# Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County v. Bill Lee

> Court of Appeals of Tennessee · June 3, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11064149

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** June 3, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11064149

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that we should avoid a construction that frustrates the object of a statute
- applying the “strong” presumption to legislation that was not precipitated by a constitutional amendment
- noting that the legislature may “employ[] a belt and suspenders approach” to ensure that its purpose is achieved and that sometimes it is better to read a statute as including “some redundancy”

## Opinion text

06/03/2025
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
March 19, 2025 Session

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON
COUNTY ET AL. v. BILL LEE ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County
No. 23-0336-I, 23-0395-III Patricia Head Moskal, Chancellor
___________________________________

No. M2024-01182-COA-R3-CV
___________________________________

A three-judge panel was convened in this case to determine the constitutionality of 2023
Tennessee Public Chapter 21. While the case was pending, the trial court temporarily
stayed implementation of subsection 1(b) of the legislation, the result of which was that
the deadlines contained therein were rendered moot. In considering competing summary
judgment motions, the trial court unanimously ruled that subsection 1(a) of the act was not
also moot. In a divided decision, however, the trial court concluded that the legislation
violated two provisions of the Tennessee Constitution: the home rule amendment and a
clause exempting metropolitan governments from a twenty-five-member cap on county
legislative bodies. Both parties appeal. We affirm the trial court’s ruling that subsection
1(a) is not moot. We reverse, however, its conclusion that the statute is barred by either
constitutional provision at issue.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
in Part; Reversed in Part; and Remanded

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CARMA
DENNIS MCGEE, J., joined. KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., filed a separate dissenting opinion.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; J. Matthew Rice, Solicitor General; and
Philip Hammersley, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, for the appellants, Bill Lee,
Governor of the State of Tennessee; Tre Hargett, Tennessee Secretary of State; and Mark
Goins, Tennessee Coordinator of Elections.

Wallace W. Dietz, Allison L. Bussell, Melissa Roberge, John K. Whitaker, Robert E.
Cooper, Jr. and Wesley S. Love, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Metropolitan
Government of Nashville & Davidson Co.
David W. Garrison, Scott P. Tift, and John Spragens, for the appellees, Sandra Sepulveda,
Judy Cummings, Alma Sanford, Delishia Porterfield, Quin Evans Segall, Zulfat Suara,
Dave Goetz, and Davie Tucker.

OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 9, 2023, 2023 Tennessee Public Chapter 21 (“the Act”) was signed into
law. Pursuant to subsection 1(a) of the Act, “[n]otwithstanding a provision of a
metropolitan government charter or § 7-2-108 to the contrary, the membership of a
metropolitan council must not exceed twenty (20) voting members, as further provided in
this section.”1 In subsection 1(b), the Act further provided that

(1) If the membership of a metropolitan council is required to be reduced in
order to comply with subsection (a), then:

(A) The metropolitan council reduction takes effect as of the next general
metropolitan election after the effective date of this act. However, if the
metropolitan council fails to take the necessary legislative action to
effectuate this section prior to the qualifying date for the next general
metropolitan election after the effective date of this act as set by the county
election commission, then the terms of the current members of the
metropolitan council are extended for one (1) year and the county election
commission shall set a special general metropolitan election to be held the
first Thursday in August 2024 to elect the councilmembers for a term of three
(3) years with the terms to begin September 1, 2024. Thereafter, members of
the metropolitan council shall serve terms of four (4) years;
(B) Within thirty (30) days of the effective date of this act, the metropolitan
planning commission shall establish district boundaries using the most recent
federal census to ensure that a reapportionment maintains substantially equal
representation based on population and otherwise complies with the United
States and Tennessee constitutions and state and federal law;
(C) Upon approval of the council districts by the planning commission, the
metropolitan council as currently constituted shall approve the new council
district boundaries by resolution on or before May 1, 2023; and
(D) The metropolitan council shall take any legislative action required to
effectuate this section by resolution receiving an affirmative majority vote of

1
The Act was later codified as Tennessee Code Annotated sections 7-1-113, related to metropolitan
councils, and 6-53-104, relating to municipal councils. We will follow the lead of the parties and the trial
court, however, and cite to the Act throughout this Opinion.
-2-
those present and voting, regardless of any provision of a charter or private
act to the contrary.

2023 Tenn. Pub. Chapter 21 § 1(b).

The Act further provided that the cap on membership would apply to metropolitan
governments formed after the effective date of the Act and did not prohibit the metropolitan
government from either specifying in its charter the manner in which to hold a special
election to fill a vacancy on the council or, by a change to the metropolitan charter, reducing
its membership to fewer than twenty members in the future. Id. § 1(c)–(e). Section 2 of the
Act contained similar limitations on the membership of municipal governing bodies. See
generally id. § 2. Finally, section 3 of the Act provided that

If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is
held invalid, then the invalidity does not affect other provisions or
applications of the act that can be given effect without the invalid provision
or application, and to that end, the provisions of this act are severable.

Id. § 3. The Act became effective upon its enactment. Id. § 4.

Two separate lawsuits were filed in the Davidson County Chancery Court (“the trial
court”) in relation to the enactment of the Act against Respondent/Appellant the State of
Tennessee (“the State”). First, on March 13, 2023, the Metropolitan Government of
Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (“Metro Nashville”), filed a complaint seeking
a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief preventing the Act, which Metro Nashville
coined as the Metro Nashville Reduction Act, from being implemented. Therein, Metro
Nashville asserted that in forcing Metro Nashville to halve its current metropolitan council
(from forty members to twenty members) without local voter approval, the Act violated
the Local Legislation Clause of the Home Rule Amendment to the Tennessee Constitution,
which prohibits the Tennessee General Assembly from passing “local” or “special” laws
“applicable to a particular county or municipality.” Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 9. In support of
this argument, Metro Nashville noted that while two other counties had chosen to form a
consolidated metropolitan government, only Metro Nashville’s metropolitan council had
more than twenty members and therefore it would be the only government subject to a
reduction under the Act.

Metro Nashville further argued that the Act violated the Tennessee Constitution’s
Consolidation Clause, in that Metro Nashville was created pursuant to the Home Rule
Amendment and granted the power to determine its own structure of government via its
charter.2
2
The Home Rule Amendment is contained in Article 11, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution.
Generally, the Home Rule Amendment “vest[s] control of local affairs in local governments, or in the
people, to the maximum permissible extent.” Farris v. Blanton, 528 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tenn. 1975). This
-3-
Finally, Metro Nashville argued that the Act violated the Exemption Clause of the
Tennessee Constitution, which placed a twenty-five-member cap on the membership of
county legislative bodies but specifically exempted metropolitan governments from this
rule. Tenn. Const. art. VII, § 1.

On March 28, 2023, a group of eight Davidson County voters (“the Tucker
Plaintiffs”) filed a similar complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in Tucker et al.
v. Lee, No. 23-0395-111. A three-judge panel was assigned to hear these matters based on
the constitutional challenge to the Act,3 and the two complaints were eventually
consolidated.

On April 10, 2023, the trial court issued a unanimous opinion ruling that Metro
Nashville was likely to prevail on its constitutional challenge to subsection 1(b) of the Act
under the Local Legislation Clause and that a temporary injunction against implementation
of subsection 1(b) should be entered. The trial court ruled, however, that Metro Nashville
was unlikely to prevail on its constitutional challenges to subsection 1(a).4 Metro Nashville
therefore was not required to comply with the council-reduction provision contained in
subsection 1(b) during the August 2023 local election.5

Following that election, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The
State argued that the case should be dismissed because the Act was not unconstitutional.
Moreover, the State asserted that any challenge to subsection 1(b) was moot as the
deadlines contained in that subsection had passed. In its motion, Metro Nashville conceded
that its challenge to subsection 1(b) was moot but argued that subsections 1(a) and 1(b)
were inextricably linked, such that neither subsection now carried the force of law. Metro
Nashville also argued that subsection 1(a) of the Act was unconstitutional. The Tucker
Plaintiffs joined in Metro Nashville’s arguments.

