for damages from
a party who, without any fault, has been required to pay because of a legal
relationship to the party at fault.” Id. at 92. “It is a fault-shifting mechanism that
comes into play when a defendant held liable by operation of law seeks to recover
from a defendant whose conduct actually caused the loss.” Id. at 92. This type of
indemnity is distinct from contractual indemnity, which “entitles a party to
indemnification for its own negligence,” but the intended nature of the terms “must
be unmistakable.” Id. at 95. Here, American’s ability to seek common law tort
indemnity from the City would require a showing that the City “actually caused”
Robinson’s injury. However, Judge Kennedy determined in his December 2020
order that the City bore no liability for Robinson’s injury because the evidence did
not show that the City had common law notice of the slippery condition where and
when Robinson fell, and that order became the law of the case. Additionally,
American’s crossclaim did not pose a contractual indemnity claim against the City
based on their lease. Accordingly, the City could not be subject to either type of
indemnity in this case.

13
In the context of a motion for summary judgment, Pennsylvania Rule
of Civil Procedure 1035.3(a)(1) states that a party adverse to the motion “may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings” and must file a response
to the motion within 30 days; the response must identify genuine issues of material
fact “arising from evidence in the record controverting the evidence cited in support
of the motion.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.3(a)(1). Failure to do so may constitute a basis
for the trial court to conclude that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and to
therefore grant the motion. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.3(d); Evans v. Thomas Jefferson
Univ., 81 A.3d 1062, 1069 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
In Ball v. Johns-Manville Corporation, 625 A.2d 650 (Pa. Super. 1993),
an asbestos case, some defendants were dismissed on summary judgment prior to
trial. Id. at 652. After the close of the plaintiff’s case at trial, Owens, one of the
remaining defendants, asked that the dismissed defendants be placed on the jury
verdict sheet as part of special interrogatories asking the jury to find that all
originally named defendants contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries and, if so, to
apportion liability among them. Id. The trial court declined to do so. Id. After trial,
at which the jury awarded a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor, the trial court refused to
grant Owens a new trial at which its proposed special interrogatories and charge on
apportionment would be given to the jury. Id. at 653.
In Ball, the Superior Court considered Paparelli v. GAF Corporation,
549 A.2d 597 (Pa. Super. 1988), where several asbestos defendants were similarly
dismissed on summary judgment. 549 A.2d at 598. The remaining Paparelli
defendants, who had not previously opposed the motion, appealed. Id. They
contended that since they had filed crossclaims for contribution and indemnity
against the dismissed defendants, the entry of summary judgment for the dismissed

14
defendants improperly prevented the remaining defendants from having their
crossclaims against those defendants resolved in one lawsuit. Id. at 599. The
Superior Court concluded that the remaining defendants had waived their right to
contest the result of the summary judgments by not opposing them prior to their
entry. Id. at 599-600.
Consistent with its reasoning in Paparelli, the Superior Court noted in
Ball that Owens did not oppose the other defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
625 A.2d at 661. Moreover, unlike the defendants in Paparelli, Owens did not even
try to appeal after the grant of summary judgment to protect its right to seek
contribution from the dismissed defendants at trial. Id. Thus, Owens had “foregone
any right it had to include these defendants in this jury’s verdict.” Id.
Here, American seeks to have the City returned to this litigation at trial
for purposes of determining the City’s liability for purposes of contribution and
indemnity; in the alternative, American seeks to have the City at least listed on the
verdict sheet so that the jury may apportion fault and reduce any recovery American
may owe to Robinson. See R.R. at 1459a-70a (American’s Motion in Limine).
Citing Ball, the City argues that when American failed to oppose the
City’s motion for summary judgment concerning Robinson’s claims, upon which
American’s crossclaims against the City relied, American waived its right to later
challenge Judge Kennedy’s grant of that motion and dismissal of the City. City’s
Br. at 16-18. The City explains that American’s failure to oppose the City’s motion
meant that it was never a party to that aspect of this litigation and could not
subsequently challenge its outcome. Id.
American responds that it had the right to object later to the dismissal
of Robinson’s claims against the City because Judge Kennedy’s December 2020

