# Goodson v. City of Dallas

> District Court, N.D. Texas · May 5, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11065395

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** May 5, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11065395

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that pro se plaintiffs must comply with the rules of civil procedure

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MARTIN ONASSIS GOODSON, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § No. 3:25-cv-816-K (BT)
§
CITY OF DALLAS, et al. §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court are pro se plaintiff Martin Onassis Goodson’s complaint
(ECF No. 3), amended complaint (ECF No. 16), and motions (ECF Nos. 6, 7, 8, 14,
25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36-45, 49). For the reasons below, the Court should
dismiss Goodson’s federal claims that imply the invalidity of his state criminal
conviction with prejudice to their being asserted again until the conditions in Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) are met; dismiss his remaining federal claims
with prejudice; dismiss his state-law claims without prejudice to his ability to
assert them in state court; and deny his pending motions.
Background
Goodson filed his original complaint on April 3, 2025. Compl. (ECF No. 3).
A few days later, he filed an amended, “supplemental” complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1). Amend. Compl. (ECF No. 16). These complaints
are the operative pleadings for screening purposes.1
In the operative pleadings, Goodson alleges as follows:

In 2018, a Dallas Fire Department (DFD) vehicle ran a red light and struck
Goodson’s vehicle, knocking Goodson unconscious. Compl. at 4; Amend. Compl.
at 11. Goodson was taken to Methodist Hospital. Compl. at 4. When Goodson
regained consciousness, he was disoriented and discovered he was naked and
handcuffed. Amend. Compl. at 11.

While Goodson was “incapacitated,” Dallas Police Department (DPD)
officers interrogated him. Amend. Compl. at 12. The officers accused him of

1Goodson also filed several proposed attachments or supplements to his
complaints (ECF Nos. 17-23, 46, 48) without leave of Court and contrary to the
Court’s explicit instructions not to file such documents without prior court
approval. Ord. (ECF No. 11). He also filed a purported second amended complaint
(ECF No. 24) without leave of Court and in violation of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a). The Court does not consider these filings for screening purposes
because they were filed in violation of its orders and/or the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See, e.g., Yazdchi v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 217 F. App’x 299, 304 (5th
Cir. 2007) (holding that pro se plaintiffs must comply with the rules of civil
procedure); see also Mills v. Treasury Retail Sec. Services, 2023 WL 6245204, at
*2 (D. Neb. Sept. 26, 2023) (“Plaintiff subsequently filed five supplements to his
Amended Complaint between January 6, 2023, and August 14, 2023. Because
these supplemental pleadings were not filed with leave of Court and contrary to the
Court’s Initial Review Order, the supplements will be stricken from the court file
and will not be considered by the Court in conducting its initial review of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint.”) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 15); see also Gibson v. Mackey, 2024
WL 4906181, at *1, n.1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2024) (“Gibson also, without leave of
court, filed several documents supplementing or amending his original allegations.
ECF Nos. 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21. The Court does not consider these documents
for screening purposes because Gibson did not move for leave of Court to file
them.”) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)-(2)) (further citation omitted), rec. accepted
2024 WL 4906749 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2024).
murder and driving under the influence of alcohol. Compl. at 4; Amend. Compl. at
14. The officers never advised him of his Miranda rights. Amend. Compl. at 15; see
also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). His blood was drawn without his

consent, and his blood alcohol level was later used to “build a criminal charge”
against him. Amend. Compl. at 15.
After Goodson was interrogated, the hospital allowed DPD officers to take
him into custody without “due process” and even though he was bleeding and
unable to walk. Id. He was discharged from the hospital without his consent and

transferred into law enforcement custody without a wheelchair, clothes, or medical
clearance. Id. at 17. He was never provided with his paperwork, a diagnosis, or the
name of the doctor or nurse responsible for his care. Id. at 35-36. The hospital did
not medically intervene to stop his removal, even though he was discharged
prematurely. Id. at 18.
After he was discharged from the hospital, Goodson was placed in the Lew

