# Micolta-Sinisterra v. United States

> District Court, M.D. Florida · June 6, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11067166

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** June 6, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11067166

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that petitioners must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

SILVIO SEGUNDO MICOLTA-SINISTERRA,

v. Case No. 8:13-cr-609-VMC-CPT
8:22-cv-1630-VMC-CPT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

_______________________________/
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Silvio Segundo
Micolta-Sinisterra’s pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion to Vacate,
Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Civ. Doc. # 1; Crim. Doc. #
295), filed on July 11, 2022. The United States of America
responded on July 14, 2023. (Civ. Doc. # 8). Mr. Micolta-
Sinisterra replied on August 13, 2023. (Civ. Doc. # 12). For
the reasons that follow, the Motion is denied.
I. Background
On December 18, 2013, a grand jury indicted Mr. Micolta-
Sinisterra on two counts: conspiracy to distribute five
kilograms or more of cocaine, knowing and intending that such
substance would be unlawfully imported into the United States
(Count One); and conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on board
a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
(Count Two). (Crim. Doc. # 1). On January 2, 2019, Mr.
Micolta-Sinisterra pled guilty to Count Two of the
indictment. (Crim. Doc. # 158).
At the change of plea hearing, Magistrate Judge
Christopher P. Tuite asked Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra, who was
under oath, a number of questions regarding his guilty plea.
Judge Tuite first assured that Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra had

sufficient education to read the documents in his case and
was not under the influence of any intoxicating substances.
(Crim. Doc. # 275 at 6:3-7:13). He next confirmed that Mr.
Micolta-Sinisterra had reviewed the charges, the evidence,
and his option to go to trial with his attorney, Ms. Angela
B. Wright. (Id. at 8:8-9:21). He asked Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra
if he was “fully satisfied with the advice and representation”
of Ms. Wright, to which he responded “[y]es, Your Honor.”
(Id. at 8:21-8:24). He also confirmed that he had read each
page of the plea agreement and discussed the terms with Ms.
Wright. (Id. at 9:17). Judge Tuite next read the most

significant terms of the plea agreement with the government
and ensured that Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra understood those
terms. (Id. at 10-16).
Judge Tuite next asked Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra whether he
had been “threatened,” “coerced,” or “forced” to plead
guilty, to which he responded “[n]o one at all, Your Honor.”
(Id. at 17:15). Judge Tuite asked him if he was “pleading
guilty freely and voluntarily?” (Id. at 17:16-17:17). Mr.
Micolta-Sinisterra responded “[y]es, Your Honor.” (Id. at
17:18). Judge Tuite also confirmed that Mr. Micolta-
Sinisterra understood that his sentence contained a mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment of fifteen years. (Id. at 18-

19).
The factual basis in the plea agreement included several
relevant facts. “From approximately 2006 until December 2013,
the defendant was part of a Colombia-based cocaine
transportation organization that transported cocaine by self-
propelled semi-submersible (SPSS) vessels and go-fast vessels
(GFVs) through the international waters of the Pacific Ocean,
from Colombia to Central America and Mexico.” (Crim. Doc. #
158 at 20). “During the course of the charged conspiracy, two
SPSSs belonging to this cocaine transportation organization
were interdicted by the United States Coast Guard (USCG).”

(Id.). The interdictions involved 2,300 and 1,572 kilograms
of cocaine, respectively. (Id. at 20-21). For the first
interdiction, which occurred in 2008, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra
“installed the engine on this SPSS. [He] was present when
this SPSS launched.” (Id.). For the second interdiction,
which occurred in 2010, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra “was present
when this SPSS launched and instructed a crewmember and the
onboard mechanic on how to properly handle the SPSS’s motor.”
(Id.). In a post-Miranda interview, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra
“admitted to installing engines on SPSSs for [a leader of the
organization] from 2007 until 2010, knowing the SPSSs were
going to be transporting multi-ton quantities of cocaine.”