15
order was interlocutory and could be modified by the trial court at any time up to the
entry of a final judgment.10 American’s Br. at 20-21. American states that Ball and
Paparelli are inapposite because they pertained to crossclaims for common law
indemnity rather than contractual indemnity. Id.
We find Ball both apposite and persuasive. Concerning American’s
effort to have the City present at trial for liability purposes, it is critical here that, as
the City explains, American’s crossclaims against the City for contribution and
indemnity depend on a finding at trial that the City is liable to Robinson. City’s
Reply Br. at 4-5 n.2. Our review of American’s crossclaim against the City confirms
this, as American’s allegations against the City are based solely on the City’s
purported negligence towards Robinson; American’s crossclaims against the City do
not include contractual assertions against the City based on the lease between the
two entities. See R.R. at 76a-77a. Further, American asserted no claims against the
City based on control of the area where Robinson fell, although the City made such
claims in its crossclaim against American.
American could, nonetheless, have protected its interest in maintaining
Robinson’s claims against the City by opposing the City’s motion for summary
judgment against Robinson’s claims, but American did not do so. Judge Kennedy’s
grant of summary judgment holding that the City was not liable to Robinson because
the City was immune and did not have common law notice of the condition of the
area where Robinson fell precluded any such finding at trial because, under the
Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act, Judge Kennedy concluded that the
City was not a tortfeasor. American fails to explain why Ball and, by extension,

10
Pursuant to Section 5505 of the Judicial Code, a trial court may only amend a final order
within 30 days of its entry but may modify an interlocutory order beyond 30 days. 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 5505; Buehl v. Horn, 728 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).

16
Paparelli, should be distinguished because those cases did not entail a crossclaim
for contractual indemnity. As explained previously, American’s crossclaim against
the City likewise did not raise contractual claims against the City, even though the
City had raised such claims against American.
By failing to oppose the City’s motion for summary judgment as to
Robinson’s claims or seek an appeal of Judge Kennedy’s December 2020 order
granting the City’s motion, American could not challenge Judge Kennedy’s grant of
summary judgment and dismissal of the City prior to trial. Therefore, Judge
Kennedy’s order removed the City from this litigation as to potential liability at trial.
As will be discussed below, Judge Carpenter’s subsequent ruling to the contrary in
the context of American’s motion in limine violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule.
Judge Kennedy’s conclusion that the City was immune from suit also
negated American’s wish to include the City on the verdict sheet at trial so that even
if the City is not required to pay damages, the jury might apportion fault to the City
and reduce American’s potential exposure. Section 8541 of the Tort Claims Act
states: “Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be
liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by
any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 8541. Although the statute states only that the governmental entity cannot be
“liable for damages,” our Courts have explained that immunity is more than “simply
a mere shield from judgment or liability”; it “protects government entities from a
lawsuit itself[.]” Brooks v. Ewing Cole, Inc., 259 A.3d 359, 372-73 (Pa. 2021)
(collecting cases); see also Hommrich v. Boscola, 329 A.3d 775, 784 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2025) (stating that governmental immunity is “more than just a shield against
damages but, instead, [is a] protection[] against suit in the first place”).

17
This is because defending a lawsuit from which it is immune “requires
a governmental entity to expend taxpayer dollars on its defense.” Ewing, 259 A.3d
at 373. As such, requiring a government entity “to engage in litigation from which
[it] is immune and allowing such litigation to proceed clearly undermines the
purpose of immunity.” Hommrich, 329 A.3d at 784. Accordingly, in light of Judge
Kennedy’s adjudication of the City’s immunity, which neither Robinson nor
American sought to appeal prior to trial, subjecting the City to further litigation in
this matter, even for the sole purpose of potentially reducing American’s exposure,
would defeat the purpose of that immunity.11
However, Judge Kennedy reached an additional independent
conclusion that the City was entitled to summary judgment because even assuming
it had control of the area where Robinson fell, the City did not have common law
notice of the condition of the area. That conclusion foreclosed any finding of fault
on the part of the City. Judge Carpenter’s subsequent order in the context of
American’s motion in limine did not expressly address or overrule Judge Kennedy’s
conclusion on this issue and, as will be discussed below, even if Judge Carpenter
had done so, it would have violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule.
To the extent Judge Kennedy’s order was interlocutory because it did
not conclude the entire litigation, American may appeal it after the final disposition,
presumably at trial, of all remaining claims and parties. See K.H. v. J.R., 826 A.2d
863, 869 (Pa. 2003) (stating that “in an action involving multiple defendants, and in
the absence of an express determination [of finality] by the trial court . . . , an order
granting summary judgment as to one party is treated as appealable as of right only
after the disposition of the claims involving the remaining parties”). Because Judge

11
However, as this matter will be remanded, the City must formally withdraw its
crossclaims against American prior to trial to ensure that it is fully excused from this litigation.