On July 29, 2024, the trial court issued an order granting in part and denying in part
the competing motions. First, the trial court ruled that it would confine its review to only
subsections 1(a) and 1(b) of the Act, as other provisions of the Act were “not applicable to
or challenged in this action.” The trial court then unanimously held that the claims
challenging subsection 1(b) of the Act were moot, as the parties had conceded. But the trial
court further ruled that the mootness of subsection 1(b) did not render subsection 1(a) moot
at well. The trial court then ruled that subsection 1(a) did not violate the Consolidation
Clause. But two members of the three-judge panel concluded that subsection 1(a) of the

argument was not raised in the appeal, so we need not tax the length of this Opinion with a discussion
thereof.
3
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-18-101.
4
The trial court’s decision as to the Exemption Clause was unanimous; Chancellor Patricia Head
Moskal dissented as to the Local Legislation Clause ruling.
5
The forty members of the Metro Nashville council were therefore elected to four-year terms that
will expire in September 2027.
-4-
Act was unconstitutional as it violated both the Local Legislation Clause and the
Exemption Clause.6 The trial court concluded, however, that subsection 1(a) of the Act
could be elided from the remaining portions of the Act, leaving subsections 1(c), 1(d), 1(e),
and section 2 of the Act intact. So the trial court permanently enjoined enforcement of only
subsection 1(a) of the Act. Judge Joseph T. Howell dissented in part, however, and
concluded that the Act violated neither the Local Legislation Clause nor the Exemption
Clause, such that the Act—save the moot subsection 1(b)—should be enforced in its
entirety.7 The State thereafter promptly appealed to this Court.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

The State raises two issues in this appeal, which are taken and slightly restated from
its brief:

1. Whether the trial court erred by holding that § 1(a) violates the Exemption
Clause, which is set forth in Tennessee Constitution article VII, § 1.
2. Whether the trial court erred by holding that § 1(a) violates the Local Legislation
Clause, which is set forth in Tennessee Constitution article XI, § 9.
In the posture of appellee, Metro Nashville argues that the undisputed mootness of
subsection 1(b) of the Act also renders subsection 1(a) moot.8

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. We review a trial court’s decision on a motion
for summary judgment de novo with no presumption of correctness. Lemon v. Williamson
Cnty. Sch., 618 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tenn. 2021) (citing Tatham v. Bridgestone Ams. Holding,
Inc., 473 S.W.3d 734, 748 (Tenn. 2015)).

Likewise, we determine the constitutionality of a statute de novo with no
presumption of correctness afforded to the trial court’s legal conclusions. Hughes v. Tenn.
Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 514 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tenn. 2017). “Generally, whether a claim is
moot involves a question of law that this Court will [also] review de novo.” Huggins v.

6
The trial court also ruled that the Tucker Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue some of their claims.
The trial court’s ruling on standing has not been challenged in this appeal.
7
Judge Howell was assigned to the panel in March 2024, after then-panel member the Honorable
Mary L. Wagner was confirmed to the Tennessee Supreme Court.
8
The Tucker Plaintiffs filed a separate brief in this Court, but merely incorporated the arguments
raised by Metro Nashville. Thus, for brevity, we will refer solely to the argument of Metro Nashville in this
appeal.
-5-
McKee, 500 S.W.3d 360, 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016).

IV. ANALYSIS

A.

At its most fundamental level, this case represents a power struggle between State
government and local government. The Tennessee General Assembly, the legislative
branch of the State of Tennessee, generally wields considerable power, limited by the other
co-equal branches and constitutional requirements. Cf., e.g., Bowling v. Carnahan, 171
Tenn. 26, 100 S.W.2d 232, 235 (1937); S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001). In contrast, local governments, like Metro
Nashville, “derive the whole of their authority solely from the General Assembly[.]” S.
Constructors, Inc., 58 S.W.3d at 710. Thus, “Article II, section 3 of our Constitution
confers upon the General Assembly the whole of the state’s legislative power, and with
limited exception, the General Assembly has the sole and plenary authority to determine
whether, and under what circumstances, portions of that power should be delegated to local
governments.” Id. at 711 (internal citation omitted). As a result, “without some form of
constitutional authorization, local governments in Tennessee possess only those powers
and authority as the General Assembly has deemed appropriate to confer upon them.” Id.
at 711–12.

An amendment to the Tennessee Constitution in 1953 altered this power dynamic.
Importantly, the Constitution was amended to allow “municipal governments to adopt and
operate under home rule authority[.]” Id. at 714 (citing Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 9). “The
effect of the home rule amendments was to fundamentally change the relationship between
the General Assembly and these types of municipalities, because such entities now derive
their power from sources other than the prerogative of the legislature.” Id.9

Within this amendment, Tennessee also permitted counties to form consolidated
metropolitan governments. See generally Frazer v. Carr, 210 Tenn. 565, 569, 360 S.W.2d
449, 451 (Tenn. 1962). Specifically, Article 11, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution
states that:

The General Assembly may provide for the consolidation of any or all of the
governmental and corporate functions now or hereafter vested in municipal
corporations with the governmental and corporate functions now or hereafter
vested in the counties in which such municipal corporations are located;
provided, such consolidations shall not become effective until submitted to
the qualified voters residing within the municipal corporation and in the
county outside thereof, and approved by a majority of those voting within the

9
The Home Rule Amendment is discussed in more detail, infra.
-6-
municipal corporation and by a majority of those voting in the county outside
the municipal corporation.

Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 9, cl. 9. This amendment, however, was “not self-executing” and
needed to be implemented via legislative enactments. Frazer, 360 S.W.2d at 451. The
General Assembly therefore enacted a statute to effectuate the amendment, which permits
each county in this state to consolidate “all, or substantially all, of their governmental and
corporate functions” with the municipal corporations within the county, resulting in “the
creation and establishment of a new metropolitan government to perform all, or
substantially all, of the governmental and corporate functions previously performed by the
county and by the municipal corporations, the voters of which approve the consolidation.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-1-103(a).

Under the consolidated metropolitan form of government, the legislative body is
referred to as the metropolitan council and wields “all the authority and functions of the
governing bodies of the county and cities being consolidated, with such exceptions and
with such additional authority as may be specified elsewhere in chapters 1-6 of this title[.]”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-2-108(a)(11). The metropolitan charter shall also determine “the size,
method of election, qualification for holding office, method of removal, term of office and
procedures of the metropolitan council, with such other provisions with respect to the
council as are normally related to the organization, powers and duties of governing bodies
in cities and counties[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-2-108(a)(12).

Metro Nashville formed a consolidated metropolitan government pursuant to this
authority in 1962. Under Metro Nashville’s charter, its metropolitan council totals forty
voting members, thirty-five from geographic districts and five at-large members.