(Id. at 21-22). Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra was extradited from
Colombia to the Middle District of Florida on April 27, 2017.
(Id.).
On January 2, 2019, Judge Tuite entered his Report and
Recommendation, recommending that the plea agreement and plea
of guilty be accepted. (Crim. Doc. # 163). Neither party filed
any objections. This Court accepted the guilty plea. (Crim.
Doc. # 248).
Prior to sentencing, a Presentence Report (“PSR”) was
prepared. (Crim. Doc. # 173). The PSR scored Mr. Micolta-
Sinisterra’s offense level as follows: his base offense level

was 38; a two-level enhancement was added because a semi-
submersible vessel was used; a two-level enhancement was
added because the defendant’s role in the offense involved a
special skill – diesel mechanics – and he taught crews how to
operate the vessels; and a three-level reduction was factored
in for acceptance of responsibility. (Id. at 9). As a result,
his total offense level was 39. (Id.). The PSR then identified
that Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra had a prior conviction from 1999
for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute
on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States. (Id. at 10-11). Thus, his criminal history category
was III. (Id.).

On March 18, 2019, this Court held the sentencing
hearing. (Crim. Doc. # 191). There are a few events from the
hearing worth noting. The Court considered the sentence
pronounced for Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra’s co-defendant, Damaso
Vente-Bonilla, noting that Mr. Micolta-Sinsterra “deserved a
more significant sentence [than Mr. Vente-Bonilla] because of
his prior offenses.” (Crim. Doc. # 273 at 30-33). In further
comparing the sentences, the Court noted that Mr. Vente-
Bonilla was not involved in the 2010 interdiction, while Mr.
Micolta-Sinisterra was involved in the 2010 interdiction.
(Id. at 32). The probation officer explained that “[i]n this

case, we used the 2009 manual which has the enhancement for
the SPSS and that was because of the [vessel] that was
[interdicted] in 2010.” (Id.). Thus, the Court found that the
two-level enhancement for the use of a semi-submersible
vessel should apply to Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra’s sentence
because that enhancement was added by the 2009 guidelines.
(Id.).
During sentencing, Ms. Wright objected on Mr. Micolta-
Sinisterra’s behalf to the enhancements for his role in the
offense and the use of the semi-submersible vessel, as well
as for the failure to credit him with a minor role reduction.
(Id. at 6). The Court overruled each objection. (Id. at 14).

Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra’s guidelines range was 324 to 405
months, but the Court varied downward to 240 months’
imprisonment. (Id. at 34-35).
Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra filed his notice of appeal on
August 12, 2020. (Crim. Doc. # 283). His appointed counsel
found that the appeal was without merit and filed an Anders
brief. (Crim. Doc. # 287). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed:
“Because independent examination of the entire record reveals
no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is
GRANTED, and Micolta-Sinisterra-Sinisterra’s conviction and
sentence are AFFIRMED.” (Id.).

Now, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra seeks to vacate his
conviction, citing numerous claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. (Civ. Doc. # 1; Crim. Doc. # 295). The government
responded in opposition (Civ. Doc. # 8), and Mr. Micolta-
Sinisterra filed a reply. (Civ. Doc. # 12). The Motion is
ripe for review.
II. Legal Standard
Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra bears the burden of proving that
he is entitled to relief under Section 2255. See LeCroy v.
United States, 739 F.3d 1297, 1321 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[O]n a
§ 2255 petition, [the burden of proof] belongs to the

petitioner.”).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a petitioner must show that (1) his counsel’s
performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). To establish deficient performance, Mr.
Micolta-Sinisterra must demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence “that particular and identified acts or omissions of
counsel were outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d
1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). In other words, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra
must show that “no competent counsel would have taken the
action that [his] counsel did take.” Id. at 1315. In deciding
whether an attorney’s performance was deficient, courts are
“highly deferential” and “indulge [the] strong presumption
that counsel’s performance was reasonable and that counsel
made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment.” Id. at 1314 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
To satisfy Strickland’s second prong — prejudice — Mr.
Micolta-Sinisterra must show that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id. “To establish prejudice in the context of a
guilty plea, [Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra] must show that there is
a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors,’ he would not have entered a guilty
plea and would have insisted on going to trial.” Solomon v.
United States, No. 1:10-cr-376-RWS-CCH, 2012 WL 1900138, at
*2 (N.D. Ga. May 2, 2012) (citation omitted), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:10-cr-0376-RWS, 2012 WL 1900136