18
Kennedy’s opinion did not conclude that the City did not control the area where
Robinson fell, American will not be precluded from arguing at trial that it did not
control the area where Robinson fell. Nonetheless, it cannot assert that the City is
liable.

B. Coordinate Jurisdiction Rule
The coordinate jurisdiction rule provides that “judges of coordinate
jurisdiction sitting in the same case should not overrule each other’s decisions.” Ivy
Hill Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 310 A.3d 742,
754 (Pa. 2024). The rule, which falls within the more general “law of the case”
doctrine, promotes judicial economy by serving “(1) to protect the settled
expectations of the parties; (2) to insure uniformity of decisions; (3) to maintain
consistency during the course of a single case; (4) to effectuate the proper and
streamlined administration of justice; and (5) to bring litigation to an end.” Id.
Whether a court’s order violates the coordinate jurisdiction rule is a question of law
over which our review is de novo. Id.
Departure from the rule is limited to exceptional circumstances “where
there has been an intervening change in the controlling law [or] a substantial change
in the facts or evidence giving rise to the dispute in the matter, or where the prior
holding was clearly erroneous and would create a manifest injustice if followed.”
Ivy Hill, 310 A.3d at 754. In considering these exceptions, the Ivy Hill Court
explained:
While a ruling issued at a different stage of the
proceedings may give rise to one of the limited exceptions
to the coordinate jurisdiction rule – for example, a change
in the facts – it is the demonstration of the exceptional

19
circumstance, not the distinct procedural posture, which
renders the coordinate jurisdiction rule inapplicable.

310 A.3d at 758.
Additionally, our Supreme Court has rejected the premise that the
coordinate jurisdiction rule should not apply if the resulting trial would result in a
directed verdict for the defendant, entailing a waste of resources. Goldey v. Trustees
of Univ. of Pa., 675 A.2d 264, 267 (Pa. 1996). According to the Court, that position
“says nothing that is not true in every case where summary judgment has once been
denied and a second judge has a different view. In effect, the defendant has
happened upon a judge for trial who agrees with the analysis that the first judge did
not accept.” Id. Instead, the keys are “the need for finality” associated with pretrial
motions and “the prevention of judge shopping.” Id. at 267-68 (citation omitted).
In Bates v. Delaware County Prison Employees’ Independent Union,
150 A.3d 121 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), this Court considered the recognized exceptions
to the coordinate jurisdiction rule, particularly the clear error/manifest injustice
exception, and reasoned:
To accede to a coordinate judge’s order that is clearly
erroneous would be not only to permit an inequity to work
on the party subject to the order, but would allow an action
to proceed in the face of almost certain reversal on
appellate review. Moreover, the requirement that the prior
holding also create a manifest injustice serves as a
significant curb on the exception so that it would apply to
only those situations in which adhering to the prior holding
would be, in essence, plainly intolerable.

Bates, 151 A.3d at 129-30. As in Goldey, this Court in Bates rejected the defendant’s
assertion that being “forced” to go to trial when the outcome, if unfavorable to the
defendant, would likely be reversed on appeal, amounted to a manifest injustice. Id.
at 130.

