# United States v. Rahimi

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 21, 2024 · 602 U.S. 680

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11066646

## Case

- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 21, 2024
- **Citations:** 602 U.S. 680
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** John G. Roberts
- **Cited by:** 93 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11066646

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that § 922(g)(8)(C)(i) satisfied the “how” component of Bruen because, like the surety laws, its temporary burdens were targeted at only those persons who had been judicially determined to present a threat to the safety of others
- holding that, in evaluating laws regulating firearm ownership and possession, we are to consider whether the “regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition”
- noting that Heller did not “establish[] a categorical rule that the Constitution prohibits regulations that forbid firearm possession in the home[,]” but rather “stated that many such prohibitions, like those on the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill,’ are …
- noting that history and tradition supported “laws banning the possession of guns by categories of persons thought by a legislature to present a special danger of misuse . . . only once a court has found that the defendant ‘represents a credible threat to the physical safety’ o…
- observing that the Superior Court “must follow the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal Constitution”

## Opinion text

PRELIMINARY PRINT

Volume 602 U. S. Part 1
Pages 680–778

OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF

THE SUPREME COURT
June 21, 2024

Page Proof Pending Publication

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions

NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
680 OCTOBER TERM, 2023

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fth circuit
No. 22–915. Argued November 7, 2023—Decided June 21, 2024
Respondent Zackey Rahimi was indicted under 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(8), a
federal statute that prohibits individuals subject to a domestic violence
restraining order from possessing a frearm. A prosecution under Sec-
tion 922(g)(8) may proceed only if the restraining order meets certain
statutory criteria. In particular, the order must either contain a fnd-
ing that the defendant “represents a credible threat to the physical
safety” of his intimate partner or his or his partner's child, § 922(g)
(8)(C)(i), or “by its terms explicitly prohibit[ ] the use,” attempted use,
or threatened use of “physical force” against those individuals, § 922(g)
(8)(C)(ii). Rahimi concedes here that the restraining order against him
satisfies the statutory criteria, but argues that on its face Section
922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment. The District Court denied
Rahimi's motion to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment
Page Proof Pending Publication
grounds. While Rahimi's case was on appeal, the Supreme Court
decided New York State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597
U. S. 1. In light of Bruen, the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding
that the Government had not shown that Section 922(g)(8) “fts within
our Nation's historical tradition of frearm regulation.” 61 F. 4th
443, 460.
Held: When an individual has been found by a court to pose a credible
threat to the physical safety of another, that individual may be tempo-
rarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment. Pp. 690–702.
(a) Since the founding, the Nation's frearm laws have included regu-
lations to stop individuals who threaten physical harm to others from
misusing frearms. As applied to the facts here, Section 922(g)(8) fts
within this tradition.
The right to keep and bear arms is among the “fundamental rights
necessary to our system of ordered liberty.” McDonald v. Chicago,
561 U. S. 742, 778. That right, however, “is not unlimited,” District
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 626. The reach of the Second
Amendment is not limited only to those arms that were in existence
at the founding. Id., at 582. Rather, it “extends, prima facie, to
all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were
not [yet] in existence.” Ibid. By that same logic, the Second Amend-
ment permits more than just regulations identical to those existing in
1791.
Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 681

Syllabus

Under our precedent, the appropriate analysis involves considering
whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that
underpin the Nation's regulatory tradition. Bruen, 597 U. S., at 26–31.
When frearm regulation is challenged under the Second Amendment,
the Government must show that the restriction “is consistent with
the Nation's historical tradition of frearm regulation.” Id., at 24. A
court must ascertain whether the new law is “relevantly similar” to
laws that our tradition is understood to permit, “apply[ing] faithfully
the balance struck by the founding generation to modern circum-
stances.” Id., at 29, and n. 7. Why and how the regulation burdens
the right are central to this inquiry. As Bruen explained, a challenged
regulation that does not precisely match its historical precursors “still
may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.” Id., at 30.
Pp. 690–692.
(b) Section 922(g)(8) survives Rahimi's challenge. Pp. 693–702.
(1) Rahimi's facial challenge to Section 922(g)(8) requires him to
“establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would
be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745. Here, Section
922(g)(8) is constitutional as applied to the facts of Rahimi's own case.
Rahimi has been found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physi-
cal safety of others, see § 922(g)(8)(C)(i), and the Government offers
Page Proof Pending Publication
ample evidence that the Second Amendment permits such individuals
to be disarmed. P. 693.
(2) The Court reviewed the history of American gun laws exten-
sively in Heller and Bruen. At common law people were barred from
misusing weapons to harm or menace others. Such conduct was often
addressed through ordinary criminal laws and civil actions, such as pro-
hibitions on fghting or private suits against individuals who threatened
others. By the 1700s and early 1800s, though, two distinct legal re-
gimes had developed that specifcally addressed frearms violence: the
surety laws and the “going armed” laws. Surety laws were a form of
“preventive justice,” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England 251 (10th ed. 1787), which authorized magistrates to require
individuals suspected of future misbehavior to post a bond. If an indi-
vidual failed to post a bond, he would be jailed. If the individual did
post a bond and then broke the peace, the bond would be forfeit.
Surety laws could be invoked to prevent all forms of violence, including
spousal abuse, and also targeted the misuse of frearms. These laws
often offered the accused signifcant procedural protections.
The “going armed” laws—a particular subset of the ancient common-
law prohibition on affrays, or fghting in public—provided a mechanism
for punishing those who had menaced others with frearms. Under
these laws, individuals were prohibited from “riding or going armed,
with dangerous or unusual weapons, [to] terrify[ ] the good people of the
682 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Syllabus

land.” Id., at 149. Those who did so faced forfeiture of their arms and
imprisonment. Prohibitions on going armed were incorporated into
American jurisprudence through the common law, and some States ex-
pressly codifed them. Pp. 693–698.
(3) Together, the surety and going armed laws confrm what com-
mon sense suggests: When an individual poses a clear threat of physical
violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed. Sec-
tion 922(g)(8) is not identical to these founding era regimes, but it does
not need to be. Like the surety and going armed laws, Section
922(g)(8)(C)(i) applies to individuals found by a court to threaten the
physical safety of another. This prohibition is “relevantly similar” to
those founding era regimes in both why and how it burdens the Second
Amendment right. 597 U. S., at 29. Section 922(g)(8) restricts gun use
to check demonstrated threats of physical violence, just as the surety
and going armed laws do. Unlike the regulation struck down in Bruen,
Section 922(g)(8) does not broadly restrict arms use by the public
generally.
The burden that Section 922(g)(8) imposes on the right to bear arms
also fts within the Nation's regulatory tradition. While the Court does
not suggest that the Second Amendment prohibits the enactment of
laws banning the possession of guns by categories of persons thought
Page Proof Pending Publication
by a legislature to present a special danger of misuse, see Heller, 554
U. S., at 626, Section 922(g)(8) applies only once a court has found that
the defendant “represents a credible threat to the physical safety” of
another, § 922(g)(8)(C)(i), which notably matches the similar judicial de-
terminations required in the surety and going armed laws. Moreover,
like surety bonds of limited duration, Section 922(g)(8) only prohibits
frearm possession so long as the defendant “is” subject to a restraining
order. Finally, the penalty—another relevant aspect of the burden—
also fts within the regulatory tradition. The going armed laws pro-
vided for imprisonment, and if imprisonment was permissible to respond
to the use of guns to threaten the physical safety of others, then the
lesser restriction of temporary disarmament that Section 922(g)(8) im-
poses is also permissible.
The Court's decisions in Heller and Bruen do not help Rahimi. While
Section 922(g)(8) bars individuals subject to restraining orders from pos-
sessing guns in the home, Heller never established a categorical rule
that the Constitution prohibits regulations that forbid frearm posses-
sion in the home. Indeed, Heller stated that many such prohibitions,
like those on the possession of frearms by “felons and the mentally ill,”
are “presumptively lawful.” 554 U. S., at 626, 627, n. 26. And
the Court's conclusion in Bruen that regulations like the surety laws
are not a proper historical analogue for a broad gun licensing regime
Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 683

Syllabus

does not mean that they cannot be an appropriate analogue for a narrow
one. Pp. 698–700.
(4) The Fifth Circuit erred in reading Bruen to require a “historical
twin” rather than a “historical analogue.” 597 U. S., at 30. The panel
also misapplied the Court's precedents when evaluating Rahimi's facial
challenge. Rather than consider the circumstances in which Section
922(g)(8) was most likely to be constitutional, the panel instead focused
on hypothetical scenarios where the provision might raise constitutional
concerns. Pp. 700–701.
(5) Finally, the Court rejects the Government's contention that
Rahimi may be disarmed simply because he is not “responsible.” The
Court used this term in Heller and Bruen to describe the class of citi-
zens who undoubtedly enjoy the Second Amendment right. Those deci-
sions, however, did not defne the term and said nothing about the status
of citizens who were not “responsible.” Pp. 701–702.
61 F. 4th 443, reversed and remanded.

Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Alito,
Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.,
joined. Sotomayor, J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Kagan, J.,
joined, post, p. 702. Gorsuch, J., post, p. 708, Kavanaugh, J., post, p. 714,
Page Proof Pending Publication
Barrett, J., post, p. 737, and Jackson, J., post, p. 740, fled concurring
opinions. Thomas, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 747.

Solici tor General Prelogar argued the cause for the
United States. With her on the briefs were Acting Assist-
ant Attorney General Argentieri, Deputy Solicitor General
Fletcher, Vivek Suri, and William A. Glaser.
J. Matthew Wright argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Jason D. Hawkins, Kevin Joel
Page, Rachel Taft, T. W. Brown, and Brandon E. Beck.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Illi-
nois et al. by Kwame Raoul, Attorney General of Illinois, Jane Elinor Notz,
Solicitor General, Alex Hemmer, Deputy Solicitor General, and Mitchell
J. Ness, Assistant Attorney General, by Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney Gen-
eral of the District of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General,
Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Alexan-
dra Lichtenstein, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys Gen-
eral and other offcials for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Kris
Mayes of Arizona, Rob Bonta of California, Philip J. Weiser of Colorado,
William Tong of Connecticut, Patrick J. Griffn, Chief State's Attorney
684 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Opinion of the Court

Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Court.
A federal statute prohibits an individual subject to a do-
mestic violence restraining order from possessing a frearm

of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Anne E. Lopez of Hawaii,
Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Andrea Joy
Campbell of Massachusetts, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of
Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Matthew J. Platkin of New Jersey,
Raúl Torrez of New Mexico, Letitia James of New York, Joshua H. Stein
of North Carolina, Edward E. Manibusan of the Northern Mariana Is-
lands, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Michelle A. Henry of Pennsylvania,
Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Charity R. Clark of Vermont, Robert
W. Ferguson of Washington, and Joshua L. Kaul of Wisconsin; for Califor-
nia Governor Gavin Newsom by James R. Sigel, David B. Sapp, and Brian
P. Goldman; for the City of New York et al. by Sylvia O. Hinds-Radix,
Richard Dearing, Claude S. Platton, Elina Druker, and Diana P. Cortes;
for AEquitas by Mary-Christine Sungaila; for the American Civil Liber-
ties Union Foundation by David D. Cole, Sandra S. Park, Ria Tabacco
Mar, Jennesa Calvo-Friedman, and Louise Melling; for the American
Page Proof Pending Publication
Medical Association et al. by Michael J. Dell and Marjorie E. Sheldon; for
Americans Against Gun Violence by Carly O. Alameda and Hilary C.
Krase; for the California Legislative Women's Caucus by Robin B. Jo-
hansen and Karen Getman; for the Center for Reproductive Rights by
Diana Kasdan and Michelle K. Moriarty; for the Citizens Crime Commis-
sion of New York City by Harry Sandick; for the DC Coalition Against
Domestic Violence et al. by Jason Stiehl, Lyndsay A. Gorton, and Micaela
Deming; for the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals
Project et al. by Michael Kim Krouse and Rosalyn Richter; for Educators
With Expertise in Domestic Violence Protective Orders et al. by Aaron
R. Marcu; for Everytown for Gun Safety by Alan Schoenfeld, Eric A.
Tirschwell, Janet Carter, and William J. Taylor, Jr.; for Former State
Chief Justices et al. by Adam M. Katz, Adam S. Gershenson, Kathleen R.
Hartnett, and Julie M. Veroff; for the Giffords Law Center To Prevent
Gun Violence by Scott A. Edelman, Lee R. Crain, Mark J. Cherry, Esther
Sanchez-Gomez, and Leigh Rome; for Global Action on Gun Violence et al.
by Jonathan K. Baum, Christopher A. Cole, and Jonathan Lowy; for Gun
Violence and Domestic Violence Prevention Groups et al. by Michael R.
Dreeben and Douglas N. Letter; for the Houston Area Women's Center by
Constance H. Pfeiffer; for Legal Aid Chicago et al. by Stephen R. McAllis-
ter; for the March For Our Lives Action Fund by Jonathan L. Diesenhaus;
for the National Indigenous Women's Resource Center et al. by Mary
Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 685