(N.D. Ga. May 24, 2012). “[I]f a claim fails to satisfy the
prejudice component, the Court need not make a ruling on the
performance component.” Ortiz v. United States, No 8:15-cr-
409-VMC-JSS, 2017 WL 6021645, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2017).
“[C]ounsel need not always investigate before pursuing
or not pursuing a line of defense. Investigation (even a
nonexhaustive, preliminary investigation) is not required for
counsel reasonably to decline to investigate a line of defense
thoroughly.” Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1060 (11th
Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). “The decision whether to
present a line of defense, or even to investigate it, is a

matter of strategy and is not ineffective unless the
petitioner can prove that the chosen course, in itself, was
unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted);
see also Stephens v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1331
(N.D. Ga. 1998) (“A decision not to investigate a potential
defense, like other litigation decisions, need only be
reasonable to fall within the range of professionally
competent assistance.” (citation omitted)).
Additionally, “[i]n cases where the files and records
make manifest the lack of merit of a Section 2255 claim, the
trial court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.”

United States v. Lagrone, 727 F.2d 1037, 1038 (11th Cir.
1984).
III. Analysis
Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra raises three ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. (Civ. Doc. # 2). First, he
claims counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
validity of the indictment because his conduct was entirely
extraterritorial, and this statute cannot apply
extraterritorially (Ground One). (Id. at 6-18). Second, he
argues that his plea was procedurally invalid because there
was insufficient evidence to support the factual basis for
his plea, which he did not understand at the time due to his

counsel’s ineffective advice (Ground Two). (Id. at 19-25).
Third, he argues that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance at sentencing (Ground Three). (Id. at 26-33). The
Court evaluates each Ground in turn.
A. Ground One
Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra argues first that counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise a challenge that the statutes
which he violated - 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a), 70506(a) and (b) –
cannot be applied extraterritorially. (Id. at 6-11). This
argument is contradicted by the statutory language. Section
70503(a)(1) makes it a crime to “manufacture or distribute,

or possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a
controlled substance,” and Section 70503(b) clarifies that
“[s]ubsection (a) applies even though the act is committed
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”
See United States v. Sinisterra, No. 23-13640, 2025 WL
1157239, at *2 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2025) (“The MDLEA applies
even though the act is committed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.” (internal citations and
quotations omitted)). Because the argument that the statute
cannot apply extraterritorially is foreclosed by both the
statutory language and precedent, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra’s
counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this

meritless argument. See Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1520
(11th Cir. 1990) (“Counsel cannot be labeled ineffective for
failing to raise issues which have no merit.”).
Relatedly, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra next argues that his
counsel should have argued that the Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the crime because it did not occur
within the United States. (Civ. Doc. # 2 at 11-18). But this
argument is also without merit. At the change of plea hearing,
Judge Tuite sought clarification on what renders the two
vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(Crim. Doc. # 275 at 2:23-24). The prosecutor responded that

the vessels are “stateless” because “[t]here either was no
claim of registry by the - by any of the crewmembers or, if
there was, that was refuted by the country they designated.”
(Id. at 3:1-6). The factual basis in the plea agreement
explained that the trafficking organization’s scheme was to
transport cocaine “through the international waters of the
Pacific Ocean,” and that “two SPSSs belonging to this cocaine
transportation organization were interdicted by the [USCG] in
international waters of the Eastern Pacific Ocean.” (Crim
Doc. # 158 at 20). When these facts were presented at the
change of plea hearing and Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra was asked
if he disagreed with any of these facts, he responded that he

disagreed with “none” of the facts. (Crim. Doc. # 275 at
28:1).
These facts — to which Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra agreed
under oath — are sufficient to establish subject matter
jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit has “long upheld the
authority of Congress to extend the criminal jurisdiction of
this country to any stateless vessel in international waters
engaged in the distribution of controlled substances.” United
States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 810 (11th Cir. 2014)
(internal quotations omitted); see also United States v.
Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 826 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[W]e have

always upheld extraterritorial convictions under our drug
trafficking laws as an exercise of power under the Felonies
Clause” (internal quotations omitted)), cert. denied, No. 24-
6177, 2025 WL 1426696 (May 19, 2025). Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra
admitted to participating in a conspiracy involving the
trafficking of cocaine in stateless vessels that were
interdicted on international waters. See (Crim. Doc. # 275 at
2:23-3:6; 28:1); see also United States v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d
1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Parties may . . . stipulate
to facts that bear on our jurisdictional inquiry.” (internal
quotations omitted)). Accordingly, the Court had subject
matter jurisdiction over the charged conduct, and any

argument otherwise would have been meritless. Thus, Mr.
Micolta-Sinisterra’s counsel was not ineffective for failing
to raise this argument. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694
(holding that petitioners must show that “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different”); see also Card, 911 F.2d at 1520 (“Counsel cannot
be labeled ineffective for failing to raise issues which have
no merit.”).
The Motion is denied as to this Ground.
B. Ground Two

