# Plaunt v. Perry County Children and Youth Services

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · June 4, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11065145

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 4, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11065145

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that it is not proper to assume Plaintiff can prove facts that she has not alleged or that Defendants have violated the law in ways Plaintiff has not alleged

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DOMINIQUE PLAUNT, ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-CV-136
Plaintiff )
)
v. )
) (ARBUCKLE, M.J.)
PERRY COUNTY CHILDREN AND )
YOUTH SERVICES, et al., )
Defendants )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
Dominque Plaunt (“Plaintiff”) initiated this civil action alleging that her civil
rights were violated by Perry County Children and Youth Services, and its director
Kristie Gantt. Both Defendants have filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Defendants ask, in the alternative, that two paragraphs of Plaintiff’s complaint be
struck if her complaint is permitted to proceed. Plaintiff filed a motion to strike
Defendants’ motions and briefs because they rely on facts contained in state court
opinions and orders.
For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motions to dismiss will be
granted, but Plaintiff will be given leave to amend some of her claims. Defendants’
request to strike two paragraphs of Plaintiff’s complaint is denied as moot, and

Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendants’ motions and briefs will be denied.
However, the Court will not consider the exhibits Defendants provided to support
their motions to dismiss.

II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Before May 15, 2023 or June 10, 2023, Perry County Children and Youth
Services (“CYS”) received a report from one of Plaintiff’s children alleging
neglect and abuse. On May 15, 2023 or June 10, 2023, CYS, at the direction of

Defendant Gantt, forcibly removed two of Plaintiff’s minor children (ages 12 and
14) from her home. (Doc. 1, ¶ 17).1 Plaintiff alleges that the report of abuse was
unsubstantiated, and that she was entitled to, and did not receive, a hearing before

her children were taken. (Doc. 1, ¶ 18).
Plaintiff also alleges that this incident attracted some unwelcome publicity,
and that unnamed CYS officials disclosed confidential information about her and
her children to local media outlets. She also alleges that unnamed CYS employees

permitted third parties to be present during home visits, which further violated her
privacy. Plaintiff does not allege whether these acts were undertaken pursuant to a
policy or custom of CYS or its director and does not allege that Defendant Gantt

directed her subordinates to engage in this conduct or was aware of and acquiesced

1 Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that her children were taken into
protective custody on June 10, 2023. In attached letters, she wrote that her children
were taken into protective custody on May 15, 2023. (Docs. 1-2, p. 2, 1-2, p. 3).
in her subordinates’ conduct of leaking information or allowing third parties to
enter Plaintiff’s residence.

On January 24, 2024, Plaintiff lodged a civil rights complaint against CYS
and against Kristie Gantt, in her official capacity as the director of CYS.2 Plaintiff
also alleges in the body of her complaint that Defendant Gantt is “personally

responsible” for denying her a pre-deprivation hearing. (Doc. 1, ¶ 19).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her right to due process because
they removed Plaintiff’s minor children from her home without prior notice or a
hearing. (Doc. 1, ¶ 17). Plaintiff also alleges that her First Amendment right to

privacy was violated because: (1) unnamed CYS employees disclosed confidential
information about her case, including her identity, her children’s identities, and the

2 Plaintiff lists herself as the only Plaintiff in the caption of her complaint. In
the body of her complaint, however, she suggests that she is brining this action on
her own behalf and on behalf of her household. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in
this case and cannot represent others (including members of her household) in this
civil rights action. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts of the United States the parties
may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel . . . .”) (emphasis
added); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all
the parties”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint will be construed Plaintiff bringing
claims on her own behalf only.
The complaint also originally listed “John Smith” as the director of CYS.
(Doc. 1). The summons issued to John Smith was returned unexecuted because it
was unknown who “John Smith” is. CYS clarified that its director is Kristie Gantt.
(Doc. 9). On March 26, 2024, Plaintiff responded that she intended to name Kristie
Gantt “in his official capacity as Director of Perry County Children and Youth
Services.” (Doc. 14). The Clerk of Court was directed to substitute Kristie Gantt
for John Smith on the docket, and the complaint was served on Kristie Gantt. (Doc.
15).
nature of the abuse allegations to local media outlets, (Doc. 1, ¶ 20); and (2)
unnamed CYS employees brought third parties to home visits at her residence that

were not essential to the ongoing investigation. (Doc. 1, ¶ 22).3
Plaintiff appears to seek relief under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5
U.S.C. § 706 (Doc. 1, ¶ 26) (quoting language from the Administrative Procedures

Act without citing the statute). She also requests compensatory damages, punitive
damages, a “declaratory judgment that the actions of Defendants violated
Plaintiff’s rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution,” an “injunction requiring [CYS] to revise its policies and training to

prevent future violations of this nature,” “[r]easonable attorney’s fees,” and “[a]ny
other relief that the Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.”
(Doc. 1, ¶¶ 25-30).

