# Befaithful Coker v. Slyvester Warren, III

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · June 4, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11064759

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** June 4, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** NEW
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________

No. 23-11160
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________

BEFAITHFUL COKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SLYVESTER WARREN, III,
individually,
JUSTICE AND EQUALITY COALITION, INCORPORATED,
collectively,
CITY COUNCIL OF LAKE CITY FLORIDA,
individually and collectively,
JAKE HILL,
individually and in his official capacity,
EUGENE JEFFERSON,
individually and in his official capacity, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11160

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cv-00518-MMH-LLL
____________________

Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Befaithful Coker, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s dismissal of her civil suit that brought state and federal
claims against numerous defendants.1 Coker v. Warren, 660 F. Supp.
3d 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2023). On appeal, Coker contests several of the

1 We write only for the parties so, as to any issues that we do not mention

explicitly, we affirm without discussion. For reference, Coker’s third amended
complaint brought 11 Counts (Counts I through IX) against the following 24
defendants: (1) Sylvester Warren, III; (2) the Justice and Equality Coalition,
Inc; (3) Audrey Sikes, City Clerk of Lake City, Florida and Deputy Supervisor
of Elections for Columbia County; (4) the City Council of Lake City (“the City
Council”); (5) Christopher Todd Sampson; (6) Jake Hill; (7) Eugene Jefferson;
(8) Stephen Witt; (9) Fred Koberlein, Jr.; (10) Kris Bradshaw Robinson;
(11) Tomi Brown, Columbia County Supervisor of Elections; (12) Stephen
Douglas; (13) Joel Foreman, Attorney for Columbia County Board of County
Commissioners and for Columbia County Supervisor of Elections; (14) the
Columbia County Board of County Commissioners; (15) Ronald Williams;
(16) Northeast Florida Newspaper, LLC; (17) Todd Wilson; (18) the Lake City,
Columbia County Chamber of Commerce; (19) Steve Smith; (20) Glennel
Bowden; (21) Vanessa George; (22) Nathan Gambles, III; (23) David Fina,
Judge of the Third Circuit Court of Florida; and (24) the Florida Secretary of
State, Division of Elections.
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district court’s jurisdictional and substantive rulings, but she fails to
preserve challenges to several other rulings of the district court.
After careful review, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
We begin by summarizing the factual allegations of Coker’s
operative complaint. In doing so, we accept, as we must, “the com-
plaint’s allegations as true and construe them in the light most fa-
vorable to” Coker. Wainberg v. Mellichamp, 93 F.4th 1221, 1224 (11th
Cir. 2024).
Coker, a community activist and volunteer in Lake City,
Florida, made several “protected disclosures” and complaints to
government officials and to “state and federal agencies.” These dis-
closures concerned, among other matters, the “misuse of taxpayers
funds, abuses of power and political position, and threatening and
intimidating practices of members of the [Lake City] City Council”
and other defendants. For example, in January 2021, Coker made
a public disclosure to the City Council that councilmember Jake
Hill had committed “gross waste and abuse of duty” by advocating
for a lease negotiation that violated the municipal charter and that
represented a conflict of interest.
In later “public disclosures,” Coker claimed another coun-
cilmember, Fred Koberlein, Jr., had engaged in negotiations with
other defendants “without using established financial policies,”
leading to “a gross waste of funds,” also in violation of the munici-
pal charter. She also claimed that councilmembers Hill and Eugene
Jefferson “abused their office” by encouraging “the Third Circuit
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11160