Sterrett Jail. Rather than receiving “medical evaluation or effective housing,”
Goodson was “knowingly” placed into a violent unit where he could not defend
himself. Id. at 20. Multiple correctional officers expressed concern about
Goodson’s condition, but their concerns were ignored or overridden. Id. at 20-21.
No one intervened to help Goodson. Id. at 21. For days, he received no medical

care, psychiatric evaluation, or reassessment of housing. Id.
Because of the vehicle collision, Goodson was charged in state court with
intoxication assault with a vehicle. See id. at 43. Goodson’s original attorney
withdrew from his representation because of a “suspicious claim of conflict of
interest.” Id. at 26-27. This resulted in a calculated, “strategic swap” of counsel,
replacing Goodson’s competent attorney with a “pit bull” attorney who was

constitutionally ineffective and failed to represent his interests. Id. at 26, 38. This
was all part of a conspiracy to harm Goodson’s ability to defend himself. Id. at 28.
On June 7, 2019, Goodson pleaded guilty to intoxication assault and received
a suspended sentence under which he was placed on community supervision for
five years. Id. at 41; The State of Texas v. Martin Goodson, F-1853869-W, (363rd

Jud. Dist. Court, Dallas, Tex., June 7, 2019). The five years of community-
supervision was longer than the three years his attorney had promised. Compl. at
4. And upon reviewing his guilty plea paperwork, Goodson discovered that it had
been “physically altered” to include a longer community supervision term than he
agreed to. Amend. Compl. at 41. Goodson’s attorney either oversaw or was
“willfully ignorant to this tampering.” Id. at 42. Further, an individual who testified

against Goodson later confirmed that Goodson’s attorney told this person not to
testify truthfully, “further proving conspiracy to suppress the truth.” Compl. at 4.
As Goodson neared the end of his probation, City of Allen police “targeted
him for baseless stops—one of which resulted in a cannabis-related reset of his
probation.” Id.

Goodson contends that the conspiracy against him has continued into this
litigation, and he charges this Court with engaging in tactics to frustrate his claims.
He alleges that the automatic referral of this matter to the undersigned United
States Magistrate Judge was a “deliberate tactic to re-route a high stakes civil rights
case” and deny him his right to an Article III judge. Amend. Compl. at 45. He
alleges that the Clerk’s Office tampered with his complaint by “improperly

stamping” the document so that the case number read, “3:25-cv-816,” without the
“federally required” leading zeroes. Id. at 49, 51. Goodson claims that this led to
“procedural confusion and laid the groundwork for evidence disruption” and
supports RICO and civil rights claims. Id. at 50.
Based on these allegations, Goodson brings federal and state-law claims

against the City of Dallas, the City of Allen, DFD, DPD, Methodist Hospital,
unidentified correctional officers at the Lew Sterrett Jail, his court-appointed
attorney, and the attorney for the individual who allegedly testified untruthfully
against him. Compl. at 3. He seeks monetary and injunctive relief. Id. at 8.
Legal Standards
Goodson proceeds in forma pauperis (IFP), so his complaint is subject to

screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that statute, a district court may
summarily dismiss a complaint filed IFP if it concludes the action is: (1) frivolous
or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must

plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[,]” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those facts with
enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Id. at 555.
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint is

frivolous when it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the
factual contentions are “clearly baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32
(1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The latter category
encompasses allegations that describe “fanciful, fantastic, and delusional”
scenarios, or that “rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible[.]” Id.

at 33 (citations omitted).
Analysis
1. Goodson’s federal claims stemming from the initial vehicle collision and
his subsequent hospital stay are time-barred and substantively meritless.
Goodson claims that a DFD firetruck ran into him in 2018 in violation of his
constitutional rights. Amend. Compl. at 12. He alleges that Methodist Hospital
violated his constitutional rights by allowing DPD officers to remove him from the
hospital after the collision even though he was incapacitated, disregarding his
“serious medical condition” during his transfer into custody, and failing to issue
his paperwork or medical records. Id. at 18.2