20
Recounting the facts here, the City’s motion for summary judgment
regarding Robinson’s claims asserted governmental immunity on the basis that the
evidence did not establish a defect of the area where Robinson fell. R.R. at 222a-
28a. The City added that the evidence did not establish that the City had common
law notice of the condition of the area where Robinson fell. Id.
Although American did not oppose the City’s motion for summary
judgment concerning Robinson’s claims, Robinson filed a response asserting that
the area where she fell was within the City’s control and was defective, and that the
City knew or should have known of the defect. R.R. at 1065a-80a. Although the
City had asserted immunity based on the inapplicability of the “streets” exception,
Robinson asserted that immunity was not warranted based on the applicability of the
“real property” exception.
Judge Kennedy granted the City’s motion in his December 2020 order
directing that “[a]ll claims and crossclaims asserted against [the City] in the above-
captioned matter are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.” R.R. at 1437a. Judge
Kennedy explained that the evidence did not support the real property exception to
the City’s asserted immunity or show that the City had common law notice of the
slippery substance on the area where Robinson fell. Trial Ct. Op., Sept. 16, 2024, at
7-10. American did not seek to appeal Judge Kennedy’s order to this Court.
Even though Judge Kennedy’s December 2020 order dismissed “all
claims and cross[-]claims” against the City in the context of the City’s motion for
summary judgment against Robinson, his subsequent January 2021 order
inexplicably purported to deny the City’s motion for summary judgment seeking

21
dismissal of American’s crossclaim against the City.12 R.R. at 1439a. On the same
date in January 2021, Judge Kennedy denied American’s motion for summary
judgment on its crossclaims against the City, which did not include a contractual
claim based on the lease between the City and American. R.R. at 1440a.
In August 2021, American filed its motion in limine seeking to present
evidence at trial of the City’s liability and to have the City included on the verdict
sheet. R.R. at 1459a-70a. American argued that the area where Robinson fell was
within the City’s care, custody, and control such that the “real property” exception
to governmental immunity should have applied. Id. at 1461a. As noted, however,
American’s crossclaims against the City made no allegations based on the lease
between the two entities, which would presumably govern which entity had legal
control of the area where Robinson fell. The City asserted in its crossclaim against
American that the contractual terms of the lease attributed that area to American, but

12
Judge Kennedy’s December 22, 2020, order disposed of American’s crossclaims as well
as Robinson’s even though American’s crossclaim would not have been formally before Judge
Kennedy in the context of the City’s motion for summary judgment with regard to Robinson’s
claims. However, that order states clearly that “all claims and cross[-]claims against [the City] in
the above-captioned matter are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.” R.R. at 1437a. As such,
Judge Kennedy’s January 7, 2021, order denying the City’s motion for summary judgment as to
American’s crossclaim appears incongruous because the December 2020 order clearly stated that
American’s crossclaim was dismissed. Normally, a court may modify or rescind an order within
30 days after its entry if the prior order has not yet been appealed. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505.
However, Section 5505 also states that this must be done “upon notice to the parties.” Id. Here,
the January 2021 order was issued within 30 days of the December 2020 order, but there was no
notice to the parties or indication in the docket that Judge Kennedy chose to rescind his December
2020 order. Moreover, neither American nor Robinson sought to appeal Judge Kennedy’s
December 2020 and January 2021 orders although American subsequently sought reconsideration
of the December 2020 order in July 2021, which Judge Kennedy denied, and American did not
seek to appeal that determination either. R.R. at 1143a-49a & 1458a. The practical effect was that
American’s crossclaim against the City, which was based on allegations of the City’s liability to
Robinson in tort rather than contractual principles based on the lease between the City and
American, was effectively terminated, the City was dismissed from the litigation, and that
determination became law of the case.

22
by the time American filed its motion in limine, the City had been dismissed and
removed from the docket and was not actively pursuing its claims against American.
On January 6, 2022, Judge Carpenter issued an order granting
American’s motion in limine. R.R. at 48a-49a. Judge Carpenter concluded that
Judge Kennedy’s December 2020 and January 2021 orders had not “properly
extinguished” American’s crossclaims against the City and that the City was not
immune from American’s crossclaims. Id. at 48a-49a. In her corresponding
opinion, Judge Carpenter wrote:
In finding that the City remained a party to the lawsuit on
[American’s] cross[-]claims, this Court rejected the City’s
claim that this Court was bound by the legal determination
of [Judge Kennedy’s] rulings on summary judgment,
which did not explicitly cover the issue before this Court.
This Court was deciding which parties were necessary for
appearance at trial and which parties could be on the
verdict sheet. The issue presented to this Court was not
clearly ruled upon by [Judge Kennedy]. Further, this
Court was not persuaded that the Streets Exception [to
governmental immunity] barred the cross[]claims because
[American] had averred sufficient facts that the claims at
issue involved the care, custody, and control of a secured
area of realty for airline operations, not a public street, and
thus the Real Property Exception [to governmental
immunity] would allow [American’s] cross[-]claims
against the City.

