# Stokes v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · June 6, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11066957

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** June 6, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DARWIN L. STOKES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 24-cv-1242-RJD
)
)
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., )
et al. )
)
Defendants.

ORDER
DALY, Magistrate Judge:1
This matter is now before the Court on Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment on
the Issue of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (Docs. 35 & 41) and on Plaintiff’s Motion for
Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 51). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motions are
GRANTED and Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED as moot.
Background
Plaintiff Darwin L. Stokes, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections and currently incarcerated at Robinson Correctional Center, brought this action on
May 7, 2024, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional deprivations stemming from the
alleged denial of medical care at Robinson. (Doc. 1; Doc. 12, p. 1). After threshold review of the
Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed on the following claims:

1 This matter has been assigned to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings, including the trial and final entry of
judgment, through the parties’ consent pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. (Doc.
27).
Page 1 of 8
Count 1: HCU Administrator Martin and Warden Jennings denied or delayed
Plaintiff adequate medical care and pain relief for a fractured jaw, ruptured
cervical disc, and two broken teeth at Robinson, in violation of his rights
under the Eighth Amendment.

Count 2: Wexford’s policy requiring inmates to submit sick call requests for
treatment of the same issue 3 times before seeing a doctor (who was not
staffed at the prison) caused the denial or delay of Plaintiff’s treatment for
a fractured jaw, ruptured cervical disc, and two broken teeth and
unnecessarily prolonged his pain, in violation of his rights under the Eighth
Amendment.
(Doc. 12, p. 5).
Defendants filed their respective Motions for Summary Judgment on the Issue of
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. (Docs. 35 &41). Therein, they asserted that, as of May
7, 2024, the date this litigation began, Plaintiff had only submitted one relevant grievance for
review by the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”): Grievance #K42-0224-0451E, dated
February 15, 2024. They represented that the ARB received Plaintiff’s appeal of grievance #K42-
0224-0451E on April 15, 2024, and denied it on May 21, 2024, fourteen days after Plaintiff filed
the Complaint. Accordingly, they argued that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”)’s requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to initiating
a complaint.2
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies along with an Affidavit,
which the Court construes as a response to Defendants’ respective motions for summary judgment.
(Doc. 38). Plaintiff countered that he filed a grievance regarding the allegations of the Complaint
on February 15, 2024, which he submitted to all three levels of review in accordance with the

2 Defendants Martin and Jennings further argue that Grievance #K42-0224-0451E, dated February 15, 2024, did not
satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement because it did not sufficiently identify them. For the reasons set forth below,
the Court does not need to address this issue.

Page 2 of 8
IDOC policies. (Doc. 38, p. 1). Plaintiff further stated that he filed two additional relevant
grievances on July 27, 2024, and October 11, 2024, and submitted those grievances to the three
necessary levels of review but received no relief. (Doc. 38, pp. 2-3).
Pavey Hearing
An evidentiary hearing pursuant to Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008) was held

on June 5, 2025. (Doc. 53). The IDOC Defendants called as a witness the Administrative Review
Board (“ARB”) Chairperson, Paige Long. Long testified that she has been in this position since
February 2024. (Doc. 101-3). She explained that the IDOC provides for three levels of review of
an inmate’s grievance, with the ultimate one being an appeal to the ARB. Long was at all relevant
times the ARB chairperson assigned to review any appeals from Plaintiff at the third level of
review. Long further testified that the ARB maintains the IGRV system, which reflects all records
received by the ARB. Long testified that based on her review of the relevant record, the only
grievance Plaintiff appealed to the ARB between September 15, 2023, and May 7, 2024, was
Grievance #K42-0224-0451E, dated February 15, 2024. Long confirmed that the appeal was

received by the ARB on April 15, 2024, and was denied by the ARB on May 21, 2024.
Plaintiff also testified at the hearing. He confirmed that he was aware of the IDOC
grievance process, including procedures for filing an emergency grievance. He stated that he
believed he had fully exhausted Grievance #K42-0224-0451E, dated February 15, 2024, prior to
filing this Complaint. He did not have an independent recollection of the dates that he received
the response of the Grievance Officer, he sent his appeal to the ARB, and he received a response
from the latter. He did not dispute, however, the accuracy of the relevant dates reflected on the
Grievance Officer’s and ARB’s responses. The plaintiff also testified that he filed additional

Page 3 of 8
grievances after initiating this action because Defendants continued to deny him proper medical
and dental care.
Analysis
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also Ruffin-
Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving
party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the
adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Estate of
Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In

considering a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the light most
favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital,
Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). While courts
generally may not resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary judgment, when the motion
pertains to a prisoner’s exhaustion of administrative remedies, “the Seventh Circuit has instructed
courts to conduct an evidentiary hearing and resolve contested issues of fact regarding a prisoner’s
efforts to exhaust.” Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008); Roberts v. Neal, 745 F.
3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 2014).