2 Goodson also claims that Methodist Hospital discharged him before stabilizing
him in violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. Id. at 18. But EMTALA explicitly provides that no
civil action may be brought more than two years after the date the alleged EMTALA
violation occurs. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(C). And tolling is unavailable under
EMTALA’s limitations period. See Young v. Scott, 2022 WL 2240300, at *2 (S.D.
Tex. May 18, 2022) (citing Vogel v. Linde, 23 F.3d 78, 80 (4th Cir. 1994); Brewer
v. Miami Cty. Hosp., 862 F. Supp. 305, 308 (D. Kan. 1994)). Thus, Goodson’s
These claims are time-barred. The statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 action is the same as the statute of limitations in a personal injury action in
the state in which the claim accrues. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279-280

(1984). In Texas, that period is the two-year statute of limitations for personal
injury actions. Mosley v. Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys., 951 F. Supp. 1279, 1288 (S.D.
Tex. 1996) (two-year statute of limitations in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003
applies to § 1983 claim). The statute of limitations begins to run when a claim
accrues, which is determined under federal law. Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616,

620-21 (5th Cir. 1994). In the Fifth Circuit, a § 1983 claim generally accrues “when
the plaintiff knowns or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis for the
action.” Brockman v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 397 F. App’x 18, 22
(5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
Here, Goodson does not allege any latent injury, so he knew—or should have
known—about his injuries from the DFD vehicle collision and his subsequent

medical care at Methodist hospital in 2018, when the collision, and the related
treatment, occurred.3 Yet Goodson did not file this action until April 2025.

EMTALA claim is untimely. Goodson also claims that Methodist Hospital violated
his rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),
but there is no private cause of action under HIPAA, so this claim should be
dismissed. See Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 2006); Amend. Compl.
at 36.
3 Goodson filed a declaration arguing that he is entitled to equitable tolling on all
his claims because, although he had “evidence, knowledge, and motivation to file
this case earlier,” he was not “in position of legal or personal safety to do so,” and
feared retaliation, obstruction, and reincarceration. See Decl. (ECF No. 28).
Therefore, Goodson’s § 1983 claims stemming from the collision with a DFD
vehicle and his subsequent medical care at Methodist Hospital should be dismissed
as untimely.

Alternatively, these claims are substantively meritless. As for the initial
collision with a DFD vehicle, Goodson alleges, at most, that a DFD vehicle
negligently hit him. But negligence cannot support a § 1983 claim. See, e.g., Russell
v. Dallas County Jail, 2019 WL 5790515, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2019) (“Plaintiff’s
allegations of negligence are insufficient to impose liability under § 1983.”)

(collecting cases), rec. accepted 2019 WL 5789420 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2019). As for
the claims against Methodist Hospital, there are no allegations that this entity
acted under color of state law. Because state action is a prerequisite to liability
under § 1983, Goodson’s § 1983 claims against Methodist Hospital should be
dismissed. See, e.g., Boyd v. Sutton, 2022 WL 2980693, at *4 (N.D. Miss. July 27,
2022) (“Relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is only available to preserve a plaintiff’s

federal constitutional or statutory rights against a defendant acting under color of

Goodson’s conjectural fear of retaliation cannot justify equitable tolling. See, e.g.,
Wershe v. City of Detroit, Michigan, 112 F.4th 357, 369 (6th Cir. 2024) (“Many of
Wershe’s other allegations amount to a sweeping fear that someone in the justice
system would retaliate against him for bringing any legal action. However, such a
generalized fear is insufficient to warrant equitable tolling.”) (citing Huff v. Neal,
555 F. App’x 289, 296 (5th Cir. 2014)) (further citations omitted); see also Pratt v.
Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 2011 WL 579152, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2011)
(“Moreover, even if fear of retaliation could provide grounds for equitable tolling,
plaintiff has failed to make such a showing in this case beyond his conclusory
assertion.”).
state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, a § 1983 plaintiff may only pursue his civil
rights claims against someone who is a state actor.”) (emphasis in original).
In sum, Goodson’s claims stemming from his initial collision with a DFD

vehicle and his subsequent medical care at Methodist Hospital are time-barred and
substantively meritless and should be dismissed with prejudice.
2. Goodson’s federal claims stemming from his incarceration are meritless.
Liberally construing Goodson’s allegations, he claims that unidentified
correctional officers at the Lew Sterrett Jail acted with deliberate indifference to
his safety by placing him in a violent unit where he could not defend himself, and
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by failing to provide him with

medical care after he arrived in the prison. Amend. Compl. at 20-21. He alleges
that unidentified correctional officers failed to intervene to stop “a known violation
of [his] civil rights.” Id. at 21. He also alleges that he was denied “necessary
neurological and psychiatric accommodations post injury” in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)/Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. at 24.