Opinion of the Court

if that order includes a fnding that he “represents a credible
threat to the physical safety of [an] intimate partner,” or a
child of the partner or individual. 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(8).
Respondent Zackey Rahimi is subject to such an order. The

Kathryn Nagle; for the National League of Cities et al. by Lawrence Ro-
senthal; for the New York County Lawyers Association by Benjamin G.
Shatz, Jacqueline C. Wolff, and Samantha J. Katze; for Prosecutor and
Law Enforcement Associations et al. by Carolyn F. Corwin and Christo-
pher M. Kimmel; for Prosecutors Against Gun Violence by Eric Del Pozo
and Joette Katz; for Public-Health Researchers et al. by Nicole A. Sahar-
sky; for Religious Leaders et al. by Emilie B. Cooper; for Second Amend-
ment Law Scholars by Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Rachel G. Miller-Ziegler,
and Justin P. Raphael; for the Texas Advocacy Project et al. by C. Andrew
Weber and Brenda L. Clayton; for the Tarrant County Criminal District
Attorney et al. by Fredericka Sargent, Steven W. Conder, Karen L. Row-
den, and Gary Young; for the United States Conference of Catholic Bish-
ops by Mark C. Fleming; for Sen. Richard Blumenthal et al. by H. Christo-
pher Boehning; for Mary Anne Franks by Douglas M. Poland and Erin
K. Deeley; for Sen. Amy Klobuchar et al. by Michelle S. Kallen and
Page Proof Pending Publication
Joshua P. Riley; and for 97Percent by Constance Van Kley and Rylee
Sommers-Flanagan.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Alameda
County Public Defenders et al. by Joshi Valentine; for the Bronx Defend-
ers Union et al. by Aimee Carlisle and David M. Porter; for the California
Rife & Pistol Association, Inc., et al. by C. D. Michel, Anna M. Barvir,
and Tiffany D. Cheuvront; for the Cato Institute et al. by Clark M. Neily
III, Anastasia P. Boden, and Thomas A. Berry; for the Center for Human
Liberty by David H. Thompson, Peter A. Patterson, and John D. Ohlen-
dorf; for the Center for Prosecutor Integrity by James E. Preston; for the
Crime Prevention Research Center by Steven W. Dulan; for the Firearms
Policy Coalition by Bradley A. Benbrook and Stephen M. Duvernay; for
the Foundation for Moral Law by John A. Eidsmoe and Roy S. Moore; for
the FPC Action Foundation by Joseph G. S. Greenlee and Cody J. Wisniew-
ski; for Gun Owners of America, Inc., et al. by Robert J. Olson, William J.
Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan, and John I. Harris III; for Law Enforcement
Groups et al. by Dan M. Peterson; for the National African American Gun
Association, Inc., by Stephen P. Halbrook; for the National Association for
Gun Rights by Barry K. Arrington; for the National Rife Association of
America, Inc., by Erin M. Erhardt and Michael T. Jean; for the Phyllis
Schlafy Eagles et al. by Andew L. Schlafy; for Professors of Second
Amendment Law et al. by David B. Kopel and Konstadinos T. Moros; for
686 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Opinion of the Court

question is whether this provision may be enforced against
him consistent with the Second Amendment.

I
A
In December 2019, Rahimi met his girlfriend, C. M., for
lunch in a parking lot. C. M. is also the mother of Rahimi's
young child, A. R. During the meal, Rahimi and C. M.
began arguing, and Rahimi became enraged. Brief for
United States 2. C. M. attempted to leave, but Rahimi
grabbed her by the wrist, dragged her back to his car, and
shoved her in, causing her to strike her head against the
dashboard. When he realized that a bystander was watch-
ing the altercation, Rahimi paused to retrieve a gun from
under the passenger seat. C. M. took advantage of the op-
portunity to escape. Rahimi fred as she fed, although it is
unclear whether he was aiming at C. M. or the witness.
Page Proof Pending Publication
Rahimi later called C. M. and warned that he would shoot
her if she reported the incident. Ibid.
Undeterred by this threat, C. M. went to court to seek a
restraining order. In the affdavit accompanying her appli-
cation, C. M. recounted the parking lot incident as well as
other assaults. She also detailed how Rahimi's conduct had
endangered A. R. Although Rahimi had an opportunity to
contest C. M.'s testimony, he did not do so. On February 5,
2020, a state court in Tarrant County, Texas, issued a re-

the Second Amendment Foundation by Edward Andrew Paltzik; for Wil-
liam English, Ph.D., et al. by Craig L. Uhrich and Serge Krimnus; and for
Angus Kirk McClellan, Ph.D., by Charles R. Flores.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the National Association of Federal
Defenders by Vincent J. Brunkow, Sarah Gannett, Judith Mizner, and
Timothy Shepherd; for Professors of History et al. by Mark D. Selwyn
and Todd C. Zubler; for Patrick J. Charles by Hugh E. McKay, L. Bradfeld
Hughes, and Shane Pennington; and for Nicholas J. Johnson by John
P. Krill, Jr.
Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 687

Opinion of the Court

straining order against him. The order, entered with the
consent of both parties, included a fnding that Rahimi had
committed “family violence.” App. 2. It also found that
this violence was “likely to occur again” and that Rahimi
posed “a credible threat” to the “physical safety” of C. M.
or A. R. Id., at 2–3. Based on these fndings, the order
prohibited Rahimi from threatening C. M. or her family for
two years or contacting C. M. during that period except to
discuss A. R. Id., at 3–7. It also suspended Rahimi's gun
license for two years. Id., at 5–6. If Rahimi was impris-
oned or confned when the order was set to expire, the order
would instead terminate either one or two years after his
release date, depending on the length of his imprisonment.
Id., at 6–7.
In May, however, Rahimi violated the order by approach-
ing C. M.'s home at night. He also began contacting her
through several social media accounts.
Page Proof Pending Publication
In November, Rahimi threatened a different woman with
a gun, resulting in a charge for aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon. And while Rahimi was under arrest for
that assault, the Texas police identifed him as the suspect
in a spate of at least fve additional shootings.
The frst, which occurred in December 2020, arose from
Rahimi's dealing in illegal drugs. After one of his custom-
ers “started talking trash,” Rahimi drove to the man's home
and shot into it. Brief for United States 3. While driving
the next day, Rahimi collided with another car, exited his
vehicle, and proceeded to shoot at the other car. Three days
later, he fred his gun in the air while driving through a resi-
dential neighborhood. A few weeks after that, Rahimi was
speeding on a highway near Arlington, Texas, when a truck
fashed its lights at him. Rahimi hit the brakes and cut
across traffc to chase the truck. Once off the highway, he
fred several times toward the truck and a nearby car before
feeing. Two weeks after that, Rahimi and a friend were
688 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Opinion of the Court

dining at a roadside burger restaurant. When the restau-
rant declined his friend's credit card, Rahimi pulled a gun
and shot into the air.
The police obtained a warrant to search Rahimi's resi-
dence. There they discovered a pistol, a rife, ammunition—
and a copy of the restraining order.

B
Rahimi was indicted on one count of possessing a frearm
while subject to a domestic violence restraining order, in
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(8). At the time, such a viola-
tion was punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment (since
amended to 15 years). § 924(a)(2); see Bipartisan Safer Com-
munities Act, Pub. L. 117–159, § 12004(c)(2), 136 Stat. 1329,
18 U. S. C. § 924(a)(8). A prosecution under Section 922(g)(8)
may proceed only if three criteria are met. First, the de-
fendant must have received actual notice and an opportunity
Page Proof Pending Publication
to be heard before the order was entered. § 922(g)(8)(A).
Second, the order must prohibit the defendant from either
“harassing, stalking, or threatening” his “intimate partner”
or his or his partner's child, or “engaging in other conduct
that would place [the] partner in reasonable fear of bodily
injury” to the partner or child. § 922(g)(8)(B). A defend-
ant's “intimate partner[s]” include his spouse or any former
spouse, the parent of his child, and anyone with whom he
cohabitates or has cohabitated. § 921(a)(32). Third, under
Section 922(g)(8)(C), the order must either contain a fnding
that the defendant “represents a credible threat to the physi-
cal safety” of his intimate partner or his or his partner's
child, § 922(g)(8)(C)(i), or “by its terms explicitly prohibit[ ]
the use,” attempted use, or threatened use of “physical force”
against those individuals, § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).
Rahimi's restraining order met all three criteria. First,
Rahimi had received notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the order was entered. App. 2. Second, the order
Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 689

Opinion of the Court

prohibited him from communicating with or threatening
C. M. Id., at 3–4. Third, the order met the requirements
of Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i), because it included a fnding that
Rahimi represented “a credible threat to the physical safety”
of C. M. or her family. Id., at 2–3. The order also “explic-
itly prohibit[ed]” Rahimi from “the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force” against C. M., satisfying the
independent basis for liability in Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).
Id., at 3.
Rahimi moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that Sec-
tion 922(g)(8) violated on its face the Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms. No. 4:21–cr–00083 (ND Tex.,
May 7, 2021), ECF Doc. 17. Concluding that Circuit prece-
dent foreclosed Rahimi's Second Amendment challenge, the
District Court denied his motion. Rahimi then pleaded
guilty. On appeal, he again raised his Second Amendment
challenge. The appeal was denied, and Rahimi petitioned
Page Proof Pending Publication
for rehearing en banc.
While Rahimi's petition was pending, this Court decided
New York State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S.
1 (2022). In Bruen, we explained that when a frearm regu-
lation is challenged under the Second Amendment, the Gov-
ernment must show that the restriction “is consistent with
the Nation's historical tradition of frearm regulation.” Id.,
at 24.
In light of Bruen, the panel withdrew the prior opinion
and ordered additional briefng. A new panel then heard
oral argument and reversed. 61 F. 4th 443, 448 (CA5 2023).
Surveying the evidence that the Government had identifed,
the panel concluded that Section 922(g)(8) does not ft within
our tradition of frearm regulation. Id., at 460–461. Judge
Ho wrote separately to express his view that the panel's
ruling did not confict with the interest in protecting peo-
ple from violent individuals. Id., at 461–462 (concurring
opinion).
690 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Opinion of the Court

We granted certiorari. 600 U. S. ––– (2023)

II
When a restraining order contains a fnding that an indi-
vidual poses a credible threat to the physical safety of an
intimate partner, that individual may—consistent with the
Second Amendment—be banned from possessing frearms
while the order is in effect. Since the founding, our Nation's
frearm laws have included provisions preventing individuals
who threaten physical harm to others from misusing fre-
arms. As applied to the facts of this case, Section 922(g)(8)
fts comfortably within this tradition.