Judicial Court not to prosecute” another defendant, Sylvester War-
ren, for pending charges in state court and for encouraging his early
release from federal probation. In June 2021, Coker made a “public
disclosure” to the City Council about “suspected criminal activity
by business owners” who were not in compliance with the munic-
ipal charter, including businesses owned by several defendants.
Another “public disclosure” stated that Koberlein failed to inform
the City Council about an “improperly called” special meeting held
to terminate a city manager and reinstate a terminated and ineligi-
ble Human Resources director, and she claimed the City Council
failed to follow its own hiring policies and practices. One “pro-
tected disclosure” notified various defendants that the City Council
“was placing members of the public” who had been convicted of
felonies “on public-funded boards” despite policies preventing peo-
ple convicted of felonies from serving in those roles. She also in-
formed defendants that members of the community were improp-
erly receiving taxpayer funds, and money was going to organiza-
tions where “convicted sex offenders” sat on the board.
Coker asserted that, in retaliation for her “protected disclo-
sures,” certain defendants defamed her at City Council meetings,
published libelous and defamatory statements about her on social
media, and encouraged threats to be made against her and her chil-
dren. Coker sought “safeguards” from various defendants and law
enforcement but received none.
Coker also alleged that the defendants retaliatorily con-
spired to deny her positions in city and local government. For
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example, she explained that, after Clerk Audry Sikes informed ad-
visory councilmember Bowden of a protected disclosure, Glennel
Bowden “publicize[d] on social media his commitment to use all
efforts to prevent” her from holding public office. Coker applied
to fill a vacancy on the Planning and Zoning Board in March 2020,
but her application was delayed. Then, the City Council denied
her application because she had been appointed, in October 2021,
to fill a vacancy on the City Council. Further, Coker contended
that various defendants blocked her from filling that seat on the
City Council, even though she was selected and eligible. After she
was denied the seat, Coker petitioned for mandamus in the Third
Circuit Judicial Court of Columbia County. Even though she had
been appointed, several defendants presented a resolution to pre-
vent her from being seated. Coker contended that, as a matter of
law, she was a member of the City Council, and the Council had
no authority to bar her from being seated. She asserted that the
actions of each member were inconsistent with the municipal char-
ter and the U.S. and Florida Constitutions.
Coker also alleged that several defendants prevented her
from attending future public meetings by intimidating and threat-
ening her. Even though the City Council had a decorum policy, it
allowed participants to “slander and defame” her at meetings while
those meetings were broadcast live over the internet. Other coun-
cilmembers listened and failed to act as defendants “hurl[ed]
threats” against her and her minor children. Coker identified sev-
eral false and malicious statements that caused her reputational
harm. For example, Coker alleged that councilman Sampson
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“maliciously” made false and reckless reports “that [Coker had]
caused a previous Georgia residence to be burned to relocate to
Florida,” in order to discourage voters from voting for Coker.
Coker’s operative complaint also included challenges to sev-
eral of the City Council’s procedures. First, she asserted that the
Council charged a qualification fee under Section 506 of the munic-
ipal charter, requiring any candidate who seeks to be a coun-
cilmember for District 14 to pay a fee of $1,065.85. Second, she
alleged that the City Council had “a practice of rezoning” that
moved a candidate from a district of incumbents which had “an
effect of reducing the representation of minorities and minority
women from holding public” office.
In Count IX, of particular relevance to our discussion here,
Coker alleged that the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1985 to prevent her from being seated on the City
Council. As part of this Count, Coker alleged the City Council tried
to secretly appoint Douglas to the vacant seat before Coker’s selec-
tion. Douglas sat on an advisory board of the Columbia County
Board of County Commissioners, which Foreman represented.
Sampson, Koberlein, and Sikes communicated about preventing
Coker from taking the vacant seat and Sikes then spread that com-
munication to Jefferson, Hill, and Witt. The City Council allowed
other defendants’ “public slander” at a November 1st City Council
meeting to be aired online. At the same meeting, the Chamber of
Commerce, represented by Smith, voiced its support for Douglas
to fill the vacant seat. After Coker sought a writ of mandamus to
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23-11160 Opinion of the Court 7

be seated on the City Council, the initially assigned judge—Judge
Jackson—entered an Order Nisi in Prohibition but then transferred
the case to Judge Fina who, Coker alleged, had a conflict of interest
in the case which he did not disclose. Judge Fina then failed to en-
force Judge Jackson’s order to seat her in her rightful position on
the City Council. Coker maintained that many defendants submit-
ted fraudulent and intentionally misleading filings in the case to de-
lay a decision and to cause her duress. She also contended that
Judge Fina’s rulings were improper and violated his duties.
Following the Council’s initial vote to seat Coker, Northeast
Florida Newspaper, LLC ran an article entitled “City council goes
with Coker.” After the Council chose not to grant Coker the seat,
the newspaper ran an article entitled “No seat for Coker either.”
Coker’s operative complaint also referenced an opinion piece in the
newspaper, written by Todd Wilson, which advised the City Coun-
cil not to seat Coker. Coker asserted that the articles had portrayed
her in a negative and false light to delay her appointment and cause
her embarrassment and humiliation.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Coker filed her initial complaint in May 2022. Shortly after
that, she filed an amended complaint. The district court struck
Coker’s amended complaint as an impermissible “shotgun plead-
ing.” Coker filed a second, and then third amended complaint—
the operative complaint—that sought damages, injunctive and de-
claratory relief, and a jury trial. All the defendants except for Doug-
las moved to dismiss the third amended complaint. Coker moved
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8 Opinion of the Court 23-11160