On March 1, 2024, Defendant CYS filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint, and requests that in the event Plaintiff’s complaint is not dismissed
certain allegations be struck from her complaint. (Doc. 10). On June 17, 2024,
Defendant Gantt filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, and requests that

3 Plaintiff’s complaint also includes a third claim, titled “supervisory
liability” in which she alleges that Kristie Gantt is liable for the constitutional
violations alleged because Defendant Gantt supervises CYS agents, and that she
engaged in policies and practices (such as failing to correct her subordinates’
actions) that were the moving force behind the violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. We will address this theory of liability in the context of
Plaintiff’s constitutional claims.
in the event Plaintiff’s complaint is not dismissed certain allegations be struck
from her complaint. (Doc. 24). On September 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion

requesting that Defendants’ briefs be stricken. (Doc. 31). These motions have been
fully briefed and are ready to resolve.4
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. RULE 12(B)(1): MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION
Under Rule 12(b)(1), a defendant may seek dismissal of a complaint based

on a court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction.5 “At issue in a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion is the court’s ‘very power to hear the case.’”6 “If a District Court does not
have subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss.”7
When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenging subject matter

jurisdiction, “[a] district court has to first determine . . . whether [the] motion

4 It appears that Plaintiff is attempting to assert at least two additional claims
in her briefs in opposition to Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not provide for piecemeal amendment, and do not allow a
litigant to supplement pleadings except in limited circumstances or with prior
approval of the Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Plaintiff has neither properly amended
her complaint nor sought the Court’s approval to supplement her complaint.
Allowing Plaintiff to file a partial amendment or supplement to her original
pleading in a brief opposing dismissal presents an undue risk of piecemeal
litigation that would greatly impede the orderly resolution of this case. We
therefore decline to treat Plaintiff’s briefs as an amendment or supplement to her
complaint and will only consider the claims included in Plaintiff’s complaint.
5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
6 Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)).
7 Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234, 242 and n.6 (3d Cir. 2009).
presents a ‘facial’ attack or a ‘factual’ attack on the claim at issue, because that
distinction determines how the pleading must be reviewed.”8 As the Third Circuit

explained in Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele:
A facial attack, as the adjective indicates, is an argument that
considers a claim on its face and asserts that it is insufficient to invoke
the subject matter jurisdiction of the court because, for example, it
does not present a question of federal law, or because there is no
indication of a diversity of citizenship among the parties, or because
some other jurisdictional defect is present. Such an attack can occur
before the moving party has filed an answer or otherwise contested
the factual allegations of the complaint.9
On the other hand, a factual attack “is an argument that there is no subject
matter jurisdiction because the facts of the case . . . do not support the asserted
jurisdiction.”10 When it reviews a factual attack, the court “may weigh and
‘consider evidence outside the pleadings.’”11 “A district court has ‘substantial
authority’ to ‘weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power
to hear the case.’”12 “[N]o presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s

8 Const. Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357-58 (3d Cir.
2014) (citing In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir.
2012)).
9 Id. at 358 (citing Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).
10 Id.
11 Id. (citing Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir.
2000), holding modified by Simon v. United States, 341 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2003)).
12 Exel v. Govan, No. 12-04280, 2013 WL 3146849, at *2 (D.N.J. June 18,
2013) (quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).
allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial
court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.”13

Courts generally treat pre-answer motions under 12(b)(1) as a facial
challenge.
B. RULE 12(B)(6): MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explains that to state a claim,
a complaint must include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.”14 This standard “does not require detailed factual
allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.”15 Thus, a complaint that contains only “labels and

conclusions,” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is
insufficient.16
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant
to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”17

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”18

13 Id.
14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
15 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).
16 Id.
17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
18 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Facial plausibility is achieved “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.”19 Plausibility does not require probability but the litigant
must show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”20
Facts “merely consistent with” liability do not satisfy this standard.21

At the motion to dismiss stage, the court accepts the complaint’s factual
allegations as true, but the court does not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions.22 In
addition, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is
“a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.”23
The federal pleading standard just described requires that district courts
conduct the following analysis when addressing a motion to dismiss a complaint:

First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated.
The District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded
facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. [Iqbal, 129
S.Ct. at 1949]. Second, a District Court must then determine whether
the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the
plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words,
a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to

19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.”).
23 Id. at 679.
relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.
See Phillips[ v. Cty. Of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234–35 (3d Cir.
2008)].24
C. SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in this case. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2), this Court has a statutory obligation to review Plaintiff’s complaint
and may dismiss claims sua sponte if a claim is: (1) frivolous or malicious, (2)

seeks relief that cannot be granted, or (4) seeks money damages from a defendant
who is immune from suit.25 When conducting this screening analysis, district
courts apply the standard governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.26