A
We have held that the right to keep and bear arms is
among the “fundamental rights necessary to our system of
ordered liberty.” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 778
Page Proof Pending Publication
(2010). Derived from English practice and codifed in the
Second Amendment, the right secures for Americans a
means of self-defense. Bruen, 597 U. S., at 17. The spark
that ignited the American Revolution was struck at Lexing-
ton and Concord, when the British governor dispatched sol-
diers to seize the local farmers' arms and powder stores. In
the aftermath of the Civil War, Congress's desire to enable
the newly freed slaves to defend themselves against former
Confederates helped inspire the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which secured the right to bear arms against
interference by the States. McDonald, 561 U. S., at 771–
776. As a leading and early proponent of emancipation ob-
served, “Disarm a community and you rob them of the means
of defending life. Take away their weapons of defense and
you take away the inalienable right of defending liberty.”
Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 1967 (1868) (statement of
Rep. Stevens).
“Like most rights,” though, “the right secured by the Sec-
ond Amendment is not unlimited.” District of Columbia v.
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Opinion of the Court

Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 626 (2008). In Heller, this Court held
that the right applied to ordinary citizens within the home.
Even as we did so, however, we recognized that the right
was never thought to sweep indiscriminately. “From Black-
stone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and
courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to
keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner what-
soever and for whatever purpose.” Ibid. At the founding,
the bearing of arms was subject to regulations ranging from
rules about frearm storage to restrictions on gun use by
drunken New Year's Eve revelers. Act of Mar. 1, 1783, 1783
Mass. Acts and Laws ch.13, pp. 218–219; 5 Colonial Laws of
New York ch. 1501, pp. 244–246 (1894). Some jurisdictions
banned the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”
554 U. S., at 627 (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England 148–149 (1769)). Others forbade carry-
ing concealed frearms. 554 U. S., at 626.
Page Proof Pending Publication
In Heller, our inquiry into the scope of the right began
with “constitutional text and history.” Bruen, 597 U. S., at
22. In Bruen, we directed courts to examine our “historical
tradition of frearm regulation” to help delineate the con-
tours of the right. Id., at 17. We explained that if a chal-
lenged regulation fts within that tradition, it is lawful under
the Second Amendment. We also clarifed that when the
Government regulates arms-bearing conduct, as when the
Government regulates other constitutional rights, it bears
the burden to “justify its regulation.” Id., at 24.
Nevertheless, some courts have misunderstood the meth-
odology of our recent Second Amendment cases. These
precedents were not meant to suggest a law trapped in
amber. As we explained in Heller, for example, the reach
of the Second Amendment is not limited only to those arms
that were in existence at the founding. 554 U. S., at 582.
Rather, it “extends, prima facie, to all instruments that con-
stitute bearable arms, even those that were not [yet] in exist-
ence.” Ibid. By that same logic, the Second Amendment
692 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

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permits more than just those regulations identical to ones
that could be found in 1791. Holding otherwise would be
as mistaken as applying the protections of the right only to
muskets and sabers.
As we explained in Bruen, the appropriate analysis in-
volves considering whether the challenged regulation is con-
sistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory
tradition. 597 U. S., at 26–31. A court must ascertain
whether the new law is “relevantly similar” to laws that our
tradition is understood to permit, “apply[ing] faithfully the
balance struck by the founding generation to modern circum-
stances.” Id., at 29, and n. 7. Discerning and developing
the law in this way is “a commonplace task for any lawyer
or judge.” Id., at 28.
Why and how the regulation burdens the right are central
to this inquiry. Id., at 29. For example, if laws at the
founding regulated frearm use to address particular prob-
lems, that will be a strong indicator that contemporary laws
Page Proof Pending Publication
imposing similar restrictions for similar reasons fall within
a permissible category of regulations. Even when a law
regulates arms-bearing for a permissible reason, though, it
may not be compatible with the right if it does so to an ex-
tent beyond what was done at the founding. And when a
challenged regulation does not precisely match its historical
precursors, “it still may be analogous enough to pass consti-
tutional muster.” Id., at 30. The law must comport with
the principles underlying the Second Amendment, but it
need not be a “dead ringer” or a “historical twin.” Ibid.
(emphasis deleted).1

1
We also recognized in Bruen the “ongoing scholarly debate on whether
courts should primarily rely on the prevailing understanding of an individ-
ual right when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratifed in 1868 when de-
fning its scope (as well as the scope of the right against the Federal Gov-
ernment).” 597 U. S., at 37. We explained that under the circumstances,
resolving the dispute was unnecessary to decide the case. Id., at 37–38.
The same is true here.
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B
Bearing these principles in mind, we conclude that Section
922(g)(8) survives Rahimi's challenge.

1
Rahimi challenges Section 922(g)(8) on its face. This is
the “most diffcult challenge to mount successfully,” because
it requires a defendant to “establish that no set of circum-
stances exists under which the Act would be valid.” United
States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987). That means that
to prevail, the Government need only demonstrate that Sec-
tion 922(g)(8) is constitutional in some of its applications.
And here the provision is constitutional as applied to the
facts of Rahimi's own case.
Recall that Section 922(g)(8) provides two independent
bases for liability. Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) bars an individual
from possessing a frearm if his restraining order includes a
Page Proof Pending Publication
fnding that he poses “a credible threat to the physical
safety” of a protected person. Separately, Section 922(g)(8)
(C)(ii) bars an individual from possessing a frearm if his re-
straining order “prohibits the use, attempted use, or threat-
ened use of physical force.” Our analysis starts and stops
with Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) because the Government offers
ample evidence that the Second Amendment permits the dis-
armament of individuals who pose a credible threat to the
physical safety of others. We need not decide whether regu-
lation under Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) is also permissible.

2
This Court reviewed the history of American gun laws ex-
tensively in Heller and Bruen. From the earliest days of
the common law, frearm regulations have included provi-
sions barring people from misusing weapons to harm or men-
ace others. The act of “go[ing] armed to terrify the King's
subjects” was recognized at common law as a “great offence.”
Sir John Knight's Case, 3 Mod. 117, 118, 87 Eng. Rep. 75,
694 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

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76 (K. B. 1686). Parliament began codifying prohibitions
against such conduct as early as the 1200s and 1300s, most
notably in the Statute of Northampton of 1328. Bruen, 597
U. S., at 40. In the aftermath of the Reformation and the
English Civil War, Parliament passed further restrictions.
The Militia Act of 1662, for example, authorized the King's
agents to “seize all Armes in the custody or possession of
any person . . . judge[d] dangerous to the Peace of the King-
dome.” 14 Car. 2 c. 3, § 13 (1662); J. Greenlee, The Historical
Justifcation for Prohibiting Dangerous Persons From Pos-
sessing Arms, 20 Wyo. L. Rev. 249, 259 (2020).
The Glorious Revolution cut back on the power of the
Crown to disarm its subjects unilaterally. King James II
had “caus[ed] several good Subjects being Protestants, to be
disarmed, at the same Time when Papists were . . . armed.”
1 Wm. & Mary c. 2, § 6, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 440 (1689).
By way of rebuke, Parliament adopted the English Bill of
Page Proof Pending Publication
Rights, which guaranteed “that the Subjects which are Prot-
estants, may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their
Conditions, and as allowed by Law.” § 7, id., at 441. But
as the document itself memorialized, the principle that arms-
bearing was constrained “by Law” remained. Ibid.
Through these centuries, English law had disarmed not
only brigands and highwaymen but also political opponents
and disfavored religious groups. By the time of the found-
ing, however, state constitutions and the Second Amendment
had largely eliminated governmental authority to disarm po-
litical opponents on this side of the Atlantic. See Heller,
554 U. S., at 594–595, 600–603. But regulations targeting
individuals who physically threatened others persisted.
Such conduct was often addressed through ordinary criminal
laws and civil actions, such as prohibitions on fghting or pri-
vate suits against individuals who threatened others. See 4
W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 145–
146, 149–150 (10th ed. 1787) (Blackstone); 3 id., at 120. By
the 1700s and early 1800s, however, two distinct legal re-
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gimes had developed that specifcally addressed frearms
violence.
The frst were the surety laws. A form of “preventive
justice,” these laws derived from the ancient practice of
frankpledges. 4 id., at 251–253. Reputedly dating to the
time of Canute, the frankpledge system involved compelling
adult men to organize themselves into ten-man “tithing[s].”
A. Lefroy, Anglo-Saxon Period of English Law, Part II, 26
Yale L. J. 388, 391 (1917). The members of each tithing then
“mutually pledge[d] for each other's good behaviour.” 4
Blackstone 252. Should any of the ten break the law, the
remaining nine would be responsible for producing him in
court, or else face punishment in his stead. D. Levinson,
Collective Sanctions, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 345, 358 (2003).
Eventually, the communal frankpledge system evolved into
the individualized surety regime. Under the surety laws, a
magistrate could “oblig[e] those persons, [of] whom there is
Page Proof Pending Publication
a probable ground to suspect of future misbehaviour, to stip-
ulate with and to give full assurance . . . that such offence
. . . shall not happen[,] by fnding pledges or securities.” 4
Blackstone 251. In other words, the law authorized magis-
trates to require individuals suspected of future misbehavior
to post a bond. Ibid. If an individual failed to post a bond,
he would be jailed. See, e. g., Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 134, § 6
(1836). If the individual did post a bond and then broke the
peace, the bond would be forfeit. 4 Blackstone 253.
Well entrenched in the common law, the surety laws could
be invoked to prevent all forms of violence, including spousal
abuse. As Blackstone explained, “[w]ives [could] demand
[sureties] against their husbands; or husbands, if necessary,
against their wives.” Id., at 254. These often took the
form of a surety of the peace, meaning that the defendant
pledged to “keep the peace.” Id., at 252–253; see R. Bloch,
The American Revolution, Wife Beating, and the Emergent
Value of Privacy, 5 Early American Studies 223, 232–233,
234–235 (2007) (Bloch) (discussing peace bonds). Wives also
696 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Opinion of the Court

demanded sureties for good behavior, whereby a husband
pledged to “demean and behave himself well.” 4 Blackstone
253; see Bloch 232–233, 234–235, and n. 34.
While communities sometimes resorted to public shaming
or vigilante justice to chastise abusers, sureties provided the
public with a more measured solution. B. McConville, The
Rise of Rough Music, in Riot and Revelry in Early America
90–100 (W. Pencak, M. Dennis, & S. Newman eds. 2002). In
one widely reported incident, Susannah Wyllys Strong, the
wife of a Connecticut judge, appeared before Tapping Reeve
in 1790 to make a complaint against her husband. K. Ryan,
“The Spirit of Contradiction”: Wife Abuse in New England,
1780–1820, 13 Early American Studies 586, 602 (2015).
Newspapers carried the story in Connecticut, Massachusetts,
and New York. Ibid. Reeve ultimately ordered the man
to post a bond of £1,000. Id., at 603.
Importantly for this case, the surety laws also targeted
Page Proof Pending Publication
the misuse of frearms. In 1795, for example, Massachusetts
enacted a law authorizing justices of the peace to “arrest” all
who “go armed offensively [and] require of the offender to
fnd sureties for his keeping the peace.” 1795 Mass. Acts ch.
2, in Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts, 1794–1795, ch. 26,
pp. 66–67 (1896). Later, Massachusetts amended its surety
laws to be even more specifc, authorizing the imposition of
bonds from individuals “[who went] armed with a dirk, dag-
ger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon.”
Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 134, § 16; see ibid. (marginal note) (ref-
erencing the earlier statute). At least nine other jurisdic-
tions did the same. See Bruen, 597 U. S., at 56, and n. 23.
These laws often offered the accused signifcant procedural
protections. Before the accused could be compelled to post
a bond for “go[ing] armed,” a complaint had to be made to a
judge or justice of the peace by “any person having reason-
able cause to fear” that the accused would do him harm or
breach the peace. Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 134, §§ 1, 16. The
magistrate would take evidence, and—if he determined that
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cause existed for the charge—summon the accused, who
could respond to the allegations. §§ 3–4. Bonds could not
be required for more than six months at a time, and an indi-
vidual could obtain an exception if he needed his arms for
self-defense or some other legitimate reason. § 16.
While the surety laws provided a mechanism for prevent-
ing violence before it occurred, a second regime provided a
mechanism for punishing those who had menaced others with
frearms. These were the “going armed” laws, a particular
subset of the ancient common-law prohibition on affrays.
Derived from the French word “affraier,” meaning “to ter-
rify,” 4 Blackstone 145, the affray laws traced their origin to
the Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3 c. 3 (1328). Although
the prototypical affray involved fghting in public, commenta-
tors understood affrays to encompass the offense of “arm-
[ing]” oneself “to the Terror of the People,” T. Barlow, The
Justice of the Peace: A Treatise 11 (1745). Moreover, the
Page Proof Pending Publication
prohibitions—on fghting and going armed—were often codi-
fed in the same statutes. E. g., 2 Edw. 3 c. 3; Acts and
Laws of His Majesty's Province of New-Hampshire in New-
England 2 (1761).
Whether classifed as an affray law or a distinct prohibi-
tion, the going armed laws prohibited “riding or going
armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, [to] terrify[ ] the
good people of the land.” 4 Blackstone 149 (emphasis de-
leted). Such conduct disrupted the “public order” and “le[d]
almost necessarily to actual violence.” State v. Huntly, 25
N. C. 418, 421–422 (1843) (per curiam). Therefore, the law
punished these acts with “forfeiture of the arms . . . and
imprisonment.” 4 Blackstone 149.
In some instances, prohibitions on going armed and affrays
were incorporated into American jurisprudence through the
common law. See, e. g., Huntly, 25 N. C., at 421–422; O'Neill
v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67 (1849); Hickman v. State, 193
Md. App. 238, 253–255, 996 A. 2d 974, 983 (2010) (recognizing
that common-law prohibition on fghting in public remains
698 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

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even now chargeable in Maryland). Moreover, at least four
States—Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and
Virginia—expressly codifed prohibitions on going armed.
1786 Va. Acts ch. 21; 2 Laws of the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts from Nov. 28, 1780 to Feb. 28, 1807, pp. 652–653
(1807); Acts and Laws of His Majesty's Province of New-
Hampshire in New-England 2 (1761); Collection of All the
Public Acts of Assembly, of the Province of North-Carolina:
Now in Force and Use 131 (1751) (1741 statute).