Trial Ct. Op., Feb. 23, 2023, at 3-4; O.R. #110.
Part of Judge Carpenter’s reasoning was based on her conclusion that
American’s evidence showed that “the City, not [American], controlled the premises
at issue because the site of the fall (in whole or in part) was located in an area of the
airport contractually under the City’s care, custody, and control.” Id. at 2 (emphasis
added). However, as noted, American’s crossclaim against the City was based on
assertions that the City was negligent with regard to Robinson; it contained no

23
contractual allegations against the City based on the lease between American and
the City. See R.R. at 74a-76a.
Judge Carpenter may have concluded that American’s crossclaims
against the City remained viable in light of Judge Kennedy’s January 2021 denial of
the City’s motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of American’s
crossclaims against the City. However, as explained in footnote 13 above, Judge
Kennedy’s January 2021 order was inconsistent with his then-recent December 2020
order dismissing all claims and crossclaims against the City. The January 2021 order
also lacked any statement or basis to conclude that it was intended to modify or
rescind any provision of the December 2020 order. Compare R.R. at 1437a, with
R.R. at 1439a. Lastly, the January 2021 order, while purporting to deny the City’s
motion for summary judgment on American’s crossclaim against the City, did not
disturb the December 2020 order’s dismissal of Robinson’s claim against the City,
which was the only basis upon which liability of the City to American could have
arisen. As discussed in footnote 13 above, any error inherent in Judge Kennedy’s
January 2021 order was harmless in light of the fact that neither Robinson nor
American sought to appeal the December 2020 or January 2021 orders; the practical
effect was that the City was dismissed from the litigation and the December 2020
order became law of the case.
The City avers that Judge Carpenter’s January 2022 order violated the
coordinate jurisdiction rule because it essentially overturned Judge Kennedy’s
December 2020 summary judgment order dismissing the City from all claims and
crossclaims against it by both Robinson and, by extension, American, whose claims
against the City rely on the City being liable to Robinson. City’s Br. at 20; City’s
Reply Br. at 4. The City adds that the rule’s exceptions do not apply because there

24
was no substantial change in the facts or law and no basis for Judge Carpenter to
conclude that Judge Kennedy’s order was clearly erroneous and that a manifest
injustice would result from it remaining in effect. City’s Br. at 20-30. The City
notes that Judge Carpenter did not declare that Judge Kennedy’s order was clearly
erroneous, only that she “was not persuaded” that the “streets” exception to the Tort
Claims Act applied. City’s Reply Br. at 9. The City adds that even if Judge
Kennedy’s order was clearly erroneous, the only result would be American having
to go to trial without the City being present or on the verdict sheet, which has
consistently been held insufficient to amount to a manifest injustice. City’s Br. at
26-27. We agree.
In supplemental briefing, the City argues that Ivy Hill, which was issued
after the close of principle briefing in this case, rejected American’s position that
because its motion in limine differed in kind and procedural posture from the City’s
prior motion for summary judgment with regard to Robinson’s claims, Judge
Carpenter’s January 2022 order did not violate the coordinate jurisdiction rule.
City’s Suppl. Br. at 3.
American argues that Judge Carpenter’s order did not violate
coordinate jurisdiction principles because Judge Kennedy’s order was clearly
erroneous. American’s Br. at 23. American insists the evidence established that the
area where Robinson fell was within City control and was defective, and therefore,
the City should not have been dismissed on summary judgment. Id. at 24-25.
American maintains that in light of Judge Kennedy’s clear error, forcing American
(and Robinson) to go to trial without being able to present evidence as to the City’s
potential liability would amount to a manifest injustice. Id.