D. RULE 12(F): MOTION TO STRIKE A PLEADING
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions to strike
pleadings. It provides that, “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient

defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”27
“Content is immaterial when it has no essential or important relationship to the
claim for relief. Content is impertinent when it does not pertain to the issues raised

24 Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009).
25 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
26 See, e.g., Endrikat v. Ransom, No. 1:21-CV-1684, 2022 WL 4111861, at
*2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2022) (“In dismissing claims under §§ 1915(e), 1915A, and
1997e, district courts apply the standard governing motions to dismiss filed
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
in the complaint. Scandalous material improperly casts a derogatory light on
someone, most typically on a party to the action.”28

Rulings on motions to strike rest in the sound discretion of the court. 29
However, “striking a pleading or a portion of a pleading ‘is a drastic remedy to be
resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice.’”30 Therefore, motions

to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) are generally disfavored “unless the allegations
have no possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the
parties, or if the allegations confuse the issues in the case.”31 In practice, courts
should exercise their discretion to strike a pleading only when the pleading is

“redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous” and prejudicial to the
opposing party.32 “When faced with allegations that could possibly serve to
achieve a better understanding of plaintiff’s claims or perform any useful purpose

28 Champ v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company, No. 5:20-CV-01238, 2020
WL 1694372, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (quoting Lee v. Eddystone Fire & Ambulance,
No. 19-cv-3295, 2019 WL 6038535, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2019)) (quotation
marks omitted).
29 Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 657 F.Supp. 1134, 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(“motions to strike portions of a complaint ‘are addressed to the discretion of the
[district] court.”).
30 Lee v. Dubose Nat’l Energy Servs., Inc., No. 18-cv-2504, 2019 WL
1897164, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2019).
31 Natale v. Winthrop Res. Corp., No. 07-2686, 2008 WL 2758238, at *14
(E.D. Pa. July 9, 2008) (quoting River Rd. Devel. Corp. v. Carlson Corp., No. 89-
7037,1990 WL 69085, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 1990)); see also Eddystone Fire &
Ambulance, 2019 WL 6038535.
32 Ruby v. Davis Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2001).
in promoting the just disposition of the litigation, courts generally deny such
motions to strike.”33

Unlike pleadings, briefs are by their nature argumentative and sometimes
contentious filings. Generally, a brief will not be considered a “pleading” which is
properly the subject of a motion to strike.34

IV. DISCUSSION
A. DOCUMENTS OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
STRIKE
Defendants’ submitted court opinions and orders with Defendant Gantt’s
brief that includes an alternative set of dates, as well as background information
that is not included in Plaintiff’s complaint. Both Defendants rely on information
contained in these documents in their briefs. Plaintiff appears to oppose

Defendants’ reliance on these documents and the facts they contain in a motion to
strike, in which she argues that the statements in these court opinions and orders
are “unsworn” and that their use violates several federal statutes and guidelines

33 Cestra v. Mylan, Inc., No. 14-825, 2015 WL 2455420, at *7 (W.D. Pa.
May 22, 2015) (quoting Eisai Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 416,
425 (D.N.J. 2009)).
34 Hrubec v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 829 F.Supp. 1502, 1506 (N.D.
Ill.,1993) (observing that objections to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, a footnote in a memorandum, a motion to strike, and a party’s
supporting memorandum are not “pleadings” and therefore are not candidates for
Rule 12(f)) (citing Anna Ready Mix, Inc. v. N.E. Pierson Const. Co., 747 F.Supp.
1299, 1303 (S.D. Ill. 1990), and Board of Education v. Admiral Heating and
Ventilation, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 300, 304 (N.D. Ill. 1982)).
promulgated by the United States Office of Child Support Enforcement and the
United States Department of Health and Human Services. (Docs. 31, 33).

Typically, a Court cannot consider documents outside the pleadings when
ruling on a motion to dismiss. Defendant Gantt argues that the documents she
submitted may be considered under an exception recognized by the Third Circuit

in Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., which allows the
Court to consider indisputably authentic documents that a plaintiff relied on when
drafting the complaint.35 We are not persuaded that the exception in Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. applies in this case because Plaintiff’s claims are not “based

on” the documents at issue. These court orders were issued after the alleged due
process violation occurred and do not reference the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s
privacy.

Defendants also suggest that these documents can be considered without
converting their motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment because they
are “public records” that would be subject to judicial notice. They are correct that a
court may properly consider matters susceptible to judicial notice when ruling on a

motion to dismiss.36 Relative to opinions and orders issued by other courts,

35 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192,
1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
36 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); see
also Fed. R. Evid. 201 (“[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial
however, we may take judicial notice of the existence of the order or opinion but
cannot take notice of the facts they contain for their truth.37 Defendants clearly

request that we take notice of these opinions and orders for the truth of the facts
they contain. We therefore cannot take judicial notice of the facts Defendants rely
on.