3
Taken together, the surety and going armed laws confrm
what common sense suggests: When an individual poses a
clear threat of physical violence to another, the threatening
individual may be disarmed. Section 922(g)(8) is by no
means identical to these founding era regimes, but it does
not need to be. See Bruen, 597 U. S., at 30. Its prohibition
Page Proof Pending Publication
on the possession of frearms by those found by a court to
present a threat to others fts neatly within the tradition the
surety and going armed laws represent.
Like the surety and going armed laws, Section 922(g)
(8)(C)(i) applies to individuals found to threaten the physical
safety of another. This provision is “relevantly similar” to
those founding era regimes in both why and how it burdens
the Second Amendment right. Id., at 29. Section 922(g)(8)
restricts gun use to mitigate demonstrated threats of physi-
cal violence, just as the surety and going armed laws do.
Unlike the regulation struck down in Bruen, Section
922(g)(8) does not broadly restrict arms use by the public
generally.
The burden Section 922(g)(8) imposes on the right to bear
arms also fts within our regulatory tradition. While we do
not suggest that the Second Amendment prohibits the enact-
ment of laws banning the possession of guns by categories of
persons thought by a legislature to present a special danger
of misuse, see Heller, 554 U. S., at 626, we note that Section
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922(g)(8) applies only once a court has found that the defend-
ant “represents a credible threat to the physical safety” of
another. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i). That matches the surety and
going armed laws, which involved judicial determinations of
whether a particular defendant likely would threaten or had
threatened another with a weapon.
Moreover, like surety bonds of limited duration, Section
922(g)(8)'s restriction was temporary as applied to Rahimi.
Section 922(g)(8) only prohibits frearm possession so long
as the defendant “is” subject to a restraining order.
§ 922(g)(8). In Rahimi's case that is one to two years after
his release from prison, according to Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 85.025(c) (West 2019). App. 6–7.
Finally, the penalty—another relevant aspect of the bur-
den—also fts within the regulatory tradition. The going
armed laws provided for imprisonment, 4 Blackstone 149,
and if imprisonment was permissible to respond to the use
Page Proof Pending Publication
of guns to threaten the physical safety of others, then the
lesser restriction of temporary disarmament that Section
922(g)(8) imposes is also permissible.
Rahimi argues Heller requires us to affrm, because Sec-
tion 922(g)(8) bars individuals subject to restraining orders
from possessing guns in the home, and in Heller we invali-
dated an “absolute prohibition of handguns . . . in the home.”
554 U. S., at 636; Brief for Respondent 32. But Heller never
established a categorical rule that the Constitution prohibits
regulations that forbid frearm possession in the home. In
fact, our opinion stated that many such prohibitions, like
those on the possession of frearms by “felons and the
mentally ill,” are “presumptively lawful.” 554 U. S., at 626,
627, n. 26.
Our analysis of the surety laws in Bruen also does not help
Rahimi. In Bruen, we explained that the surety laws were
not a proper historical analogue for New York's gun licensing
regime. 597 U. S., at 55–60. What distinguished the re-
gimes, we observed, was that the surety laws “presumed
700 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Opinion of the Court

that individuals had a right to . . . carry,” whereas New
York's law effectively presumed that no citizen had such a
right, absent a special need. Id., at 56 (emphasis deleted).
Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) does not make the same faulty pre-
sumption. To the contrary, it presumes, like the surety laws
before it, that the Second Amendment right may only be
burdened once a defendant has been found to pose a credible
threat to the physical safety of others. See ibid.
While we also noted that the surety laws applied different
penalties than New York's special-need regime, we did so
only to emphasize just how severely the State treated the
rights of its citizens. Id., at 57. But as we have explained,
our Nation's tradition of frearm regulation distinguishes cit-
izens who have been found to pose a credible threat to the
physical safety of others from those who have not. The con-
clusion that focused regulations like the surety laws are not a
historical analogue for a broad prohibitory regime like New
York's does not mean that they cannot be an appropriate
Page Proof Pending Publication
analogue for a narrow one.
4
In short, we have no trouble concluding that Section
922(g)(8) survives Rahimi's facial challenge. Our tradition
of frearm regulation allows the Government to disarm in-
dividuals who present a credible threat to the physical safety
of others. Section 922(g)(8) can be applied lawfully to
Rahimi.
The dissent reaches a contrary conclusion, primarily on the
ground that the historical analogues for Section 922(g)(8) are
not suffciently similar to place that provision in our histori-
cal tradition. The dissent does, however, acknowledge that
Section 922(g)(8) is within that tradition when it comes to
the “why” of the appropriate inquiry. The objection is to
the “how.” See post, at 767 (opinion of Thomas, J.). For the
reasons we have set forth, however, we conclude that Section
922(g)(8) satisfes that part of the inquiry as well. See
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Opinion of the Court

supra, at 692, 698–700. As we said in Bruen, a “historical
twin” is not required. 597 U. S., at 30.
For its part, the Fifth Circuit made two errors. First,
like the dissent, it read Bruen to require a “historical twin”
rather than a “historical analogue.” Ibid. Second, it did
not correctly apply our precedents governing facial chal-
lenges. 61 F. 4th, at 453. As we have said in other con-
texts, “[w]hen legislation and the Constitution brush up
against each other, [a court's] task is to seek harmony, not to
manufacture confict.” United States v. Hansen, 599 U. S.
762, 781 (2023). Rather than consider the circumstances in
which Section 922(g)(8) was most likely to be constitutional,
the panel instead focused on hypothetical scenarios where
Section 922(g)(8) might raise constitutional concerns. See
61 F. 4th, at 459; id., at 465–467 (Ho, J., concurring). That
error left the panel slaying a straw man.2

5
Page Proof
Finally, in Pending
holding that Publication
Section 922(g)(8) is constitutional
as applied to Rahimi, we reject the Government's contention
that Rahimi may be disarmed simply because he is not “re-
sponsible.” Brief for United States 6; see Tr. of Oral Arg.
8–11. “Responsible” is a vague term. It is unclear what
such a rule would entail. Nor does such a line derive from
our case law. In Heller and Bruen, we used the term “re-
sponsible” to describe the class of ordinary citizens who un-
2
Many of the potential faults that the Fifth Circuit identifes in Section
922(g)(8) appear to sound in due process rather than the Second Amend-
ment. E. g., 61 F. 4th, at 459; id., at 465–467 (Ho, J., concurring). As we
have explained, unless these hypothetical faults occur in every case, they
do not justify invalidating Section 922(g)(8) on its face. See United States
v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987) (a facial challenge fails if the law is
constitutional in at least some of its applications). In any event, we need
not address any due process concern here because this challenge was not
litigated as a due process challenge and there is no such claim before us.
See this Court's Rule 14.1(a).
702 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Sotomayor, J., concurring

doubtedly enjoy the Second Amendment right. See, e. g.,
Heller, 554 U. S., at 635; Bruen, 597 U. S., at 70. But those
decisions did not defne the term and said nothing about the
status of citizens who were not “responsible.” The question
was simply not presented.

* * *
In Heller, McDonald, and Bruen, this Court did not “un-
dertake an exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the full scope
of the Second Amendment.” Bruen, 597 U. S., at 31. Nor
do we do so today. Rather, we conclude only this: An indi-
vidual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physi-
cal safety of another may be temporarily disarmed consistent
with the Second Amendment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Page Proof Pending Publication It is so ordered.

Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kagan joins,
concurring.
Today, the Court applies its decision in New York State
Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1 (2022), for the
frst time. Although I continue to believe that Bruen was
wrongly decided, see id., at 83–133 (Breyer, J., joined by So-
tomayor and Kagan, JJ., dissenting), I join the Court's opin-
ion applying that precedent to uphold 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(8).
The Court today emphasizes that a challenged regulation
“must comport with the principles underlying the Second
Amendment,” but need not have a precise historical match.
Ante, at 692. I agree. I write separately to highlight why
the Court's interpretation of Bruen, and not the dissent's, is
the right one. In short, the Court's interpretation permits
a historical inquiry calibrated to reveal something useful and
transferable to the present day, while the dissent would
make the historical inquiry so exacting as to be useless, a
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Sotomayor, J., concurring

too-sensitive alarm that sounds whenever a regulation did
not exist in an essentially identical form at the founding.

I
Even under Bruen, this is an easy case. Section 922(g)(8)
prohibits an individual subject to a domestic violence re-
straining order from possessing a frearm, so long as certain
criteria are met. See ante, at 688. Section 922(g)(8) is
wholly consistent with the Nation's history and tradition of
frearm regulation.
The Court correctly concludes that “the Second Amend-
ment permits the disarmament of individuals who pose a
credible threat to the physical safety of others.” Ante, at
693. That conclusion fnds historical support in both the
surety laws, which “provided a mechanism for preventing
violence before it occurred” by requiring an individual who
posed a credible threat of violence to another to post a
Page Proof Pending Publication
surety, and the “going armed” laws, which “provided a mech-
anism for punishing those who had menaced others with
frearms” through forfeiture of the arms or imprisonment.
Ante, at 697. “Taken together, the surety and going armed
laws confrm what common sense suggests: When an individ-
ual poses a clear threat of physical violence to another, the
threatening individual may be disarmed.” Ante, at 698.
Section 922(g)(8)'s prohibition on gun possession for individ-
uals subject to domestic violence restraining orders is part
of that “tradition of frearm regulation allow[ing] the Gov-
ernment to disarm individuals who present a credible threat
to the physical safety of others,” ante, at 700, as are the
similar restrictions that have been adopted by 48 States and
Territories, see Brief for United States 34–35, and nn. 22–23
(collecting statutes).
The Court's opinion also clarifes an important method-
ological point that bears repeating: Rather than asking
whether a present-day gun regulation has a precise his-
torical analogue, courts applying Bruen should “conside[r]
704 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Sotomayor, J., concurring

whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the
principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” Ante,
at 692 (emphasis added); see also ibid. (“The law must com-
port with the principles underlying the Second Amendment,
but it need not be a `dead ringer' or a `historical
twin' ” (quoting Bruen, 597 U. S., at 30)). Here, for example,
the Government has not identified a founding-era or
Reconstruction-era law that specifcally disarmed domestic
abusers, see, e. g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 40 (conceding as much),
but it did not need to do so. Although § 922(g)(8) “is by no
means identical” to the surety or going armed laws, ante, at
698, it “restricts gun use to mitigate demonstrated threats
of physical violence, just as the surety and going armed laws
d[id],” ibid. That shared principle is suffcient.

