# Newcomer v. Mountain

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · June 3, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11064394

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** June 3, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

BOSTYN NEWCOMER,
Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-cv-03286-JEH

BRANT MOUNTAIN,
Defendant.

Order
This matter is now before the Court on Defendant Brant Mountain’s Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Doc.
27). For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
I
On October 15, 2024, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendant Mountain, a correctional lieutenant at
Western Illinois Correctional Center, violated his Eighth Amendment rights by
using excessive force against him on May 29, 2024. (Docs. 1 and 20).
On May 6, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
arguing that judgment should be entered in his favor because Plaintiff’s claim is
barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Doc. 27). The Clerk issued a
Notice warning Plaintiff that if he failed to respond to Defendant’s Motion within
fourteen days, the Court may grant the motion and dismiss the case. (Doc. 28). To
date, Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant’s Motion or requested additional
time to do so.
II
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment
on the pleadings “after the pleadings are closed – but early enough not to delay
trial.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). Pleadings “include the complaint, the answer, and any
written instruments attached as exhibits.” Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coyle Mech.
Supply, Inc., 983 F.3d 307, 312-13 (7th Cir. 2020). A motion for judgment on the
pleadings is subject to the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and
is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Nat’l Fid. Life
Ins. Co. v. Karaganis, 811 F.2d 357, 358 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Republic Steel Corp. v.
Pennsylvania Eng’g Corp., 785 F.2d 174, 177 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1986)). To survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient facts, accepted as true, to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. Id. “A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be granted
only if the moving party clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains
to be resolved and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Nat’l
Fid. Life Ins. Co., 811 F.2d at 358 (citing Flora v. Home Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n, 685
F.2d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 1982)); Bannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 503 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir.
2007).
III
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant used excessive force
against him on May 29, 2024. (Doc. 1). An Adjustment Committee hearing was
held on June 6, 2024. Id. at p. 16. According to the Adjustment Committee hearing
summary, Plaintiff was found guilty of assaulting a staff member, intimidation or
threats, disobeying a direct order essential to safety and security, and insolence
and sentenced to three months of C-grade, two months of segregation, the
revocation of three months GCC or SCT, and six months contact visits restriction.
Id. at pp. 16-17.
In his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Defendant argues that
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), as a favorable
judgment on Plaintiff’s claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
disciplinary conviction. (Doc. 27).
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that, to challenge the validity of a
conviction or sentence in a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
sentence of conviction has been reversed or invalidated by another tribunal or
called into question by the issuance of a federal habeas corpus petition. Id. at 487;
see also Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d 409 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding that Heck’s favorable
termination requirement controls outcome whenever § 1983 claim implies
invalidity of conviction or sentence, regardless of availability of habeas relief). The
Supreme Court further held that “[a] claim for damages bearing that relationship
to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under
§ 1983.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Under Heck and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), a prisoner deprived
of good credit time in a disciplinary proceeding cannot bring a suit for damages
that would imply the invalidity of the disciplinary conviction and sanctions.
Whether the plaintiff asserts that his disciplinary conviction and sanctions are not
supported by evidence or that he was denied a procedural protection, he cannot
bring a suit for damages or declaratory relief unless “the conviction or sentence
has previously been invalidated.” Balisok, 520 U.S. at 643, 648. Heck applies even
when a plaintiff has been released from custody and can no longer utilize habeas
proceedings to invalidate the revocation. See Savory, 947 F.3d at 419-428.
As Heck instructs, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the disciplinary
conviction and related revocation of good time credits (GCC) has been vacated.
However, exhibits submitted with his Complaint and the docket in his case
pending before the state court in Brown County show that his disciplinary
conviction has not been vacated. Plaintiff attached a copy of a Writ of Certiorari as
an exhibit in support of his claim. (Doc. 1 at pp. 20-35). The Writ was filed in Brown
County on August 23, 2024, and was assigned Case No. 2024MR7. Id. The Writ
asked the State Court to “vacate the disciplinary decisions” against him and to
return him to “the position he was in before the disciplinary sanctions were
imposed.” Id. at p. 34. The Writ describes his claims against Defendant Mountain
regarding the events of May 29, 2024, and alleges officers used excessive force. Id.
at pp. 24, 27-28. The Brown County docket shows that the state court did not vacate
his parole revocation and has taken no action on the Writ. (Doc. 27-1; Docket for
Case No. 2024MR7). A district court may take judicial notice of matters of public
record when considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule
12(c). United States v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1582 (7th Cir. 1991).
The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to show his disciplinary violation was
vacated or that his good time credits were restored. As such, Plaintiff’s claims are
barred by Heck. Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendant’s Motion or present
any arguments or documentation to the contrary. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
(1) Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [27] is GRANTED.
Defendant Mountain is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff takes
nothing. Each party is to bear their own attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. The
Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close this case.

(2) Although Plaintiff's case has been dismissed, he remains responsible
for the remainder of the $350.00 filing fee. (10/15/2024).
(3) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of
appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P.
4(a)(4).

(4) If Plaintiff wishes to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, his motion
for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must identify the issues he will present on
appeal to assist the Court in determining whether the appeal is taken in good
faith. FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(c); Celske v. Edwards, 164 F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir.
1999) (an appellant should be given an opportunity to submit a statement of his
grounds for appealing so that the district judge "can make a responsible
assessment of the issue of good faith."); Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th
Cir. 2000) (providing that a good faith appeal is an appeal that "a reasonable
person could suppose . . . has some merit" from a legal perspective). If Plaintiff
chooses to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee regardless
of the outcome of the appeal.

It is so ordered.

Entered: June 3, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11064394. Public record. Not legal advice.