25
In supplemental briefing, American acknowledged Ivy Hill’s holding
that a difference in procedural posture alone will not overcome the coordinate
jurisdiction rule. American’s Suppl. Br. at 15. American maintains, however, that
Judge Kennedy’s December 2020 order constituted a clear error and that Judge
Carpenter’s order requiring the City’s presence at trial and on the verdict sheet
corrected that error. Id. at 16-17. American adds that Judge Carpenter’s order would
ensure all necessary parties are present at trial and that there is no allegation here
that it “judge-shopped” to reach Judge Carpenter. Id. at 18-19.
As noted, Judge Kennedy’s December 2020 order on the City’s motion
for summary judgment concerning Robinson’s claims stated that “[a]ll claims and
crossclaims asserted against [the City] in the above-captioned matter are hereby
DISMISSED with prejudice.” R.R. at 1437a. Nevertheless, Judge Carpenter’s
January 2022 order granting American’s subsequent motion in limine stated that the
City was not immune, remained a party to the action, and would be listed on the
verdict sheet. Id. at 48a-49a. Judge Carpenter’s order, in effect, overruled Judge
Kennedy’s order.
American’s motion in limine before Judge Carpenter differed in kind
from the City’s prior motion for summary judgment before Judge Kennedy.
However, the procedural nature of different motions before trial judges, without
more, is not relevant in a coordinate jurisdiction analysis. Ivy Hill, 310 A.3d at 758.
Accordingly, the difference here does not preclude a determination that Judge
Carpenter’s ruling violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule unless one of the two
exceptions applies.
The first exception requires a substantial change in the facts or law
between the first and second rulings. Ivy Hill, 310 A.3d at 758. American did not

26
argue that any such change occurred. The arguments and evidentiary references
made by Robinson in opposition to the City’s motion for summary judgment,
specifically that the City controlled the area where she fell and that the City should
not be found immune, were identical to American’s arguments in support of its
subsequent motion in limine. As such, this exception is not applicable.
The second exception requires a showing that the first ruling was
clearly erroneous and would result in manifest injustice. Ivy Hill, 310 A.3d at 758.
In the context of the City’s motion for summary judgment against Robinson’s
claims, both sides presented evidence-based arguments for and against the City’s
immunity or liability to Robinson. Judge Kennedy accepted the City’s position,
concluding that the evidence showed only that Robinson fell on an oily substance
“on” the tarmac and not because of a defect “of” the tarmac that would satisfy either
the “streets” or “real estate” exceptions to the City’s asserted immunity. Trial Ct.
Op., Sept. 16, 2024, at 7-8. Judge Kennedy also concluded that the City did not have
common law notice of the condition of the area where Robinson fell, which is part
of the “streets” exception to immunity but also an independent duty of care owed by
a landowner to business invitees based on Section 343 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. Id. at 9-10.
Even though Judge Kennedy’s December 2020 order, which was an
evidence-based adjudication, became the law of the case when neither Robinson nor
American sought to appeal it, Judge Carpenter concluded differently when presented
with the same issue and evidence in the context of American’s motion in limine
months later. Although Judge Carpenter believed American’s crossclaims against
the City were still viable, our review of the record indicates otherwise. American’s
crossclaims against the City were based solely on allegations of the City’s liability

27
in negligence to Robinson, which Judge Kennedy rejected in light of the City’s
immunity and lack of common law notice. Importantly, American did not raise any
contractual crossclaims against the City based on the lease between the two entities,
and by the time Judge Carpenter considered American’s motion in limine, the City
had been dismissed on the basis of Judge Kennedy’s order and was not actively
pursuing its contractual crossclaims against American based on the lease, which
would have determined which entity had control over the area where Robinson fell.
See R.R. at 74a-76a.
Even if Judge Carpenter may have disagreed with Judge Kennedy’s
determination regarding the nature of the area where Robinson fell, she did not state
that it constituted clear error. Moreover, Judge Carpenter did not address Judge
Kennedy’s determination that the City had no common law notice of the area’s
condition, which constituted an independent basis for dismissing the City from this
litigation. These conclusions by Judge Kennedy were evidence-based adjudications
that became the law of the case when neither Robinson nor American sought to
appeal his order. Because this case presents no basis for a finding that the City was
liable in tort to Robinson, the City cannot be kept in this litigation for the purposes
of contribution, indemnity, or apportionment of fault, as discussed above.
The only reason the City could still be considered a party when this
matter came before Judge Carpenter on American’s motion in limine was because
of Judge Kennedy’s January 2021 order denying the City’s motion for summary
judgment against American’s crossclaims. As stated, that order was inconsistent
with Judge Kennedy’s December 2020 order dismissing all claims and crossclaims
against the City; it was also unsupported because American raised no contractual
crossclaims against the City based on their lease. This apparent discrepancy is a far