II
The dissent reaches a different conclusion by applying the
Page Proof Pending Publication
strictest possible interpretation of Bruen. It picks off the
Government's historical sources one by one, viewing any
basis for distinction as fatal. See, e. g., post, at 764 (opinion
of Thomas, J.) (“Although surety laws shared a common jus-
tifcation with § 922(g)(8), surety laws imposed a materially
different burden”); post, at 771 (explaining that “[a]ffray laws
are wide of the mark” because they “expressly carve out the
very conduct § 922(g)(8) was designed to prevent (interper-
sonal violence in the home)”). The dissent urges a close look
“at the historical law's justifcation as articulated during the
relevant time period,” post, at 774, and a “careful parsing of
regulatory burdens” to ensure that courts do not “stray too
far from [history] by eliding material differences between
historical and modern laws,” post, at 761. The dissent criti-
cizes this Court for adopting a more “piecemeal approach”
that distills principles from a variety of historical evidence
rather than insisting on a precise historical analogue. Post,
at 767.
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Sotomayor, J., concurring

If the dissent's interpretation of Bruen were the law, then
Bruen really would be the “one-way ratchet” that I and the
other dissenters in that case feared, “disqualify[ing] virtually
any `representative historical analogue' and mak[ing] it
nearly impossible to sustain common-sense regulations nec-
essary to our Nation's safety and security.” 597 U. S., at 112
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Thankfully, the Court rejects that
rigid approach to the historical inquiry. As the Court puts
it today, Bruen was “not meant to suggest a law trapped in
amber.” Ante, at 691.
This case lays bare the perils of the dissent's approach.
Because the dissent concludes that “§ 922(g)(8) addresses a
societal problem—the risk of interpersonal violence—`that
has persisted since the 18th century,' ” post, at 752–753, it in-
sists that the means of addressing that problem cannot be
“ `materially different' ” from the means that existed in the
18th century, post, at 753. That is so, it seems, even when the
Page Proof Pending Publication
weapons in question have evolved dramatically. See R. Roth,
Why Guns Are and Are Not the Problem, in A Right To Bear
Arms?: The Contested Role of History in Contemporary De-
bates on the Second Amendment 117 (J. Tucker, B. Hacker, &
M. Vining eds. 2019) (explaining that guns in the 18th cen-
tury took a long time to load, typically fred only one shot,
and often misfred). According to the dissent, the solution
cannot be “materially different” even when societal percep-
tion of the problem has changed, and even if it is now clear
to everyone that the historical means of addressing the prob-
lem had been wholly inadequate. Given the fact that the
law at the founding was more likely to protect husbands who
abused their spouses than offer some measure of accountabil-
ity, see, e. g., R. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale L. J. 2117, 2154–2170
(1996), it is no surprise that that generation did not have an
equivalent to § 922(g)(8). Under the dissent's approach, the
legislatures of today would be limited not by a distant gener-
706 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Sotomayor, J., concurring

ation's determination that such a law was unconstitutional,
but by a distant generation's failure to consider that such a
law might be necessary. History has a role to play in Second
Amendment analysis, but a rigid adherence to history (par-
ticularly history predating the inclusion of women and people
of color as full members of the polity) impoverishes constitu-
tional interpretation and hamstrings our democracy.
III
The Court today clarifes Bruen's historical inquiry and
rejects the dissent's exacting historical test. I welcome that
development. That being said, I remain troubled by
Bruen's myopic focus on history and tradition, which fails to
give full consideration to the real and present stakes of the
problems facing our society today. In my view, the Second
Amendment allows legislators “to take account of the serious
problems posed by gun violence,” Bruen, 597 U. S., at 91
(Breyer, J., dissenting), not merely by asking what their
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predecessors at the time of the founding or Reconstruction
thought, but by listening to their constituents and crafting
new and appropriately tailored solutions. Under the means-
end scrutiny that this Court rejected in Bruen but “regu-
larly use[s] . . . in cases involving other constitutional provi-
sions,” id., at 106, the constitutionality of § 922(g)(8) is even
more readily apparent.*
To start, the Government has a compelling interest in
keeping frearms out of the hands of domestic abusers. A
woman who lives in a house with a domestic abuser is fve

*By “means-end scrutiny,” I refer to the mode of analysis that would
permit courts “to consider the State's interest in preventing gun violence,
the effectiveness of the contested law in achieving that interest, the
degree to which the law burdens the Second Amendment right, and, if
appropriate, any less restrictive alternatives.” Bruen, 597 U. S., at 131
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Prior to Bruen, the Courts of Appeals would
apply a level of means-end scrutiny “ `proportionate to the severity of the
burden that the law imposes on the right': strict scrutiny if the burden is
severe, and intermediate scrutiny if it is not.” Id., at 103.
Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 707

Sotomayor, J., concurring

times more likely to be murdered if the abuser has access to
a gun. See A. Kivisto & M. Porter, Firearm Use Increases
Risk of Multiple Victims in Domestic Homicides, 48 J. Am.
Acad. Psychiatry & L. 26 (2020). With over 70 people shot
and killed by an intimate partner each month in the United
States, the seriousness of the problem can hardly be over-
stated. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
WISQARS Nat. Violent Death Reporting System, Violent
Deaths Report 2020, https://wisqars.cdc.gov/nvdrs (showing
that 863 people were killed with a frearm by a spouse or
other intimate partner in 2020). Because domestic violence
is rarely confned to the intimate partner that receives the
protective order, the Government's interest extends even
further. In roughly a quarter of cases where an abuser
killed an intimate partner, the abuser also killed someone
else, such as a child, family member, or roommate. See S.
Smith, K. Fowler, & P. Niolon, Intimate Partner Homicide
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and Corollary Victims in 16 States: National Violent Death
Reporting System, 2003–2009, 104 Am. J. Pub. Health 461,
463–464 (2014). Moreover, one study found that domestic
disputes were the most dangerous type of call for responding
offcers, causing more offcer deaths with a frearm than any
other type of call. See N. Breul & M. Keith, Deadly Calls
and Fatal Encounters: Analysis of U. S. Law Enforcement
Line of Duty Deaths When Offcers Responded to Dis-
patched Calls for Service and Conducted Enforcement, 2010–
2014, p. 15 (2016).
While the Second Amendment does not yield automatically
to the Government's compelling interest, § 922(g)(8) is tai-
lored to the vital objective of keeping guns out of the
hands of domestic abusers. See ante, at 688, 699. Section
922(g)(8) should easily pass constitutional muster under any
level of scrutiny.
Although I continue to think that the means-end approach
to Second Amendment analysis is the right one, neither
party asks the Court to reconsider Bruen at this time, and
708 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Gorsuch, J., concurring

that question would of course involve other considerations
than whether Bruen was rightly decided. Whether consid-
ered under Bruen or under means-end scrutiny, § 922(g)(8)
clears the constitutional bar. I join in full the Court's opin-
ion, which offers a more helpful model than the dissent for
lower courts struggling to apply Bruen.

Justice Gorsuch, concurring.
Mr. Rahimi pursues the “most diffcult challenge to mount
successfully”: a facial challenge. United States v. Salerno,
481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987). He contends that 18 U. S. C.
§ 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment “in all its applica-
tions.” Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U. S. 119, 138 (2019). To
prevail, he must show “no set of circumstances” exists in
which that law can be applied without violating the Second
Amendment. Salerno, 481 U. S., at 745. I agree with the
Court that he has failed to make that showing. Ante, at 693.
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That is not because the Constitution has little to say about
the matter. The Second Amendment protects the “right of
the people to keep and bear Arms.” “ `[T]ext and history' ”
dictate the contours of that right. Ante, at 691 (quoting
New York State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S.
1, 22 (2022)). As this Court has recognized, too, the Amend-
ment's text “ `guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and
carry weapons in case of confrontation.' ” Id., at 32 (quoting
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 592 (2008)).
And where that “text covers an individual's conduct,” a law
regulating that conduct may be upheld only if it is “consist-
ent with this Nation's historical tradition of frearms regula-
tion.” 597 U. S., at 17; see ante, at 691.
In this case, no one questions that the law Mr. Rahimi
challenges addresses individual conduct covered by the text
of the Second Amendment. So, in this facial challenge, the
question becomes whether that law, in at least some of its
applications, is consistent with historic frearm regulations.
To prevail, the government need not show that the current
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Gorsuch, J., concurring

law is a “ `dead ringer' ” for some historical analogue. Ante,
at 692 (quoting Bruen, 597 U. S., at 30). But the government
must establish that, in at least some of its applications, the
challenged law “impose[s] a comparable burden on the right of
armed self-defense” to that imposed by a historically recog-
nized regulation. Id., at 29; see ante, at 692. And it must
show that the burden imposed by the current law “is compara-
bly justifed.” Bruen, 597 U. S., at 29; see ante, at 692.
Why do we require those showings? Through them, we
seek to honor the fact that the Second Amendment “codifed
a pre-existing right” belonging to the American people, one
that carries the same “scope” today that it was “understood
to have when the people adopted” it. Heller, 554 U. S., at
592, 634–635. When the people ratifed the Second Amend-
ment, they surely understood an arms-bearing citizenry
posed some risks. But just as surely they believed that the
right protected by the Second Amendment was itself vital to
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the preservation of life and liberty. See, e. g., 1 Blackstone's
Commentaries, Editor's App. 300 (St. George Tucker ed.
1803) (observing that the Second Amendment may represent
the “palladium of liberty,” for “[t]he right of self defence is
the frst law of nature,” and “in most governments[,] it has
been the study of rulers to confne this right within the nar-
rowest limits”); 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States § 1890, p. 746 (1833) (“The right of the
citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered, as
the palladium of the liberties of a republic”).
We have no authority to question that judgment. As
judges charged with respecting the people's directions in
the Constitution—directions that are “trapped in amber,”
see ante, at 691—our only lawful role is to apply them in the
cases that come before us. Developments in the world may
change, facts on the ground may evolve, and new laws may
invite new challenges, but the Constitution the people
adopted remains our enduring guide. Bruen, 597 U. S., at
27–28; see, e. g., United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. 400, 404–
710 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Gorsuch, J., concurring

405 (2012); Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U. S. 411, 411–412
(2016) (per curiam). If changes are to be made to the Con-
stitution's directions, they must be made by the American
people. Nor is there anything remotely unusual about any
of this. Routinely, litigants and courts alike must consult
history when seeking to discern the meaning and scope of a
constitutional provision. See post, at 719–729 (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring) (offering examples). And when doing so, liti-
gants and courts “must exercise care.” See post, at 739, n.
(Barrett, J., concurring).
Consider just one example. We have recognized that the
Sixth Amendment enshrines another pre-existing right:
the right of a defendant to confront his accusers at trial.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 54 (2004). Just as
here, we have recognized that, in placing this right in the
Constitution, the people set its scope, “admitting only those
exceptions established at the time of the founding.” Ibid.
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And, just as here, when parties ask us to sustain some mod-
ern exception to the confrontation right, we require them to
point to a close historic analogue to justify it. See Giles v.
California, 554 U. S. 353, 358–361 (2008). Just as here, too,
we have expressly rejected arguments that courts should
proceed differently, such as by trying to glean from historic
exceptions overarching “policies,” “ `purposes,' ” or “values”
to guide them in future cases. See id., at 374–375 (opinion
of Scalia, J.). We have rejected those paths because the
Constitution enshrines the people's choice to achieve certain
policies, purposes, and values “through very specifc means”:
the right of confrontation as originally understood at the
time of the founding. Id., at 375. As we have put it, a court
may not “extrapolate” from the Constitution's text and his-
tory “the values behind [that right], and then . . . enforce its
guarantees only to the extent they serve (in the courts'
views) those underlying values.” Ibid. Proceeding that
way, we have warned, risks handing judges a license to turn
“the guarantee of confrontation” into “no guarantee at all.”
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Gorsuch, J., concurring