Section 1 of the Act at issue, however, seeks to limit the size of consolidated
metropolitan councils to no more than twenty voting members. There appears to be no
dispute that the General Assembly had the power to limit the size of metropolitan councils
unless prohibited by the Tennessee Constitution. See generally Cnty. of Shelby v.
McWherter, 936 S.W.2d 923, 933–34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (“There is no constitutional
provision that prohibits the Legislature from enacting laws which in some form or fashion
are contrary to a local law set forth in a county’s home rule charter. To the contrary, there
is ample authority for the proposition that when the Legislature acts through general
legislation, the Legislature retains power over a county, despite the county’s home rule
status, and this is true even with respect to functions that are governmental or political in
nature.”); Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 9, cl. 5 (“[N]o charter provision except with respect to
compensation of municipal personnel shall be effective if inconsistent with any general act
of the General Assembly”). To that end, Metro Nashville argues in this appeal, and a
divided panel of the trial court ruled, that subsection 1(a) of the Act is prohibited by two
separate provisions of the Tennessee Constitution—the Local Legislation Clause of the

-7-
Home Rule Amendment and the Exemption Clause.10 The State, of course, argues that
neither the Local Legislation Cause nor the Exemption Clause prohibit the General
Assembly’s proper exercise of power through the Act.

Before we reach those constitutional provisions, however, Metro Nashville asserts
that any enforcement of subsection 1(a) of the Act has been rendered moot by the
undisputed mootness of subsection 1(b). Questions of justiciability such as mootness are
often threshold issues. Northshore Corridor Ass’n v. Knox Cnty., 633 S.W.3d 561, 571
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2021) (citing City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 96 (Tenn.
2013)). Moreover, this Court has a duty to avoid deciding constitutional issues if the case
can be decided on non-constitutional grounds. Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn.
1995). So we consider Metro Nashville’s mootness argument first.

B.

Mootness is a judge-made doctrine of judicial restraint:

Tennessee courts follow self-imposed rules of judicial restraint so that
they stay within their province “to decide, not advise, and to settle rights, not
to give abstract opinions.” Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Family Purpose LLC
v. Putnam Co., 301 S.W.3d 196, 203 (Tenn. 2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The mootness doctrine is one such rule: a “case must remain
justiciable (remain a legal controversy) from the time it is filed until the
moment of final appellate disposition.” Id. at 203–04. A moot case or issue
is one that has lost its justiciability for some reason occurring after
commencement of the case. Id. at 204. A case, or an issue in a case, becomes
moot when the parties no longer have a continuing, real, live, and substantial
interest in the outcome. Id. at 210.

Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409, 417 (Tenn. 2014). This rule applies in particular to
constitutional questions, as “[t]he long and well established rule in this State is that the
Court ‘will not decide a moot question, though it be the question of constitutionality of a
statute.’” Id. (quoting Tenn. Negro Funeral Dirs. Ass’n v. Bd. of Funeral Dirs. &
Embalmers of Tenn., 206 Tenn. 141, 332 S.W.2d 195, 197 (1960)).

“The central question in a mootness inquiry is whether changes in the circumstances
existing at the beginning of the litigation have forestalled the need for meaningful relief.”
McIntyre v. Traughber, 884 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). When a case is
rendered moot while an appeal is pending, it “should [be] dismiss[ed,]” unless an exception

10
As previously discussed, Metro Nashville also asserted that the Act violated the Consolidation
Clause in the trial court. The trial court, however, unanimously ruled that it did not. That ruling has not
been appealed, but the Consolidation Clause is mentioned in other arguments set forth by Metro Nashville.
-8-
is present. Hooker, 437 S.W.3d at 433 (quoting Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Fam. Purpose
LLC, 301 S.W.3d at 210).

Still, we “do not apply the mootness doctrine mechanically.” Norma Faye Pyles
Lynch Fam. Purpose LLC, 301 S.W.3d at 204. The Tennessee Supreme Court has
therefore recognized that even where a case has become moot, “a court should consider
whether to exercise its discretion to apply one of the recognized exceptions to the mootness
doctrine.” Hooker, 437 S.W.3d at 417. These exceptions are as follows:

(1) when the issue is of great public importance or affects the administration
of justice;
(2) when the challenged conduct is capable of repetition and is of such short
duration that it will evade judicial review;
(3) when the primary subject of the dispute has become moot but collateral
consequences to one of the parties remain; and
(4) when the defendant voluntarily stops engaging in the conduct.

Id. at 417–18 (quoting Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Fam. Purpose LLC, 301 S.W.3d at 204).
Thus, the first question this Court must answer is whether implementation of subsection
1(a) has been rendered moot by the undisputed mootness of subsection 1(b). If we conclude
that subsection 1(a) is moot, then we must proceed to consider whether a recognized
exception to the mootness doctrine should be applied in this Court’s discretion.

Metro Nashville’s mootness argument rests largely on the language of the Act and
the purported necessity of subsection 1(b) to the implementation of subsection 1(a).
Specifically, Metro Nashville points out that the State concedes, as it must, that while
implementation of the Act was stayed by the trial court, the deadlines for action contained
in subsection 1(b) passed and Metro Nashville simply cannot comply with those deadlines.
Metro Nashville further argues that the cap on metropolitan council membership in
subsection 1(a) is “qualifie[d]” by the language that the cap is to be effected “as further
provided in this section[,]” i.e., in subsection 1(b). According to Metro Nashville, this
language indicates the Tennessee General Assembly’s intent that the two subsections work
in concert to effect the Act’s purpose. In other words, Metro Nashville argues that the Act
should be interpreted in such a way that the validity of subsection 1(a) is conditioned on
the effectiveness of subsection 1(b), given the “as further provided” language. And given
that Metro Nashville cannot comply with subsection 1(b), it argues that the Act imposes
no ongoing obligation to reduce the size of its metropolitan council membership. Thus,
Metro Nashville argues that the undisputed ineffectiveness of subsection 1(b) is also fatal
to enforcement of subsection 1(a).

The State disagrees with Metro Nashville’s reading of the Act. Rather, the State
argues that subsection 1(a) imposes ongoing legal obligations on all metropolitan
governments in the state and that it operates independently of subsection 1(b). As for the
-9-
“as further provided” language, the State argues that this language merely clarifies the
details about how subsection 1(a) operates, in that after-formed metropolitan governments
must comply with the twenty-member cap and all metropolitan councils are permitted
under the Act to have less than twenty members. As for subsection 1(b), the State argues
that it is only a transitional provision that does not affect the validity of the remaining
portions of the Act.

It appears that Metro Nashville posits a fairly novel argument. Indeed, neither party
cites any caselaw from this state or elsewhere in which a court was tasked with determining
whether the mootness of one subsection of an act, and in particular mootness due to the
passage of time while the statute was enjoined, should alone necessitate invalidation of
other portions of the act.11 In the trial court, the State likened this question to an issue of
elision, which applies “where the valid portion of the statute is not so dependent upon the
portion said to be void that the Court cannot presume that the Legislature would not have
enacted the valid portion in the absence of the inclusion within the enactment of that portion
which is said to be void.” Davidson Cnty. v. Elrod, 191 Tenn. 109, 111–12, 232 S.W.2d 1,
2 (1950). The trial court rejected this argument, however, concluding that because
subsection 1(b) was not declared unconstitutional, elision did not apply.12 See Willeford v.
Klepper, 597 S.W.3d 454, 470 (Tenn. 2020) (“Under the doctrine of elision, a court may,
under appropriate circumstances and in keeping with the expressed intent of a legislative
body, elide an unconstitutional portion of a statute and find the remaining provisions to
be constitutional and effective.” (emphasis added) (quoting Lowe’s Cos., Inc. v. Cardwell,
813 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tenn. 1991))). But see Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-110 (“It is hereby
declared that the sections, clauses, sentences and parts of the Tennessee Code are severable,
are not matters of mutual essential inducement, and any of them shall be exscinded if the
code would otherwise be unconstitutional or ineffective. If any one (1) or more sections,
clauses, sentences or parts shall for any reason be questioned in any court, and shall be
adjudged unconstitutional or invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate

11
To the extent that Metro Nashville asserts that County of Shelby v. McWherter stands for this
proposition, we disagree. In that case, the plaintiffs raised several challenges to the constitutionality of a
law affecting school boards. 936 S.W.2d at 925. We declined to consider an argument that a transitional
provision of the challenged act was unconstitutional, as the passing of the deadlines contained in the
provision rendered that challenge moot. Id. at 931–32. As the State points out, the fact that one subsection
of the challenged act containing certain provisional directives was moot did not prevent this Court from
considering the remaining constitutional challenges to the act. See id. at 932–36. Thus, this case actually
suggests that the mootness of one provision of an act due to an injunction preventing certain deadlines from
being met does not result in the invalidation of the act as a whole. But it does not appear that this argument
was raised in County of Shelby v. McWherter, so there is some question as to its precedential value in this
case. See Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 550 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (“It is axiomatic that judicial
decisions do not stand for propositions that were neither raised by the parties nor actually addressed by the
court.” (citing Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Serv., Inc., 210 Tenn. 384, 390, 358 S.W.2d 471, 473
(Tenn. 1962))).
12
As previously discussed, the trial court nevertheless unanimously concluded that subsection 1(a)
was not moot.
- 10 -
the remaining provisions thereof, but shall be confined in its operation to the specific
provision or provisions so held unconstitutional or invalid, and the inapplicability or
invalidity of any section, clause, sentence or part in any one (1) or more instances shall not
be taken to affect or prejudice in any way its applicability or validity in any other instance.”
(emphasis added)). The State appears to have abandoned any argument in favor of elision
in this appeal.

Given that Metro Nashville’s argument focuses on the language of the Act, we apply
our familiar rules of statutory construction to this issue. As the Tennessee Supreme Court
has previously explained in this context:

The cardinal canon of statutory construction requires the courts to
ascertain and to carry out the General Assembly’s intent. A statute’s intent is
reflected in the statute’s words, and, therefore, we must focus initially on the
words of the statute. When the words of the statute are clear and
unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute, but rather, we must
simply enforce the statute as it is written.

Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Fam. Purpose LLC, 301 S.W.3d at 213 (citations omitted).
Moreover, we must consider the whole text of the statute and the overall statutory
framework, ensuring that we “interpret each word ‘so that no part will be inoperative,
superfluous, void or insignificant.’” State v. Deberry, 651 S.W.3d 918, 925 (Tenn. 2022)
(quoting Bailey v. Blount Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 303 S.W.3d 216, 228 (Tenn. 2010)). In other
words, “[i]n interpreting statutes, . . . we are required to construe them as a whole, read
them in conjunction with their surrounding parts, and view them consistently with the
legislative purpose.” Coffman v. Armstrong Int’l, Inc., 615 S.W.3d 888, 897 (Tenn. 2021)
(quoting Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 889, 897 (Tenn. 2011)). Like the other
issues in this case, statutory construction is an issue of law that is amenable to summary
judgment. Metro. Dev. & Hous. Agency v. Trinity Marine Nashville, Inc., 40 S.W.3d 73,
76 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

In essence, Metro Nashville contends that to treat the “as further provided in this
section” language in subsection 1(a) as if it does not exist violates statutory principles. And
based on the plain language of the Act, subsection 1(b) is “the sole implementation
mechanism” by which existing metropolitan councils with too many members may reduce
their membership. So then, the mootness of subsection 1(b) renders subsection 1(a) moot,
in turn.

We note, however, that statutes must also be construed “with the saving grace of
common sense.” State ex rel. Maner v. Leech, 588 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Tenn. 1979). Thus,
“a construction which impairs, frustrates or defeats the object of a statute should be
avoided[.]” Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank v. McCanless, 186 Tenn. 1, 207 S.W.2d 1007
(Tenn. 1948)). Moreover, while “we presume that every word in a statute has meaning and
- 11 -
purpose and should be given full effect,” this rule applies only “if the obvious intention of
the General Assembly is not violated by so doing” Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263
S.W.3d 827, 836 (Tenn. 2008) (citing In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tenn. 2005)).

The obvious intention of the Tennessee General Assembly in enacting section 1 as
a whole was to place a cap on the membership of metropolitan councils that applies to both
existing councils and future councils.13 Cf. Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Family Purpose
LLC, 301 S.W.3d at 213 (stating that our primary goal in statutory construction is to “carry
out the General Assembly’s intent”). Our legislature also clearly and unequivocally
expressed its intent that invalid portions of the Act could be severed from valid portions.
See 2023 Tenn. Pub. Chapter 21 § 3 (providing that if any provision of the Act was “held
invalid” the invalid portion could be severed so long as the other provisions could be given
effect without the invalid portion).14 The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that “[t]he
inclusion of a severability clause” in an act is “evidence [of] an intent on the part of the
legislature to have the valid parts of the statute in force” despite the invalidity of other
portions of the statute. Gibson Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. v. Palmer, 691 S.W.2d 544, 551
(Tenn. 1985) (involving unconstitutionality). Thus, while the doctrine of elision may not
be strictly applicable here,15 the severability clause itself is evidence of the Tennessee
General Assembly’s intent that subsection 1(a)’s validity was not purposefully and
compulsorily qualified or conditioned on the validity of subsection 1(b) or any other
subsection.

Moreover, the plain language of the Act does not lead us to conclude that subsection
1(b) is necessary to either the operation of subsection 1(a) or to carry out the intent of the
legislature. Cf. generally Frost v. City of Chattanooga, 488 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Tenn. 1972)
(“The general rule is that, . . . ‘where a clause is so interwoven with other portions of an
act as that we cannot suppose that the legislature would have passed the act with that clause
omitted, then if such clause is declared void, it renders the whole act null.’” (quoting Hobbs
v. Lawrence Cnty., 193 Tenn. 608, 615, 247 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tenn. 1952))). As an initial
matter, Metro Nashville offers no legal authority mandating that the Tennessee General
Assembly adopt specific provisions directing Metro Nashville in how to implement the
Act’s twenty-member cap.16 Cf. Civ. Serv. Merit Bd. v. Burson, 816 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn.
13
Although in this appeal Metro Nashville focuses on the unconstitutionality of subsection 1(a)
alone, we do not consider statutory language in a vacuum but with reference to all of its component parts.
See In re Est. of Davis, 308 S.W.3d 832, 839 (Tenn. 2010) (“Rules of construction establish that statutory
language cannot be considered in a vacuum, but ‘should be construed, if practicable, so that its component
parts are consistent and reasonable.’” (quoting Marsh v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 42, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196
(Tenn. 1968))).
14
The term “invalid” is not defined by the Act. Generally, the term means that something is “[n]ot
legally binding[.]” Invalid, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
15
Given the State’s choice to abandon its reliance on elision, we express no opinion as to whether
the doctrine is applicable when a portion of a statute has been rendered moot.
16
Metro Nashville instead argues that whether the Tennessee General Assembly could have passed
the Act without subsection 1(b) is irrelevant because they did pass the Act with the inclusion of subsection
- 12 -
1991) (involving a general law that altered the qualifications of members of civil service
merit boards without including specific guidance as to how Knox County, the only county
required to make changes to comply with the act, was to meet this aim, other than
specifying that the legislation did not abridge the term of any incumbent member of the
board but would apply upon a vacancy).17 While it may be true that the Tennessee General
Assembly intended subsection 1(b) to be the sole implementation mechanism applicable to
Metro Nashville when that subsection was of legal effect, there is no language in the Act
to suggest that should subsection 1(b) become invalid, the aims of the statute should also
die or that existing metropolitan governments could not take other appropriate action to
meet that aim going forward. Cf. State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118, 162 (Tenn. Crim. App.
2016) (“As near as one body can reason the collective minds of another body, we believe
the legislature would choose the survival of subsection (c) and the remaining provisions of
Section 40-35-121 as opposed to the death of the entire statute.”). Thus, even though Metro
Nashville is not bound by the specific deadlines imposed by subsection 1(b), nothing
appears to prevent it from nevertheless meeting the overarching aims of subsection 1(a)
going forward.18