Having decided that we cannot consider Defendants’ exhibits when ruling
on a motion to dismiss, we must next decide whether to convert Defendants’
motions to summary judgment motions. When presented with extrinsic documents
not properly considered on a motion to dismiss, the Court may of course simply

disregard them; otherwise, it may convert a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Notably, “[t]he decision
whether to convert a motion to dismiss into a [motion for summary judgment] . . .
is a discretionary one.”38

In this case we find that converting Defendants’ motions to motions for
summary judgment would needlessly delay and complicate this case. First,
Defendants did not submit a statement of material facts with their motion or brief.39

The Court would be inclined to request that Defendants submit statements of

jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”).
37 S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181
F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 1999).
38 United States v. Est. of Elson, 421 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.N.J. 2019).
39 See L.R. 56.1.
material facts, and that Plaintiff submit a response, before converting Defendants’
motions. This would prolong the resolution of Defendants’ motions. Second,

Defendants’ motion did not clearly notify Plaintiff of the potential for conversion.
Thus, the Court would be required to both notify Plaintiff of its intent to convert
the motion and provide her an opportunity to supplement her response. This would

also prolong the resolution of Defendants’ motions. Finally, the documents in
question are relevant to the resolution of only one of Plaintiff’s claims—her denial
of a pre-deprivation hearing claim. There is little likelihood that converting
Defendants’ motion would fully resolve this case, and Plaintiff would be entitled to

amend some of the remaining claims that are subject to dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6).
Therefore, we decline to convert Defendants’ motions to dismiss to motions

for summary judgment at this time because it would needlessly delay and
complicate the resolution of this matter. We will resolve these motions to dismiss
without considering the court orders and opinions Defendants provided, or the
facts those orders and opinions contain.

Although we will decline to consider certain facts contained in Defendants’
motions and briefs, we decline to strike the motions or briefs themselves. Striking
documents from the record is a disfavored practice, and courts use their authority

to do so sparingly and under circumstances where the offending document will
result in some prejudice to the party requesting it be struck. Plaintiff has failed to
offer any reason why the continued presence of Defendants’ motions and briefs on

the docket would result in prejudice to her. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to
strike Defendants’ motions and briefs (Doc. 31) will be denied.
B. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR RELIEF UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES ACT
Under the heading “prayer for relief,” Plaintiff writes that she requests:
Judicial Review: To the extent necessary to decision and when
presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of
law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine
the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.
And –
(1) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed; and
(2) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be—
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence
or
(F) unwarranted by the facts
(Doc. 1, ¶ 24).
This language appears to be taken from a section of the Administrative
Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“APA”). Under the APA, “A person suffering

legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof.”40 As used in the APA, the term “agency” means “each authority of the
Government of the United States.”41 The APA is not applicable to state agencies.42

To the extent Plaintiff intends to assert a claim under the APA, it has not
been adequately pleaded. Furthermore, the two named Defendants, CYS and
Defendant Gantt, are not federal agencies. CYS is a state agency, and Defendant

Gantt is the director of a state agency. The APA is not applicable to these
Defendants because they are not federal agencies.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for relief under the APA will be dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). She will not be afforded leave to amend
this claim for relief as it would be futile; the APA is not applicable to any
Defendant named in Plaintiff’s complaint.

40 5 U.S.C. § 702; see also John v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Hum. Servs., No.
5:24-CV-0781, 2024 WL 3204474, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2024).
41 5 U.S.C. § 551(1); 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1).
42 Johnson v. Guhl, 166 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D.N.J. 2001), aff’d, 357 F.3d 403
(3d Cir. 2004), as amended (Mar. 26, 2004); John, 2024 WL 3204474, at *6 (E.D.
Pa. June 26, 2024).
C. DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS: LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION
CYS argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over all of Plaintiff’s claims
against it because it is immune under the Eleventh Amendment. Similarly,

Defendant Gantt argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims
against her in her official capacity because she is immune under the Eleventh
Amendment. In response, Plaintiff argues that her claims “against the state officials
fall squarely within the jurisdiction established by Ex parte Young,” because she

“alleges that state officials infringed upon her constitutional rights, including her
right to familial association and due process, which necessitates federal judicial
intervention.” (Doc. 23, pp. 2-3); (Doc. 29, pp. 2-3).

A 12(b)(1) motion is the proper mechanism for raising the issue of whether
the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars the exercise of
federal court jurisdiction.43 The Eleventh Amendment bars lawsuits against states
in federal court.44 This immunity extends to state agencies. Similarly, lawsuits filed

against state officers in their official capacity should be treated as lawsuits against
the state.45 Therefore, a claim in a lawsuit against an agency of the Commonwealth
or a Commonwealth officer in their official capacity is treated as a lawsuit against

43 Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 694 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996)
(citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–100 (1984)).
44 U.S. Const. amend XI.
45 Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for the purposes of Eleventh Amendment
immunity.

