# Mavins v. Sanchez

> District Court, E.D. New York · June 6, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11067381

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** June 6, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11067381

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “[e]ven after Twombly,” courts “remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”
- noting that “[e]ven after Twombly,” courts “remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”
- noting that “[e]ven after Twombly,” courts “remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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BETTY M. MAVINS,

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM
v. AND ORDER
24-CV-08124-SJB-ST

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, et al.,

Defendants.
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BULSARA, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is the Amended Complaint filed pro se by Betty M. Mavins
(“Mavins”) and her renewed motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Am. Compl.
dated Dec. 30, 2024 (“Am. Compl.”), Dkt. No. 8; Mot. to Proceed IFP dated Dec. 9, 2024
(“IFP Mot.”), Dkt. No. 7). The Court finds that the financial information reported by
Mavins now qualifies her to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fee.
Accordingly, the renewed IFP motion is granted.
However, the Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Mavins is granted 30 days—until July 7, 2025—to file an
amended complaint.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mavins commenced this action on November 7, 2024, and named two
individuals as defendants, Jamaris Sanchez (“Sanchez”) and “Charlene.”1 (Compl.

1 Sanchez is alleged to be a “letter carrier” and Charlene a supervisor at the
Hempstead Post Office located in Hempstead, New York. (Compl. at 2).
dated Nov. 7, 2024 (“Compl.”), Dkt. No. 1 at 2). By Order dated November 26, 2024,
District Judge Joan M. Azrack denied her motion to proceed IFP without prejudice and
with leave to renew. (See Order dated Nov. 26, 2024, Dkt. No. 4; Appl. to Proceed IFP

dated Nov. 7, 2024, Dkt. No. 2). On December 9, 2024, Mavins filed a renewed IFP
motion, and on December 30, 2024, an Amended Complaint. (IFP Mot.; Am. Compl.).
On January 17, 2025, this case was reassigned to the undersigned.
The Amended Complaint names as defendants Sanchez and Charlene, and also
adds the United States Postal Service (“USPS” and collectively, “Defendants”). (See
Am. Compl. at 1). Mavins alleges that for the past two years, Sanchez and Charlene

have engaged in mail theft and delivery delay tactics, including stealing a birthday card
with cash, delaying her mail by several months, and stopping her first class mail
entirely—including mail from her bank, landlord, and Medicaid/Medicare. (Id. ¶¶ 2–4,
and at 3–4). Mavins alleges that as a result, she has suffered financial harm, fines for
delayed utility payments, and physical effects such as hypertension. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 4).
Mavins seeks $5,000,000. (Id. at 1).
DISCUSSION

A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The determination of whether a party
has alleged a plausible claim is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
A pro se plaintiff’s pleadings are held “to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72

(2d Cir. 2009) (noting that “[e]ven after Twombly,” courts “remain obligated to construe
a pro se complaint liberally”). “Where, as here, the complaint was filed pro se, it must be
construed liberally with ‘special solicitude’ and interpreted to raise the strongest claims
that it suggests.” Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Hill v.
Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011)); Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 491 (2d
Cir. 2007) (“We liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants . . .

‘to raise the strongest arguments they suggest’” (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787,
790 (2d Cir. 1994)). “This is particularly so when the pro se plaintiff alleges that [his]
civil rights have been violated.”  Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d
Cir. 2008).
“Before deciding any case on the merits, a district court must determine that it
has subject matter jurisdiction over the matter,” Humphrey v. Syracuse Police Dep’t, 758 F.
App’x 205, 205–06 (2d Cir. 2019), including cases brought by IFP complainants. E.g.,