Still, we concede that the “as further provided in this section” language points to the
General Assembly’s intent that an existing metropolitan government with a council
membership exceeding twenty voting members would comply with subsection 1(b) in
order to effectuate that goal. But that is not the only provision that was “further provided”
in section 1 of the Act. Subsections 1(c), 1(d), and 1(e) all provide guidance as to how the
overarching rule imposed by subsection 1(a) is to be implemented on an ongoing basis. See
2023 Tenn. Pub. Chapter 21 § 1(c) (involving how the cap would apply to newly formed
metropolitan governments), (d) (permitting the metropolitan government to specify in its
charter how vacancies would be filled), (e) (permitting metropolitan governments to make
future changes to the size of their councils so long as membership does not exceed twenty
members). Reading these subsections as providing specific and clarifying guidance as to
how subsection 1(a)’s general rule is to be implemented does not render any part of the Act
surplusage, but is instead the most reasonable reading of the Act as a whole to further the
intent of the legislature. Cf. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian, 590 U.S. 1, 14 n.5 140 S. Ct.
1335, 1350, 206 L. Ed. 2d 516 (2020) (noting that the legislature may “employ[] a belt and
suspenders approach” to ensure that its purpose is achieved and that sometimes it is better
to read a statute as including “some redundancy”) (citation omitted). Thus, it does not
appear that subsection 1(b)’s guidance was so integral to the functioning of subsection 1(a)
or section 1 as a whole that subsection 1(a) cannot survive its mootness.

Finally, there is perhaps even more reason to uphold the remaining portions of the

1(b).
17
Burson is discussed in detail, infra.
18
The specifics of how Metro Nashville chooses to accomplish those aims are not within the scope
of this appeal.
- 13 -
Act in this case than in the context of a partially unconstitutional statute. While the
unconstitutionality of a legislative act may result from the good faith, yet mistaken belief
in the legislation’s validity by our General Assembly, the mootness of subsection 1(b)
results solely from the injunction put in place by the trial court.19 It would certainly frustrate
the intent of the legislature to hold that an entire act, or at least a large portion thereof,
could be invalidated solely because a discrete portion of the legislation was rendered
ineffective by a challenge to the act making its way through our courts, regardless of the
success of that challenge on its merits. See State ex rel. Maner, 588 S.W.2d at 540 (noting
that we should avoid a construction that frustrates the object of a statute). Rather, it is our
conclusion that the Tennessee General Assembly did not intend for a construction of the
Act that would defeat its very object and which would result in the death of the statutory
scheme as it applied to existing metropolitan governments simply because litigation meant
certain deadlines for jurisdictions to make the changes necessary under the Act could not
be complied with. Id. So we conclude that while subsection 1(b) is undisputedly moot,
subsection 1(a) should not be construed as being conditioned or qualified by that provision.
As a result, subsection 1(a) continues to carry the force of law unless prohibited by one of
the constitutional provisions raised by Metro Nashville. We therefore proceed to address
those questions.

C.

The State next argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the Act violated what
the parties refer to as the Exemption Clause of the Tennessee Constitution. In evaluating
this issue, we begin with the presumption that the acts passed by our legislature are
constitutional. See Willeford, 597 S.W.3d at 465 (“In evaluating the constitutionality of a
statute, we begin with the presumption that an act of the General Assembly is
constitutional.” (quoting Gallaher v. Elam, 104 S.W.3d 455, 459 (Tenn. 2003))).
Consequently, we “indulge every presumption and resolve every doubt in favor of the
statute’s constitutionality.” Gallaher, 104 S.W.3d at 459 (quoting State v. Taylor, 70
S.W.3d 717, 721 (Tenn. 2002)).

Article VII, section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution provides certain requirements
applicable to local legislative bodies. In particular, the second paragraph of section 1 states
as follows:

19
Hypothetically, if subsection 1(b) was not moot and a court were to conclude that this section
was unconstitutional, it is arguable that the purportedly unconstitutional provision could be elided from the
Act. See generally Willeford, 597 S.W.3d at 471 (“[T]he legislature’s endorsement of elision does not
automatically make it applicable to every situation; however, when a conclusion can be reached that the
legislature would have enacted the act in question with the unconstitutional portion omitted, then elision of
the unconstitutional portion is appropriate.” (quoting In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 189 (Tenn. 1999))).
Therefore, it is somewhat nonsensical to suggest that an arguably unconstitutional provision that is not in
effect will be more fatal to the legislature’s intended purpose than an arguably unconstitutional provision
that is in effect.
- 14 -
The legislative body shall be composed of representatives from districts in
the county as drawn by the county legislative body pursuant to statutes
enacted by the General Assembly. Districts shall be reapportioned at least
every ten years based upon the most recent federal census. The legislative
body shall not exceed twenty-five members, and no more than three
representatives shall be elected from a district.

Tenn. Const. art. VII, § 1, cl. 2. The clause further provides, however, that “[a]ny county
organized under the consolidated government provisions of Article XI, Section 9, of this
Constitution shall be exempt from having a county executive and a county legislative body
as described in this paragraph.” Id.

There is no dispute that Metro Nashville is organized under the consolidated
government provisions referred to above. As a result, the trial court ruled that the Act was
an unconstitutional attempt to avoid the application of the Exemption Clause, noting that
the General Assembly could not “accomplish by statute that which is expressly prohibited
under the [Tennessee] Constitution.”

On appeal, the State argues that the trial court misconstrued the Exemption Clause
as prohibiting the General Assembly’s valid exercise of power through the Act. While the
State concedes that the twenty-five-member cap contained in Article VII, section 1 does
not apply to Metro Nashville or any other consolidated metropolitan government, the State
asserts that nothing in that provision restricts the legislature from imposing such a statutory
cap on metropolitan council membership.

Metro Nashville concedes in its brief that, despite the trial court’s apparent
conclusion to the contrary, “the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit the General
Assembly from altering legislative body size for metropolitan governments.” But Metro
Nashville contends that the inquiry is not ended by this fact. Rather, it asserts that the
language of Article VII, section 1 should be read to “exempt[] consolidated city/county
governments from any limit on the size of their legislative bodies[.]” (Emphasis added).

In construing a constitutional provision, “we begin by reading the plain language
and giving terms ‘their ordinary and inherent meaning.’” McNabb v. Harrison, -- S.W.3d
--, 2025 WL 730065, at *3 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 2025) (quoting State v. Phillips, 159 Tenn. 546,
21 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tenn. 1929)). We therefore “construe a constitutional provision as it is
written” and “[w]hen a constitutional provision has a clear meaning[,]” we do not apply
another meaning or create an ambiguity. Id. (citations omitted). Finally, when the
Constitution is silent as to an issue within the legislature’s purview, it has been held that
the subject is left to the sound discretion of the legislature. See Caruthers v. Andrews, 42
Tenn. 378, 381 (Tenn. 1865) (“The constitution of 1796 was silent upon the subject of
interest, leaving that subject to the sound discretion of the legislature. In other words, there
- 15 -
was no constitutional inhibition upon the legislature, upon the subject of interest.”); see
also McFarland v. Pemberton, 530 S.W.3d 76, 86 (Tenn. 2017) (“It is well settled that the
power of the Legislature, except as restrained by the Constitution, is supreme . . . in the
creation of subordinate governmental agencies, and in prescribing their powers and duties.”
(quoting Waldauer v. Britton, 172 Tenn. 649, 113 S.W.2d 1178, 1181 (1938))).