Ibid. As there, so too here: Courts must proceed with
care in making comparisons to historic frearms regulations,
or else they risk gaming away an individual right the people
expressly preserved for themselves in the Constitution's
text.
Proceeding with this well in mind today, the Court rightly
holds that Mr. Rahimi's facial challenge to § 922(g)(8) cannot
succeed. It cannot because, through surety laws and re-
strictions on “going armed,” the people in this country have
understood from the start that the government may disarm
an individual temporarily after a “judicial determinatio[n]”
that he “likely would threaten or ha[s] threatened another
with a weapon.” Ante, at 699. And, at least in some cases,
the statute before us works in the same way and does so for
the same reasons: It permits a court to disarm a person only
if, after notice and hearing, it fnds that he “represents a
credible threat to the physical safety” of others. §§ 922(g)
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(8)(A), (g)(8)(C)(i). A court, too, may disarm an individual
only for so long as its order is in effect. § 922(g)(8). In
short, in at least some applications, the challenged law does
not diminish any aspect of the right the Second Amendment
was originally understood to protect. See Bruen, 597 U. S.,
at 24.
I appreciate that one of our colleagues sees things differ-
ently. Post, at 751 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But if reason-
able minds can disagree whether § 922(g)(8) is analogous to
past practices originally understood to fall outside the Sec-
ond Amendment's scope, we at least agree that is the only
proper question a court may ask. Post, at 750. Discerning
what the original meaning of the Constitution requires in
this or that case may sometimes be diffcult. Asking that
question, however, at least keeps judges in their proper
lane, seeking to honor the supreme law the people have or-
dained rather than substituting our will for theirs. And
whatever indeterminacy may be associated with seeking to
honor the Constitution's original meaning in modern dis-
712 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Gorsuch, J., concurring

putes, that path offers surer footing than any other this
Court has attempted from time to time. Come to this Court
with arguments from text and history, and we are bound to
reason through them as best we can. (As we have today.)
Allow judges to reign unbounded by those materials, or
permit them to extrapolate their own broad new principles
from those sources, and no one can have any idea how they
might rule. (Except the judges themselves.) Faithful ad-
herence to the Constitution's original meaning may be an
imperfect guide, but I can think of no more perfect one for
us to follow.
Just consider how lower courts approached the Second
Amendment before our decision in Bruen. They reviewed
frearm regulations under a two-step test that quickly “de-
volved” into an interest-balancing inquiry, where courts
would weigh a law's burden on the right against the benefts
the law offered. See Rogers v. Grewal, 590 U. S. 996, 999–
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1000, and n. 1 (2020) (Thomas, J., joined by Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also, e. g., Peruta v.
County of San Diego, 742 F. 3d 1144, 1167–1168, 1176–1177
(CA9 2014); Drake v. Filko, 724 F. 3d 426, 457 (CA3 2013)
(Hardiman, J., dissenting). Some judges expressed concern
that the prevailing two-step test had become “just window
dressing for judicial policymaking.” Duncan v. Bonta, 19 F.
4th 1087, 1148 (CA9 2021) (en banc) (Bumatay, J., dissenting).
To them, the inquiry worked as a “black box regime” that
gave a judge broad license to support policies he “[f]avored”
and discard those he disliked. Ibid. How did the govern-
ment fare under that regime? In one circuit, it had an “un-
defeated, 50–0 record.” Id., at 1167, n. 8 (VanDyke, J., dis-
senting). In Bruen, we rejected that approach for one
guided by constitutional text and history. 597 U. S., at 19.
Perhaps judges' jobs would be easier if they could simply
strike the policy balance they prefer. And a principle that
the government always wins surely would be simple for
judges to implement. But either approach would let judges
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Gorsuch, J., concurring

stray far from the Constitution's promise. See Heller, 554
U. S., at 634.
One more point: Our resolution of Mr. Rahimi's facial chal-
lenge to § 922(g)(8) necessarily leaves open the question
whether the statute might be unconstitutional as applied in
“particular circumstances.” Salerno, 481 U. S., at 751. So,
for example, we do not decide today whether the government
may disarm a person without a judicial fnding that he poses
a “credible threat” to another's physical safety. § 922(g)(8)
(C)(i); see ante, at 693. We do not resolve whether the gov-
ernment may disarm an individual permanently. See ante,
at 699 (stressing that, “like surety bonds of limited duration,
Section 922(g)(8)'s restriction was temporary as applied to
[Mr.] Rahimi”). We do not determine whether § 922(g)(8)
may be constitutionally enforced against a person who uses
a frearm in self-defense. Notably, the surety laws that in-
form today's decision allowed even an individual found to
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pose a threat to another to “obtain an exception if he needed
his arms for self-defense.” Ante, at 697; see also post, at 769
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Nor do we purport to approve in
advance other laws denying frearms on a categorical basis
to any group of persons a legislature happens to deem, as
the government puts it, “not `responsible.' ” Ante, at 701
(quoting Brief for United States 6); see Tr. of Oral Arg. 31–
32; see also post, at 773 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (“Not a single
Member of the Court adopts the Government's theory”).
We do not resolve any of those questions (and perhaps oth-
ers like them) because we cannot. Article III of the Con-
stitution vests in this Court the power to decide only the
“ `actual cas[e]' ” before us, “ `not abstractions.' ” Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 89 (1947). And the case
before us does not pose the question whether the challenged
statute is always lawfully applied, or whether other statutes
might be permissible, but only whether this one has any law-
ful scope. Nor should future litigants and courts read any
more into our decision than that. As this Court has long
714 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

recognized, what we say in our opinions must “be taken in
connection with the case in which those expressions are
used,” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821), and may
not be “stretch[ed] . . . beyond their context,” Brown v. Dav-
enport, 596 U. S. 118, 141 (2022).
Among all the opinions issued in this case, its central mes-
sages should not be lost. The Court reinforces the focus on
text, history, and tradition, following exactly the path we
described in Bruen. Ante, at 690–692. And after carefully
consulting those materials, the Court “conclude[s] only this”:
“An individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to
the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed
consistent with the Second Amendment.” Ante, at 702 (em-
phasis added). With these observations, I am pleased to
concur.

Justice Kavanaugh, concurring.

Page Proof Pending Publication
The Framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights wisely
sought the best of both worlds: democratic self-government
and the protection of individual rights against excesses of
that form of government. In justiciable cases, this Court
determines whether a democratically enacted law or other
government action infringes on individual rights guaranteed
by the Constitution. When performing that Article III
duty, the Court does not implement its own policy judgments
about, for example, free speech or gun regulation. Rather,
the Court interprets and applies the Constitution by examin-
ing text, pre-ratifcation and post-ratifcation history, and
precedent. The Court's opinion today does just that, and I
join it in full.
The concurring opinions, and the briefs of the parties and
amici in this case, raise important questions about judicial
reliance on text, history, and precedent, particularly in Sec-
ond Amendment cases. I add this concurring opinion to re-
view the proper roles of text, history, and precedent in
constitutional interpretation.
Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 715

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

I
The American people established an enduring American
Constitution. The frst and most important rule in constitu-
tional interpretation is to heed the text—that is, the actual
words of the Constitution—and to interpret that text accord-
ing to its ordinary meaning as originally understood. The
text of the Constitution is the “Law of the Land.” Art. VI.
As a general matter, the text of the Constitution says what
it means and means what it says. And unless and until it is
amended, that text controls.
In many important provisions, the Constitution is a docu-
ment of majestic specifcity with “strikingly clean prose.”
A. Amar, America's Constitution xi (2005). Two Houses
of Congress. A House elected every two years. Senators
serve 6-year terms. Two Senators per State. A State's
equal suffrage in the Senate may not be changed without the
State's consent. A two-thirds House vote to expel a Mem-
Page Proof Pending Publication
ber of the House. The same for the Senate. Appropria-
tions are made by law. Bicameralism and presentment.
The Presidential veto. The Presidential pardon. The Pres-
ident serves a 4-year term. A maximum of two elected
terms for a President. The salary of a sitting President may
not be increased or decreased. A vote of a majority of the
House and two-thirds of the Senate to remove a President.
The President nominates and the Senate confrms principal
executive offcers. One Supreme Court. Tenure and salary
protection for Supreme Court and other federal judges.
Two-thirds of each House of Congress together with three-
fourths of the States may amend the Constitution. Con-
gress meets at noon on January 3rd unless otherwise
specifed by Congress. The District of Columbia votes in
Presidential elections. The list goes on.
Those and many other constitutional provisions are rela-
tively clear. And when the “framers of the Constitution em-
ployed words in their natural sense; and where they are plain
and clear, resort to collateral aids to interpretation is unnec-
716 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

essary and cannot be indulged in to narrow or enlarge the
text.” McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 27 (1892).
Of course, some provisions of the Constitution are broadly
worded or vague—to put it in Madison's words, “more or less
obscure and equivocal.” The Federalist No. 37, p. 229 (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961). As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained,
the Constitution is in some parts “obviously not a specifcally
worded document but one couched in general phraseology.”
W. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Texas
L. Rev. 693, 697 (1976).
That is especially true with respect to the broadly worded
or vague individual-rights provisions. (I will use the terms
“broadly worded” and “vague” interchangeably in this opin-
ion.) For example, the First Amendment provides that
“Congress shall make no law” “abridging the freedom of
speech.” And the Second Amendment, at issue here, guar-
antees that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”
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“shall not be infringed.”
Read literally, those Amendments might seem to grant ab-
solute protection, meaning that the government could never
regulate speech or guns in any way. But American law has
long recognized, as a matter of original understanding and
original meaning, that constitutional rights generally come
with exceptions.
With respect to the First Amendment, for example, this
Court's “jurisprudence over the past 216”—now 233—“years
has rejected an absolutist interpretation.” Federal Elec-
tion Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449,
482 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C. J.); see R. Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind.
L. J. 1, 21–22 (1971). From 1791 to the present, “the First
Amendment has permitted restrictions upon the content of
speech in a few limited areas”—including obscenity, defama-
tion, fraud, and incitement. United States v. Stevens, 559
U. S. 460, 468 (2010) (quotation marks omitted). So too with
respect to the Second Amendment: “Like most rights, the
Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 717

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited”;
it is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever
in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 626 (2008).
II
A recurring and diffcult issue for judges, therefore, is how
to interpret vague constitutional text. That issue often
arises (as here) in the context of determining exceptions to
textually guaranteed individual rights. To what extent
does the Constitution allow the government to regulate
speech or guns, for example? 1
In many cases, judicial precedent informs or controls the
answer (more on that later). But absent precedent, there
are really only two potential answers to the question of how
to determine exceptions to broadly worded constitutional
rights: history or policy.
Generally speaking, the historical approach examines the
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laws, practices, and understandings from before and after
ratifcation that may help the interpreter discern the mean-
ing of the constitutional text and the principles embodied in
that text. The policy approach rests on the philosophical or
policy dispositions of the individual judge.
History, not policy, is the proper guide.
For more than 200 years, this Court has relied on history
when construing vague constitutional text in all manner of
constitutional disputes. For good reason. History can sup-
1
There are two ways to frame this point—either (i) determining the
exceptions to a constitutional right or (ii) determining the affrmative
scope or contours of that constitutional right. Either way, the analysis is
the same—does the constitutional provision, as originally understood, per-
mit the challenged law? This opinion uses the term “exceptions,” which
underscores that the constitutional baseline is protection of the textually
enumerated right. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to
Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449, 482 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C. J.) (stating
in a First Amendment case that “it is worth recalling the language we
are applying”).
718 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

ply evidence of the original meaning of vague text. History
is far less subjective than policy. And reliance on history is
more consistent with the properly neutral judicial role than
an approach where judges subtly (or not so subtly) impose
their own policy views on the American people.
Judges are like umpires, as The Chief Justice has aptly
explained. And in a constitutional system that counts on an
independent Judiciary, judges must act like umpires. To be
an umpire, the judge “must stick close to the text and the
history, and their fair implications,” because there “is no
principled way” for a neutral judge “to prefer any claimed
human value to any other.” R. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1, 8 (1971).
History establishes a “criterion that is conceptually quite
separate from the preferences of the judge himself.” A.
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849,
864 (1989). When properly applied, history helps ensure
that judges do not simply create constitutional meaning “out
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of whole cloth.” A. Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1183 (1989).2
Absent precedent, therefore, history guides the interpre-
tation of vague constitutional text. Of course, this Court
has been deciding constitutional cases for about 230 years,
so relevant precedent often exists. As the Court's opinions

2
The historical approach applies when the text is vague. But the text
of the Constitution always controls. So history contrary to clear text is
not to be followed. See, e. g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 945–959
(1983); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 546–547 (1969); Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 490–495, and n. 5 (1954); cf. Sedi-
tion Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596. In some cases, there may be debate
about whether the relevant text is suffciently clear to override contrary
historical practices. See, e. g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513, 613
(2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“What the majority needs to
sustain its judgment is an ambiguous text and a clear historical practice.
What it has is a clear text and an at-best-ambiguous historical practice”).
The basic principle remains: Text controls over contrary historical
practices.
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Kavanaugh, J., concurring

over time amply demonstrate, precedent matters a great
deal in constitutional interpretation.
I now turn to explaining how courts apply pre-ratifcation
history, post-ratifcation history, and precedent when analyz-
ing vague constitutional text.

