# TALOTTA, MD v. TROXELL,J.S.C.

> District Court, D. New Jersey · June 5, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11066172

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** June 5, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11066172

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that a “plaintiff's failure to establish any element .. . renders a preliminary injunction inappropriate”
- affirming district court’s order dismissing complaint because judges were entitled to judicial immunity

## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JOE TALOTTA, MD,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 25-3783 (MAS) (JTQ)
° MEMORANDUM OPINION
HON. DAVID TROXELL, J.S.C., et al.,
Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Joe Talotta, MD’s! (“Plaintiff”)
Amended Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and Preliminary Injunction (“PI”).
(ECF No. 12.) Defendants the Honorable Christopher M. Troxell, J.S.C. (“Judge Troxell”),” the
Honorable Robert G. Wilson, J.S.C. (“Judge Wilson”), the Honorable John J. Burke, II, J.S.C.
(“Judge Burke”), and the Honorable Kevin M. Shanahan, A.J.S.C. (“Judge Shanahan”)
(collectively, “Judicial Defendants”) opposed. (ECF No. 20.)° The Court has carefully considered
the parties’ submissions and reaches its decision without oral argument under Local Civil Rule
78.1(b). For the reasons below, Plaintiff's Motion for a TRO and PI as to the Judicial Defendants
is denied.

! The Court notes that Plaintiff has proceeded in the state court as “Nicholas J. Talotta,” but he has
filed the instant case as “Joe Talotta, MD.” (See, e.g., ECF No. 11 at *10.)
? The Court recognizes that Judge Troxell was improperly pled in the Amended Complaint as
“Hon. David Troxell, J.S.C.” (Judicial Defs.” Opp’n Br. 1, ECF No. 20.)
> Defendants Linda A. Schofel, Esq., LCSW and David Gomberg, Ph.D. still have not been
properly served in this action and have not appeared. (See ECF No. 21.)

I, BACKGROUND‘
A. The Parties
Plaintiff is the father of minor child G.T. (Am. Compl. 19, ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff alleges
that: (1) Judge Troxell is a judge of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Somerset County, Family
Part, who entered an ex parte no-contact order against him in December 2022 (id. at 19); (2) Judge
Wilson was reassigned to the case in early 2023 and “repeatedly extended highly limited or
no-contact orders without ever providing a plenary hearing” (id.); (3) Judge Burke is currently
assigned to Plaintiffs state court matter and “has authority to lift or continue the parenting
restrictions” (id. at 20); and (4) Judge Shanahan is the Assignment Judge who bears supervisory
responsibility over Plaintiff's case (id.).
B. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff alleges that in January 2022, he and his ex-wife entered into a consent order that
mandated all parenting-time disputes be resolved through alternative dispute resolution no later
than November 1, 2022 (the “2022 Consent Order”). (id. at 21; Exs. to Compl.° *16-20,° ECF No.
11.) Approximately five months later, Defendant Linda A. Schofel, Esq., LCSW, was appointed
as Parenting Coordinator to assist the parties in resolving their parenting-related conflicts. (Am.
Compl. 21; Exs. to Compl. *10-14.)
Plaintiff alleges that on December 9, 2022, Judge Troxell entered an ex parte no-contact
order that suspended Plaintiff's parenting time based solely on Plaintiff's ex-wife’s allegations in

* The following facts are taken from the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 5.)
> Plaintiff did not originally attach the exhibits to the Amended Complaint, but later filed them in
a separate docket entry after a quality control message the Clerk’s Office issued.
° Page numbers preceded by an asterisk refer to the page number provided in the ECF header.

the papers of her emergency motion, without conferring with Plaintiff or his attorney and without
a hearing. (Am. Compl. 21-22.) The court conditioned the restoration of Plaintiff's parenting time
on a psychological risk evaluation conducted by Defendant David Gomberg, Ph.D. (“Gomberg”).
(id. at 22.) Plaintiff alleges that he requested that this evaluation comply with “professional
standards typically followed by board-certified forensic psychologists” but that Gomberg
withdrew, citing Plaintiff's communications as “evidence of ‘non-compliance.’” Ud. (emphasis
omitted).)
Plaintiff alleges that in June 2023 he was incarcerated for one month for contempt after
objecting to these court orders, (/d.) Plaintiff appealed the court’s no-contact order to the New
Jersey Appellate Division in November 2023. Ud. at 23.) Plaintiff alleges that the Appellate
Division’s decision, issued on April 16, 2025, confirmed that his confinement in June 2023 was
unlawful, but it failed to resolve his alleged constitutional violations. (/d.)
On May 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed the original complaint and a Motion for a TRO and PI in
the instant case. (ECF Nos. 1, 6.) Two days later, he filed the Amended Complaint and an
Amended Motion for a TRO and PI (“Motion”). (Am. Compl., Pl.’s Moving Br., ECF No. 5 at
48-58.") The Amended Complaint asserts: (1) a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right to
procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Count I’); (2) a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment right to substantive due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Count IT”); and (3) a claim
for equitable relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (“Count II”). (Am. Compl. 24-33.)
In his Motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court order: (1) reinstatement of his parenting time;
(2) enforcement of the 2022 Consent Order; (3) a plenary evidentiary hearing; (4) enjoining the

7 In addition to the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 5 also includes Plaintiff's Moving Brief (P1.’s
Moving Br., ECF No. 5 at 48-58) to accompany his Amended Motion (ECF No. 12).