Chestnut v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11-CV-5369, 2012 WL 1657362 at *2, *5 (E.D.N.Y.
May 7, 2012) (dismissing claims under IFP Statute where court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction). Thus, “[n]otwithstanding the liberal pleading standard afforded pro se
litigants, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may not preside over cases
if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.” Id. at *3 (citing Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co. v.
Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700–01 (2d Cir. 2000)). “[F]ailure of subject matter jurisdiction . . .
may be raised . . . by the court sua sponte.” Lyndonville, 211 F.3d at 700. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Relatedly, it is well established that “[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity bars
federal courts from hearing all suits for monetary damages against the federal
government, including federal agencies . . . unless sovereign immunity has been
waived.” Humphrey v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 22-CV-1052, 2022 WL 17728194, at *1
(2d Cir. Dec. 16, 2022) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)). The
doctrine is jurisdictional, and where present, the Court must dismiss the claim barred

by sovereign immunity pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See Wake v. United States, 89 F.3d 53,
57 (2d Cir. 1996).
Suits against the USPS and its employees are barred by sovereign immunity,
unless an exception applies. See Dolan v. USPS, 546 U.S. 481, 484 (2006). The well-
known exception is the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–
2680, which provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity for injuries arising from the
tortious conduct of federal officers or agents “acting within the scope of his office or

employment[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). But there are exceptions to the exception, and as
relevant here, the “postal matter exception” restores immunity for “[a]ny claim arising
out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.” 28
U.S.C. § 2680(b); Raila v. United States, 355 F.3d 118, 119 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Dolan, 546
U.S. at 489 (construing “postal matter exception” as encompassing “injuries arising,
directly or consequentially, because mail either fails to arrive at all or arrives late, in
damaged condition, or at the wrong address”).
The Second Circuit has held that the postal matter exception “was not aimed to

encompass intentional acts.” Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 328 (2d Cir. 1978).
Mavins alleges that the interference with her mail and other conduct directed towards
her by postal employees was intentional. (Am. Compl. at 4 (“Jamaris has opened my
[mail] . . . . Her goal was to get my lights turned off[.]”)). The Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari to address this very question. USPS v. Konan, No. 24-CV-351, 2025
WL 1151223, at *1 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2025); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Konan, 2024 WL

436081 (Sept. 27, 2024) (“The question presented is . . . [w]hether a plaintiff’s claim that
she and her tenants did not receive mail because Postal Service employees intentionally
did not deliver it to a designated address arises out of ‘the loss’ or ‘miscarriage’ of
letters or postal matter.”).
But even construing Mavins’s allegations as falling outside of the “postal service
exception” to the statute’s waiver of immunity, her FTCA claim still must be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The FTCA requires that a plaintiff present a

notice of claim “to the appropriate Federal agency[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). If the agency
fails to make a final decision on the claim within six months after filing, the claimant
may bring an action in federal court. Id. Where a plaintiff fails “to exhaust their
administrative remedies as mandated by the FTCA, the district court lack[s] subject
matter jurisdiction to entertain their tort claims against the United States.” Romulus v.
United States, 160 F.3d 131, 132 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Collins v. United States, 996 F.3d
102, 109 (2d. Cir. 2021) (holding that a FTCA claim must be presented to the USPS
before federal subject matter jurisdiction attaches). Because Mavins’s Amended
Complaint fails to allege that she filed a notice of claim and pursued administrative

remedies first, this Court must dismiss her case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Mavins’s Amended Complaint was filed as of right, because no summons had
yet issued and so the filing falls within the parameters of Rule 15. Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1)(A)(2). A pro se plaintiff should ordinarily be given the opportunity “to amend
at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid
claim might be stated.” Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009)

(quotations omitted). Because Mavins filed her Amended Complaint before being
apprised of the deficiencies, she should have at least one opportunity to demonstrate
that she presented a notice of claim. The Court therefore grants Mavins leave to file a
second amended complaint to allege facts establishing subject matter jurisdiction.
Mavins is also encouraged to call the Pro Se Legal Assistance Clinic at 631-297-2575 to
discuss with an attorney this opinion and the need to present her claim to the
appropriate federal agency before commencing a lawsuit in her federal court.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mavins’s IFP motion is granted, but the
Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Mavins has until Monday, July 7,
2025 to file a second amended complaint that alleges that she presented her claim to the
appropriate federal agency. Should she fail to file a complaint by July 7, 2025, the Clerk
of Court will be directed to close this case.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 19l5(a)(3) that any appeal would not
be taken in good faith. Therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of
any appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this Order to Mavins at her
address of record and note such mailing on the docket.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Sanket J. Bulsara
SANKET J. BULSARA
United States District Judge

Date: June 6, 2025
Central Islip, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11067381. Public record. Not legal advice.