A
Pre-ratifcation history. When interpreting vague con-
stitutional text, the Court typically scrutinizes the stated in-
tentions and understandings of the Framers and Ratifers
of the Constitution (or, as relevant, the Amendments). The
Court also looks to the understandings of the American peo-
ple from the pertinent ratifcation era. Those intentions and
understandings do not necessarily determine meaning, but
they may be strong evidence of meaning. See generally,
e. g., The Federalist (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); Records of the
Federal Convention of 1787 (M. Farrand ed. 1911); Debates
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on the Federal Constitution (J. Elliot ed. 1836).
Especially for the original Constitution and the Bill of
Rights, the Court also examines the pre-ratifcation history
in the American Colonies, including pre-ratifcation laws and
practices. And the Court pays particular attention to the
historical laws and practices in the United States from
Independence in 1776 until ratifcation in 1788 or 1791. Pre-
ratifcation American history can shed light on constitutional
meaning in various ways.
For example, some provisions of the Constitution use lan-
guage that appeared in the Articles of Confederation or state
constitutional provisions. And when the language that ap-
peared in the Articles of Confederation or in state constitu-
tions is the same as or similar to the language in the U. S.
Constitution, the history of how people understood the lan-
guage in the Articles or state constitutions can inform inter-
pretation of that language in the U. S. Constitution. See,
e. g., Moore v. Harper, 600 U. S. 1, 33 (2023) (the “Framers
did not write the Elections Clause on a blank slate—they
720 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

instead borrowed from the Articles of Confederation” as evi-
denced by their use of “closely parallel” language); District
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 600–601 (2008) (“Our
interpretation is confrmed by analogous arms-bearing rights
in state constitutions that preceded and immediately fol-
lowed adoption of the Second Amendment”); United States
Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U. S. 452, 460, and
n. 10 (1978) (“The history of interstate agreements under
the Articles of Confederation suggests the same distinction
between `treaties, alliances, and confederations' on the one
hand, and `agreements and compacts' on the other,” as the
distinction made in the Constitution's Treaty and Compact
Clauses).
Similarly, other pre-ratifcation national or state laws and
practices may sometimes help an interpreter discern the
meaning of particular constitutional provisions. Those pre-
ratifcation American laws and practices formed part of the
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foundation on which the Framers constructed the Constitu-
tion and Bill of Rights. Indeed, the Constitution did not
displace but largely co-exists with state constitutions and
state laws, except to the extent they confict with federal
law. See Art. VI.
On the other hand, some pre-ratifcation history can be
probative of what the Constitution does not mean. The
Framers drafted and approved many provisions of the Con-
stitution precisely to depart from rather than adhere to cer-
tain pre-ratifcation laws, practices, or understandings.
For example, the “defects” of the Articles of Confederation
inspired some of the key decisions made by the Framers in
Philadelphia and by the First Congress in drafting the Bill
of Rights. The Federalist No. 37, at 224 (J. Madison); see,
e. g., id., at 226 (“the existing Confederation is founded on
principles which are fallacious; that we must consequently
change this frst foundation, and with it the superstructure
resting upon it”); PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 594
U. S. 482, 508 (2021) (“When the Framers met in Philadelphia
Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 721

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

in the summer of 1787, they sought to create a cohesive na-
tional sovereign in response to the failings of the Articles of
Confederation”); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692,
716–717 (2004) (“The Continental Congress was hamstrung
by its inability to `cause infractions of treaties, or of the law
of nations to be punished,' ” and the “Framers responded by
vesting the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over
`all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and
Consuls,' and the First Congress followed through” (citation
omitted)); U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779,
803 (1995) (“After the Constitutional Convention convened,
the Framers were presented with, and eventually adopted
a variation of, a plan not merely to amend the Articles of
Confederation but to create an entirely new National Gov-
ernment with a National Executive, National Judiciary, and
a National Legislature” (quotation marks omitted)).
The pre-ratifcation history of America's many objections
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to British laws and the system of oppressive British rule
over the Colonies—identifed most prominently in the Decla-
ration of Independence—can likewise inform interpretation
of some of the crucial provisions of the original Constitution
and Bill of Rights. Compare Declaration of Independence
¶11 (under British rule, the King “made Judges dependent
on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offces, and the
amount and payment of their salaries”) with U. S. Const.,
Art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offces during good Behaviour, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compen-
sation, which shall not be diminished during their Continu-
ance in Offce”); see, e. g., The Federalist No. 37, at 226 (“The
most that the convention could do” “was to avoid the errors
suggested by the past experience of other countries, as well
as of our own”); 1 Annals of Cong. 436 (1789) (J. Madison)
(“The freedom of the press and rights of conscience, those
choicest privileges of the people, are unguarded in the Brit-
ish Constitution”).
722 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

This Court has recognized, for example, that no “purpose
in ratifying the Bill of Rights was clearer than that of secur-
ing for the people of the United States much greater freedom
of religion, expression, assembly, and petition than the peo-
ple of Great Britain had ever enjoyed.” Bridges v. Califor-
nia, 314 U. S. 252, 265 (1941). Ratifed as it was “while
the memory of many oppressive English restrictions on the
enumerated liberties was still fresh,” the Bill of Rights “can-
not reasonably be taken as approving prevalent English
practices.” Ibid.; see, e. g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lu-
theran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U. S. 171, 183 (2012)
(“Familiar with life under the established Church of Eng-
land, the founding generation sought to foreclose the possi-
bility of a national church” through the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 60
(1932) (right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment re-
fected America's rejection of the English common law rule
that a “person charged with treason or felony was denied the
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aid of counsel”).3

3
To be sure, as the Court's cases reveal, pre-ratifcation English law and
practices may supply background for some constitutional provisions. But
the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, did not purport to take Eng-
lish law or history wholesale and silently download it into the U. S. Consti-
tution. See, e. g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 975 (1991) (opinion
of Scalia, J.) (“Unless one accepts the notion of a blind incorporation, how-
ever, the ultimate question is not what `cruell and unusuall punishments'
meant in the [English] Declaration of Rights, but what its meaning was to
the Americans who adopted the Eighth Amendment”). Therefore, re-
fexively resorting to English law or history without careful analysis can
sometimes be problematic because America had fought a war—and would
soon fght another in 1812—to free itself from British law and practices
and rid itself of tyrannical British rule. See The Federalist No. 45, p. 289
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison) (“Was, then, the American Revolution
effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood
of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not
that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety,” but
that they should continue to be subject to the “impious doctrine in the old
world, that the people were made for kings, not kings for the people”?).
Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 723

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

The Equal Protection Clause provides another example.
Ratifed in 1868, that Clause sought to reject the Nation's
history of racial discrimination, not to backdoor incorporate
racially discriminatory and oppressive historical practices
and laws into the Constitution. See generally Flowers v.
Mississippi, 588 U. S. 284 (2019); Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U. S. 79 (1986); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954).
In short, pre-ratifcation American history—that is, pre-
ratifcation laws, practices, and understandings—can inform
interpretation of vague constitutional provisions in the origi-
nal Constitution and Bill of Rights. The same principle of
looking to relevant pre-ratifcation history applies when in-
terpreting broadly worded language in the later amend-
ments, including the Fourteenth Amendment ratifed in 1868.
But in using pre-ratifcation history, courts must exercise
care to rely only on the history that the Constitution actually
incorporated and not on the history that the Constitution
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left behind.
B
Post-ratifcation history. As the Framers made clear,
and as this Court has stated time and again for more than
two centuries, post-ratifcation history—sometimes referred
to as tradition—can also be important for interpreting vague
constitutional text and determining exceptions to individual
constitutional rights. When the text is vague and the pre-
ratifcation history is elusive or inconclusive, post-ratifcation
history becomes especially important. Indeed, absent prec-
edent, there can be little else to guide a judge deciding a
constitutional case in that situation, unless the judge simply
defaults to his or her own policy preferences.
After ratifcation, the National Government and the state
governments began interpreting and applying the Constitu-
tion's text. They have continued to do so ever since. As
the national and state governments over time have enacted
laws and implemented practices to promote the general wel-
724 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

fare, those laws and practices have often refected and rein-
forced common understandings of the Constitution's authori-
zations and limitations.
Post-ratifcation interpretations and applications by gov-
ernment actors—at least when reasonably consistent and
longstanding—can be probative of the meaning of vague con-
stitutional text. The collective understanding of Americans
who, over time, have interpreted and applied the broadly
worded constitutional text can provide good guidance for a
judge who is trying to interpret that same text decades
or centuries later. See, e. g., Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U. S. 765, 785 (2002) (a “universal and long-
established tradition of prohibiting certain conduct creates
a strong presumption that the prohibition is constitutional”
(quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,
236 U. S. 459, 472–473 (1915) (“offcers, law-makers and citi-
zens naturally adjust themselves to any long-continued ac-
tion” of the government “on the presumption that” unconsti-
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tutional “acts would not have been allowed to be so often
repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice”); McPher-
son v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 27 (1892) (when constitutional
text is vague, “contemporaneous and subsequent practical
construction are entitled to the greatest weight”).4
4
Post-ratifcation history is sometimes also referred to as tradition, liq-
uidation, or historical gloss. Those concepts are probably not identical in
all respects. In any event, in applying those concepts in constitutional
interpretation, some important questions can arise, such as: (i) the level
of generality at which to defne a historical practice; (ii) how widespread
a historical practice must have been; (iii) how long ago it must have
started; and (iv) how long it must have endured.
Although this Court's constitutional precedents routinely rely on post-
ratifcation history, those precedents do not supply a one-size-fts-all an-
swer to those various methodological questions. See, e. g., Noel Canning,
573 U. S., at 522–556; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S.
579, 610–611 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
And I will not attempt to answer all of those questions here. Re-
spected scholars are continuing to undertake careful analysis. See gener-
ally J. Alicea, Practice-Based Constitutional Theories, 133 Yale L. J. 568
Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 725

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

Importantly, the Framers themselves intended that post-
ratifcation history would shed light on the meaning of vague
constitutional text. They understood that some constitu-
tional text may be “more or less obscure and equivocal” such
that questions “daily occur in the course of practice.” The
Federalist No. 37, at 228–229. Madison explained that the
meaning of vague text would be “liquidated and ascertained
by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.” Id.,
at 229. In other words, Madison articulated the Framers'
expectation and intent that post-ratifcation history would be
a proper and important tool to help constitutional interpret-
ers determine the meaning of vague constitutional text.
From early on, this Court followed Madison's lead. In
1819, in one of its most important decisions ever, the Court
addressed the scope of Article I's Necessary and Proper
Clause. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall invoked post-
ratifcation history to conclude that Congress's authority to
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establish a national bank could “scarcely be considered as
an open question.” Id., at 401. The constitutionality of the
national bank had “been recognised by many successive leg-
islatures,” and an “exposition of the constitution, deliberately
established by legislative acts, on the faith of which an im-
mense property has been advanced, ought not to be lightly
disregarded.” Ibid. Marshall added: The “respective pow-
ers of those who are equally the representatives of the peo-
ple, are to be adjusted; if not put at rest by the practice of

(2023); R. Barnett & L. Solum, Originalism After Dobbs, Bruen, and Ken-
nedy: The Role of History and Tradition, 118 Nw. U. L. Rev. 433 (2023); M.
DeGirolami, Traditionalism Rising, 24 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 9 (2023);
S. Girgis, Living Traditionalism, 98 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1477 (2023); W. Baude,
Constitutional Liquidation, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2019); C. Bradley, Doing
Gloss, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 59 (2017); C. Bradley & T. Morrison, Historical
Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411 (2012); A. Amar,
America's Constitution (2005); C. Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive
Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519 (2003); M. McConnell, Tradition and
Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 173.
726 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

the government, ought to receive a considerable impression
from that practice.” Ibid.
In relying on post-ratifcation history as a proper tool to
discern constitutional meaning, Madison and Marshall make
for a formidable duo. Moving from distant American his-
tory to more recent times, one can add Justice Scalia.
Throughout his consequential 30-year tenure on this Court,
Justice Scalia repeatedly emphasized that constitutional in-
terpretation must take account of text, pre-ratifcation his-
tory, and post-ratifcation history—the last of which he often
referred to as “tradition.” In his words, when judges in-
terpret vague or broadly worded constitutional text, the
“traditions of our people” are “paramount.” McDonald v.
Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 792 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Constitutional interpretation should refect “the principles
adhered to, over time, by the American people, rather than
those favored by the personal (and necessarily shifting) phil-
osophical dispositions of a majority of this Court.” Rutan
Page Proof Pending Publication
v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U. S. 62, 96 (1990) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
The U. S. Reports are well stocked with Scalia opinions
looking to post-ratifcation history and tradition.5 In Heller,
5
Justice Scalia's opinions “made extensive use of post-ratifcation his-
tory,” and “his assessment of post-ratifcation history” in those opinions
extended “far beyond the time of enactment.” M. Ramsey, Beyond the
Text: Justice Scalia's Originalism in Practice, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1945,
1957, 1960 (2017). Justice Scalia did not necessarily “use[ ] tradition as an
independent source of interpretive authority; rather, he had a very broad
view of what traditions might be indicative of original meaning.” Id., at
1962, n. 79; see, e. g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513, 584–593, 602–
615 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 605–619, 626–628 (2008); McCreary County v. Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U. S. 844, 886–900 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 558–563 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 47–50 (2004); Mitchell v.
United States, 526 U. S. 314, 334–336, and n. 1 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525
U. S. 316, 347–349 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Clinton v. City of
Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 727