Here, the plain language at issue does two things. First, it mandates that legislative
bodies meet certain requirements, including that the legislative body’s membership not
exceed twenty-five members. Then, it states that counties organized under a metropolitan
government are exempt from the restrictions contained “in this paragraph.” Nothing in this
language, however, indicates that other restrictions that derive outside of “this paragraph”
are prohibited. Nor does the plain language of this paragraph in any way circumscribe the
power of the General Assembly to legislate the membership of metropolitan councils.

A somewhat similar argument was rejected by the Tennessee Supreme Court in
Bailey v. County of Shelby, 188 S.W.3d 539, 544 (Tenn. 2006). In Bailey, current members
of the Shelby County Board of Commissions challenged term limits adopted in the Shelby
County Charter under Article VII, section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution. On appeal, the
plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that Article VII, section 1 should be construed “as establishing
terms of four years with no limit.” Id. at 544 (citing Tenn. Const. art. VII, § 1, cl. 1 (“The
qualified voters of each county shall elect for terms of four years a legislative body, a
county executive, a Sheriff, a Trustee, a Register, a County Clerk and an Assessor of
Property.”)).

The Tennessee Supreme Court disagreed with this reading of the Tennessee
Constitution:

Although it is true that Article VII states that county officials shall be elected
for “terms of four years,” we do not construe this phrase to mean that such
officials must be capable of being elected to more than one term. Rather, the
phrase “terms of four years” merely refers to the duration of each term. There
is nothing in the language of the constitution to prevent a county from placing
a limit on the number of terms that may be served.

Id. at 544–45.

Metro Nashville advances essentially the same argument that the plaintiffs in Bailey
employed. It asks this Court to read Article VII, section 1 so expansively that not only are
metropolitan governments exempt from the explicit twenty-five-member cap contained in
that paragraph, but also the legislature is prohibited from exercising its power to impose
any such cap on a metropolitan government. But there is simply “nothing in the language
of the constitution to prevent” the Tennessee General Assembly from imposing its own
limit on the voting membership of a metropolitan council. Id. Given that we must “indulge
- 16 -
every presumption and resolve every doubt in favor of the statute’s constitutionality,” we
cannot condone interpreting the Tennessee Constitution’s silence such that the legislature’s
power is curtailed in this manner. Gallaher, 104 S.W.3d at 459; see also Waldauer, 113
S.W.2d at 1181. We therefore conclude that the limitation on membership imposed by
section 1 of the Act does not violate Article VII, section 1’s Exemption Clause.

D.

Finally, we turn to consider whether subsection 1(a) of the Act violates the Local
Legislation Clause of the Home Rule Amendment to the Tennessee Constitution. This
clause provides as follows:

[A]ny act of the General Assembly private or local in form or effect
applicable to a particular county or municipality either in its governmental
or its proprietary capacity shall be void and of no effect unless the act by its
terms either requires the approval by a two-thirds vote of the local legislative
body of the municipality or county, or requires approval in an election by a
majority of those voting in said election in the municipality or county
affected.

Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 9, cl. 2. The intent of the Local Legislation Clause was “to strengthen
local self-government.” Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. v. Tenn. Dep’t of
Educ., 645 S.W.3d 141, 149 (Tenn. 2022) (citation omitted). Indeed, “[t]he whole purpose
of the Home Rule Amendment was to vest control of local affairs in local governments.”
S. Constructors, Inc., 58 S.W.3d at 714 (quoting Burson, 816 S.W.2d at 729).

In determining whether the Local Legislation Clause is implicated in a particular
situation, three requirements must be met: “1) the statute in question must be local in form
or effect; 2) it must be applicable to a particular county or municipality; and 3) it must be
applicable to the particular county or municipality in either its governmental or proprietary
capacity.” Metro. Gov’t, 645 S.W.3d at 150. If the legislation implicates the Local
Legislation Clause but does not require approval by a majority of the county or
municipality’s local legislative body or voters, it is unconstitutional and void. See id. In
this appeal, the question of whether the statute in question is local in form or effect is
dispositive. We therefore confine our analysis to that question.

While the phrase “private or local in form or effect” is not defined by the Tennessee
Constitution, courts have understood the term in the negative—that is, it does not constitute
a general law. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. v. Tennessee Dep’t of Educ.,
No. M2020-00683-COA-R9-CV, 2020 WL 5807636, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29,
2020), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 645 S.W.3d 141 (Tenn. 2022).20 And

20
The Tennessee Supreme Court held that a different element required to demonstrate the
- 17 -
a general law is “one ‘neither for one or more particular persons, nor to operate exclusively
in particular part or parts of a state.’” Id. (quoting Nashville Gas & Heating Co. v. City of
Nashville, 152 S.W.2d 229, 234 (Tenn. 1941)). In order to determine whether a law is
general, the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained,

The test is not the outward, visible or facial indices, nor the
designation, description or nomenclature employed by the Legislature. Such
a criterion would emasculate the purpose of the amendment. The whole
purpose of the Home Rule Amendment was to vest control of local affairs in
local governments, or in the people, to the maximum permissible extent. The
sole constitutional test must be whether the legislative enactment,
irrespective of its form, is local in effect and application.

Farris v. Blanton, 528 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tenn. 1975). In applying this test, we are directed
to “determine whether th[e] legislation was designed to apply to any other county in
Tennessee, for if it is potentially applicable throughout the state it is not local in effect even
though at the time of its passage it might have applied to [a single county] only.” Id. at 552.
“But in determining potential applicability we must apply reasonable, rational and
pragmatic rules as opposed to theoretical, illusory or merely possible considerations.” Id.

Here, there is no dispute that three counties have formed metropolitan governments:
Nashville and Davidson County, Lynchburg and Moore County, and Hartsville and
Trousdale County. There is also no dispute that only Metro Nashville’s metropolitan
council exceeds the new twenty-member cap. Based on these undisputed facts, a majority
of the trial court panel concluded that the Act was local in nature, explaining

Only Metro is required to make any changes as the size of the legislative
bodies of the other two is 20 or less. . . . The potential that Section 1(a) could
apply theoretically to Lynchburg-Moore County or Hartsville-Trousdale
County sometime in the future in the event they were to propose amendments
to their charters to increase the size of their legislative bodies to more than
twenty (with the design to run afoul of Section 1(a)) and such charter
amendments were approved by local voters, seems speculative and illusory,
and not a reasonable or rational application of Section 1(a). . . . Section 1(a)
is not a statute of statewide application; indeed, its application to a lone
county is the clearest possible example of local in effect.

The State argues that the trial court was incorrect in its conclusion as to the
applicability of subsection 1(a). Rather, the State argues that subsection 1(a), considered
as a whole, applies to all governments that currently or potentially could adopt a

applicability of the Local Legislation Clause was lacking. Metro. Gov’t, 645 S.W.3d at 151–54. So the
court limited its analysis to only that element. Id. at 150.
- 18 -
metropolitan form of government, with subsection 1(b) adding transitional provisions to
help Metro Nashville accomplish the purpose of the Act.

In support of this argument, the parties focus on a series of cases involving the Local
Legislation Clause. The first, Farris v. Blanton, involved legislation providing for run-off
elections in counties with a mayor as the head of the county government. 528 S.W.2d at
550. Members of the Shelby County Quarterly Court filed a declaratory judgment action,
asserting that the legislation violated the Local Legislation Clause of the Home Rule
Amendment. Id. at 550–51. The trial court, however, ruled that the act was constitutional.
Id. at 551.