Goodson’s constitutional claims are time-barred. Goodson alleges no latent
injury in relation to these claims; he knew, or had reason to know, of the alleged
failure to protect, medical indifference, and failure to intervene when he was
incarcerated in 2018. But he did not file this suit until April 2025.
Alternatively, these claims are substantively meritless. As for the failure-to-
protect claim, the Fourteenth Amendment vests pretrial detainees with the

constitutional right to have the essentials of their well-being tended to while in
state custody, including their basic right to be protected. See, e.g., Congious by and
through Hammond v. City of Fort Worth, 690 F. Supp. 3d 571, 585 (N.D. Tex.
2023). But “[a] plaintiff must . . . demonstrate actual physical harm resulting from

the alleged improper conduct by prison officials.” Johnson v. Burnly, 2018 WL
1341727, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 9, 2018). “Absent a showing that other inmates
harmed [the plaintiff], there is no factual basis for a failure to protect claim.”
Walzier v. McMullen, 333 F. App’x 848, 851 (5th Cir. 2009). Here, Goodson fails
to allege any physical injury or harm because he was placed in a “violent” unit, so

his failure-to-protect claim should be dismissed.
As for the medical indifference claim, the Fourteenth Amendment protects
an arrestee or pre-trial detainee’s right “not to have their serious medical needs
met with deliberate indifference on the part of . . . officials.” Brooks v. Taylor
County, 592 F. Supp. 3d 550, 556 (N.D. Tex. 2022) (citing Thomson v. Upshur
County, 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001)). “Deliberate indifference is an

extremely high standard to meet.” Domino v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d
752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff must show that (1) the official was aware of
facts that give rise to an inference that a substantial risk of serious harm existed,
and (2) the official drew this inference and disregarded the risk. Dyer v. Houston,
964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Domino, 239 F.3d at 755).

Goodson has not plausibly alleged facts from which the Court could infer
that any correctional officer knew that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm
and disregarded it. He alleges that he was “blind in his left eye,” deaf in his left ear,
“barely able to walk or speak clearly due to physical trauma and disorientation,”
and that some correctional officers remarked on his condition. Amend. Compl. at
20. But Goodson had recently been discharged from a hospital, and the

correctional officers could have reasonably assumed he would not have been
discharged if he was facing any kind of serious medical issue.
In sum, Goodson’s medical indifference claim—in addition to being
untimely—is meritless, and should be dismissed.
And because Goodson fails to allege any underlying constitutional violation

in relation to his time in the Lew Sterrett Jail, he necessarily fails to state a claim
that any correctional officer failed to intervene to protect his constitutional rights
while he was there. See, e.g., Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“In order for there to be a failure to intervene, it logically follows that there must
exist an underlying constitutional violation . . . .”).
Finally, Goodson’s ADA/Rehabilitation Act claim for the jail’s alleged denial

of accommodations is untimely and should be dismissed. This claim arises under
Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g., Cleveland
v. Gautreaux, 198 F. Supp. 3d 717, 736 (M.D. La. 2016) (citing Pa. Dep’t of Corr.
v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209-10 (1998) (further citation omitted)). “‘Based on []
guidance from the Supreme Court most circuits that have adopted a statute of

limitations for ADA or Rehabilitation Act claims have looked to the state’s
limitations period for personal injury actions.’” Eber v. Harris County Hosp. Dist.,
130 F. Supp. 2d 847, 869 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (quoting Everett v. Cobb County Sch.
Dist., 138 F.3d 1407, 1409 (11th Cir. 1998)). In Texas, “[t]he general statutory
limitation period for personal injury claims is two years, beginning the day after
the cause of action accrues.” Grace v. Colorito, 4 S.W.3d 765, 769 (Tex. App.—

Austin 1999, pet. denied). Federal law governs when the cause of action accrues.
Eber, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 870 (citing Burns v. Harris County Bail Bond Bd., 139
F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 1998)). As with the § 1983 claims, under federal law, a Title
II ADA claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury
which is the basis of the action. Id.