for default judgment against Douglas for failure to respond, and
she opposed the motions to dismiss. 2
The district court granted the motions to dismiss in a 46-
page order, for reasons we explain more below. See Coker, 660 F.
Supp. 3d at 1315-36. The court dismissed Counts VII and VIII, as
well as Coker’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, without
prejudice for lack of standing. It dismissed the claims for damages
in Counts II, V, VI, IX, and X for failure to state a claim and it dis-
missed the state-law claims in Counts I, III, IV, and XI without prej-
udice, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those
Counts. It also denied Coker’s motion for default judgment against
Douglas. Coker timely appealed.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We resolve jurisdictional issues before we address the merits
of the underlying claims, see Friends of the Everglades v. E.P.A.,
699 F.3d 1280, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2012), and we review subject-
matter jurisdiction questions de novo, Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206,
1209 (11th Cir. 2021). That said, “[w]e review the district court’s
decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of dis-
cretion.” Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 738

2 In her filings in opposition to the motions to dismiss, Coker included more

allegations that were not part of her operative complaint. The district court
declined to consider those allegations and did not err in doing so. See Michel v.
NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686, 705 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[A plaintiff] can-
not . . . use h[er] briefing to add new allegations and argue that those new as-
sertions support h[er] cause of action.”).
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(11th Cir. 2006). We review a district court’s dismissal of a com-
plaint for failure to state a claim de novo. Watts v. Joggers Run Prop.
Owners Ass’n, 133 F.4th 1032, 1038–39 (11th Cir. 2025). We also
review questions of law de novo. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Ham-
ilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006).
Additionally, “[w]e review the denial of a motion for a de-
fault judgment for abuse of discretion.” Mitchell v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2002). “De-
fault is to be used sparingly,” as we have a general preference that
cases be heard on the merits. Id. at 1316–17; Wahl v. McIver, 773
F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985).
In applying these principles, we hold pro se pleadings to a less
stringent standard and liberally construe them. Campbell v. Air Jam.,
Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). Even so, we will not
“serve as de facto counsel for a party” nor “rewrite an otherwise
deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Id. at 1168–69
(quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369
(11th Cir. 1998)).
IV. DISCUSSION
Coker appeals the district court’s dismissal of her complaint
for lack of standing, lack of jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim.
She also contends she was entitled to a jury trial and a default
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10 Opinion of the Court 23-11160

judgment as to Douglas. We review the court’s rulings on these
issues in turn below. 3
A. The District Court properly dismissed Counts VII and
VIII and Coker’s requests for Prospective Relief for lack of
Article III Standing
Read liberally, Coker’s brief challenges the district court’s
conclusion that she lacked standing to bring several of her claims.4
“[T]o enjoy standing to sue in a federal court[,]” Coker needed to
make three showings for each claim: “(i) that [s]he ‘suffered an in-
jury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent’;
(ii) that [the defendants] ‘likely caused’ h[er] injury; and (iii) that a
favorable judicial decision can likely redress h[er] injury.” Polelle v.

3 Coker has abandoned challenges to several of the district court’s rulings by

failing to challenge them on appeal. See Irwin v. Hawk, 40 F.3d 347, 347 n.1
(11th Cir. 1994); Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th
Cir. 2014). First, Coker does not address the district court’s dismissal of Count
II and Count V against the City Council, Hill, Sampson, Witt, Jefferson, Sikes,
and Koberlein. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681. Further, as to Count X and the por-
tion of Count IX brought against Judge Fina, the district court dismissed the
counts on multiple, independent grounds, thus, to reverse, Coker had to “con-
vince us that every stated ground for the judgment against h[er] [wa]s incor-
rect.” Id. at 680. Still, Coker has not challenged the district court’s conclusions
that Judge Fina was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and
was entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s dismissal of these portions of her suit.
4 Admittedly, Coker’s brief is not all that clear about this issue, but she is pro-