On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court first noted that ninety-three counties had
the conventional form of county government headed by a County Judge or Chairman,
Davidson County had formed a consolidated government, and only Shelby County vested
the executive and administrative powers of the county in a county mayor. Id. at 552. As a
result,

Shelby County stands unique among the counties in Tennessee. It, and it
alone, has a county mayor. No other county may have such a form of
government except by the affirmative action of the General Assembly. There
is no general enabling act under which any other county may opt to so
operate. Thus, [the subject legislation] relates to Shelby County alone.

Id.

The proponents of the run-off election legislation nevertheless argued that the act
could also apply to the mayor of a metropolitan government. Id. at 552. But the court
determined that a consolidated metropolitan government “stands on entirely different
footing.” Id. While the challenged legislation applied to “elections for mayor in a county
with a mayor as head of the executive or administrative branch,” a metropolitan mayor is
not “a county mayor,” but instead “the chief executive officer of a consolidated entity[.]”
Id. at 551–53. The court therefore held that “it is a fallacy to attempt to equate the County
Mayor of Shelby County with” the mayor of a consolidated metropolitan government. Id.
at 553. Our supreme court also rejected the argument that the law was not local in effect
because it was generally applicable to all counties “which now or hereafter have a mayor
as head of the executive or administrative branch.” Id. at 555. It noted that no other county
could form such a government structure without an act of the Tennessee General Assembly,
emphasizing that “the run-off law applies solely to Shelby County under the present laws
of the State of Tennessee. We cannot conjecture what the law may be in the future.” Id. So
the court held that the subject legislation was local in effect and void under the Local
Legislation Clause. Id. at 556.

The Tennessee Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Civil Service Merit
- 19 -
Board of the City of Knoxville v. Burson. In Burson, members of the City of Knoxville’s
civil service merit board challenged the enactment of a statute that would “make uniform
the qualifications and procedures for the nomination of members serving on the municipal
civil service boards in Tennessee’s most populous counties.” 816 S.W.2d at 727.
Specifically, the challenged legislation applied only to the civil service boards in counties
with populations greater than 300,000 but excluded municipalities with a mayor-alderman
form of government. Id. at 728.

Current members of the civil service merit board argued that this legislation violated
the Local Legislation Clause. Id. The trial court denied the challenge, ruling that the law
applied to civil service merit boards in both Davidson and Shelby Counties, as well as
“boards of municipalities located in counties that may grow to meet the act’s population
requirements[.]” Id.

In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Tennessee Supreme Court first noted
that “[n]ot every statute that affects a single county will automatically be found to be
unconstitutional[.]” Id. at 729. Indeed, the court noted that prior legislation was upheld as
constitutional even where it applied only to Davidson County, as the single county that had
formed a metropolitan government at that time. Id. (citing, e.g., Doyle v. Metro. Gov’t, 225
Tenn. 496, 471 S.W.2d 371 (Tenn. 1971)). The court distinguished those cases from Farris
in that the law permitting counties to form metropolitan governments was still in existence,
whereas no counties could elect a mayor at the time of Farris without action by the
Tennessee General Assembly. Id. (citing Farris, 528 S.W.2d at 554–55).

Applying this to the legislation at issue, the Burson court concluded that because,
in effect, the legislation applied to three counties who met both the population and mayor-
alderman requirements, it did not constitute local legislation. Id. at 730. Importantly, the
court noted that even though only one of these three counties would be required to take
affirmative action to comply with the law, this fact did not alter its conclusion:

It is true in this case that because existing civil service commissions in
Davidson County and Shelby County are already in compliance with the
provisions of [the challenged legislation], only the Knoxville board will be
required to take affirmative steps to comply with the statute. On the other
hand, civil service commissions in the other two counties are certainly
affected by the statute, because they will have to maintain compliance with
[it] in the future.

Id. Moreover, population changes could result in additional counties “eventually
becom[ing] subject to the provisions of [the challenged act].” Id. Thus, the court held that
the subject law was not local in effect and therefore did not require local approval to
withstand constitutional scrutiny. See also Bd. of Educ. of Shelby Cnty. v. Memphis City
Bd. of Educ., 911 F. Supp. 2d 631, 656 (W.D. Tenn. 2012) (citing Burson and holding that
- 20 -
the Local Legislation Clause “does not require that legislation apply to ‘every part of’ or
‘everywhere’ in Tennessee”).

The State contends that Burson is controlling and mandates that we reverse the
decision of the trial court. Like the legislation in Burson, the Act applies to three counties
that have adopted metropolitan governments, as well as any future counties that adopt such
a form of government. Moreover, just like in Burson, only a single county, Davidson, will
be required to take affirmative steps to alter the membership of its metropolitan council, as
the other two counties are already in compliance with the Act. Still, those counties will be
required to maintain their compliance in the future. So then, the State asserts that this Court
should follow the precedent set in Burson and hold that the Act does not violate the Local
Legislation Clause.

Metro Nashville contends, however, that Burson does not control here. Rather,
Metro Nashville contends that while the legislation in Burson applied uniformly to all three
applicable counties, that is not the case under the Act. Instead, Metro Nashville asserts, it
alone is subject to unique and unreasonable provisions forcing it to reduce its metropolitan
council on an expedited timeline and by specific measures, i.e., pursuant to subsection 1(b).

In response, the State points out that the only way that Metro Nashville attempts to
demonstrate that it is treated any differently under the Act is by pointing to subsection 1(b).
But as Metro Nashville so forcefully emphasizes, subsection 1(b)’s mandates are moot and
therefore no longer impose any requirements on Metro Nashville.

Moreover, the State asserts that even if subsection 1(b) should be considered in
determining whether the Act violates the Local Legislation Clause, subsection 1(b)’s
requirements are nothing more than “transitional provisions” that have previously
withstood Local Legislation Clause scrutiny. In support of this argument, the State cites
State ex rel. Maner v. Leech, 588 S.W.2d 534 (Tenn. 1979). In Maner, the Tennessee
Constitution was amended to rework the general framework for county government. But
the constitutional provisions were not self-executing. Id. at 537. The Tennessee General
Assembly “responded with a carefully considered and comprehensive plan of
implementation[.]” Id. at 538. The newly enacted legislation provided both “the specifics
of the new basic structure for county government” and “an orderly method of transition.”
Id.

In its effort toward this second goal, the legislature adopted transitional provisions
applicable only to Knox County, which “very properly balanced the existing situation in
Knox County against the demands for interim adherence to an ultimate standard set by the
legislature to provide a constitutional and basic form of government.” Id. at 539. In relevant
part, these transitional provisions provided that if Knox County did not form a consolidated

- 21 -
metropolitan form of government or other type of government by January 1, 1980,21 then
a county executive and county legislative body would be elected at the August 1980
election. Id. at 540.

The plaintiffs filed suit, arguing that the special provisions applicable to Knox
County violated the Local Legislation Clause. Id. at 536. The trial court agreed, but the
Tennessee Supreme Court reversed. Given the statute’s stated purpose of “assur[ing]
orderly election of county officers, minimum disruption . . . and continuity of county
government[,]” and the upheaval that would have been caused to Knoxville without any
transitional provisions, the court held that the Tennessee General Assembly “acted
responsibly and on a reasoned and rational basis in providing a hiatus in the implementation
of” the new form of government to Knox County alone. Id. at 540–41. The court thus
concluded that “[h]ere we deal with a general law of statewide application, containing
transitory provisions necessitated because of unique conditions in certain specified
counties.” Id. at 541. So the Tennessee Supreme Court held that these transitional
provisions withstood scrutiny under the Local Legislation Clause. Id.