CYS is an agency of the Commonwealth.46 Therefore, Eleventh Amendment
immunity is applicable to CYS. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gantt is the
Director of CYS, and thus is an officer of the Commonwealth. Plaintiff has sued

Defendant Gantt in her official capacity. Therefore, Eleventh Amendment
immunity is applicable to all claims brought against Defendant Gantt in her official
capacity because she is an officer of the Commonwealth. Unless an exception
applies, Plaintiff’s claims against CYS and her official capacity claims against

Defendant Gantt are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Eleventh Amendment immunity is subject to three exceptions: “(1)
congressional abrogation, (2) waiver by the state, and (3) suits against individual

state officers [in their official capacity] for prospective injunctive and declaratory
relief to end an ongoing violation of federal law.”47

46 Al Hadidi v. Jones, No. 4:22-CV-00861, 2022 WL 21757151, at *4 (M.D.
Pa. June 7, 2022) (explaining that “Pennsylvania’s domestic relations agencies,
such as [Northumberland County] Children and Youth Services, are defined by
statute as arms of the state courts and institutions of state government” and that
Eleventh Amendment immunity applied to Northumberland County CYS), report
and recommendation adopted sub nom. Hadidi v. Jones, No. 4:22-CV-00861, 2022
WL 21757149 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2022).
47 Pennsylvania Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323
(3d Cir. 2002).
Congress has not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity in enacting 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived its

immunity from suit for § 1983 claims. The first two exceptions to Eleventh
Amendment immunity, therefore, do not apply in this case.
The third exception, as articulated in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908),

applies to suits brought against individual officers in their official capacity, and
allows a plaintiff to bring suit where the relief sought is a prospective injunction or
prospective declaratory relief. This exception, therefore, only applies to claims
against state officers sued in their official capacity, and where the plaintiff alleges

an ongoing violation of federal law.
CYS is a state agency, not a state officer. Therefore, the third exception to
Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply to CYS. Accordingly, all of

Plaintiff’s claims against CYS will be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
As to Defendant Gantt, Plaintiff seeks damages, including compensatory
damages, punitive damages, costs, and attorney fees. These types of relief are not

injunctive or declaratory. Therefore, we will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims seeking
compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs, and attorney fees from Defendant
Gantt in her official capacity for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because this

relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Regarding Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, Defendant
Gantt is a state officer sued in her official capacity. However, Plaintiff does not

allege an ongoing violation of federal law. Instead, she alleges that: (1) Defendant
Gantt violated her rights when Defendant Gantt ordered others to take her children
on May 14, 2023 without providing Plaintiff with a hearing on or before that date;

(2) an unnamed CYS employee gave confidential information about Plaintiff to
media outlets in the past; and (3) an unnamed CYS employee allowed third parties
into Plaintiff’s house during past home visits. She requests the following equitable
relief: (1) “declaratory judgment that the actions of Defendants violated Plaintiff’s

rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution,” (Doc. 1, ¶ 27), and (2) “[a]n injunction requiring CPS to revise their
policies and training to prevent future violations of this nature” (Doc. 1, ¶ 28).

Thus, while Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, her complaint is based
entirely on past conduct. She does not allege facts from which the Court might
infer that the conduct at issue (failing to provide Plaintiff a pre-deprivation hearing
in May 2023, providing confidential information to local media outlets in the past,

or bringing third parties to past home visits) has continued, or is anticipated to
continue, indicating an ongoing violation of federal law.48

48 Harr v. Buczak, No. CV 21-1555, 2024 WL 4064139, at *5 (W.D. Pa.
Sept. 5, 2024) (citing Suring v. South River Bd. of Educ., No. 20-2804, 2022 WL
264464, at *3 (3d Cir. Jan. 27, 2022) (holding that the Ex Parte Young exception
Therefore, we will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief from Defendant Gantt in her official capacity for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction because they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Plaintiff’s claims against CYS and Defendant Gantt in her official capacity
will be dismissed without leave to amend. Amendment of the claims against CYS

and Defendant Gantt would be futile because they are immune from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment.
D. DEFENDANT GANTT’S MOTION TO DISMISS: FAILURE TO STATE A
CLAIM
To the extent Plaintiff intended to assert a claim against Defendant Gantt in
her personal capacity, Defendant Gannt argues that Plaintiff’s constitutional claims

should be dismissed because (1) Plaintiff does not allege facts that show Defendant
Gannt was personally involved in the constitutional violations alleged; (2) Plaintiff
did not plead plausible violations of her constitutional rights; and (3) Defendant
Gantt is absolutely immune from Plaintiff’s claim for damages.