Page 4 of 8
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), prisoners are required to exhaust available administrative
remedies prior to filing lawsuits in federal court. “[A] prisoner who does not properly take each
step within the administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies.” Pozo v. McCaughtry,
286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002). “[A] suit filed by a prisoner before administrative remedies

have been exhausted must be dismissed; the district court lacks discretion to resolve the claim on
the merits, even if the prisoner exhausts intra-prison remedies before judgment.” Perez v.
Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999). Further, while courts generally may
not resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary judgment, when the motion pertains to a
prisoner’s exhaustion of administrative remedies, “the Seventh Circuit has instructed courts to
conduct an evidentiary hearing and resolve contested issues of fact regarding a prisoner’s efforts
to exhaust.” Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008); Roberts v. Neal, 745 F. 3d 232,
236 (7th Cir. 2014).
An inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections must first submit a

written grievance within 60 days after the discovery of the incident, occurrence, or problem to his
or her institutional counselor unless certain discrete issues are being grieved. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 504.810(a). If the complaint is not resolved through a counselor, the grievance is considered by
a Grievance Officer who must render a written recommendation to the Chief Administrative
Officer (“CAO”) — usually the Warden — within two months of receipt, “when reasonably
feasible under the circumstances.” Id. §504.830(e). The CAO then advises the inmate of a
decision on the grievance. Id.

Page 5 of 8
An inmate may appeal the CAO’s decision in writing within 30 days to the Administrative
Review Board (“ARB”) for a final decision. Id. §_504.850(a); see also Dole v. Chandler, 438
F.3d 804, 806–07 (7th Cir. 2006). The ARB will submit a written report of its findings and
recommendations to the Director, who shall review the same and make a final determination within
six months of receipt of the appeal. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(d) and (e).

An inmate may request that a grievance be handled as an emergency by forwarding it
directly to the Chief Administrative Officer. Id. § 504.840. If it is determined that there exists a
substantial risk of imminent personal injury or other serious or irreparable harm, the grievance is
handled on an emergency basis, which allows for expedited processing of the grievance by
responding directly to the offender. Id. Processing of an appeal to an emergency grievance shall
also be expedited by the ARB. Id. § 504.850. Inmates may further submit certain types of
grievances directly to the ARB, including grievances related to protective custody, psychotropic
medication, and certain issues relating to facilities other than the inmate’s currently assigned
facility. Id. at § 504.870.

Here, Plaintiff pointed to three grievances that he alleged are relevant to the Complaint.
However, only one of the three grievances was filed prior to May 7, 2024, the day this action was
initiated. (Doc. 38, pp. 2-3). Accordingly, the grievances Plaintiff filed on July 27, 2024, and on
October 11, 2024, could not have satisfied the PLRA exhaustion requirement. Perez, 182 F.3d at
535 (“[A] suit filed by a prisoner before administrative remedies have been exhausted must be
dismissed; the district court lacks discretion to resolve the claim on the merits, even if the prisoner
exhausts intra-prison remedies before judgment.”).

Page 6 of 8
Turning to Grievance #K42-0224-0451E, dated February 15, 2024, Long’s testimony
sufficiently established that the ARB did not issue a response to Plaintiff’s appeal until May 21,
2024, fourteen days after Plaintiff filed the Complaint. (See also Doc. 41-4, p. 1). Because by
May 7, 2024, the day the Complaint was filed, the ARB had not issued a decision on Grievance
#K42-0224-0451E, Plaintiff did not comply with the PLRA exhaustion requirement.

Further, Plaintiff never argued that the administrative remedies were unavailable to him.
An administrative remedy will be deemed “‘unavailable’ if prison employees do not respond to a
properly filed grievance or otherwise use affirmative misconduct to prevent a prisoner from
exhausting.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809 (quoting Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th
Cir.2002). Review of the record shows that both the CAO and the ARB issued their respective
decisions at the second and third levels of review within the timeframes set forth in the Illinois
Administrative Code. Specifically, the CAO deemed #K42-0224-0451E, dated February 15, 2024,
an emergency on February 20, 2024, within five days of its filing. (Doc. 41-4, p. 4). On February
23, 2024, the Grievance Officer recommended that the grievance be denied because nothing in

Plaintiff’s record documented his alleged jaw and neck injuries at the time of his transfer to
Robinson. (Doc. 41-4, p. 3). The CAO concurred on March 15, 2024, which was well within the
two-month timeframe specified in the Illinois Administrative Code. (Doc. 41-4, p. 3). The ARB
received Plaintiff’s appeal on April 15, 2024, and promptly issued a response denying the
grievance on its merits on May 21, 2024, in accordance with the relevant regulations. In sum, the
grievance had been fully exhausted within three months of its filing. Further, because the ARB
denied the grievance on its merits, had Plaintiff waited two weeks to file his Complaint, he would
have likely satisfied the PLRA exhaustion requirement at least as to some of the Defendants. But

Page 7 of 8
Plaintiff did not do so. Because a “‘sue first, exhaust later’ approach is not acceptable, the case
must be dismissed as being filed prematurely. Chambers v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979, 984 (7th Cir.
2020). The Court clarifies that the dismissal is without prejudice, and Plaintiff may file a new suit
and pay a new filing fee after he has fully exhausted administrative remedies. Id; see also Gakuba
v. Pannier, No. 21-1961, 2022 WL 1768843, at *2 (7th Cir. June 1, 2022); Ford v. Johnson, 362

F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir. 2004) (“if the prisoner does exhaust, but files suit early, then dismissal of
the premature action may be followed by a new suit that unquestionably post-dates the
administrative decision”).
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment on the Issue
of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (Docs. 35 & 41) are GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Motion
for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 51) is DENIED as moot. This case is DISMISSED without
prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 6, 2025

s/ Reona J. Daly
Hon. Reona J. Daly
United States Magistrate Judge

Page 8 of 8

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11066957. Public record. Not legal advice.