Here, Goodson does not allege any latent injury from the alleged failure to
accommodate. Thus, he knew or had reason to know about any injury in 2018, yet
he did not file this suit until April 2025. So his ADA/Rehabilitation Act claim, filed
in April 2025, is untimely and should be dismissed.
3. Goodson’s federal claims that imply the invalidity of his conviction are
barred by Heck v. Humphrey.
Goodson claims that his state criminal proceedings in which he pleaded
guilty to intoxication assault were tainted in several respects.
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that “a claim that, in effect,
attacks the constitutionality of a conviction or imprisonment is not cognizable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and does not accrue until that conviction or sentence has

been ‘reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by
a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question
by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.’” Darnell v. Sabo, 2022 WL
16577866, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2022) (citing 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Wells
v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 94 (5th Cir. 1995)). Put differently, unless the conviction
has been invalidated, Heck bars claims under § 1983 if “success on the claim would
necessarily imply that a prior conviction or sentence is invalid.” Aucoin v. Cupil,

958 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2020). “Although the Heck opinion involved a bar to
claims for monetary damages, a dismissal of a claim for injunctive relief and for
declaratory relief may also be made pursuant to Heck.” Id. (citing Edwards v.
Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (extending Heck to claims for declaratory relief
that necessarily would imply the invalidity of punishment); Clarke v. Stadler, 154

F.3d 186, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc)) (holding that a claim for prospective
injunctive relief that would imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s conviction may be
dismissed without prejudice subject to the rule of Heck v. Humphrey).
Here, Goodson alleges that officers withdrew blood in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, and the results were used to support his criminal charge. Amend.
Compl. at 15. He alleges that officers interrogated him when he was incapacitated

and without advising him of his Miranda rights. Id. He alleges that his original
attorney improperly withdrew because of a fabricated conflict of interest, and his
replacement attorney was ineffective. Id. at 26. He alleges that his counsel’s
withdrawal was part of a conspiracy that harmed his ability to defend himself. Id.
at 28. He alleges that, after he pleaded guilty, his guilty plea paperwork was

tampered with to increase the length of his community supervision without his
consent and in violation of his due process rights and the terms of the plea
agreement. Id. at 41-42. Finally, he alleges that an attorney for another individual,
Harold Leroy, encouraged Leroy to withhold evidence that was exculpatory for
Goodson. Compl. at 4.
All these claims necessarily imply the invalidity of Goodson’s conviction,

which Goodson has not alleged has been invalidated. Thus, Heck bars these claims
until Goodson’s conviction is invalidated. See, e.g., Bryant v. Reed, 2007 WL
701143, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 2007) (“Because a finding that the plea agreement
was breached would render his conviction invalid, a claim for monetary damages
for such a breach is currently barred by Heck v. Humphrey . . . .”) (citation

omitted); Mouton v. Louisiana, 547 F. App’x 502, 502-03 (5th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) (“Mouton’s arguments regarding ineffective assistance, prosecutorial
misconduct, trial court error, judicial misconduct, juror misconduct, and wrongful
incarceration are all barred by Heck because these claims are directly related to the
validity of his conviction.”) (citation omitted); Hall v. Lorenz, 2002 WL 31049457
(5th Cir. 2002) (holding that Heck barred plaintiff’s illegal search and seizure claim

because, if successful, it would undermine the validity of plaintiff’s criminal
conviction); Ortiz v. County of Los Angeles, 2013 WL 2371181, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May
29, 2013) (civil rights claims against police officers for not giving Miranda
warnings barred by Heck).
4. Goodson’s allegations against the City of Allen are too conclusory to state
a federal claim.
Goodson alleges that City of Allen police officers surveilled him and “stopped
[him] under false pretenses to reset probation and prevent legal retaliation.”
Compl. at 7.
The Court liberally construes these allegations as attempting to plead a false
arrest claim. “[T]o state a § 1983 claim for false arrest/false imprisonment,
[Plaintiff] must plausibly allege that [the officer] ‘did not have probable cause to