ceeding pro se, Campbell, 760 F.3d at 1168, and generally, “parties cannot waive
[or forfeit] subject matter jurisdiction.” Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 960
(11th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, we address the standing issues.
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Fla. Sec’y of State, 131 F.4th 1201, 1208 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021)). All three re-
quirements were necessary, and the failure to establish any of them
deprives a federal court of jurisdiction. See id. To be “particular-
ized,” an injury must be “‘individual and personal in nature’” rather
than a mere “generalized grievance[] that anybody could pursue.”
Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964)). Coker’s ar-
guments about standing implicate the district court’s dismissal of
Counts VII and VIII of her complaint, as well as her claims for pro-
spective (declaratory and injunctive) relief in each count.
First, as to Count VII, Coker alleged that the City Council,
Sikes, Brown, and the Florida Secretary of State violated the Voting
Rights Act (“VRA”), 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301, 10304, & 10308, by requir-
ing candidates for the City Council to pay a qualifying fee. She
contended that this fee limited the opportunities of minorities to
participate in the political process, and she requested monetary
damages and injunctive relief, presumably against the imposition
of the fee going forward. The district court held that Coker had
not asserted an injury in fact because she did not allege that she was
charged a qualifying fee, who charged her that fee, that she re-
quested a waiver of the fee, or that she planned to run for office
(and incur the fee) in the future. Rather, it concluded that Coker
complained of a generalized harm to all Black female candidates
and that the fee was not alleged to be related to any of the other
facts alleged in the amended complaint. Taking as true Coker’s
contentions in Count VII regarding the unlawfulness of the candi-
date fee—Coker did not allege that she was charged that fee or
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12 Opinion of the Court 23-11160

intended to participate as a candidate subjected to the fee, and she
therefore did not allege an injury “individual and personal in na-
ture.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561. Accordingly, we affirm on this
issue.
Second, in Count VIII, Coker alleged that the City Council
violated the VRA, 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301, 10304, and 10308, by rezon-
ing District 13 to reduce the voting power of minorities. She again
sought monetary damages and injunctive relief. The district court
held Coker did not assert an injury in fact because she failed to al-
lege that she was injured by the rezoning in 2013, either as a candi-
date or as a voter in that district. As with her allegations in
Count VII, Coker did not allege that she intended to participate as
a candidate or a voter affected by the 2013 rezoning and, therefore,
she also did not allege an injury “individual and personal in nature”
for Count VIII. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561. Thus, we affirm on this
issue as well.
Finally, in each of her other counts—Counts I through VII
and IX through XI—Coker sought injunctive and declaratory relief
in addition to monetary relief. The district court held Coker’s com-
plaint alleged harms that were “entirely in the past,” and therefore
insufficient to show standing for prospective relief. When a plain-
tiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief, she must show “a real and
immediate threat of a future harm.” Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199,
1207 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Food & Drug. Admin. v. All. for Hippo-
cratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024) (“And when a plaintiff seeks
prospective relief such as an injunction, the plaintiff must establish
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a sufficient likelihood of future injury.”). “[I]t follows that ‘[p]ast
exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or
controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by
any continuing, present adverse effects.’” Elend, 471 F.3d at 1207
(quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)).
Here, Coker’s amended complaint only addressed past
events and there were no allegations that she would be exposed to
the same illegal conduct again. Coker did not allege that she in-
tends to seek a seat on the City Council in the future or attend a
City Council meeting. Nor did she allege that she will be forced to
pay, as relevant to her VRA claims, any fees going forward or that
she would be a voter or candidate impacted by the current voting
maps. As the district court explained, the amended complaint does
not contain “facts showing that she is likely to have another en-
counter with any Defendant under the same or similar circum-
stances that gave rise to her past injuries.” Coker, 660 F. Supp. 3d
at 1326.
In sum, the district court did not err in dismissing, without
prejudice, Coker’s claims for prospective relief and her claims un-
der the Voting Rights Act. These portions of Coker’s operative
complaint did not establish that she had an “injury in fact” as op-
posed to “only a general legal, moral, ideological, or policy objec-
tion to” the defendants alleged actions. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602
U.S. at 381. Because Coker’s operative complaint did not establish
that she had standing in these respects, the court lacked jurisdiction
over them and properly dismissed them without prejudice. See
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14 Opinion of the Court 23-11160