did not apply to that case because, even though the injunctive relief plaintiff sought
was phrased in prospective terms, there were not facts alleged indicating that the
purported violations of constitutional rights were ongoing); Taylor v. City of Jersey
City, No. 22-457, 2023 WL 6997250, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2023) (dismissing
claims as barred by the Eleventh Amendment where the plaintiff failed to allege
specific facts from which the court might infer that the alleged civil rights
violations were ongoing); see also Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal.
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983) (observing that it is not
proper to assume Plaintiff can prove facts that she has not alleged or that
Defendants have violated the law in ways Plaintiff has not alleged).
In response, Plaintiff alleges she adequately alleged Defendant Gantt’s
personal involvement because her complaint includes “allegations of Defendant

Gantt’s direct involvement and supervisory role, making her complicit in the
violations of Plaintiff’s rights.” (Doc. 29, p. 4). She also argues that she pleaded
plausible constitutional claims, and that Defendant Gantt is not entitled to absolute

immunity because it “applies only to specific functions closely associated with the
judicial process, not to all actions taken by child welfare workers.” (Doc. 29, p. 5).
1. Plaintiff’s Claims alleging Violations of her Privacy
Plaintiff asserts claims that her constitutional rights were violated. These

claims are brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 imposes civil
liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another
individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States.”49 “It is well settled that § 1983 does not confer any

substantive rights, but merely ‘provides a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred.’”50 For a state actor to be liable under § 1983, that actor must
subject or cause Plaintiff to be subjected to the deprivation of a right, privilege, or

immunity secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.51 For

49 Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005).
50 Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm’n, 870 F.3d 294, 297
(3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir.
2014)).
51 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
individual actors, like Defendant Gantt, subjecting, or causing someone to be
subjected to an act, is usually referred to as “personal involvement.” It is well-

settled that liability under § 1983 is personal in nature, and that to be held
responsible an individual defendant in a § 1983 action must have personal
involvement in the alleged wrongdoing. One way of establishing personal

involvement at the pleading stage is through allegations that the defendant directly
participated in the alleged wrongdoing.
In some cases, plaintiffs allege that a supervisor is liable for constitutional
violations committed by that supervisor’s subordinates. This concept is sometimes

referred to as “supervisory liability.” Liability under § 1983, however, cannot be
predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”52 When addressing
supervisory liability in 2009, the United States Supreme Court wrote that, “[i]n a §

1983 suit . . . where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants—the term
‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government
official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own
misconduct.”53 Thus, to the extent the concept of supervisory liability survives in

§ 1983 cases after Iqbal, the scope of that liability is narrowly defined. As the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals has observed:

52 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
53 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.
“There are two theories of supervisory liability,” one under which
supervisors can be liable if they “established and maintained a policy,
practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm,”
and another under which they can be liable if they “participated in
violating plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the
person[s] in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in [their]
subordinates’ violations.”54
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege facts in
her complaint that demonstrate the supervisor’s personal involvement.55
Regarding the allegations of Defendant Gantt’s personal involvement in the
violation of Plaintiff’s personal privacy, Plaintiff’s suggests in her complaint that
Defendant Gantt was responsible for “policies and practices” that were the moving
force behind the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 23-26).
Plaintiff’s vague allegation that Defendant Gantt enforced policies and
allowed others to engage in practices that were the “moving force” behind the
violations of her rights are insufficient to show that Defendant Gantt was

personally involved in disclosing information to local media outlets or bringing
third parties to Plaintiff’s residence during home visits. To state a claim, a
complaint must include more than a recitation of the elements of a cause of action.

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding her “policy or practice” theory of liability are
limited to the elements to establish liability and do not include any factual basis

54 Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010)
(quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586
(3d Cir.2004)).
55 Jetter v. Beard, 183 F. App’x 178, 181 (3d Cir. 2006).
from which we could reasonably infer Defendant Gantt was involved in the
misconduct alleged. Plaintiff does not identify any actual policy or practice that led

to the alleged violation of her privacy. Accordingly, she has not adequately
pleaded Defendant Gantt’s personal involvement based on a “policy or practice”
theory for any of her claims. She similarly does not allege facts that suggest

Defendant Gantt directed her subordinates to engage in the conduct at issue or
knew and acquiesced in their actions.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendant Gantt regarding
the disclosure of Plaintiff’s personal information to media outlets, and bringing

third parties into Plaintiff’s home for inspections, will be dismissed because she
did not allege facts demonstrating Defendant Gantt’s personal involvement.
In one of her briefs, Plaintiff requests that she be granted an opportunity to

file an amended complaint. If a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state
a claim, “a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an
amendment would be inequitable or futile.”56 Given her vague allegations
concerning the nature of her privacy violation claims, we cannot say with certainty

that amendment of the constitutional claims brought against Defendant Gantt in her
individual capacity would be futile. Therefore, Plaintiff will be granted the
opportunity to amend these claims.