arrest him.’” Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 655 (5th Cir. 2004)). “A warrantless arrest
must be based on ‘probable cause.’ Probable cause exists when the totality of the
facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest
are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed

or was committing an offense.” Resendiz v. Miller, 203 F.3d 902, 903 (5th Cir.
2000). “Because probable cause is an objective standard, an arrest is lawful if the
officer had probable cause to arrest for any offense, not just the offense stated at
the time of arrest or booking.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 538 U.S. 48, 54 n. 2
(2018).
Goodson fails to allege any facts to establish that the City of Allen police

officers lacked probable cause to arrest him, so his claim against the City of Allen
is meritless and should be dismissed.4

4 To the extent that Goodson is asserting a First Amendment retaliatory arrest
claim, the claim lacks merit because he fails to allege the lack of probable cause for
his arrest. See, e.g., Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 408 (2019). Nor has he
plausibly alleged that he was engaged in protected activity that was a substantial
motivation for his arrest. See Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2002).
5. “Quasi-judicial immunity” bars any federal claims that Goodson is trying
to allege against Clerk’s Office employees.
Goodson alleges that the Clerk’s Office “tamper[ed]” with his complaint by
using a stamping device that “failed to reflect the correct 3:2025cv00816
formatting.” Amend. Compl. at 49. Goodson claims that these allegations support
“RICO and civil rights claims, showing deliberate targeting, document tampering,
and malicious interference in judicial process.” Id. at 50.
This claim is meritless. Goodson has not shown that Clerk’s Office used an

incorrect number—25-cv-00816 and 25-cv-816 are interchangeable on the Court’s
CM/ECF docketing system—or that he suffered any prejudice. Goodson has been
able to file numerous documents without issue.
Further, any claim against Clerk’s Office employees for inaccurately
stamping his docket sheet number is barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Judges are immune from suit for damages resulting from any judicial act, unless
performed in “the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,
11-12 (1991). And absolute immunity also extends to others who perform judicial
functions in accordance with a court directive, including court clerks. See Clay v.
Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001). Court clerks have absolute immunity from
actions for damages arising for actions they are specifically required to perform by

court order or judicial discretion and qualified immunity for routine duties not
explicitly commanded by court decree or judicial instruction. Id.
Here, Goodson’s claim against Clerk’s Office employees is based on
performance of functions closely associated with the judicial process—filing court
documents—so the Clerk’s Office employees are immune from suit. See Balistreri-
Amrhein v. Verrilli, 2016 WL 11191119, at *8-9 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2016)
(recommending dismissal of claims against federal court staff and clerks for filing

motions incorrectly, refusing to file or misplacing documents, charging court costs
and filing fees, and failing to provide the plaintiff notice of orders, as barred by
absolute immunity); see also Lewis v. Roxbury Dist. Ct., 2013 WL 4854117, at *2
(D. Mass. Sept. 10, 2013) (holding that clerk who failed to record plaintiff’s case
accurately, ignored plaintiff’s request to send him copies of all docket entries, and

lied to plaintiff’s wife about sending such entries had absolute quasi-judicial
immunity because “[t]hose duties arise directly from the Clerk’s role in supporting
the adjudication of cases”).
6. Goodson fails to state a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
Goodson alleges that, from the time he collided with a DFD firetruck, to the
time the Clerk of this Court stamped a number on his complaint that he believes

was incorrect, the defendants have participated in a conspiracy to violate his civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. See generally Compl; Amend. Compl.
Goodson fails to state a civil conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. First,
this claim, as much as it alleges that the conspiracy touched on Goodson’s
underlying criminal proceedings, is barred by Heck because its success would

necessarily imply the invalidity of Goodson’s conviction, which has not been
invalidated. Second, a conspiracy under § 1985 requires a predicate constitutional
violation. See Jackson v. Pierre, 810 F. App’x 276, 281 (5th Cir. 2020). As
explained, Goodson has not alleged a predicate constitutional violation, so he
necessarily fails to allege a § 1985 conspiracy claim.
7. The Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Goodson’s state-law claims.
Goodson alleges state-law claims for negligence (Amend. Compl. at 12, 18),
forgery and tampering with a government record under the Texas Penal Code
(Amend. Compl. at 42), legal malpractice and fraud (Compl. at 5), defamation
(Compl. at 5), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Compl. at 6), and false