Dupree v. Owens, 92 F.4th 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he jurisdic-
tional nature of the dismissal requires it to be entered without prej-
udice.”).
B. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in declin-
ing to exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction over Coker’s
state law claims in Counts I, III, IV, and XI
The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion over Coker’s state-law claims to serve judicial economy. It
explained that these aspects of Coker’s suit presented “uniquely
state[-]law claims that [were] best addressed by the state courts”
and it noted that, although the case had been pending for some
time, it remained in the motion to dismiss stage and the court had
not issued any dispositive rulings as to the state-law claims. On
appeal, Coker contends the district court should not have dismissed
these claims because they were connected to her federal claims,
and she makes arguments about the merits of these claims which
the district court did not reach.
“[T]he abuse of discretion standard allows ‘a range of choice
for the district court, so long as that choice does not constitute a
clear error of judgment.’” Rasbury v. IRS (In re Rasbury), 24 F.3d
159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732,
745 (11th Cir. 1989)); see Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1359 (11th
Cir. 1999) (“In making” a supplemental jurisdiction “determina-
tion, [a] judge should ‘take into account concerns of comity, judi-
cial economy, convenience, fairness, and the like.’” (quoting Roche
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 257 (1st Cir. 1996))).
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The relevant factors here weighed against exercising supplemental
jurisdiction, as the district court had dismissed all the claims over
which it had jurisdiction.5 Accordingly, the district court weighed
appropriate factors and reached an appropriate conclusion, so we
affirm. Parker, 468 F.3d at 738.
C. Coker Failed to State a Claim for Conspiracy in Count IX
Coker contends the district court erred in holding she failed
to state a Section 1985 claim for civil conspiracy in Count IX. Sec-
tion 1985 has three subsections—titled: “(1) Preventing officer
from performing duties[,]” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1), “(2) Obstructing
justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror[,]” id. § 1985(2), and
“(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges[,]” id. § 1985(3)—each
prohibiting conspiracies to interfere with civil rights. The district
court determined that Coker’s complaint failed to specify which
subsection of Section 1985 she intended to invoke and that, in any
event, her complaint failed to state a claim under any of the three
subsections. We agree, and we discuss each section in turn.
Section 1985(1) applies to “conspiracies that interfere with
the performance of official duties by federal officers.” Morast v.
Lance, 807 F.2d 926, 929 (11th Cir. 1987), overruled in part on other
grounds by Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 123–24 (1998); see also
Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724 (1983); 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1). The
district court concluded that Coker’s complaint did not state a

5 Moreover, as we explain, we affirm the district court’s resolution of Coker’s

federal claims, further supporting its supplemental jurisdiction ruling.
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16 Opinion of the Court 23-11160

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) for interference with a federal of-
fice because her complaint only discussed local office, not federal
office. See Morast, 807 F.2d at 929.
“Section 1985(2) applies only if the conspiracy attempted to
prevent [a] witness from attending or testifying in federal court.”
Id. at 930 (citing Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 348 (5th
Cir. 1981) (en banc), overruled in part on other grounds by Kush, 460
U.S. at 723). 6 Coker’s allegations did not present such a circum-
stance, and thus she did not state a claim under § 1985(2) either. Id.
To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege:
(1) a conspiracy, (2) for the purpose of depriving, ei-
ther directly or indirectly, any person or class of per-
sons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an
act in furtherance of the conspiracy, (4) whereby a
person is either injured in his person or property or
deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States.

Childree v. UAP/GA AG CHEM, Inc., 92 F.3d 1140, 1146–47 (11th Cir.
1996) (citing Lucero v. Operation Rescue, 954 F.2d 624, 627 (11th Cir.
1992)). “In the context of section 1985 conspiracy claims, ‘conclu-
sory, vague, and general allegations of conspiracy may justify