Next, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra claims that his plea was
involuntary because his counsel failed to advise him that the
government lacked sufficient evidence to support the alleged
conspiracy. (Civ. Doc. # 2 at 19-25). Specifically, he asserts
that “[t]he factual basis failed to establish the existence
of any agreement between him and another person, which was a
necessary element of conspiracy.” (Id. at 23). But, as stated
in the plea agreement, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra admitted in his
post-Miranda interview to “installing engines on SPSSs for [a
leader of the drug trafficking organization] from 2007 until
2010, knowing the SPSSs were going to be transporting multi-
ton quantities of cocaine.” (Crim. Doc. # 158 at 21-22). He

also admitted to instructing crewmembers on how to handle the
vessels’ motors. (Crim. Doc. # 275 at 27).
To obtain a conviction, the government needed to “prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy existed, that
the defendant knew about it and that he voluntarily agreed to
join it.” United States v. Chandler, 388 F.3d 796, 806 (11th
Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). The factual basis for Mr.
Micolta-Sinisterra’s plea included the existence of the drug
trafficking conspiracy, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra’s knowledge of
the conspiracy, and his admission that he joined it
voluntarily. (Crim. Doc. # 158 at 21-22). Therefore, Mr.

Micolta-Sinisterra’s plea to the conspiracy charge contained
a sufficient factual basis, and he did not suffer any
prejudice because of counsel’s alleged failure to advise him
of this meritless argument. See United States v. Winfield,
960 F.2d 970, 974 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[A] lawyer’s failure to
preserve a meritless issue plainly cannot prejudice a
client.”). Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra has not shown that he would
have proceeded to trial in the face of overwhelming evidence
if his counsel had raised doubts about the sufficiency of the
plea agreement’s factual basis. See Solomon, 2012 WL 1900138,
at *2 (requiring plaintiffs claiming ineffective assistance
of counsel in the plea process to demonstrate prejudice by

“show[ing] that there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors,’ he would not have
entered a guilty plea and would have insisted on going to
trial”). This ineffective assistance of counsel argument
fails. See Ortiz, 2017 WL 6021645, at *2 (“[I]f a claim fails
to satisfy the prejudice component, the Court need not make
a ruling on the performance component.”).
Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra also argues that his counsel
failed to advise him that the statute of limitations had
passed. (Civ. Doc. # 2 at 21-22). However, the statute of
limitations had not passed. The statute of limitations was

five years. 18 U.S.C. § 3282. The two vessels were interdicted
on December 31, 2008, and May 2, 2010. (Crim. Doc. # 173 at
7-8). Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra was indicted on December 18,
2013. (Crim. Doc. # 1). Thus, the indictment was filed within
five years of each interdiction. Accordingly, Mr. Micolta-
Sinisterra’s prosecution was not barred by the statute of
limitations, and it would have been fruitless for his counsel
to argue as such. This argument fails to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Winfield, 960 F.2d at 974 (“[A]
lawyer’s failure to preserve a meritless issue plainly cannot
prejudice a client.”).
The Motion is denied as to Ground Two.

C. Ground Three
Finally, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra argues that his counsel
provided ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.
(Civ. Doc. # 2 at 26-33). Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra raises three
supposed errors of his counsel, which the Court analyzes in
turn.
i. Mandatory Minimum
Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra argues that his counsel should
have argued that he was eligible for the statutory safety-
valve, such that the mandatory minimum did not apply. (Id. at
26-29). But he was ineligible for the statutory safety-valve.