imprisonment and abuse of process (Compl. at 5). There is no independent
jurisdictional basis for these claims, so the Court can only exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over them under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if “(1) the claim raises a novel or complex

issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims
over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional
circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” “In
making its determination as to whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘the
court is guided by the . . . statutory factors as well as the common law factors of

judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Robinson v. Webster Cty.,
Miss., 2020 WL 1180422, at *11 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 11, 2020), aff’d, 825 F. App’x 192
(5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
“As a general rule, a federal court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over
pendant state claims when all federal claims are disposed of prior to trial.” Brim v.
ExxonMobil Pipeline Co., 213 F. App’x 303, 305 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)

(citations omitted). “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are
eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendant
jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will
point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claims.” Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Ind., 972 F.2d 580, 586 (5th

Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
Here, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
any state-law claims. The Court has recommended dismissal of all of Goodson’s
federal claims, which weighs against retaining the state claims. Relatedly, given the
dismissal of the federal claims, the state claims predominate. Finally, judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity also support declining jurisdiction

because this case is still at the screening stage, no trial date has been set, and there
is no scheduling order in place.
8. Goodson’s pending motions should be denied.
Goodson has filed several motions seeking, among things, a preliminary
injunction; a protective order to “prevent retaliation, harassment, and

intimidation; a “reassignment” of this case to an Article III Judge5; exemption from

5 Goodson’s challenge to the referral of this matter to a United States magistrate
judge is frivolous. Referrals to United States magistrate judges are authorized by
PACER fees; the appointment of a court-funded investigator or special master; a
scheduling conference; and the appointment of the U.S. Marshal for service of
process. See ECF Nos. 6, 7, 8, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36-45.

Because Goodson’s federal claims fail to survive judicial screening and the
Court has recommended declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law
claims, these motions should be denied as moot.
Goodson also moved for leave to file a second amended complaint (ECF No.
49). According to Goodson, the proposed second amended complaint “does not

seek to add any new defendant or cause of action,” but includes additional facts
related to “(1) the City of Allen police department’s unlawful targeting, stop, and
arrest of [Goodson], and (2) the beating and unconstitutional treatment [Goodson]
endured at the Dallas County Lew Sterrett Detention Center.” Mot. at 1 (ECF No.
49).
“Under Rule 15(a), ‘leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so

requires,’ and should be granted absent some justification for refusal.” U.S. ex rel.
Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Texas, Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 386 (5th Cir. 2023)
(citation omitted). But a district court can deny leave to amend if the proposed
amendment would be futile. Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., L.L.C., 234 F.3d 863,

28 U.S.C. § 636 and are constitutional. See, e.g., Escudero v. Jordan, 2019 WL
4463265, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2019) (citing Bowman v. Bordenkircher, 522
F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1975); Corbett v. United States, 2014 WL 1783599 (S.D.W. Va.
May 5, 2014)). Goodson has lost no right to have an Article III Judge hear his case,
as he can object to the undersigned’s recommendations and orders. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1).
873 (5th Cir. 2000). An amendment is futile when the amended complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted applying the “the same standard of
legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id.

Here, Goodson’s proposed amendments would be futile. Starting with the
false and retaliatory arrest claims stemming from his arrest by City of Allen police
officers, Goodson’s proposed second amended complaint alleges that, at the time
of the arrest, he was working as a mover and that he and his employer were
operating a moving truck. Proposed Second Amend. Compl. at 57. He alleges in

conclusory fashion that he and his “employer were unlawfully targeted, pulled over
without any lawful basis, and subsequently arrested by Allen Police.” Id. He alleges
that video evidence shows that “supervisory officers” “pre-instructed” their
subordinates to pull over the moving truck when it was spotted, “with no lawful
cause or articulable suspicion.” Id. He notes that the district attorney dropped
Goodson’s case “almost immediately upon evaluation.” Id. at 58.