56 Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).
2. Plaintiff’s Claim That She Was Denied a Pre-Deprivation
Hearing
Defendant Gantt argues that Plaintiff fails to plead a plausible procedural
due process claim regarding the denial of a pre-deprivation hearing. (Doc. 25, pp.

9-10) (incorporating Doc. 11, pp. 6-8). In response, Plaintiff argues that she has
pleaded a plausible due process claim because she was not given a pre-deprivation
hearing. (Doc. 23, pp. 2-3, 4-5); (Doc. 29, p. 7).
Like her privacy claims, Plaintiff’s due process claim alleging the denial of a

pre-deprivation hearing is brought under § 1983. To state a § 1983 alleging the
denial of one’s right to procedural due process, “a plaintiff must allege that (1)
[s]he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the

Fourteenth Amendment's protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the
procedures available to [her] did not provide ‘due process of law.’”57 “The
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”58

The Third Circuit has recognized that there is a “fundamental liberty
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of
their child.” Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 373 (3d. Cir.
1999). However, “this liberty interest in familial integrity is limited by
the compelling governmental interest in the protection of children.”
Croft v. Westmoreland Cty. Children and Youth Servs., 103 F.3d
1123, 1125 (3d. 1997). “This interest, however, must be balanced
against the state’s interest in protecting children suspected of being

57 Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006).
58 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
abused.” Miller, 174 F.3d at 373 (3d. Cir. 1999). “The right to familial
integrity, in other words, does not include a right to remain free from
child abuse investigations.” Croft, 103 F.3d at 1125 (3d. 1997).59
As other courts have observed in the context of child abuse investigations,
“[d]ue Process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.”60 The Third Circuit has held that “[i]initiating child custody
proceedings by ex parte orders is generally constitutional if a prompt post-

deprivation hearing is held.”61 It has also held that a county’s failure to provide the
parents of a child with a pre-deprivation hearing before taking a child into
protective custody did not amount to a violation of procedural due process where a

post-deprivation hearing was held within 72-hours.62
Here, Plaintiff alleges that she was not given a pre-deprivation hearing
before Defendant Gantt ordered that her children be taken into protective custody.
She does not, however, allege sufficient facts for the Court to determine whether

her due process claim is plausible because she does not allege what, if any, post-
deprivation process she received. Therefore, she has failed to plead a procedural
due process claim upon which relief can be granted.

59 Smith v. Northampton Cty., No. CV 22-3788, 2023 WL 1767765, at *7
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2023).
60 Id. at *8 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
61 Dennis v. Dejong, 557 F. App’x 112, 117 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Miller,
174 F.3d at 372 n. 4).
62 Id.
Moreover, as Defendants argue, Defendant Gantt is immune from Plaintiff’s
individual capacity claim against her for damages arising out of this conduct. CYS

caseworkers like Defendant Gantt may be cloaked in two forms of immunity from
civil liability for damages claims: (1) absolute immunity; or (2) qualified
immunity.

“[P]ublic policy considerations supporting absolute immunity for
prosecutors are equally applicable to child welfare workers acting in a quasi-
prosecutorial capacity in dependency proceedings.”63 Because child welfare
workers exercise discretion in deciding whether to bring a child dependency

proceeding, their judgment would be compromised if the workers faced the threat
of personal liability for mistakes. 64
The Third Circuit has explained:

In the absence of absolute immunity, we would expect suits in
retaliation for the initiation of dependency proceedings to occur with
even greater frequency than suits against prosecutors. Parents
involved in seemingly unjustified dependency proceedings are likely
to be even more resentful of state interference in the usually
sacrosanct parent-child relationship than are defendants of criminal
prosecution. In turn, the likely frequency of such suits would result in
a significant diversion of the energies of child welfare workers away
from their official duties to the defense of § 1983 litigation. Further,
defending against § 1983 actions would likely be as difficult for child
welfare workers as it would be for prosecutors because child welfare
workers, like prosecutors, must make quick decisions on the basis of

63 Ernst v. Child and Youth Services of Chester Cty., 108 F.3d 486, 496 (3d
Cir. 1997).
64 Id.
limited information. Defending these decisions, often years after they
are made, could impose unique and intolerable burdens on child
welfare workers responsible annually for hundreds of dependency
and child abuse cases.65
This immunity, however, has limits. It does not insulate from liability all
actions taken by child welfare employees.66 To determine whether absolute
immunity applies, the Court must ascertain what conduct forms the basis of the
plaintiff’s causes of action, and then determine what function that act served and
the role the actor occupied when carrying it out. Id.