He had a prior conviction from 1999 for conspiracy to possess
cocaine with intent to distribute on board a vessel subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States, which is a three-
point offense. (Crim. Doc. # 173 at 10-11). As Mr. Micolta-
Sinisterra has a prior three-point offense, he is ineligible
for safety-valve relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)(B). Thus, Mr.
Micolta-Sinisterra cannot establish any prejudice from his
counsel’s failure to raise a meritless argument. See
Winfield, 960 F.2d at 974 (“[A] lawyer’s failure to preserve
a meritless issue plainly cannot prejudice a client.”).
ii. Sentencing enhancements
Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra argues that no sentencing

enhancements should have applied to his sentence so his
counsel was ineffective for not objecting to each
enhancement. (Civ. Doc. # 2 at 29-30). A two-level enhancement
was added because a semi-submersible vessel was used, and a
two-level enhancement was added because the defendant’s role
in the offense involved a special skill – diesel mechanics –
and he taught crews how to operate the vessels. (Crim. Doc.
# 173 at 9). Notably, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra’s counsel
objected to each enhancement at sentencing, so she was not
ineffective. (Crim. Doc. # 191 at 6). Even if Mr. Micolta-
Sinisterra had adequately identified a specific argument that

his counsel failed to raise, he still could not establish
prejudice because both enhancements were properly applied.
First, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra admitted to being “part of
a Colombia-based cocaine transportation organization that
transported cocaine by . . . semi-submersible . . . vessels.”
(Crim. Doc. # 158 at 20). Thus, the two-level enhancement for
semi-submersible vessel use was properly applied. See USSG
§2D1.1(b)(3)(B) (directing courts to apply two-level
enhancement “[i]f the defendant unlawfully imported or
exported a controlled substance under circumstances in which
. . . a submersible vessel or semi-submersible vessel . . .
was used”).

Second, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra admitted to installing
engines on each interdicted vessel and instructing
crewmembers on using the vessels. (Crim. Doc. # 158 at 21).
The PSR also noted that he had “studied diesel mechanics for
six years” and “had training in hydraulics.” (Crim. Doc. #
173 at 9). Therefore, the two-level enhancement for use of a
special skill was properly applied. See USSG §3B1.3
(directing courts to apply two-level enhancement when the
defendant “used a special skill, in a manner that
significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of
the offense”); see also United States v. Mateu, No. 24-10500,

2024 WL 4707423, at *1 (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2024) (“If an
‘average person off the street’ does not possess the skill,
then the skill is considered special for purposes of applying
the enhancement.”). Having failed to establish both deficient
performance and prejudice, the Court finds that this argument
fails. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
iii. Reference to 2009 Sentencing Guidelines
Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra argues that his counsel erred by
failing to object to the Court’s reference to the 2009
sentencing guidelines in calculating his sentence. (Civ. Doc.
# 2 at 31-33). But Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra misconstrues the

Court’s limited reference to the 2009 sentencing guidelines
at his sentencing hearing. The Court did not calculate his
sentence based off the 2009 guidelines as Mr. Micolta-
Sinisterra asserts. (Id.).
Rather, the Court noted that it could apply the
enhancement for the usage of a semi-submersible vessel
because the enhancement was first added by the 2009 guidelines
and the second interdiction occurred in 2010. (Crim. Doc. #
273 at 32). Thus, the Court assured that applying the
enhancement would not violate the ex post facto clause of the
Constitution. See U.S.S.G. 1B1.11(b)(1) (“If the court

determines that use of the Guidelines Manual in effect on the
date that the defendant is sentenced would violate the ex
post facto clause of the United States Constitution, the
court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date
that the offense of conviction was committed.” (emphasis in
original)). Therefore, Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra was not
prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to raise this meritless
argument. See Winfield, 960 F.2d at 974 (“[A] lawyer’s failure
to preserve a meritless issue plainly cannot prejudice a
client.”).
In short, the Motion is denied as to Ground Three.

IV. Evidentiary Hearing
As the Court has readily concluded that the Motion lacks
merit, the Court declines to hold an evidentiary hearing on
Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra’s Section 2255 Motion. See Lagrone,
727 F.2d at 1038 (holding that courts need not hold
evidentiary hearings in § 2255 actions when the lack of merit
is “manifest”).
V. Certificate of Appealability and Leave to Appeal In
Forma Pauperis Denied

The Court declines to issue a certificate of
appealability because Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra has failed to
make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor will the
Court authorize Mr. Micolta-Sinisterra to proceed on appeal
in forma pauperis because such an appeal would not be taken
in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). Mr. Micolta-
Sinisterra shall be required to pay the full amount of the
appellate filing fee pursuant to Section 1915(b) (1) and (2).
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Silvio Micolta-Sinisterra’s pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255
Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Civ.
Doc. # 1; Crim. Doc. # 295) is DENIED.
(2) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for the United
States of America and to close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 6th
day of June, 2025.

Eigen Maca ee
VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ*COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11067166. Public record. Not legal advice.