28
cry, however, from supporting a conclusion that Judge Kennedy’s order was clearly
erroneous.
This case is analogous to Goldey, where the circumstances were like
“every case where summary judgment has once been denied and a second judge has
a different view. In effect, the defendant has happened upon a judge for trial who
agrees with the analysis that the first judge did not accept.” 675 A.2d at 267. In its
reply to American’s motion in limine, the City correctly described American’s
efforts here as little more than thinly veiled attempts to get a second bite at the
proverbial apple. R.R. at 1519a-28a.
Judge Carpenter’s explanation that the issue before her was not the
same as that before Judge Kennedy because she was deciding “which parties were
necessary for appearance and trial and which parties could be on the verdict sheet”
is unavailing. It suggests that Judge Kennedy erred in determining that the City bore
no liability at all to Robinson, but Judge Carpenter stated only that she “was not
persuaded” of the City’s asserted immunity because she concluded that the evidence
suggested otherwise. See Trial Ct. Op., Feb. 23, 2023, at 3-4. Accordingly, the
record establishes only that Judge Carpenter came to a different conclusion on that
issue when presented with the same facts and arguments as Judge Kennedy. It does
not establish that Judge Kennedy’s grant of summary judgment to the City was
clearly erroneous on the issue of the nature of the area where Robinson fell, which
might have subjected the City to liability at trial. Moreover, Judge Carpenter did not
even address Judge Kennedy’s determination on common law notice, which was an
independent basis for the City’s non-liability at trial as well as a bar of its inclusion
on the verdict sheet, as discussed above in “A.”

29
Even if Judge Kennedy’s December 2020 order amounted to clear error,
the exception to the coordinate jurisdiction rule also requires a manifest injustice.
Ivy Hill, 310 A.3d at 754. American’s argument to Judge Carpenter in support of its
motion in limine posited that having to go to trial without the City as a co-defendant
or even just listed on the verdict sheet would constitute a manifest injustice. R.R. at
1461a. However, this Court held in Bates that an alleged “waste of resources”
incurred by a party (or, by extension, the courts) in going to trial when an
unfavorable outcome would likely be overturned on appeal was insufficient to create
a manifest injustice. 150 A.3d at 131.
Here, the result of letting Judge Kennedy’s order stand would be that
American must go to trial and make its own case that it is not liable to Robinson; as
noted above, it may argue that it did not control the area where Robinson fell, but it
may not assert that the City is liable. We recognize that if American loses, it may
ultimately see the verdict overturned on appeal. In light of our precedent, however,
this does not establish a manifest injustice, and the clearly erroneous/manifest
injustice exception to the coordinate jurisdiction rule does not apply here.

IV. Conclusion
American, which had a stake in the City’s motion for summary
judgment concerning Robinson’s claims, failed to oppose the motion or seek to
appeal Judge Kennedy’s December 2020 order granting the motion and dismissing
the City from this litigation. Accordingly, American could not pursue the City at
trial or have the City on the verdict sheet; that said, American may appeal after trial,
depending on the outcome. We hold that Judge Carpenter’s January 6, 2022, order
granting American’s motion in limine and effectively restoring the City to this

30
litigation for trial purposes violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule. As such, Judge
Carpenter’s order is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings in
accordance with this Opinion, including for issuance of an order directing the City
of Philadelphia to formally withdraw its crossclaims against American.

__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

Judge Dumas did not participate in the decision in this case.

31
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tasha Robinson :
:
v. :
:
Philadelphia International Airport, :
City of Philadelphia, Menzies Aviation, :
John Menzies, PLC, Menzies Aviation :
Group (USA), Inc., Aircraft Service :
International, Inc., PSA Airlines, :
and American Airlines Terminal F :
: No. 263 C.D. 2022
Appeal of: City of Philadelphia :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 9th day of June, 2025, the January 6, 2022, order of
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is REVERSED. This case is
REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with the foregoing Opinion,
including for issuance of an order directing the City of Philadelphia to formally
withdraw its crossclaims against American Airlines Terminal F.
Jurisdiction is relinquished.

__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11067613. Public record. Not legal advice.