use of unscreened psychological or psychiatric evidence; and (5) staying or sealing any contempt
orders. (P1.’s Moving Br. 55-56.) Judicial Defendants opposed Plaintiffs motion. (Judicial Defs.’
Opp’n Br., ECF No. 20.)® The motion is now ripe for review as to the Judicial Defendants.
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
“Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy and should be granted only in
limited circumstances.”? Kos Pharms., Inc. vy. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This remedy should be granted only if plaintiffs
establish that: (1) “they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims”; (2) “they are likely to
suffer irreparable harm without relief’; (3) “the balance of harms favors them”; and (4) “relief is
in the public interest.” Issa v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 847 F.3d 121, 131 Gd Cir. 2017) (citation
omitted). “A plaintiffs failure to establish any element in [his] favor renders a preliminary
injunction inappropriate.” NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mars Enters., Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (Gd Cir.
1999) (citation omitted). With respect to the first factor, “on an application for injunctive relief,
the movant need only make a showing of reasonable probability, not the certainty, of success on
the merits.” Ail. City Coin & Slot Serv. Co., Inc. v. IGT, 14 F. Supp. 2d 644, 657 (D.N.J. 1998)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In the end, however, “[t]he burden is on the
moving party ‘to convince the district court that all four factors favor preliminary relief.’” Peter v.
Gen. of N.J., No. 23-3337, 2023 WL 4627866, at *1 (D.N.J. July 19, 2023) (quoting AT&T
v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994)).

The Court scheduled a telephone conference to address Plaintiff's motion, at which Plaintiff
failed to appear on May 20, 2025. (See ECF No. 21.) Plaintiff has not had any interaction with the
Court since he failed to appear.
? Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions require the same elements be met.
Koons v. Reynolds, 649 F. Supp. 3d 14, 21-22 (D.N.J. 2023).

I. DISCUSSION
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Plaintiff argues that he is likely to succeed on the merits because he has asserted violations
of procedural and substantive due process as it relates to the fundamental liberty interest of “a fit
parent to care for and maintain contact with their child.” (Pl.’s Moving Br. 51.) In particular,
Plaintiff avers that his parenting rights were suspended ex parte and indefinitely without a required
hearing. (See id, at 51-52.) Judicial Defendants argue in opposition that Plaintiff is not likely to
succeed on the merits because his claims are barred by “sovereign immunity, injunctive relief is
unavailable against a judicial officer who is immune from suit, and the relief sought runs afoul of
the Younger abstention doctrine.” (Judicial Defs.’ Opp’n Br. 11.) Given “the importance of
resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation,” the Court addresses
Judicial Defendants’ immunity arguments first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)
(quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)).
L. Judicial Immunity
“A judicial officer in the performance of his duties has absolute immunity from suit and
will not be liable for his judicial acts.” Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991)); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)
(“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done
maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.”). Importantly, “judicial immunity is an immunity
from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)
(citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
The Supreme Court has identified two exceptions to this rule. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S.
at 11-12. “First, a judge is not immune from liability for non-judicial acts, i.e., actions not taken in

the judge’s judicial capacity.” /d. at 11. “Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial
in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” /d. at 12. To determine whether an act
qualifies as a judicial act, courts look to “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function
normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with
the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362.
All of the allegations against Judge Troxell, Judge Wilson, Judge Burke, and Judge
Shanahan relate to their actions taken in their respective capacities as judges in the Superior Court
of New Jersey. As to Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Judicial Defendants violated his procedural due
process rights by: (1) imposing the ex parte no-contact order without factual findings;
(2) accepting untested psychological claims related to his case in the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Family Part; (3) relying on a psychological risk evaluator without proper qualifications; and
(4) denying Plaintiff a forum to contest the deprivation of his parental rights. (Am. Compl. 26-27.)
As to Count I], Plaintiff alleges that his parental rights have been terminated “absent a finding of
unfitness or danger” through the no-contact order. (/d. at 27-29.) As to Count II, Plaintiff alleges
that he is entitled to equitable relief because of alleged procedural due process violations related
to the no-contact order. (/d. at 29-33.) These allegations refer exclusively to judicial acts that the
Judicial Defendants allegedly took related to Plaintiff's case before the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Family Part. Because Plaintiff has neither alleged any facts to demonstrate that the Judicial
Defendants performed non-judicial acts with respect to Plaintiff, nor alleged that any of the Judicial
Defendants performed actions in the clear absence of jurisdiction, the Court finds that the Judicial

Defendants are entitled to judicial immunity.!° See, e.g., Kinnard v. George, 652 F. App’x 96, 98
(3d Cir, 2016) (affirming district court’s order dismissing complaint because judges were entitled
to judicial immunity); Jones v. Ocean Cnty. DCP&P, No. 18-11528, 2019 WL 1529712, at *4
(D.N.J. Apr. 9, 2019) (dismissing case against a Superior Court of New Jersey, Family Part judge
because he was “entitled to judicial immunity”); Clauso v. Solomon, No. 14-5280, 2017 WL
1528712, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2017) (dismissing claims against state court judges because they
were “entitled to absolute judicial immunity”), aff'd, 790 F. App’x 427 (3d Cir. 2019).
Since Plaintiff has not established a likelihood of success on the merits, the Court need not
consider the remaining three factors. Nutrasweet, 176 F.3d at 153 (stating that a “plaintiff's failure
to establish any element .. . renders a preliminary injunction inappropriate”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Amended Motion for a TRO and PI as to the
Judicial Defendants is denied. The Court will issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum
Opinion.

MICHAEL A. SHIPP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

' As to Counts I and II, the Court also notes that the 1996 amendments to § 1983 explicitly bar
granting injunctive relief against a judicial officer “for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006)
(explaining that “the 1996 amendment[s] to § 1983 bar [plaintiff's] claims for injunctive relief
against the state court judges.”).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11066172. Public record. Not legal advice.