A CYS employee’s conduct may also be shielded by qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity shields officials from liability for civil damages brought
pursuant to section 1983 “so long as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.”67 To determine whether an official is entitled to the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity for a section 1983 claim, a court must determine (1)

65 Id. at 496-97 (cleaned up).
66 B.S. v. Somerset Cty., 704 F.3d 250, 270 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Ernst, 108
F.3d at 497 n.7) (“[W]e would be unwilling to accord absolute immunity to
investigating or administrative actions taken by child welfare workers outside the
context of a judicial proceeding.”).
67 Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Mullenix
v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)).
whether the official violated a constitutional right and, if so, (2) whether the right
was clearly established.68

The conduct that forms the basis of Plaintiff’s due process claim against
Defendant Gantt in her individual capacity is a direction she gave to unidentified
CYS staff members to remove Plaintiff’s children from her custody on May 14,

2023. Defendant Gantt’s role was as a child welfare worker, and her act of
directing subordinate employees to take Plaintiff’s children into protective custody
was based on the exercise of her judgment after receiving a report of potential
child abuse and neglect and prompted Defendant Gantt to initiate a dependency

proceeding. The exercise of this type of professional judgment by a CYS employee
is comparable to a criminal prosecutor’s decision to initiate a criminal proceeding.
Defendant Gantt’s conduct of directing her subordinates to take children into

protective custody following a report of potential abuse and neglect served a
function that was quasi-prosecutorial in nature and is an integral part of the judicial
process in a dependency proceeding. Thus, like a prosecutor who has absolute
immunity from damages claims arising out of the decision to initiate a criminal

prosecution, Defendant Gantt has absolute immunity from liability for Plaintiff’s
damages claim arising out of her decision to respond to a report of suspected abuse

68 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (permitting federal courts to exercise
discretion in deciding which of the two Saucier prongs should be addressed first).
or neglect by taking the children into protective custody and initiating a
dependency proceeding. Accordingly, even if this due process claim was plausible,

Plaintiff would not be able to seek damages from Defendant Gantt arising out of
this conduct because Defendant Gantt is absolutely immune.
As we discussed above, the Court is required to grant Plaintiff leave to

amend her civil rights claim unless amendment is inequitable or futile. Plaintiff
will be granted leave to amend her procedural due process claim seeking injunctive
or declaratory relief against Defendant Gantt in her individual capacity only.
Allowing amendment of Plaintiff’s damages claim against Defendant Gantt in her

individual capacity would be futile because Defendant Gantt is absolutely immune.
E. LEAVE TO AMEND, AND DEFENDANTS’ REQUESTS TO STRIKE
PARAGRAPHS 14 AND 16 OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
If a civil rights complaint, like the one Plaintiff filed in this case, is subject
to dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a district court must permit a curative
amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.”69 As we

have explained, amendment of several of the claims Plaintiff asserts in her
complaint would be futile.
For the reasons we explained in this memorandum opinion, Plaintiff will not

be given leave to amend the following claims: (1) her claim for relief under the
APA; (2) the § 1983 claims alleging denial of a pre-deprivation hearing and

69 Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245.
privacy violations brought against CYS; (3) the § 1983 claims alleging denial of a
pre-deprivation hearing and privacy violations brought against Defendant Gantt in

her official capacity; and (4) Plaintiff’s request for money damages against
Defendant Gantt in her individual capacity for the denial of a pre-deprivation
hearing.

Plaintiff may amend all other claims.
Regarding Defendants’ requests to strike paragraphs 14 and 16 of Plaintiff’s
complaint, because we have recommended dismissal of the original complaint their
request is now moot. Plaintiff, however, should exclude her allegations about

Defendants’ insurance coverage from her amended complaint.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it will be ordered that Plaintiff’s motion to strike (Doc. 31) be
denied, and that Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 10 and 24) be granted as

follows:
(1) The following claims will be dismissed with prejudice:
a. Plaintiff’s claim for relief under the APA;
b. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims alleging denial of a pre-deprivation
hearing and privacy violations brought against CYS;
c. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims alleging denial of a pre-deprivation
hearing and privacy violations brought against Defendant Gantt
in her official capacity; and
d. Plaintiff’s request for money damages against Defendant Gantt
in her individual capacity for the denial of a pre-deprivation
hearing.
(2) Plaintiff’s remaining claims will be dismissed without prejudice, and
with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint on or
before July 2, 2025. If no amended complaint is received by this
deadline, this case may be dismissed in its entirety and closed.
(3) Defendants’ requests to strike paragraphs 14 and 16 of Plaintiff’s
complaint will be denied as moot. However, Plaintiff is instructed to
exclude the allegations about Defendants’ insurance coverage from
her amended complaint.
Date: June 4, 2025 BY THE COURT
s/William I. Arbuckle
William I. Arbuckle
U.S. Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11065145. Public record. Not legal advice.