According to the State, Maner demonstrates that the inclusion of specific provisions
necessary for a single county to adjust to new legislation does not transform an otherwise
law of general application into local legislation. But Metro Nashville argues that Maner
and other similar cases involving transitional provisions are distinguishable from this case
because the laws at issue were enacted in order to execute a constitutional amendment. See
also Marion Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Marion Cnty., 594 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tenn. 1980)
(upholding a law that contained specific provisions to “bring Marion County into
synchronization with the general statutory scheme” required by an amendment to the
Tennessee Constitution); Leech v. Wayne Cnty., 588 S.W.2d 270, 274 (Tenn. 1979)
(holding that a law exempting two counties from a law of general application based on a
narrow population bracket could not “be justified as a transitional part of a general
restructuring scheme”). Metro Nashville therefore asserts that the flexibility that the
Tennessee Supreme Court employed in Maner is inapplicable to a case involving a
legislative enactment that was not made necessary by a constitutional amendment.

In resolving this dispute, we remember that it is our duty “to resolve every
reasonable doubt in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment[.]” Maner, 588
S.W.2d at 536. Moreover, we look to the effect of section 1 of the Act in a pragmatic
manner, rather than dealing in hypotheticals. Farris, 528 S.W.2d at 552. Applying these
principles, we must conclude that the inclusion of subsection 1(b)’s now-moot transitional
provisions does not render subsection 1(a) a local law violative of the Local Legislation
Clause.

21
A vote to determine whether Knox County would form a metropolitan government was pending
at the time of the enactment of the legislation at issue in Maner. Id. at 539–40.
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While it is true that Tennessee courts’ previous consideration of transitional
provisions under the Local Legislation Clause has involved legislative enactments required
to effectuate constitutional amendments, nothing in those cases states that their analysis is
confined to only that type of legislation. Rather, the cases apply roughly the same Local
Legislation Clause analysis that was employed in Burson. Indeed, the presumption in favor
of the constitutionality of our statutes applies with equal force regardless of whether
legislation was enacted to execute a constitutional amendment or otherwise. See, e.g.,
McWherter, 936 S.W.2d at 936 (applying the “strong” presumption to legislation that was
not precipitated by a constitutional amendment); Maner, 588 S.W.2d at 536 (applying the
presumption to legislation required to effectuate a constitutional amendment). Moreover,
courts in both situations based their conclusions not on the catalyst of the legislature’s
enactment of the subject provisions, but on the fact that the laws were generally applicable
and only necessitated transitional provisions due to the special circumstances present in
certain counties. See, e.g., Burson, 816 S.W.2d at 729–30; Maner, 588 S.W.2d at 540–41.

The same is true in this case. Here, of the three counties currently governed by a
consolidated metropolitan form of government, only Davidson County’s metropolitan
council has a membership that exceeds the new statutory cap. Thus, in order to bring
Davidson County “into synchronization with the statutory scheme,” the Tennessee General
Assembly enacted subsection 1(b). Marion Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 594 S.W.2d at 683. But
these transitional provisions simply do not transform subsection 1(a) of the Act from what
it clearly is: a law of general application applicable to all counties that have formed a
consolidated metropolitan government or will do so in the future.

Moreover, there is even less risk here that subsection 1(b)’s transitional provisions
have altered the fundamental nature of section 1 from a law of general application to a law
local in effect. As repeatedly pointed out by both parties in this case, subsection 1(b) is
moot and the State has correctly conceded that it cannot be enforced. Thus, in reality, Metro
Nashville has already succeeded in invalidating what it deems the expedited and
unreasonable timeline imposed by subsection 1(b). So Metro Nashville’s insistence that we
invalidate subsection 1(a) of the Act due to the purported locality of subsection 1(b) alone
is an argument divorced from the reality that subsection 1(b) is of no legal effect and
therefore places no ongoing special or unique burdens on Metro Nashville. Cf. Farris, 528
S.W.2d at 552.

In reaching this conclusion, we note that a different panel of this Court recently
came to the opposite conclusion regarding another statute enacted by the Tennessee
General Assembly in 2023. Specifically, in Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County v. Governor Bill Lee et al., Metro Nashville argued, inter alia, that a
statute vacating the existing boards of airport authorities and appointing new commissions
to staggered terms ending in 2028 targeted Metro Nashville alone. No. M2023-01678-
COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL 1218089, at *1–2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2025). The new law
applied if three conditions were met: (1) the county had a metropolitan form of
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government; (2) the county had a population exceeding 500,000 based on the 2020 federal
census or a subsequent federal census; and (3) the county had established a metropolitan
airport authority. Id. at *8 (citing 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 488, § 2(1)(A)). The only
Tennessee county to meet all three requirements was Metro Nashville. A three-judge panel
therefore concluded that the law established “a closed class of counties” that could only
apply to Davidson County. Id. at *9–10. As a result, the trial court declared the subject law
local in effect and therefore in violation of the Local Legislation Clause. Id. at *4.

This Court affirmed the decision of the trial court that the law was local in effect.
Id. at *10. As the Court explained,

Although the original Metropolitan Airport Authority Act was
enacted in 1969, only four counties have established metropolitan airport
authorities since that time. Assessing the likelihood or immediacy of other
counties doing so would be clear speculation. In addition, although there will
likely be population growth in other counties, a new federal census will not
be released until 2030 at the earliest. Given the timeframes set forth in section
two of the Act for expiration of the new board members’ initial terms, the
only other county that could meet the population threshold within those
timeframes was Shelby. No other county in Tennessee could possibly comply
with the population requirement until 2030. Most importantly, of the counties
meeting the first two requirements, Davidson County is the only county with
a metropolitan form of government. No evidence was presented that Shelby
County had impending plans to adopt such a form of government.
Accordingly, the layering of the statute’s applicability requirements renders
the possibility that the Act could apply to any other county theoretical at best.
We therefore conclude that the trial court correctly determined section two
of the Act to be local legislation.

Id.

The facts in the above case are readily distinguishable from the present action. In
that case, the law contained “layer[ed]” applicability requirements that meant that
application beyond Metro Nashville was not only not imminently feasible, but also unlikely
to potentially arise in the future. Here, other than the transitional provisions that are
undisputedly moot and of no effect, section 1 of the Act clearly applies to all counties that
have formed or will form a consolidated metropolitan government. And even subsection
1(a) alone applies to all three existing metropolitan governments regardless of the fact that
only one of those governments will have to take affirmative action to bring itself into
compliance with the Act. See Burson, 816 S.W.2d at 730. Thus, the “class created” by
section 1 of the Act, is not “so narrowly designed that only one county can reasonably,
rationally, and pragmatically be expected to fall within that class[.]” Metro. Gov’t, 2025
WL 1218089 at *9 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Shelby Cnty., 911 F. Supp. 2d at 656). We
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therefore reverse the decision of the trial court that subsection 1(a) of the Act is local in
effect and therefore void in violation of the Local Legislation Clause of the Home Rule
Amendment.

V. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Davidson County Chancery Court is affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The permanent injunction against enforcement of subsection 1(a) of 2023
Tennessee Public Chapter 21 is dissolved, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for
all further proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with this Opinion. Costs of this
appeal are taxed to Appellees, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson
County, Tennessee, Davie Tucker, Delishia Porterfield, Judy Cummings, Dave Goetz,
Alma Sanford, Quin Evans Segall, Sandra Sepulvada, and Zulfat Suara, for which
execution may issue, if necessary.

S/ J. Steven Stafford
J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11064149. Public record. Not legal advice.