6 All Fifth Circuit decisions issued by the close of business on September 30,

1981, are binding precedent in this Court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d
1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). Kimble was issued in June 1981, so it is
binding in this Circuit.
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23-11160 Opinion of the Court 17

dismissal of a complaint.’” Wainberg, 93 F.4th at 1224 (quoting
Kearson v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 763 F.2d 405, 407 (11th Cir. 1985)).
A claim under § 1985(3) also requires “some racial, or perhaps oth-
erwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators’ action.” Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
“That animus standard requires that the defendant proceeded on
his course of conduct ‘because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group.’” Dean v. Warren, 12 F.4th 1248,
1255 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health
Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 272 (1993)).
Here, the district court properly concluded Coker had “not
alleged sufficient facts demonstrating a meeting of the minds be-
tween the alleged conspirators,” as necessary for a complaint under
Section 1985(3). Coker, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1329. Coker’s complaint
presented vague and general allegations of misconduct by many
different actors, and there were no facts alleged that tied each indi-
vidual defendant’s alleged misconduct to any overarching conspir-
acy. Kearson, 763 F.2d at 407. For example, Coker alleged the
Newspaper defendants—Northeast Florida Newspaper, LLC and
Wilson—published a story on the Lake City government and an
opinion piece that advocated for the Council to delay filling the va-
cancy. She did not allege they were instructed by or agreed with
anyone else to publish these articles. Instead, Coker’s complaint
contended that the articles “interfere[d] with [her] right to hold
public office” and that the Lake City Reporter “had no right” to
publish them. Robinson, one of the other defendants, is hardly
mentioned in the amended complaint, and those mentions did not
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18 Opinion of the Court 23-11160

identify any agreement between him and any of the other defend-
ants. See id. 7
Further, many of Coker’s other allegations are conclusory,
and “we need not accept legal conclusions, even when they are
‘couched as . . . factual allegation[s].’” Wainberg, 93 F.4th at 1224
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). For instance, at
the beginning of Count IX, Coker, quoting Section 1985(3), alleged
that all defendants “prevented her from performing duties . . . con-
spired to prevent, by force intimidation, or threat, . . . any person
from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence
under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof.”
These allegations were also insufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (“[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007))).
Notwithstanding these problems, Coker also failed to ade-
quately plead that the defendants acted with “invidious discrimina-
tory intent.” Coker, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1329. Specifically, the por-
tion of Coker’s complaint related to Count IX did not explain what
the motivation for the defendants’ alleged conspiracy was, and the
defendants were not alleged to have been engaged in the conspir-
acy because of any class-based animus rather than personal animus

7 We describe these defendants as examples only, and we conclude that the

allegations against the other parties fail for the same reasons.
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23-11160 Opinion of the Court 19

against Coker as an individual. Dean, 12 F.4th at 1255; Griffin,
403 U.S. at 102.
For these reasons, Coker’s operative complaint failed to
state a claim under any subsection of Section 1985, and we affirm
the district court’s dismissal of Count IX for that reason.
D. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Coker’s request for a Default Judgment
Next, Coker contends the district court erred in denying her
request for a default judgment against Douglas. Coker’s only claim
against Douglas was Count IX. The district court concluded that
Douglas was “similarly situated to” the other defendants with re-
gard to that Count and reasoned that it would be “appropriate” to
dismiss Count IX against Douglas as well even though he had not
appeared.
“Default is to be used sparingly,” Mitchell, 294 F.3d at 1316,
and our caselaw provides that “[a] District Court may properly on
its own motion dismiss an action as to defendants who have not
moved to dismiss where such defendants are in a position similar
to that of moving defendants or where claims against such defend-
ants are integrally related,” Loman Dev. Co. v. Daytona Hotel & Motel
Suppliers, Inc., 817 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting Silver-
ton v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981)). In
other words, our precedent allows for the exact sort of dismissal
that occurred here. Id. Moreover, the district court did not err in
concluding that Count IX failed to state a claim, as discussed above.
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20 Opinion of the Court 23-11160

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of her request for
a default judgment.
E. The District Court did not err in denying Coker a Jury Trial
Finally, Coker argues that she was entitled to a jury trial. See
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Yet, “there is no need to go forward with
a jury trial when the pertinent facts are obvious and indisputable
from the record; the only remaining truly debatable matters are le-
gal questions that a court is competent to address.” Garvie v. City
of Fort Walton Beach, 366 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir. 2004). As we
have explained, the district court properly dismissed Coker’s
claims—either for lack of standing, on supplemental jurisdiction
grounds, or for failure to state a claim—so it did not err in denying
Coker a jury trial. Id.
V. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we discern no reversible error by the dis-
trict court. We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11064759. Public record. Not legal advice.