Even with those added details, the proposed second amended complaint still
does not allege a plausible false arrest or retaliatory arrest claim against the City of
Allen. Goodson’s conclusory assertion that the officers lacked probable cause—
without corresponding factual detail about the relevant circumstances of the arrest
and the facts confronting the officers—is not enough to establish a lack of probable

cause—an element of both false and retaliatory arrest claims. See, e.g., Barra v.
Boudreaux, 2020 WL 1695124, at *4 (W.D. La. Apr. 6, 2020) (“Barra’s unlawful
arrest allegations fail to state a claim because they do not include facts supporting
his conclusory statement that the arrest was ‘unlawful,’ and the Complaint’s
description of the arrest and Barra’s prior encounters with the police do not
demonstrate a lack of probable cause.”); see also Torns v. City of Jackson, 622 F.

App’x 414, 417 (5th Cir. 2015) (false arrest claims “require[] an inquiry into the
specific situation confronting the public officials”) (citing Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635 (1987)).
Further, as to a retaliatory arrest claim in particular, Goodson fails to
plausibly allege that he was engaged in some kind of protected activity that

substantially motivated the adverse actions against him. See Keenan, 290 F.3d at
258. He claims that the arrest was connected to his “efforts to assert his rights”
(ECF No. 50 at 58) but he does not explain what “efforts to assert his rights” that
he is talking about, and it is not apparent to the Court, as the arrest occurred before
Goodson filed this action.
Finally, as for Goodson’s excessive force claim, the proposed second

amended complaint alleges that, on an unspecified date, he was transferred to Lew
Sterrett Jail after a “probation-related hearing,” where unidentified correctional
officers “commenced a coordinated beating, repeatedly kicking and punching
[him], while he remained handcuffed and unable to defend himself.” Proposed
Second Amended Compl. at 60. He alleges that the assault aggravated “existing

neurological vulnerabilities” from a prior “traumatic brain injury from unrelated
civil rights violations.” Id. at 61.
Even if these allegations could state an excessive force claim, Goodson has
sued no individual correctional officer. He has only sued the City of Dallas. And
under § 1983, municipalities like the City of Dallas are not liable for the

unconstitutional actions of their employees under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Instead, a
plaintiff seeking relief against a municipal defendant such as a city must establish
that the allegedly unconstitutional conduct is “directly attributable to the
municipality through some sort of official action or imprimatur.” Piotrowski v.

City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001). Municipal liability requires
proof of three elements: “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a
policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a
constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom.” Valle v. City
of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541-42 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pineda v. City of
Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)).

Goodson’s proposed second amended complaint does not plausibly allege
any of those elements. He does not identify a City of Dallas policy or custom—of
which a policymaker could be charged with actual or constructive knowledge—that
led to the alleged excessive force against him.
In sum, Goodson’s proposed amendments would be futile, so the Court

should deny his motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, along with
his other motions.
Leave to Amend
Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint
before dismissal. Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). Leave

to amend is not necessary, however, when the plaintiff has already pleaded his best
case. Wiggins v. La. State Univ.—Health Care Servs. Div., 710 F. App’x 625, 627
(5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Here, Goodson has already filed a
detailed amended complaint, as well as a motion to file a second one with
additional allegations. Thus, it appears that, at this point, Goodson has pleaded his

best case. At any rate, the chance to object to this recommendation (explained
below), gives Goodson yet another chance to plead his best case by explaining how
he could amend his complaint to allege a plausible federal claim. But unless he
shows the Court that he could amend to allege a plausible claim, he is not entitled
to further leave to amend.
Recommendation

The Court should dismiss Goodson’s federal claims that imply the invalidity
of his state criminal conviction with prejudice to their being asserted again until
the conditions in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) are met, dismiss his
remaining federal claims with prejudice, dismiss his state-law claims without
prejudice to his ability to assert them in state court, and deny his pending motions.
SO RECOMMENDED.
May 5, 2025.

Henn
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in
the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(); FED. R. Civ. P..72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services
Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

25

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11065395. Public record. Not legal advice.