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that “a critical tool of con-
stitutional interpretation” is “the examination of a variety of
legal and other sources to determine the public understand-
ing of a legal text in the period after its enactment or ratif-
cation.” 554 U. S., at 605 (emphasis in original); see also
ibid. (“We now address how the Second Amendment was in-
terpreted from immediately after its ratifcation through the
end of the 19th century”).
Heller echoed years of earlier Scalia opinions. To take
one: “Where the meaning of a constitutional text (such as
`the freedom of speech') is unclear, the widespread and long-
accepted practices of the American people are the best indi-
cation of what fundamental beliefs it was intended to en-
shrine.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334,
378 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Or another: A “venerable
and accepted tradition is not to be laid on the examining
table and scrutinized for its conformity to some abstract
principle” of “adjudication devised by this Court. To the
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contrary, such traditions are themselves the stuff out of
which the Court's principles are to be formed. They are, in
these uncertain areas, the very points of reference by which
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of other practices is to be fg-
ured out.” Rutan, 497 U. S., at 95–96 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).

New York, 524 U. S. 417, 465–469 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 905–918 (1997);
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 515–519 (1995); McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334, 375–378, and nn. 1–2 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 223–225 (1995);
Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U. S. 687,
732, 744 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390,
427–428 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U. S. 40, 54
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 979–
985 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497
U. S. 62, 95–97 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); McKoy v. North Carolina,
494 U. S. 433, 466, 471 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Holland v. Illinois,
493 U. S. 474, 481–482, and n. 1 (1990).
728 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

As leading actors and theorists in the earliest and latest
chapters of the American constitutional story, Madison, Mar-
shall, and Scalia made clear that courts should look to
post-ratifcation history as well as pre-ratifcation history to
interpret vague constitutional text.
For more than two centuries—from the early 1800s to this
case—this Court has done just that. The Court has repeat-
edly employed post-ratifcation history to determine the
meaning of vague constitutional text. Reliance on post-
ratifcation history “has shaped scores of Court cases span-
ning all domains of constitutional law, every era of the
nation's history, and Justices of every stripe.” S. Girgis,
Living Traditionalism, 98 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1477, 1480 (2023);
see, e. g., Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Com-
munity Financial Services Assn. of America, Ltd., 601 U. S.
416, 441–445 (2024) (Kagan, J., concurring); Trump v. Ander-
son, 601 U. S. 100, 113–115 (2024) (per curiam); Moore v.
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Harper, 600 U. S. 1, 22, 32–34 (2023); Kennedy v. Bremerton
School Dist., 597 U. S. 507, 535–536, 540–541, and n. 6 (2022);
New York State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S.
1, 35–37, 50–70 (2022); City of Austin v. Reagan Nat. Adver-
tising of Austin, LLC, 596 U. S. 61, 75 (2022); Houston Com-
munity College System v. Wilson, 595 U. S. 468, 474–477
(2022); PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 594 U. S. 482,
494–497, 508 (2021); TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S.
413, 424–425, 432–434 (2021); Torres v. Madrid, 592 U. S. 306,
314 (2021); Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591 U. S. 848, 858–
862 (2020); Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U. S. 578, 592–597
(2020); American Legion v. American Humanist Assn., 588
U. S. 29, 58–66 (2019); Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U. S. 1, 15–
17, 23–28 (2015); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U. S. 565,
575–579 (2014); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570,
605–619, 626–628 (2008); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S.
36, 47–50 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 481–
483, and n. 10 (2000); Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437,
445–448 (1992); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474, 481–482,
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Kavanaugh, J., concurring

and n. 1 (1990); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 786–792
(1983); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654, 678–682
(1981); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U. S.
664, 676–680 (1970); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 522,
541–547 (1969); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U. S. 579, 610–613 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304,
321–329 (1936); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655, 688–691
(1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 155–158 (1926);
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 469–475
(1915); Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 683–692
(1892); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 18 How. 272, 279–280 (1856); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 400–401 (1819).6

C
Precedent. With a Constitution and a Supreme Court
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that are both more than two centuries old, this Court and
other courts are rarely interpreting a constitutional provi-
sion for the frst time. Rather, a substantial body of Su-
preme Court precedent already exists for many provisions
of the Constitution.
Precedent is fundamental to day-to-day constitutional de-
cisionmaking in this Court and every American court. The
“judicial Power” established in Article III incorporates the
6
The Court has similarly relied on history when deciding cases involv-
ing textually unenumerated rights under the Due Process Clause or the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. In those contexts, the baseline is
180-degrees different: The text supplies no express protection of any as-
serted substantive right. The Court has recognized exceptions to that
textual baseline, but in doing so has regularly observed that the Four-
teenth Amendment “specially protects those fundamental rights and liber-
ties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720–721 (1997) (quotation
marks omitted); see, e. g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534–
535 (1925) (“liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control”).
730 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

principle of stare decisis, both vertical and horizontal. As
Hamilton stated, to “avoid an arbitrary discretion in the
courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down
by strict rules and precedents” that will “unavoidably swell
to a very considerable bulk” and “serve to defne and point
out their duty in every particular case that comes before
them.” The Federalist No. 78, at 471 (A. Hamilton).
Courts must respect precedent, while at the same time
recognizing that precedent on occasion may appropriately be
overturned. See, e. g., Brown, 347 U. S. 483; West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937); see also Ramos
v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. 83, 115–132 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in part). In light of the signifcant amount of
Supreme Court precedent that has built up over time, this
Court and other courts often decide constitutional cases by
reference to those extensive bodies of precedent.
Even then, however, text and history still matter a great
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deal. When determining how broadly or narrowly to read a
precedent; when determining whether to extend, limit, or
narrow a precedent; or in relatively infrequent cases, when
determining whether to overrule a precedent, a court often
will consider how the precedent squares with the Constitu-
tion's text and history. Therefore, the text, as well as pre-
ratifcation and post-ratifcation history, may appropriately
function as a gravitational pull on the Court's interpretation
of precedent. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Com-
pany Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F. 3d 667, 698 (CADC
2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“We should resolve ques-
tions about the scope of those precedents in light of and
in the direction of the constitutional text and constitutional
history”).
But the frst stop in this Court's constitutional decision-
making is the Court's precedents—the accumulated wisdom
of jurists from Marshall and Story to Harlan and Taft; from
Hughes and Black to Jackson and White; from Rehnquist and
O'Connor to Kennedy and Scalia; and so on.
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Kavanaugh, J., concurring

III
Some say that courts should determine exceptions to
broadly worded individual rights, including the Second
Amendment, by looking to policy. Uphold a law if it is a
good idea; strike it down if it is not. True, the proponents
of a policy-based approach to interpretation of broadly
worded or vague constitutional text usually do not say so
explicitly (although some do). Rather, they support a bal-
ancing approach variously known as means-end scrutiny,
heightened scrutiny, tiers of scrutiny, rational basis with
bite, or strict or intermediate or intermediate-plus or rigor-
ous or skeptical scrutiny. Whatever the label of the day,
that balancing approach is policy by another name. It re-
quires judges to weigh the benefts against the burdens of a
law and to uphold the law as constitutional if, in the judge's
view, the law is suffciently reasonable or important. See
M. Barnes & E. Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal
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Protection Doctrine?, 43 Conn. L. Rev. 1059, 1080 (2011)
(“The levels of scrutiny are essentially balancing tests”).
To begin, as I have explained, that kind of balancing ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation departs from what
Framers such as Madison stated, what jurists such as Mar-
shall and Scalia did, what judges as umpires should strive to
do, and what this Court has actually done across the consti-
tutional landscape for the last two centuries.
The balancing tests (heightened scrutiny and the like) are
a relatively modern judicial innovation in constitutional deci-
sionmaking. The “tiers of scrutiny have no basis in the text
or original meaning of the Constitution.” J. Alicea & J.
Ohlendorf, Against the Tiers of Constitutional Scrutiny,
National Affairs 72, 73 (2019). And before the late 1950s,
“what we would now call strict judicial scrutiny did not
exist.” R. Fallon, The Nature of Constitutional Rights: The
Invention and Logic of Strict Judicial Scrutiny 30 (2019).
The Court “appears to have adopted” heightened-scrutiny
tests “by accident” in the 1950s and 1960s in a series of Com-
732 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

munist speech cases, “rather than as the result of a consid-
ered judgment.” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 125 (1991) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in judgment). The Court has employed
balancing only in discrete areas of constitutional law—and
even in those cases, history still tends to play a far larger
role than overt judicial policymaking.7
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the Court overrule
cases where the Court has applied those heightened-scrutiny
tests. But I am challenging the notion that those tests are
the ordinary approach to constitutional interpretation. And
I am arguing against extending those tests to new areas,
including the Second Amendment.
One major problem with using a balancing approach to de-
termine exceptions to constitutional rights is that it requires
highly subjective judicial evaluations of how important a law
is—at least unless the balancing test itself incorporates his-
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tory, in which case judges might as well just continue to rely
on history directly.
The subjective balancing approach forces judges to act
more like legislators who decide what the law should be,
rather than judges who “say what the law is.” Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). That is because the

7
The Court has articulated a heightened-scrutiny test in some pockets
of free-speech jurisprudence. But even when invoking heightened scru-
tiny in that context, the Court still often relies directly on history. See,
e. g., City of Austin v. Reagan Nat. Advertising of Austin, LLC, 596 U. S.
61, 75 (2022) (a city's regulation of solely off-premises billboards was
within “the Nation's history of regulating off-premises signs” as “federal,
state, and local jurisdictions have repeatedly relied upon on-/off-premises
distinctions” “for the last 50-plus years”); Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local
Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45–46 (1983) (“In places which by long
tradition” “have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the
State to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed”). The Court
has also used heightened scrutiny in certain equal protection cases. As
discussed above, the Equal Protection Clause rejected the history of ra-
cially discriminatory laws and practices.
Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 733

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

balancing approach requires judges to weigh the benefts of
a law against its burdens—a value-laden and political task
that is usually reserved for the political branches. And that
power in essence vests judges with “a roving commission to
second-guess” legislators and administrative offcers “con-
cerning what is best for the country.” W. Rehnquist, The
Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Texas L. Rev. 693, 698
(1976). Stated otherwise, when a court “does not have a
solid textual anchor or an established social norm from which
to derive the general rule, its pronouncement appears un-
comfortably like legislation.” A. Scalia, The Rule of Law as
a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1185 (1989).
Moreover, the balancing approach is ill-defned. Some
judges will apply heightened scrutiny with a presumption in
favor of deference to the legislature. Other judges will
apply heightened scrutiny with a presumption in favor of the
individual right in question. Because it is unmoored, the
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balancing approach presents the real “danger” that “judges
will mistake their own predilections for the law.” A. Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 863
(1989). Under the balancing approach, to use Justice Sca-
lia's characteristically vivid description, if “We The Court
conclude that They The People's answers to a problem” are
unwise, “we are free to intervene,” but if we “think the
States may be on to something, we can loosen the leash.”
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 803 (2010) (concurring
opinion) (quotation marks omitted).
The balancing approach can be antithetical to the principle
that judges must act like umpires. It turns judges into
players. Justice Black once protested that the Court should
not balance away bedrock free speech protections for the
perceived policy needs of the moment. He argued that “the
balancing approach” “disregards all of the unique features

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11066646. Public record. Not legal advice.
